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Editorial: Continuities and challenges

One of the first steps that Durkheim took when attempting to establish sociology as a science and institutionalize it as an academic discipline was to found a journal, *L'Année sociologique*, in 1897. As an academic and political initiative, or as the mythic origin of sociology, periodicals played a fundamental role in constructing knowledge in our field – a necessarily united construction, one based on dialogue, and a collective project happily wrought with tension and conflict. *Current Sociology* is part of this tradition to promote dialogue and consolidate the field of sociology in a dynamic that fully acknowledges the limits of the discipline. At the same time, it is a publication that seeks to surpass these obstacles, encouraging the readings of other areas that allow us to critically rethink our postulates.

Current Sociology was born from this interest to consolidate the debates within the International Sociological Association. Relaunched in 1997 under the direction of Susan McDaniel, the journal sought to adapt to the demands of new times while remaining a vehicle for dialogue among sociologists from different parts of the world.

In this issue, I begin my work as the *Current Sociology* editor. I have the privilege of continuing – and the challenge of trying to further – the work done by Dennis Smith, the previous editor, over the past eight years. Dennis took this post in 2002 and continued Susan's pioneering efforts, providing a fresh outlook on the new academic demands. Under his editorship the journal was accepted for ISI listing and has already achieved a very respectable ranking. In addition, thanks to his capacity to read the implicit sociological agendas that were formulated in the works submitted for publication, Dennis's editorship helped to create a space in which those works and agendas could be subject to critical debate. This was done, in part, by organizing dialogues in *Current Sociology*, allowing authors and critics to engage with one another on topics such as globalization, climate change, public sociology and qualitative methodology, to cite some of the recent themes.

Current Sociology has always received submissions in the official languages of the ISA: English, French and Spanish. And, thanks to an initiative by the former Publications Committee headed by Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, it currently accepts submissions in practically every language. By taking into account the current ISA membership, which extends to countries all around the world, Devorah sought to facilitate publication for scholars who find it difficult to write in English, and who often have to spend a great deal of money in order to get their article translated for the initial submission to the journal. Her intention was that they should not be forced to do so until at least they know that their article has been accepted. For researchers working outside the English-speaking

world – especially those who live in peripheral countries – this initiative provides a unique opportunity to share their findings with an international audience. In the years to come, my intention is to pursue this initiative, in spite of the difficulties it implies. I thus invite potential authors to contact this editor, sending their texts in the original language in addition to an extended abstract in English, which will help to gauge their contents and potential interest for *Current Sociology*.

This initiative also entails a major challenge: finding adequate peer reviewers who are proficient in these languages. In this regard, and in addition to our Editorial Board and the Research Committees coordinators at the ISA, this editor has the critical support of the Research Group on Peripheral Studies and South Cooperation and the networks that my colleagues have put together to reach potential referees, especially in Asia, Africa and Oceania. I would also like to extend my thanks to all of them in advance.

Nowadays, the world's universities seem to share the same concern and complaint: publish or perish. Funding, project approval and prestige all depend on the quantity of a researcher's publications, in the first place, and also on the ranking of the journals where such research is published. Although I am fully aware of the anxiety and the institutional pressure to put any research findings into print, at *Current Sociology*, I would like to focus on the tradition of dialogue among academic publications, where reflections can be made available for colleagues to debate, critique and improve, and where the careful reading of works by other colleagues constitutes a place for exchange. I support a journal that is more than a place for researchers to establish themselves; a journal that serves as a mediator for dialogue, allowing exchanges that sometimes are not possible due to sub-divisions within disciplines, geographical limits and different intellectual traditions among regions. I invite you to read us and share us with others. Rethinking criteria helps us to refound our discipline. And within these dialogues, we can find new heuristic tools to contemplate our local realities while considering sociology a necessarily global project.

Eloísa Martín

Article

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The rationalization of civil society

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Abstract
Two ideas are almost universally accepted as reality in political sociology. One is that numbers are declining in nearly all membership associations. The usual interpretation of this phenomenon is that it occurs because of individualization. The other is that the character of collective action has changed. This idea, which stems from Touraine, Melucci and Castells, states that a new historical category of social action has emerged, one that resembles action in primary groups rather than in organizations and in some way is a victory over the iron law of oligarchy. This article questions both ideas. The author intends to show that another historical process is in play here, namely, a process of 'inert rationalization' in social movements, political parties and associations, which is taking place in Europe with different starting points and at different tempos. The result of this process can be summed up as 'more organization with fewer people'. Domination, inherent in oligarchic organizations, is being transformed by the creation of a new organizational boundary between elite (or profession) and members. The point is that it is membership itself as a form for affiliation that is disappearing, not just members. The article argues that this is mainly because resource mobilization patterns have historically changed from the mobilization of resources drawn from members to the mobilization of resources drawn from other organizations. Finally, the article analyses the importance of the unstructured power fields (or open spaces) created by rationalization processes for social innovation and new social movements.

Keywords
civil society, new boundaries of exclusion, open spaces, rationalization, social movements

Introduction

As in many other countries in recent years, debates have raged regarding the future of political parties in Sweden, with many pages in the editorial, op-ed and cultural sections

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of big daily newspapers devoted to the topic. In a report issued in the spring of 2000, for example, the Council of Democracy stated that political parties would disappear some time after 2013. The report noted several trends that, with minor exceptions, can be observed in all western countries. Class voting and party loyalty are decreasing, political parties no longer enjoy the same legitimacy as before, young people prefer other types of political activity than that which is offered by political parties and the number of members in political parties is diminishing. With the help of this last extrapolated trend and of the other trends used to support the argument, the report infers that we are moving towards a democracy without parties. It is not that political activity is on the decline, rather it is changing shape (Petersson et al., 2000) and is expressing itself through individualized actions in subpolitical spaces located near people's everyday lives.

What has been described above regarding the political sphere bears a strong resemblance to what postmodern thinkers have elucidated in discussions on new social movements. Here, the idea is that, from a qualitative standpoint, the new social movements that are developing in, for example, Western Europe and that developed in Eastern Europe, belong to a new postmodern era. In contrast to the old movements, these are formless; they build on informal ties among people and on networks among groups; they build on creation of meaning and identity (preferably new postmodern identities) and, for the most part, they can be considered the contemporary victory over Michels' famous law on the indispensability of oligarchy (Castells, 1997; Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1981; Touraine et al., 1983).

Basic to both of the above streams of thought is the idea of formlessness and individualization, two phenomena that are simultaneously the expression of a new era and the driving force in social change. These ideas have now gained such a hegemonic position in large segments of social science that few individuals question their validity. In this article, I use organization-realistic points of departure to argue that the idea of formlessness is based on weak theoretical and empirical grounds and that individualization is a consequence rather than a driving force. This leads me to another interpretation of the social processes that are currently occurring in voluntary organizations in what is usually referred to as civil society.

A somewhat erroneous conclusion is often reached in studies of social movements: a historical parenthesis such as the development of protests in the decomposing Soviet Union (see, for example, Touraine et al., 1983) and a less well-known but old sociological category, formlessness in several social movements, are transformed into a new historical category by postmodern social action. Researchers have been inundated by change because they have paid far too much attention to everything that is considered new. In order to put what is new into perspective and possibly capture its direction, I start from the historical and permanent – that which is relatively constant and relatively unchanging. Therefore, in this article, I also describe the past repertoires of organized collective action, because much of what is now considered new is actually old and that which is new has escaped observation. All things considered, what is new does not seem to me to be more formlessness with more people but the exact opposite: *more organization with fewer people and more organizations with fewer issues*. This is an argument that goes against the idea of Touraine, Castells, Melucci and many others to the effect that new movements resemble networks rather than organizations and that the organizational form

in new social movements has a tendency to be more informal or to exhibit the characteristics of primary groups.

This article is the result of a new reading, comparison and summary of material and secondary literature I have had the opportunity to collect through two different studies in which I took part. The first dealt with the social conditions for labour movement organizations in Sweden and Greece (Papakostas, 1995). In the second, which concerned the preconditions for new voluntary and social movement organizations in 1980s Sweden, Göran Ahrne and I studied, among other things, the conditions for the genesis of a new party (the Environmental Party), a new church (the Word of Life) and a new sport (floor bandy) (see Ahrne and Papakostas, 2002). I also had the opportunity to follow in the making several excellent, detailed studies of new movement organizations which have been carried out at the Department of Sociology and the Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research at Stockholm University in recent years, and some of my illustrations are taken from these studies.[1] Accordingly, this is a comparative study of old and new voluntary organizations, as well as a comparison of different types of voluntary organizations.

Here, I apply one of the more difficult variants of the comparative method by which one seeks to find uniform processes and mechanisms behind discrete and highly variable forms of expression. The reader should be forewarned that this type of comparison often has the directly observed variable expressions against it and that one can always find examples that do not fit the mould. The fact that one can find cases that deviate does not mean that one is wrong because uniform processes can lie latent without always generating observable expressions, and when they give rise to expressions, they are not always uniform. In other words, on the level of empirical observation, the process of rationalization described here is broadly but not universally true.

Alongside the generalizations about the process of rationalization, I provide a number of illustrations on social movements, mainly taken from the Swedish context. My intention is not to suggest that evidence drawn from the Swedish case 'proves' the theoretical validity of the more general case. However, the Swedish case is of particular interest because it is an extreme case of a society where social movements have historically been predominantly membership-based. The rationalization process described here has been observed in the international movement literature, although not always formulated in clear terms (see, for example, Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). The evidence from the Swedish case suggests that rationalization is now even affecting social movements with a strong and membership-based foothold in social life. For this reason, the case of Sweden tends to support the more general argument.

In organizational terms the notion of rationalization could mean: that organization expands to many aspects of social life; that organization spreads to different parts or the world; or that an organization accomplishes the same tasks with a more systematic structure, which is the intended meaning of *more organization with fewer people* (see Ahrne and Papakostas, 2002). This article uses the notion of rationalization in the third way. The argument implies that this new form of 'more organization with few people' is being emulated by new social movement organizations and other new voluntary associations in civil society. I use the term 'inert rationalization' in order to capture the slow, durable and unnoticed character of this process of social change.[2]

In the rest of this article, I first position the argument in debates within social sciences. I then describe 'old' forms of organization, such as membership-based and cadre organizations. Next, I use evidence from Sweden and other countries to illustrate the slow change of rationalization towards organizational forms, such as donation-gathering and foundations. Finally, I discuss two major consequences: one, the emergence of open spaces that create opportunities for new social movements and voluntary associations, and two, the inverted relationship between proximity and distance that emerges between the elite and the social base as a consequence of the rationalization process.

From oligarchic relations to boundaries of exclusion

By applying a classic dichotomy in sociology – between movement and institution – Gunnar Olofsson (1988) pointed out that new movements distinguish themselves from old ones by the fact that they are new and are therefore in a nascent stage. Implicit in this mode of thinking is the idea that, sooner or later, movements are transformed into institutions through processes similar to those described by Max Weber as the routinization of charisma. In studies of social movements, this is usually referred to as the Weber–Michels tradition even though one can also place such diverse thinkers as Francesco Alberoni and Jean-Paul Sartre in the same tradition. As Dieter Rucht points out, taken as a 'tendency' rather than as a 'law', most social scientists would agree with the argument (Rucht, 2007). The argument must however be qualified. It is true that, when it comes to old movements, they are transformed into institutions, for example, the labour movement in northwestern Europe. With time, this process has become shorter, in part through the increased organizational capacity of the population and in part through the standardization of organizational knowledge. In other words, a process of historic learning shortens the period in a movement's history usually known as 'the nascent stage'. Another aspect deals with the movements' opportunity structures, which in time have changed as a result of the extensive concentration of resources that occurred all over Western Europe and the United States. As McCarthy and Zald put it: 'as the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite public increase, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the SMS (Social Movement Sector) increases' (McCarthy and Zald, 1987: 25) Access to concentrated resources that become available for use affects new movements or parties to such an extent that, in principle, they can skip the entire period and, in addition, acquire a structure that is significantly different from that of old mass-membership organizations.

At first glance, these processes of rationalization and bureaucratization, which have been observed not only in states or capitalist companies but in voluntary organizations as well, seem to confirm Max Weber's misgivings about a future iron cage. But behind and primarily among these worlds of rationalizing inertia, interstitial space, in which citizens can develop new interpretations of reality and articulate new interests, is continually opening up. In the discontinuities that arise between social life's slow changes and those that exist because of the incomplete intertwinement of the social fabric lies a whole world of often-overlooked opportunities. I use the metaphor of open spaces to describe such power-unstructured fields (for definitions, see Ahrne and Papakostas, 2002).

In one way, it is correct to maintain that new social movement organizations are not characterized by the distance between leaders and followers which was observed in old

social movements. However, this position can be supported on grounds other than those one often imagines. Membership organizations and political parties can be described as three circles: leaders, members and sympathizers (cf. Duverger, 1964). Characteristic of membership-based organizations is an organizational dividing line between members and sympathizers, and distance between leaders and members, which is the content of oligarchy's iron law (Michels, 1983). What is maintained in discussions about new social movements is that they have solved the distance problem between leaders and members. In actual fact, they have transformed the distance into a new organizational boundary, which lies between leaders and members and transformed members into sympathizers or, if you will, consumers of politics. I believe that the theoretical shift from a study of a movement's organization (widespread in studies of old movements) to the study of the movements' meaning-creating processes, such as those described in the movement's own terms (widespread in studies of new social movements; see, for example, Castells, 1997: 69–70), has prevented many people from seeing the new, narrower organizational boundary. In other more systematic studies of social movement organizations, like the edited volume by David S Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (1998), the argument seems to be there, nearly mentioned by almost all authors of the volume, but the argument is not really elaborated.[3]

Several other arguments – especially within political sociology or sociology-inspired political science – build on an image of a society with at least two speeds. On the one hand, we have a social life that is changing at an ever-increasing tempo, and in which change is expressed primarily as changes in human mentality. New attitudes, often post-material in character, are reported from almost every corner of the world, particularly among young people (Inglehart, 2007). At the same time, new problems arise or are defined, and new questions crop up continuously. On the other hand, the established parties and old social movements remain rigid. They were established and grew during what can be viewed as the age of the industrial society, and from the point of view of social phenomena, they were rational responses to the society's problems and adopted the prevailing basic organizational logic. This intertwinement with the industrial society's logic makes them inert. They have not adapted quickly to new conditions, and they no longer correspond to the expectations of the citizens, who turn their backs on the parties and old movements. People's disloyalty translates into declining membership numbers, a trend that is more striking in younger generations, who have no emotional or ideological ties to the old parties or movements and are quicker to adopt the new mentalities of the times. Therefore, young people choose new forms for political activity.[4]

In its totality, this is such an elegant argument that its structure has been used by innovators or prophets down through the ages in order to underrate the past, mark the juncture for a new era and define reality in a new way (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1966). It has also been repeated so many times by prominent political scientists who appear in the mass media and on the op-ed and arts sections of major newspapers that it has been accepted as reality. From a scientific standpoint, the argument places the preferences and choices of human beings at the centre; they are assumed to be more variable than institutional structures. In the interstitial space that arises in a social life that travels at two speeds, on the one hand, the variable mentalities and the inert institutions on the other, niches are created that make it possible for political entrepreneurs to define reality in new

terms. In the discussion about two speeds, the analyses early on reveal a gap between an inert organizational life and altered attitudes. I believe that researchers have not gone further in their analyses in order to see how far this interstitial space extends. The revitalization of an honourable tradition in political sociology from the 1950s and 1960s, during which political form and content were considered to be a projection that could be deduced from the electorate's composition and characteristics, has also contributed to the placement of the mechanisms that create this space in the domains of mentalities, attitudes and altered habits.[5] A well-known, contemporary representative of this tradition is Robert Putnam, with his studies on the disappearance of civic spirit in the United States (Putman, 1996).

Organizations turn their backs on members ...

From relation-realistic traditions, I see this atomization process and the closely related process of turning away from society as a consequence, not a cause. I shall turn the entire argument around and place the domain of mechanisms among core political and social institutions. The interstitial space one discovers in the above argument extends far into organizational life, which is where the mechanisms that create it can be found. People do not turn their backs on parties and movements, quite the contrary. The parties and other voluntary organizations turn their backs on the citizens by creating new, narrower boundaries among social movement organizations and members. A relatively extensive but inert and often unnoticed rationalization process is underway in what is usually referred to as civil society; furthermore, in my opinion, one of the core mechanisms that makes this and the new designation of boundaries possible is the shift in the methods used to mobilize resources from other organizations rather than from members.

The social scientists of the future will agree that the previous century – short or long – was undeniably the century of membership organizations. Never before have so many millions of people participated in political parties, union activities or charitable groups as they did during the period that is slowly passing by.[6] As is the case with all complex organizations, there are several different ways to describe a *membership organization*. Although it usually has many members, size is not a membership organization's most important attribute. Generally, membership organizations are also based primarily on non-material incentives; however, one of the most essential characteristics has been the specific, palpable connection and reciprocal dependency relationship that develops between the organization and its members. The organization was necessary in order to sustain, coordinate and multiply the efforts of like-minded individuals. At the same time, it was dependent on people's efforts and resources. As the purpose of the membership organization was to mobilize many people and their limited resources, it was a labour-intensive organization. Therefore, it is not surprising that agitation, scrupulous membership records, membership meetings and membership fees constituted core organizational phenomena in the membership organization, and the agitator, association secretary and association treasurer were the organization's most prominent figures.[7]

One can find embryonic membership organizations earlier in history but as an organizational form, they belong to the social innovations associated with the growth of European socialism immediately prior to the expansion of the right to vote in a number

of European countries. This became a model for the organization of both voluntary associations and the sports movement. The decades that immediately followed the Second World War embodied the golden age of mass politics – most of the membership parties in Europe recorded their highest membership levels, and many people regarded the membership organization as democracy's obvious way of aggregating citizen interest, and as a symbol for modern democracy (Duverger, 1964).

The trend was somewhat different for the parties to the right of the political spectrum. With a tight little core of personalities and hangers-on instead of members, the *cadre organization* originally was an archaic way of organizing political activity in countries with limited political rights. In more recent times, this has been viewed as the normal political expression of the middle class. The cadre organization has no members. It is a coalition of prominent personalities who are intent on winning elections with the support of influential persons' names, prestige and contacts. These individuals work with experts who know how they should be handled vis-a-vis the voters and how to organize campaigns. The cadre organizations acquire their power to act by coordinating the considerable resources of a handful of people.

During the golden era of membership organizations, the cadre organizations adapted themselves, at least in part, to the new conditions by opening their doors to the masses, and sometimes they even based their operations on membership. This is the content of Duverger's famous 'contagion from the left' thesis. However, this adaptation was never complete. Through its location in the social structure, the cadre organization had access to concentrated resources. Therefore, it needed the electorate's votes but not the members' resources. With the exception of those countries in which the cadre organization was combined with clientelist networks, it did not succeed in establishing lasting ties with the electorate, and its foothold in social life has therefore been a fragile one.

More organization with fewer people

For most social movement organizations, the membership organization has served as the prototype for the organizational form even if, in reality, the existing voluntary organizations were a combination of membership and cadre forms in different configurations. In the last 40 years, both the membership organization and the cadre organization have gone through processes of inert rationalization, which affected actual organizations differently depending on how the membership and cadre forms were previously combined. This can be observed most clearly in parties to the right and less clearly in parties to the left, in the new social democratic parties that were established after the fall of dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece and did not become membership organizations of the older social democratic type, as well as in new political parties in Eastern Europe (see Van Biezen, 2003).

The first expression of rationalization is that human labour is no longer required in order to convey the party's message because the technology for mass communication and propaganda has been developed and systematized and become the realm of professional activities in modern mass media, primarily television (see Tarrow, 1994: 143–5; Tilly, 1978). The most striking consequence of this trend is the personalization of politics – the acquisition of votes by way of leaders' charismatic personalities, which are exposed in

the mass media (McAllister, 2007). Another organizational consequence is the fact that the agitator and the message intermediary are no longer needed for the organization's operations. While the chain of people within the party who are conveying the message among the party heads and the members is disappearing, a staff of election strategists and media experts is appearing on the scene (see Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 152–3).

It is possible to date the genesis of a research approach in studies of social movements, known as 'the resource mobilization school' (McCarthy and Zald, 1987), up to about the middle of the 1970s. Originally a way of solving a theoretical problem dealing with the genesis of collective action, the school directed its attention to the manner in which social movement organizations mobilize their resources. Studies in this tradition revealed that the mobilization of resources was more important than, and a prerequisite for, the mobilization of members. Some of the researchers in this field seem to believe that this applies to both old and new social movement organizations, but my reading of the extensive research on social movements dates the phenomenon to about 1960. In general, new social movement organizations that were founded after 1960 seem to be more resource-intensive than those founded before.

In actual fact, resource intensity is a type of change that could just as well have strengthened the bond between members and the organization. However, resource intensity has been coupled with a shift in the location of resources, a move that has far-reaching consequences. Previously, I mentioned that, according to the logic of the membership organization, it was important to concentrate many people's limited and scattered resources. However, the major portion of the organizations' resources no longer comes from their members. Since the mid-1960s, membership dues in political parties in Sweden have accounted for less than 20 percent of the parties' revenues, and in the 1990s, this figure dropped to below 10 percent (Pierre and Widfeldt, 1995: 43). A similar trend has been observed in the political parties of a number of Western European countries (Katz and Mair, 1994) and in the rest of world (for an overview, see Austin and Tjernström, 2003). Investigations from Sweden report a constant rise of public support for organizations in civil society.

In the Scandinavian context, most resources come from the state; however, there is tremendous variation in this area. Bourgeois parties have traditionally sought support from companies, and companies have also sponsored the sports movement. In recent years, funds, foundations and organizations, together with insurance companies and other institutional forms for the concentration of resources, have played the same role for social movement organizations as banks and investment firms have played for companies and states all over the world.[8] In a general sense, resources that movements mobilize are now more concentrated and available for social movement organizations at early stages of their development and there are more dispersed resources that can be mobilized at early stages by modern techniques of mobilization. Looking at Figure 1, the argument in this article implies a slow historical change from boxes 1 and 2 towards box 3 and foremost to 4.

The source of resources outside the organizations or, if anything, in other organizations, has consequences for social movement organizations, since resource dependence in organizations is usually associated with a relationship of dependence (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

DENSITY OF RESOURCES	SOURCE OF RESOURCES: Inside the organization	SOURCE OF RESOURCES: Outside the organization
Dispersed	1 **Membership** *Old social movements in Sweden* Externally created parties in Northern and Western Europe	3 **Donation-gathering** *Cancer and Allergy Fund* Greenpeace* WWF*
Concentrated	2 **Cadre** Political parties in Sweden before 1900. *Internally created political parties in Europe*	4 **Foundation**[a] Fathers and Mothers in the city* Noah' s Ark* New political parties & new movement organizations *The Natural Step*

Figure 1. The organizational space of civil society

[a] There are other concepts describing this type, such as memberless organization or professional movement. I use the term *foundation* here, not in its legal form but in order to capture a resource-intensive organization with few members that can be professionals or other organizations and with a narrow organizational boundary vis-a-vis its social base.

An asterisk (*) denotes hybrid forms between donation-gathering and foundation. *Italics* denotes the best approximations in real life.

Among the most obvious consequences are the amateurs who turn professional, after which they lose their importance in the same way that conscripts are no longer needed in professional armies. By placing the aforementioned changing patterns of resource mobilization alongside studies of the professionalization of political parties or of sports movements, the connection between resource capital and professionalization becomes apparent. The professionalization of political parties described by Angelo Panebianco (1988), for example, occurs somewhat later than does the shift in the way resources are mobilized; this also applies to the sports movement, although the latter sometimes appears to have moved from a membership to a donation-gathering organization and then to a foundation. Organization figures linked to membership, such as agitators, association secretaries and treasurers, or organizational phenomena, such as membership rolls and dues, to the extent that they exist, are more reminiscent of relics of times long gone than of substantial organizational occurrences. Instead, in their place one finds professional activists, campaign experts, sponsor consultants, project managers and directors (Boström, 1999). In research on new social movements, one now comes across such descriptive terms as 'professional movements', 'the movement industry' and 'movement entrepreneur' (McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Today's voluntary organizations seem to lack the popular proximity that is reported, for example, from the labour movement's infancy.[9]

The resource-intensive way of running a collective activity is most obvious in new voluntary organizations, where the course of events proceeds at a faster pace. They are created at a time when resources are concentrated, and the technology for organizing collective behaviour is systematized and professionalized. With few exceptions, they

resemble foundations more than they do membership organizations. To the extent that they aim to mobilize resources that are not concentrated, they become donation-gathering organizations that appeal to the public for voluntary contributions instead. But like foundations, they have more narrowly defined boundaries vis-a-vis the public than do membership organizations.

On the whole, new movements routinize their charisma and acquire permanent structures much more quickly than before, and the adjectives used to describe them are based more on external symbols than on the new organizations' essence. In a study of three new social movement organizations in Sweden, Noah's Ark, the 5 to 12 Movement and Fathers and Mothers in the City, Lars-Erik Olsson (1999) found that these organizations had a short 'nascent period' and that they differed tangibly from the model of the old popular movement, which was based on membership. None of the organizations has had to depend on membership fees, and access to concentrated resources makes it possible for them to hire personnel at an early stage. Other detailed case studies of old and new social movement organizations in Sweden (like the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, Swedish Greenpeace, the Swedish World Wildlife Fund, the Natural Step) show the same patterns (see Boström, 1999, 2001). Studies of new social movements, for example, ecological, peace, solidarity and gay movements in Europe (Kriesi, 1996), the rural movement in Sweden (Herlitz, 1998) or women's shelters (Johansson, 2001), report the extensive mobilization of resources from other organizations at an early stage.

The most powerful and detailed single-case illustration from the literature on social movements of the arguments, put in this article in a more general sense, comes from Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward's study of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) in the United States (Piven and Cloward, 1979: espec. 316–31). The NWRO was established in the mid-1960s, with its leadership and organizers deeply committed to the goal of building mass-based permanent organizations among the black urban poor. But as the NWRO became more successful in establishing interactions with government agencies and other organizations, and in securing resources from other organizations, the ties binding existing members with the organization were weakened, making membership superfluous. As Piven and Cloward put it: 'this enlarging of resources did not lead to enlarged organizing, it undermined organizing . . . it produced a leadership deeply involved in negotiating and lobbying, but on behalf on a constituency that was organized in name only' and to a degree that 'external resources became a substitute for a mass base' (Piven and Cloward, 1979: 317, 331).

The new organizations are far from being alone in adopting the new organizational technology. Even the old organizations have been affected, albeit at a somewhat slower and more variable tempo. The historic course, whose beginning in Western Europe on a whole can be dated to the 1960s, is the same, from Figure 1's left to right side and primarily towards the lower part of the right side. The opportunity for mobilizing resources from other organizations determines the course's beginning at specific places, and the strength of the social ties between members and old organizations determines its speed. These changes began earlier and proceeded more rapidly in cadre organizations, whereas in membership organizations, the changes began later and proceeded at a slower tempo. Leon Epstein (1967) observed these tendencies in his monumental work about political

parties. The early start of the processes and the intensity within the right bloc lured him into thinking that this might be about a 'contagion from the right', which expressed itself in counter-organizational tendencies. But in reality, this seemed to be like the wind – it was more noticeable in the glades and sparse stretches of woodland than in the dense forests. And this is not about a wind that opposes more organization but rather the exact opposite of what Epstein thought. If organizations are, as Göran Ahrne (1990) put it, 'part human being, part organization', then it is the organization part that expands. There is not less organization and more people but rather more organization with fewer people. What Leon Epstein was unable to see in the 1960s became more obvious to Angelo Panebianco in the 1980s. One of the best illustrations of the arguments I present herein comes from a reading of three classic works on political parties. When Maurice Duverger wrote his book at the beginning of the 1950s, he saw the dominance of membership organizations (Duverger, 1964). Although unaware of the rationalization process, Leon Epstein, in the book he wrote in the mid-1960s, describes how this process began in American political parties and conservative parties in Europe, which have not been classic membership parties (Epstein, 1967). In his book, written in the mid-1980s and translated into English in the late 1980s, Angelo Panebianco faces a clear-cut rationalization trend (Panebianco, 1988). With the addition of a 1990s book about political parties (Katz and Mair, 1994), one sees clearly how the weakening of membership and the connection to government resources have allowed the parties to be transformed into 'catch all' entities without obvious ties to specific social strata.

One can find similar historical trends in studies of voluntary organizations in Sweden. In his study of the interaction between Gothenburg Municipality and voluntary organizations, Staffan Johansson states that, in the 1950s, public funds accounted for less than one-fifth of the budgets of the Gothenburg Religious City Mission, founded in 1952, and the Länken Service Club, founded in 1948. In the 1990s, public funds had increased to about two-thirds of the budgets. Here, the transformation occurs slowly and it takes about 50 years. The contrast with a new voluntary organization, the Ada Women's Shelter in Gothenburg, founded at the end of the 1970s, is striking and yet one more example of charisma's rapidly growing routinization in new voluntary organizations. As early as 1987, about 10 years after the shelter was founded, public funds constituted 95 percent of its total assets (Johansson, 2001).

Evidence from other countries shows very similar patterns. From the United States, the country with strong Tocquevillean traditions, Theda Skocpol reports a process of rationalization in her historical exposé of the development of American civil society. According to Skocpol, a restructuring of civil society has occurred in the United States, the meaning of which is that civil society is not reproducing the old membership values that were once the virtue of American civic life. Instead, the new civil society, operated by professional and memberless organizations, is becoming remarkably oligarchic (Skocpol, 2003: 219–23). And Dana R Fisher remarks in her study of canvassing in the United States, that the professionalization and outsourcing of political activism increases the distance between national progressive groups and members, and reinforces the role of citizens as spectators (Fisher, 2006: 111–12).

From Norway, with its Scandinavian traditions of membership-based popular movements, two researchers on the huge Norwegian research programme, the Power and

Democracy Project, report that a similar process is underway in Norway. According to Tommy Tranvik and Per Selle (2007), there seems to be increased professionalization within social movement organizations in contemporary Norwegian organizations, which are becoming more dependent on public and private sponsors. In addition, volunteering takes place outside the membership institution, thus weakening the ties between the volunteer and the organization.[10]

Many organizations with few questions

In the wake of this process of inert rationalization, several interesting phenomena manifest themselves. If joking in traditional societies and political satire in totalitarian regimes symbolize the distance between human beings and an established organizational structure, then their functional equivalents in modern democracies seem to be an increase in voter mobility and parties that ride a roller coaster between successive elections.

In countries like Sweden, where politics is traditionally based on category-based class standing, these signs manifest themselves as an increased mobility among parties in the same bloc (see Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2004). And since the parties in the bloc to the right have not been classic member parties, these signs manifest themselves sooner and more clearly, and chance circumstances, such as political conjunctures, unusual events, the leaders' personal characteristics or campaign skills, determine the mobility's direction. Altogether, the process in Sweden has also been delayed historically, in comparison with other European countries. This has to do with the fact that, from a historical standpoint, political parties and organizational life in Sweden have, as a whole, been closer to the ideal type of membership organization to the extent that even the right-wing parties resembled membership organizations.

These signs are even weaker in the leftist bloc in Sweden because social democracy has had two substantial footholds in social life, partly through strong labour union membership ties in the workplace, and partly through the daily proximity of the working class to a series of membership organizations – from tenants' associations to insurance associations and educational activities. Membership ties are characterized by loyalty, and even if the organizational changes that are discussed here have permeated the entire political spectrum, the symptoms within social democracy have been mitigated by this loyalty.

As stated earlier, this process of rationalization within Swedish social democracy has been weaker than in other countries. This is related to the fact that Swedish social democracy, to a greater extent, has been organized as a number of membership organizations in political, union, social and cultural associations. This represents an ideal example of what Gerassimos Moschonas calls *organizationally over-mobilized socialism*[11] and has been characterized by, among other things, a relatively high degree of association in all activities, obvious social ties to the working class and an autonomous financial base for the movement as a whole. In countries such as Austria, Denmark and Norway, where social democracy belongs to the same group (although not as fully organized as the ideal Swedish model), these tendencies are somewhat more noticeable. The more a country's social democracy previously combined membership with cadre organizations, the more noticeable they become and the earlier they begin. The later a country's social democracy was consolidated (which is the case with Spanish, Greek and Portuguese social

democracy), the earlier these processes begin. The pattern is an obvious one: membership as a historic phenomenon has also weakened in Northern European social democracies, and the social democratic movement in Europe is on the way to simultaneously converging from separate starting positions towards an *organizationally under-mobilized socialism* with weak links to its traditional social base.

However, the fact that the pattern is obvious does not mean that the process has taken place without friction, protests, opposition and conflicts. Up to now, experience has shown that the opposition of the membership has only succeeded in postponing the process temporarily. Nor have friction, protests, opposition and conflicts been the typical outcome of this process. The transfer of power from the members to the organization occurred in a relatively protracted, often unnoticed process, and as is the case in such transfers of power, the losers' voice was transformed into *a presence without a voice* and later to *silent departure*. The member is transformed into a voter and becomes more independent and autonomous, less controlled by Michelian oligarchies but at the same time more isolated and confused (cf. Panebianco, 1988: 273).

When membership decreases, the organizational activities associated with managing it tend to disappear. The organization loses its ability to manage its members, and a number of the people who constituted the membership organization's *critical mass* can now constitute a potential core group for new organizations. Old organizations also found themselves in a structural position of power in relation to newcomers. Since they had strong social ties to social life, they did not actually have to take any action to meet challenges. New types of movements were *organizationally outflanked* (Mann, 1986) or, to use an analogy from sport sociology, they were 'crowded out' (Markovits and Hellerman, 2001) by the old organizations and forced to confront insurmountable obstacles. Given the weakening of the membership, the old organizations lost this structural 'bonus', which actors who hold established positions always have. They must act when new movements gain a foothold in social life and, moreover, with a capacity to act that in great part has been circumscribed. Since those activities that were tied to membership management disappeared, the organizations have to use new methods to handle challengers. New technological methods make mass communication easier, but they are no substitute for the membership organizations' tangible ties.

The weakening of the membership, the loss of the old membership organizations' structural bonus and the reduced ability to manage challenges, combined with the fact that the old organizations no longer need their critical mass, open social space in which new social (and asocial) innovations can flourish. Further, there is room for numerous organizations, since new organizational forms do not require the coordination of many people's activities. The weakening of membership as a form for participation in political and social life and the strengthening of the organizations' non-human characteristics constitute the basis for and allow contemporary phenomena such as the festivalization of politics and civil society or a spectacle-like character and, to a certain extent, politics' fixation on personal characteristics. The more the organization part expands, the more it needs to over-emphasize its human characteristics and conceal its organizational ones.

However, the 'more organization' old social movements become, the greater the spaces that are left open. These are framed as empty space in the individuals' collective identity and as open space among organizations. It is perhaps more difficult to see them

if one is captured by the exciting rhythms of the festival, spectacle and fixation on politicians' personalities or has, through atomized actions, completely turned away from political and social life. However, for those who set foot in such social spaces, life has been full of surprises. The size of the space can turn big projects into fiascos, and seemingly hopeless efforts can meet with unexpected success. The tempo of the diffusion lapses can be accelerated or slacken off. Organizations can expand; agitators can create movements; and apostles can found churches. Fashion designers can create trends; innovators can realize new innovations; and entrepreneurs can establish new companies. For better or worse, open social spaces are the social landscape's fertile plains, but they can also stand empty and unnoticed for long periods of time; they are not like black holes that swallow everything but more like hotels waiting for visitors.[12]

It was just such a space that new sports such as floor bandy, new parties such as the Environmental Party, new churches such as Word of Life and particularly other new political parties and voluntary organizations found in the social landscape of 1980s and 1990s Sweden. In these spaces, social innovators could, by combining ideas and inspiration, which were often but not exclusively drawn from global contexts, with available resources on the local level, create many new voluntary organizations and partially regenerate Sweden's social landscape – but in general terms they did not establish membership organizations.

The inverted relationship between proximity and distance

Many descriptive terms – some secondary, some fundamental – capture the essence of the Swedish popular movement. The basic ones include a collective that is organized from within/from below and is fixed – a large amalgamation that strives to realize some interests (cf. Therborn, 1988: 39; Thörnberg, 1943: 5–19). This has also been a collective of strong, independent, self-financed organizations founded on the basis of the association model. Characteristic of all of these associations was organizational proximity to broad groups in social life. The solution of practical problems in proximity to people's daily lives belonged to the organizations' routine activities, independent of whether they were a religious movement or a union, a political party or a regional social insurance association, a temperance movement or a health insurance association. In this way, ideological, political and social interests were substantiated in reality and created the basis for broad recruitment within the base of distinct social groups. By working in political, social and cultural surroundings that, because of fortunate circumstances, became exceptionally organization-tolerant at the core level, almost all political and social movements could be active in one way or another as central actors in social life.

This dual foothold, expressed on the one hand through activities at the local level and on the other through activities on a national level, was not completely without problems. The movements' broad social extension between the neighbourhood or workplace and the national level, combined with their numerical strength, created social distances between the leaders and the followers similar to those described by Robert Michels almost a century ago. In almost all classic social movements and political parties, it is possible to observe the ways in which popular proximity was combined with distance to

the leaders. However, the distance could not be transformed into a screening off of the elite because of the mutual dependency of leaders and followers in society, and of leaders and the numerically strong member corps in particular. This mutual dependence was institutionalized in relatively compact organizations, which functioned as social bridges between the local and national levels and constantly renewed politics by recruiting individuals and capturing social demands from broad social groups.

In this article, I have attempted to show how the mutual dependence was successively undermined through changes in the mobilization of resources for activities, in developments in mass communication and in the growth of organizational expertise. The primary consequence of this is the weakening of membership as a historic form for participation in voluntary organizations and political parties. Through weakened membership, the social basis for political parties and social movements narrows. Instead of an intertwinement of class and association, one between the profession (or elite) and foundation is created, with very narrowly defined borders in relation to large population categories.[13] The oligarchic distance is transformed into oligarchies encapsulated behind clear-cut organizational borders, and many signs indicate that the intertwinement of the elite and the foundation tends to be reproduced by, among other things, the narrowing of the recruitment base for new politicians. Even in a country like Sweden and a movement such as the social democratic one, new cabinet ministers are beginning to have ministers as parents. This phenomenon was an unusual one in the Swedish popular movement tradition.

At the same that the elite increasingly shield themselves behind organizational borders, they come closer to the public than previously, but in a more technicalized and, in part, more personal way. Communication between leaders and followers has been technicalized and become more one-sided. It takes place via surveys and other systematic methods for information gathering; questions and structures are drawn up by professional staffs and other experts without being considered in democratic assemblies that build on membership. What is politically relevant and what questions will appear on the agenda to a greater extent than previously are determined by groups that are virtually shielded from public life. This also occurs through the artful exposition of their personal characteristics in campaigns, which are prepared by professional politicians and campaign experts, or in personal accounts in newspapers and popular entertainment programmes on television. An organizational proximity via associations and membership organizations, and a long social distance between leaders and followers has been transformed into organizational shielding and a personal but fictitious proximity between the leader and the follower. Further, it is not political programmes and ideologies that are conveyed in this visual communication. We live in an age of images through which the personal and concrete can be conveyed more easily than they can through written texts and abstract ideas. All of this has coincided with another long-term historic process, which Richard Sennett has described as the 'the fall of public man', a trend of informality that goes hand-in-hand with the eroding of borders between private life and the public sphere (Sennett, 1978). This is a process that has escalated the elites' private expectations and psychological categories to such a degree that they are capable of defining public life. This is the same trend that has made us believe that questions of power and resource allocation can be managed through trust and human warmth or other virtues drawn from the private sphere. The over-exposure of

the private and informal in today's public life has prevented many people from seeing the real social processes that take place behind the virtual veil.

The inverted relationship between proximity and distance changes democracy's circumstances. Instead of the horizontal incorporation that took place via relatively autonomous political parties and social movements in the majority of the Northern European democracies, integration now takes place vertically and directly between the leading elite or a broad segment of the population without the mediation of intermediary organizations based on membership as a form of affiliation. As a form, this type of integration is closely related to the populist integration methods which historically took place in several countries on the world system's periphery (Mouzelis, 1985). However, this is not about a simple anachronism, a historic retrogression or a semi-peripheralization of the centre, if we speak the words of Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein. The communication between the leaders and the followers now takes place through a modern, sophisticated, yet one-sided means of communication, and the political spectacle is more fictive and illusory in character. Nor is the message directed to people, classes or groups but rather to 'you', and 'you' are the one who is going to put trust in your leaders. They are as human as 'you' are. To be sure, populism has become postmodern.

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Notes

1. These are studies of three new social movements (Olsson, 1999), five environmental organizations (Boström, 2001), Front National and right-wing populism (Rydgren, 2002), New Age (Brodin, 2001), immigrant organizations (Emami, 2003), on work in four voluntary welfare organizations (Chartrand, 2004) and Adrienne Sörbom's study of new forms of political participation (Sörbom, 2002). I owe the authors of the studies mentioned many thanks for inspiration
2. In terms of perspective from organization theory I use here the Resource Dependence Perspective (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in a rather historical manner in order to capture the historical contingencies of the organizations of civil society.
3. The major exception is of course Frances Fox Piven and Richard A Cloward's (1979) work *Poor People's Movements* discussed later in this article.
4. For illustrations from the Swedish context, see Amnå (2004) and Sörbom (2002).
5. Compare Martin Shefter's (1993) similar argument.
6. See Mackie and Rose (1974) for historical statistics on mobilization in political parties and Bain and Price (1980) for membership in trade unions.
7. For the origins of the mass membership organization in the 18th century politics see Charles Tilly's *Social Movements 1768–2004* (Tilly, 2004).
8. See Skocpol (2003) for a similar argument.
9. For the Swedish labour movement's proximity to everyday life concerns, see Nordström (1938).
10. For a similar trend in Sweden, see Chartrand (2004).
11. The passage on social democracy builds on Moschonas (2002).
12. See Ahrne and Papakostas (2002) for a theoretical discussion of the concept of social space.
13. See Tilly (1998) for a discussion of how organizations and social categories intertwine.

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Perceptions of labour market risks: Shifts and continuities across generations

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Abstract
In the risk society thesis, most notably forwarded by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, the labour market plays a key role in individualization processes. While for previous generations, family and personal networks, and also government institutions, were important in providing access to and mobility within the labour market, cohorts entering the labour market since the 1970s and onwards are perceived to be living in a modern 'risk regime', requiring each individual to make choices and decisions in relation to a market that no longer accommodates employment based on kinship and friendship. Based on data from 58 qualitative interviews with parents and their adult children, this article examines more closely these purported changes. The study's main observation is that important changes towards increased perceived individualization have taken place from one generation to the next. While affirming the disjuncture posited by Beck between a 'collectivized past' and an 'individualized present', this study's empirical evidence from two generations of individuals indicates that the disjuncture is muddier and more complex than previously understood.

Keywords
generations, individualization, labour market, life course, risk perceptions, risk society

Introduction

Grand theories of increasing levels of individualization and risk in modern society have been forwarded most notably by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991). For Beck, an

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all-pervasive sense of risk has become a ubiquitous feature of life in both public and private domains. Individuals are seen as required to negotiate and plan their own actions and pathways in environments where known and unknown, objective and subjective risks pose potential threats to their sense of identity, belonging and well-being. Beck defines individualization as a process in which 'each person's biography is [being] removed from given determinations and placed in his or her own hands, open and dependent on decisions' (Beck, 1992: 135). Each individual thus becomes responsible for his or her own future life chances, choices and decisions, and the continuous creation and construction of the self can be viewed as an ongoing DIY project (Beck, 2000: 75).

The notion that the individual is solely responsible for his or her life chances and decision-making implies a heightened subjective sense of risk, as possible courses of action are numerous and include options that, if chosen, may have detrimental effects on the life chances and social mobility of the individual. The reverse side of the coin is that individualized responsibility may function in a liberating sense, giving the individual the opportunity to realize personal aspirations, make decisions and take risks that positively affect his or her life chances and social mobility. In this sense, as Tulloch and Lupton (2003: 18–19) emphasize, risk does not necessarily represent danger or loss of control, as it can also provide individuals with opportunities that may enhance or improve their well-being.

Importantly, Beck's argument does not imply full individual autonomy. Although the individual is 'removed from traditional commitments and support relationships', these are exchanged for constraints produced by the labour market and consumerism (Beck, 1992: 131). 'The place of *traditional* ties and social forms (social class, nuclear family) is taken by *secondary* agencies and institutions, which stamp the biography of the individual and makes that person dependent upon fashions, social policy, economic cycles and markets' (Beck, 1992: 131). There is thus an inherent contradiction in the individualization process between an individual's expectation of being able to plan and control his or her life, and the limitations that are placed on this ability by external societal factors.

In relation to the labour market and the sphere of work, Beck posits that increasing individualization will bring along new chances and freedom for individuals to carve out their roles, but 'new trapdoors' may limit opportunities and lead to marginalization and exclusion (Beck, 2000: 53). The bottom line is, according to Beck, that 'risks are shifted from the state and the economy on to the shoulders of individuals', thus underlining a 'new precariousness of work' (Beck, 2000: 53–4). In Beck's account, there is a clear disjuncture within modernity itself between the two phases of a 'collectivized' past and an individualized present, where the first phase, described as a 'Fordist regime', introduced standardization, mass production and full employment (Beck, 2000: 68). Security, certainty and clearly defined boundaries are said to describe life in the Fordist regime, where families and communities were responsible for interpreting 'opportunities, dangers [and] biographical uncertainties' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 4). The risk regime of the second phase of modernity, however, 'firmly rules out, beyond a transition period, any eventual recovery of the old certainties of standardized work [and] standard life histories' (Beck, 2000: 70). Moreover, the burden of interpreting 'opportunities, dangers [and] biographical uncertainties' has shifted from families and communities onto the individual who, by necessity, develops a heightened sense of risk and responsibility.

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: 4) suggest that only *a comparison of different generations* (birth cohorts) will allow a proper assessment of the increase in demands placed on individuals. Our research, based on interviews with different generations of individuals, allows us to examine new empirical evidence and to ask how clearly the posited disjuncture between a collectivized past and an individualized present can be identified in biographical narratives about labour market entry and participation across these generations. As such, our research can be viewed as a response to the often-presented charge that the risk society thesis lacks empirical verification (Alexander, 1996; De Beer, 2007; Mythen, 2004, 2005; Tulloch and Lupton, 2003; Wilkinson, 2001). Our research also adds to the growing academic literature which underlines that risk perceptions are mediated and differentiated along cultural and social-structural lines (e.g. Abbot et al., 2006; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Mythen, 2005; Vickerstaff, 2006). Cultural theorists argue that perceptions of risk are culturally constructed and mediated, and subject to social learning (Douglas and Wildawsky, 1982; Oltedal et al., 2004). Social theorists highlight how social class, gender, ethnicity and age have a bearing on people's perceptions of and responses to risk – making them, for example, more or less risk-averse (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997, 2007; Lupton, 1999; Mitchell et al., 2001; Mythen, 2005; Tulloch and Lupton, 2003; Wilkinson, 2001). Our research adds important theoretical and empirical nuances to this debate by focusing explicitly on intergenerational shifts and continuities in risk perceptions.

Intergenerational risk perceptions and the labour market

Both Giddens and Beck have placed the emergence of risk society in historical, Western European time in or around the 1950s. At that time social and economic structures began to mutate in ways that would ultimately bring about a reconstituted social order. The new order placed risk at the centre of social functioning; not as risk calculation and assessment (although both are clearly permeating society today), but as uncertainty, which undermines any notion of the calculability of risk probabilities and makes it increasingly difficult for the individual to anticipate (and thus plan) his or her future.

In the risk society thesis, the labour market is seen to have a key role in the production of processes of individualization (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). While the 1950s and 1960s are perceived as a 'traditional' modern society, in the sense that family and personal networks played an important role in access to and mobility within the labour market, the 1970s and onwards are perceived as a modern 'risk regime' which requires each individual to be responsible for his or her own choices in relation to a labour market which no longer accommodates employment based on kinship and friendship (see Beck, 2000). Our intergenerational study of parents and their adult offspring facilitates an examination of these purported changes in terms of entry to and participation in the labour market.

If a radical disjuncture in the social positioning of the individual from the Fordist regime to risk society has indeed occurred, we would expect to find discontinuity between trajectories buttressed by traditional support networks, more typical among the parent generation, and the more individualized biographies emphasizing self-reliance and risk, more typical for the offspring generation. We would also expect a break or

evolution in the typical personalized response mechanisms – reflexivity as reflex or reaction (see our next section) – to be observed between the generations.

Exploring continuities and discontinuities between parents and their offspring also allows us to consider the influence and 'transfer' of perceptions across family generations. There is a wealth of research literature on intergenerational relationships and intergenerational transmission (see Scabini and Marta, 2006 for an overview), but to date there is very little research on the intergenerational transmission of attitudes to risk and uncertainty. A notable exception is that of Dohmen et al. (2006), who used a large-scale, representative survey in Germany and found that there is a strong correlation between parents' willingness to take risks and that of their children. Our qualitative research adds to the knowledge currently being developed around intergenerational relationships and the transmission of attitudes to and perceptions of risk.

Reflexivity as planned reactions or unplanned reflexes

Although Beck and Giddens essentially agree in their understanding of the material foundations of risk society, they offer somewhat different perspectives on the human responses to perceived or experienced social risk. Their disaccord, which centres on the sociological use of a core element of risk theory, that of 'reflexivity', remains useful as an analytical tool that sheds light on the 'true' nature of our ability to cope with perceived risk. For Giddens, reflexivity signifies the self-aware assessment of behavioural options and the ability to reconcile internal and external demands and influences in order to maintain a coherent personal narrative, if necessary by self-correcting earlier decisions 'on reflection' of their appropriateness (Giddens, 1991). Beck, in contrast, certainly in his earlier writings (Beck, 1992), understood reflexivity as a *spontaneous* reaction to unforeseen threats, opportunities and situations that presented choices and required decisions. Unlike Giddens, who perceived reflexivity as purposeful (re-)actions to events (and as responsive to context), the early Beck perceived reflexivity as very much unplanned – a *reflex* rather than an act of reflecting. Whereas Giddens' notion of reflexivity assumes an individual's ability to know, judge and weigh options before taking decisions, in Beck's use of the term, decision-making may be ad hoc and preceding judgement and the weighing of options. For the theory and practice of individualization, these opposing interpretations of 'reflexivity' have correspondingly opposing effects, as one all but rules out long-term strategic behaviours whereas the other retains them at its core. One implies a 'structured randomness' of behaviour, where behaviour is shaped by new institutions of control that have replaced traditional (kinship) ties; the other proclaims scope for planned and learned behaviour. Re-flex and re-action thus represent different response modes to the uncertain events and outcomes in a society that increasingly manufactures its own risks. As behavioural concepts, they are useful tools for exploring possible experiential divides between generations.

Research methodology

We conducted 58 in-depth interviews for our study of intergenerational perceptions and experiences of risk in relation to labour market entry and participation. The interviews

were with 29 pairs of parents and their adult children of the same sex (i.e. mothers and daughters, fathers and sons). Gender differences in risk perceptions and experiences are well documented (Gustafson, 1998). Moreover, the gender disparities in the nature and extent of change in career structures and opportunities over the last 50 years (see Scott, 1994) may be expected to impact on intergenerational perceptions of career planning and risk. Our interviews therefore involved same-sex intergenerational pairs rather than mixed pairs (16 female pairs and 13 male pairs). In addition to an emphasis on gender balance, the recruitment of interviewees also considered their socioeconomic backgrounds. We thought it essential that one of each pair had either changed jobs or been made redundant or experienced unemployment in the last two years, as such events are likely to trigger important decision-making processes.

Our sample consisted of 29 parent generation individuals aged 38–80, with most (20) aged in their sixties and seventies, and 29 offspring generation individuals aged 17–53, with most (26) aged in their twenties, thirties and forties. The age profiles can be mapped onto the 1950s break line that Giddens and Beck have suggested as indicative of the turning point in the emergence of risk society: roughly half of the parent generation had typically completed their education and started work before or not long into the 1950s, while the other half did so either in the latter half of the 1950s, in the 1960s, or the early 1970s. Members of the offspring generation, on the other hand, typically started this process either in the late 1970s, in the 1980s, or the early 1990s.

Mirroring the socioeconomic changes of the latter half of the 20th century, the educational and occupational profiles of the parent and the offspring generations differed markedly. Among the 29 individuals in the parent generation, five had a university degree and two had attended college. A majority of them (22) had left school between the ages of 14 and 16. Of the 29 individuals in the offspring generation, seven had a university degree while two had attended university without achieving a degree, and eight had attended college. Fewer than half (12) had left school between the ages of 15 and 18. There is thus evidence of some upward social mobility in educational terms from one generation to the next. In terms of class background (perceived as occupational status), a majority (18) of the parent generation were from the working classes (non-managerial/non-professional, skilled or unskilled; see Roberts, 2001: 28–9), while five were from the middle classes and six had worked themselves up from working to middle class through their employment career. There was some evidence of upward social mobility from one generation to the next in terms of occupational status achievement. A majority (16) of the offspring generation belonged to the middle classes, while 10 were from working classes and three worked themselves up from working to middle class through their employment career. Many in the offspring generation are also in their early careers and thus have time to achieve more upward mobility.

In sum, a majority of the parent generation were from the working classes and had only completed compulsory education, while a majority of the offspring generation were from the middle classes and roughly half of them had received education beyond compulsory schooling. The interviews were conducted in 2005, and most of the participants lived in the English Midlands. With the exception of one pair, the interviewees were all white. Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of the participants.

The interviews were conducted through what can be loosely described as a narrative biographical method (Heinz and Krüger, 2001; Riessman, 1993; Roberts, 2002) to explore participants' careers over their life course, with a focus on decision-making. This involved asking participants to 'map out' their entire employment history and subsequently focusing on key moments in their career and decision-making related to those events. We used biographical narratives of career histories and career transitions as an anchor to explore changes in risk perceptions across generations. We did not attempt to *predict* or *determine* the extent of influence and transfer of risk perceptions across family generations, but to examine and discuss whether, and the extent to which, the biographical narratives revealed the possibility of such influence and transfer in the context of entry to and participation in the labour market.

In contrast to a more direct approach to the study of risk perceptions, the narrative biographical approach enabled us to 'de-centre' the question of risk in the interview context and to apply a more indirect approach without an a priori construction of risk and uncertainty. Empirical research on risk perceptions is often based on the assumption that risk *is* a significant dimension of people's worldviews and everyday lives, rather than asking whether this is actually so (see Henwood et al., 2008). An alternative view is that people construct and perceive risks in different ways, and attribute different meanings, values and intensities to risks. In a study of the role of risk in everyday life, Tulloch and Lupton (2003: 19) found that their research participants viewed risk as 'biographical, or different for each individual', and that 'risk is the product of a way of seeing rather than an objective fact'. In our own research interviews, we sought to talk explicitly about risk-related events such as applying for or changing jobs, or being made redundant, without immediately using the term 'risk'. Participants were informed that the research was about careers and decision-making, and in this sense a framework for invoking a discussion of risk was offered. The interviews included questions about trust in employers and support networks, level of knowledge about future options, and consequences (financial and otherwise) when plans do not work out. Importantly, the intergenerational approach allowed us to examine similarities and differences across generations. Although such similarities and differences *can* be due to variations over the life course, the presence of quite broad age bands within both the parent and offspring generation mitigates the impact of life course position. Moreover, a study of parents and offspring is useful because it reduces the impact of variations in external factors; parents and their children are, for example, likely to have similar religious and cultural backgrounds.

Risk and decision-making

In the next section we present and discuss the biographical accounts of the parent generation, before turning to those of their children, whom we collectively refer to as the offspring generation. Our immediate concern is with grasping the quintessential characteristics of the individual generations' account and their rooting in the respective historical context. Our next concern is to match parents to their children and to make linkages across generations. We explore circumstances that generate matching and non-matching experiences and, importantly, accounts of these experiences. As will become apparent,

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we witnessed both stability and change across generations, it is not only experiences but also their framing or interpretation that frequently separated the generations. This said, in the presentation and discussion of difference and separateness it is important not to lose sight of the, often considerable, overlap between the experiences and accounts of both generations. Both during the interviews and at the analysis stage, when reading stories of the two groups of participants, it became apparent that participants from both generations anchored their accounts in different forms of reflexivity that left room for both mediated reaction and immediate reflex.

Some of our participants mainly presented themselves as planners and active decision-makers. They were individualistic in their outlook, and typically aware of different options available to them in terms of labour market participation. They presented narratives suffused with notions of choice, planning, individual control, action and decision-making. We call them *planners*.

A second group of participants mainly presented themselves as people forced by circumstances beyond their control as they entered the labour market or experienced changes in their labour market participation, such as redundancy, unemployment, or changing employer. Whenever possible, people in this group 'played it safe' by relying on what family and friends had done before them – they went into traditional labour market trajectories. They valued a secure income over alternative opportunities and possible instability (we call them *safe-players*). The narratives from this group were often suffused with notions of tradition, limited opportunities and choice, and financial need.

A third and final group of participants mainly presented themselves as highly flexible individuals, or as people who were 'going with the flow' or 'taking one day at a time'. Narratives from this group are characterized by a combination of predetermined objectives and potential or actual deviations from these, experimentation with perceived options and opportunities, flexibility and a general lack of worrying about the future (our short-hand for this group is *surfers*). People in this group may 'surf' when opportunities arise, but might also skip 'a good surf' without much regret. They are very flexible in their outlook, and do not worry much. They are aware of different options but do not necessarily think it is worthwhile to pursue them.

In most of the biographical stories, either the 'planner', the 'safe-player' or the 'surfer' narratives were predominant. In some, however, a more mixed self-presentation and understanding came to the fore, either as a constant complexity or as a marked change over time resulting from life changes or transitions (we revisit this issue later).

Our sample consists of individuals with an attachment to the labour market, which might itself propagate the value placed on labour market participation. The research participants portrayed themselves as having a strong work ethic, including a commitment to provide for the family and a deep hesitation, even resentment, towards becoming dependent on the welfare state, and the notion that it was important to avoid idleness. As such, a strong Protestant work ethic and attitude towards life (Weber, 2001) shone through the biographical narratives. What differed between individuals and between generations, however, were the ways in which individuals entered the labour market, how they made decisions about changes in their employment and their more general perceptions of risk and control in relation to paid work.

Generational pathways to the labour market: The parent generation

Typically, members of the parent generation presented narratives in which forces beyond their own control were decisive in relation to their first entry into the labour market. By and large, they were 'safe-players': 18 of the 29 parent narratives mainly displayed 'safe-player' attitudes and experiences. Seven individuals in the parent generation mainly presented 'surfer' identities, while four perceived themselves as a 'planner'. While three of the 'planners' among the parents had left school early, one undertook a four-year university degree and became a teacher. All but two of the 'safe-players' had left school early, while the 'surfers' in the parent generation displayed a more mixed picture of both early school-leavers and individuals achieving higher education.

Options and choices in terms of educational and employment opportunities were often quite limited for the parent generation. Many families from a manual or working-class background, who formed the majority of participants from the older generation in our study, were simply not in a position to support their children through further education beyond compulsory schooling, and for some families it was necessary to send children to work in order to obtain much needed additional income to support family needs. Ingrid (aged 67) was a typical representative of her generation. She remembered having three options when she left school at the age of 15: shop, factory or office work. Her father would not let her work in a factory, and said she would be working 'all hours' at a shop, so office work was presented as the best option. Her mother took her to find an office job at a company where her brother was already employed, and she got a job there without being interviewed for it. Ingrid was expected to contribute for her board at the family home. Her mother also helped Ingrid to change jobs later on, by contacting someone she knew who then offered Ingrid a job. 'So I just went along, they weren't advertising', said Ingrid, who thought that it would be difficult to obtain a job in the same informal way today. Ingrid often wishes she had become a nurse, but reflects that she has had limited opportunities and choices.

James (77) was another typical representative of the parent generation. The oldest of 10 children, he left school at the age of 14, and recalled that he had three choices when he was 15: iron works, upholstery or the railway. James made a conscious decision to go for what he perceived as the least risky employer, namely the railway, which was the biggest employer in the area. Moreover, his father, who already worked for the railway, helped him get a job by arranging an interview. James worked on the railway all his life.

Many of the 'safe-players' reminisced about previous times when it was possible to obtain 'a job for life' upon entering the labour market. To them, a job for life presented something positive, as secure, long-term jobs enabled people to worry less about possible redundancies and unemployment. The interviewees clearly saw the option of having a job for life as something belonging to the past; as something rather unachievable in today's labour market.

Among the parent generation, the narratives were not permeated by any strong sense of risk in relation to entry into the labour market. Although options were in many cases limited, there were no instances where members of the parent generation were left with no choice at all. Furthermore, they were able to rely to a large extent on personal networks

and in a few cases also on institutions like the Labour Exchange if such networks were non-existent, when seeking entry to the labour market. Pathways to employment were thus usually determined by (limited) local opportunities and personal networks consisting of family and friends and their connections to local employers.[1] Our findings complement those of previous research in emphasizing the stability and security offered to young people entering the labour market through the guidance and opportunities provided by significant others such as family members or peers (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007: 8).

Major employers, such as the railway, or the mining and textile industries, gave young people the opportunity to enter the local labour market. Besides class background, options depended on what your local area could offer, as the geographical mobility of individuals was limited due to lack of transport and other factors. Mildred (68), for example, left school at 15, and was presented with only one option as her mother found her a job in a factory where her older sister already worked. As soon as Mildred grew in confidence and experience, however, she realized there were other factories in her area that offered better pay, and she actually found it easy to change jobs: 'Well, jobs were available then. I mean if you didn't like a job today you got another job tomorrow. It was, it was so easy.' There were three big factories in Mildred's local area, and the second job she found was at a factory where her aunt had previously worked. If you were offered a job at one of these factories, 'you'd got a job for life if you wanted it. Nowadays nobody can say that, that they've got a job for life because they haven't', said Mildred. The main driving force for labour market participation among study participants from the parent generation was financial need. Money to pay for housing, food and clothing for the family has been the most important employment outcome for this cohort. In other words, 'playing it safe' was considered the best course of action.

Paul (80) was one of the few individuals in our sample who had relied on institutional assistance to get jobs. He came from a small town and used the Labour Exchange twice to get jobs: the first time when leaving school at 14 years of age and then again a few years later. Paul had limited job opportunities, but in hindsight he felt that the jobs he did have had been his choice, that he had made the right decisions and that he had been in control of his career promotions and progression.

Paul's case highlighted an important gender difference we found typical for this generation: it was primarily the men (and husbands) of the parent generation who felt in control of their decisions, even within the constraints of their local employment markets and the expectations of their own parents and peers. The women (and wives) had fewer options, were more strongly guided by tradition and their parents, and ultimately curtailed in their choices by their partners. The labour market also provided fewer opportunities, especially as these women had rarely benefited from more than the minimum of (compulsory) education. The parent generation in our sample was typically conscious of the structural constraints imposed on their career choices by their social background; that is, their need to secure an income for themselves and for their family. While social conditions forced both men and women to seek 'safe' employment, men, more so than women, described their efforts as seeking these opportunities proactively and portrayed their choices as primarily their own. Even though they presented what Beck describes as 'standard life histories' (Beck, 2000: 70), it is important to note that 'playing it safe' also involves elements of choice, decision-making and control. Although a job for life and job

security were clearly available in the Fordist era, people who entered and participated in the labour market at that time were also actively factoring in such elements in deciding on their course of action. They were acutely aware that choosing differently would increase the risk of instability and insecurity in terms of income.

Although the parent generation conceded that obtaining secure employment had become more difficult and employment itself more precarious for their children than had been the case for themselves, both women and, especially, men of this generation had been alert to the need for secure employment and sought to select employers on that basis. But this appeared easier to them than how they perceived their children's choices today. The parent generation was concerned about not going to work for the 'wrong' employer – someone whose business might go under, for whatever reason. Men appeared particularly sensitive to job insecurity, possibly because they sensed the effects job loss might have on their future role as breadwinners. This generation was aware of risk; that is, the risk of economic failure. But it also felt it was able to control this risk, which was calculable to the extent that the men and women felt able to judge if their (prospective) employer was of the kind that would remain in business for more than the foreseeable future, ideally for the duration of their working lives.

Generational pathways to the labour market: The offspring generation

Clear changes in people's approaches to job seeking and their work orientations had taken place by the time the offspring generation entered the labour market. On the whole, the offspring generation reported less reliance on family, friends and institutions than we found among the parent generation. Predominantly, the offspring generation perceived themselves either as active decision-makers in charge of their careers, as 'going with the flow' and having a flexible attitude towards career opportunities, or as a mixture of these two seemingly contradictory identities. Overall, their biographical narratives were markedly suffused with the notion of individualized choice and responsibility in relation to labour market participation. Although having a wide range of opportunities was to some extent valued positively, many also felt overwhelmed by the (career) choices that they faced. Only eight offspring individuals 'played it safe' by following traditional trajectories that primarily offered job security.

Rebecca (23) was a typical representative of the offspring generation. After completing her university degree she had taken a job and deferred her plans for postgraduate education for a year. She had doubts about going back to university, as she also had ideas for a private business. She was constantly weighing her options: 'Should I, shouldn't I?' She associated her indecision with the fact that she had lots of opportunities and options in terms of what direction to take. Although she appreciated having many options, it made it hard for her to choose a particular direction. Any and all choices would contribute to the making of her biography and self-identity. Rebecca was used to making her own decisions and liked to be in control of what she was doing. Her motive in seeking a job was to stay financially independent from a future husband, to enjoy a high standard of living and to be a valued member of society. She saw herself as having more choices and options than her mother, to whom she made repeated references. The mother, Amelia (62),

had been instructed by her father and cousin to work at a particular company after finishing compulsory schooling. Amelia's options had been further impeded by an early start to her own family and by her husband's expectations for her to be a housewife. Rebecca reflected that she did not want to find herself in a similar position to her mother, and insisted that she would make her own choices despite any objections or resistance from her parents. She was not sure if she was always choosing the right course of action, 'and sometimes it feels really risky, but it will always be something positive', said Rebecca.

Another example of a discontinuity in outlooks between the parent and the offspring generation was that of Isabella (37) and her mother Ingrid (67), whom we described earlier. Similar to Amelia in the above example, Ingrid had experienced limited choice and opportunity in terms of labour market entry and participation. Unlike her daughter Isabella some decades later, Ingrid was comparatively resigned to this fact – if not content with it. Isabella, on the other hand, had been at the same company since leaving school at the age of 18, but had been through numerous job changes and had taken on more and increasingly challenging responsibilities within the company. She was confident, had career aspirations and cared a great deal about her own success. Her biographical narrative was suffused with the notion of individual agency and choice. She saw herself as having made opportunities for herself by taking risks within the company, by pushing herself forward to take on new roles and responsibilities. Her narrative was also contradictory, as she claimed not to think about the future. Yet she had balanced her career risk-taking by obtaining some financial security through home ownership and a private pension. Isabella described herself as sensible in not spending everything she earned. Security was important to her, and she was keenly aware that her job might not be for life: 'Work is something these days that is not a given, it's not a permanent [thing].' Although she cared about the financial security a job could and did give her, her driver for change was 'stimulation and challenge'. Self-satisfaction was thus a deeply rooted motivation in her work. She was also aware of the generational differences between herself and her mother: 'Because everything that I've said has been me, me, me, hasn't it?' Her mother, on the other hand, had always made her decisions with a view to other people around her, including husband and children.

Peter (47), son of Paul (80), whom we met earlier, provided in many respects a contrast to Isabella. While Isabella had worked for the same company but in different and increasingly challenging roles over the years, Peter had been in and out of jobs with various employers. His father Paul had, we recall, found work through the Labour Exchange, while Peter, after obtaining a university degree, found it hard to get a job using the now typical means of newspaper job sections and job centres. He also found it difficult to choose what to do, and sent out applications for a range of different jobs. He had about 50 interviews before being offered his first job in which he stayed for three and a half years. He then changed job within the company and stayed another two and a half years before changing jobs again. He always worried about possible redundancy, and maintained a constant vigilance of the job market, 'just in case'. He described the last two and a half years at the company as a 'high anxiety period', with 'no feeling of job security'. He was eventually made redundant by the company he worked for next, and remained unemployed for a while. From then on, his career involved repeated moves between short, temporary contracts and unemployment.

Despite his financial instability, however, Peter found it more important 'to have the right kind of job' than to receive the added benefits a job can offer (e.g. a company car or financial shares). Although it was important for him to work from an economic point of view, he would also have liked to be able 'to make a difference' through his job. In his current position he enjoyed job security, as he was working for a government agency. Feeling that something was missing, however, and that he needed more inspiration in his work, he was looking for a new job. As a consequence of the instabilities in his employment history, he found it difficult to trust anyone. He was very aware that the economy and market forces affected job seekers, and felt that he had 'been able to make the best decisions that the market has allowed'. He insisted that he had made his own choices and not been influenced by family or friends. In his view he was not to be blamed for the 'bad timing' associated with his entry into the job market and subsequent job changes. Rather, these events had been marked by constraints produced by economic and societal factors. Peter was thus caught between individualized responsibility, so typical of Beck's risk regime, and structural constraints placed on individual agency, or between what Beck calls the placing of each person's biography 'in his or her own hands, open and dependent on decisions' and the constraints produced by the economy, the labour market and consumerism (Beck, 1992: 135, 131).

Among the three examples we have used of individuals from the offspring generation, at 47, Peter was the oldest. Despite his wish to combine a self-fulfilling career with a stable income, he had been unable to construct and develop the career track that Isabella had built for herself, after a period of indecision not dissimilar to Rebecca's current experience. While Peter did his best to obtain both interesting and secure jobs through actively and continuously seeking employment, his labour market participation is marked by periods of temporary and short-term employment, redundancies and unemployment. Similar to Isabella, Peter has an individualistic outlook, in that he sees himself as having been responsible for his own life and for making his own decisions. In Peter's narrative, however, 'market forces' or 'the economy' are depicted as limiting his ability to create a continuous career for himself. In the end, therefore, although Peter accepts his own responsibility, he is also adamant that his options and opportunities have been limited by structural forces over which he has no control.

Narrative shifts and continuities between generations

These brief but representative summaries of the narratives presented by the participants in our study highlight a remarkable shift in the experiences of labour market entry and the approaches with which individuals, faced with rather different choices, initiated their careers. Along with the accounts of these experiences, perceptions of past and present altered from labour market entry as an almost fixed trajectory to – at least for some – a variable, if not flexible development path that tolerated experimenting in options to a previously unknown degree. These accounts were grounded in different and at times novel perceptions of the scope for individual self-determination.

Unlike the parent generation, there was not one singular discourse that dominated among the offspring generation. Rather, the majority of them displayed elements of the 'planner' and 'surfer' narratives. This generation, if anything, appeared to be characterized

by a diversity that occasionally paired with rootlessness. The rootlessness of 'surfers' was both geographical and developmental, marking a lack of fixation on (career) objectives in stark contrast to the purpose-driven accounts of some of their peers (the 'planners'). Julia (30), for example, stated that 'I've just gone along with things and whatever path it's taken me to, I've just gone with it and I'll see what comes out at the end of it.'

In our sample we encountered a self-confidence and assertiveness among the offspring generation that had rarely been recalled by the parent generation. This assertiveness was reflected in accounts of active individual decision-making, driven by aspirations for upward mobility, awareness of choices and options, desire for self-fulfilment in a career and a break from reliance on family and from family tradition. These individuals felt in control, they were planning for the future and ready to take risks to achieve their ambitions. Education played a key role in this, as did awareness of options and opportunities, something that had been denied many of the parent generation.

However, as our findings suggest, career-driven, active decision-making was not the only type of risk discourse among the offspring generation. We also found the offspring generation characterizing their early labour market experiences as often experimental, sometimes confusing and not infrequently resulting in reversions and 'corrections'. Many in the offspring generation predominantly described their experiences as lacking a clear target to aim for, resulting in opportunistic drifting, a 'going with the flow' that grasped opportunities as they appeared – naturally unforeseen – without specific consideration for their effect on or contributions to the construction of careers in the long term. This was not the result of a lack of awareness of alternative options, but of a decision not to make use of them. This behavioural pattern was not exclusive to the offspring generation as also some members of the parent generation had, especially in their earlier careers, opted for this experimental strategy that allowed them to delay decisions about their eventual career destinations, even for several years. However, the presence of 'surfer' narratives increased markedly from one generation to the next.

Among the parent generation, we found a majority of individuals who described their labour market entries as virtually predetermined and their own development path as ultimately beyond their personal control. Not only were choices more limited than today (as acknowledged by this generation), participants from the parent generation also often pointed out that they simply had not been aware of alternative options. Their reliance on family, friends and local institutions (such as the Labour Exchange) in obtaining their first – and later – jobs reflected the absence of known alternatives as much as they perpetuated this limited perspective. But this did not matter much, because at the heart of their labour market choices was financial need, not the satisfaction of personal aspirations. Of course, the emerging postwar middle class of service workers generated new ambitions within a new economic environment, fostered by an expanding, but still exclusionary system of secondary education. For the majority of the parent generation in our sample, however, the primary risk concern was to keep control over everyday life basics such as provision of home and food for family. The future was not and could not be planned, although individuals were worried about it and felt disempowered by their own lack of control. This was the dominant discourse among 18 of the 29 participants from the parent generation. Among the offspring generation, this discourse was dominant among only 8 of the 29 participants. All members of the offspring generation displaying

a 'safe-player' narrative were children of parents who presented similar stories. With few exceptions, the two generations of 'safe-players' shared similar working-class locations and were early school-leavers. Such continuities, however, neither imply a direct nor a wholesale transmission of values and outlooks, as there may be a mix of shared and not shared narrative elements from one generation to the next. Moreover, continuities may be a reflection of shared socioeconomic background (Scabini and Marta, 2006: 85).

In all, our sample contained comparatively few cases (10 pairs, or roughly one-third of the sample) of fundamental cross-generational similarity in risk perception and career decision-making, while a further one-third (10 pairs) displayed a mix of shared and not shared narrative elements, and the final third (9 pairs) consisted of fundamentally dissimilar generational pairs that demonstrated discontinuities in risk perception and career decision-making. In eight of the nine dissimilar pairs the parent member displayed full or mixed 'safe-player' narratives, while none of the children in these pairs narrated similar orientations. Rather, these eight children were either predominantly 'surfers' (5) or 'planners' (3). Such juxtapositions between generations affirm the disjuncture within modernity posited by Beck (1992) between a 'collectivized past' and a present characterized by a heightened and individualized perception of risk. However, our empirical evidence of both cross-generational continuities and discontinuities indicates that the disjuncture is rather muddy and complex.

Just as the detection of continuity or similarity between generations is not synonymous with direct transmission of risk perceptions from one generation to the next, a lack of similarity does not necessarily imply failure of transmission (Scabini and Marta, 2006: 87). It is likely that general societal changes in values, outlooks and practices from one generation to the next have a significant impact on generational changes within families. For example, structural changes in the labour market might facilitate changes in how individuals view opportunities and constraints in relation to their own labour market participation. Along these lines Furlong and Cartmel (2007: 2) argue that social structures continue to be important for individuals' life chances, but because such structures are increasingly obscured, people now perceive the world as more unpredictable and risky than before. Furthermore, even though a lack of similarity can be detected between parents and their offspring in relation to some of the values they attach to labour market participation (earning money vs self-realization), other values that are of importance to labour market attachment (work ethic, socializing with other people) seem to remain constant across generations. As stated earlier, all the participants in our study presented themselves as having a strong work ethic, even though the motivation to take on work seems to have developed from taking on paid work to provide for self and family to taking on paid work to fulfil personal aspirations and enhance personal life quality in combination with securing an income. A broader examination of values and outlooks would present a greater potential for generational transmission but remains outside the remit of our qualitative research.

Conclusion

We have examined how people from different generations narrate their own life history in relation to risk perceptions and decision-making in the context of labour market entry

and participation. Our observation is that important changes have taken place from one generation to the next, from more predetermined trajectories for the parent generation to more individualized, flexible and open-ended trajectories for the offspring generation. Importantly, these changes are gradual and complex, as evidenced by the continuities and discontinuities identified in the biographical narratives of our research participants.

Among the older generation, and especially among those with a working-class background, we found that individuals often used networks consisting of family members and friends, and in a few cases relied on institutional support from public job agencies, in order to obtain entry to the labour market. Many in the parent generation were happy to be in a 'job for life', as this provided a secure income. Money was most often the driving force for the parent generation's participation in the labour market. Although the local employment market and personal networks were important in determining their job opportunities, we found no pervasive sense of risk among members of the parent generation. In the words of one individual, John (74), 'there was always some sort of work'. In a sense it is community and family life, and aspirations in terms of earning your way and not being a burden on society, that take centre stage in the biographical narratives of the parent generation.

Among the offspring generation, however, it is the individual that increasingly takes centre stage in the biographical narratives, supporting Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's view that individualization both *permits* and *demands* active individual involvement (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 4). The new generation has been presented with many more options and opportunities than the older generation, and this in turn has made it more difficult to choose any particular path. The development of self-identity and satisfaction seems to hinge on the ability to make the right choices in an often confusing world. This generation is risk aware, and individuals find themselves in a more or less constant self-doubt where they are unsure whether they are actually making the right choices. Individuals are also actively seeking and taking on risks as they may seize opportunities that come along. Risk awareness, however, does not necessarily imply risk preparedness, and many lament that they have no job security or investments for the future. For this generation, the labour market is constantly changing, and jobs are perceived as more volatile and less secure than in the past. Individualized biographies are being worked on and produced in an environment where the individual is still faced with structural constraints. These are no longer produced by the limits of local employment markets and personal networks of friends and family, but by the global economy, the demands of the labour market and consumerism (Beck, 1992). Under such conditions, social relationships (including those in the labour market) can neither be dictated by others nor calculated in advance (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 151).

At the same time, societal changes towards individualization and less of a reliance on tradition appear to have influenced the ways in which members of the offspring generation have been met with more opportunities and also their increased ability to make individual choices. In some cases offspring have resisted parental influences through individual agency, but in this process they have been aided by societal changes in how we all apply for and obtain work.

What is different for the offspring generation when compared to the parent generation is that their biographies are much more individualized and suffused with notions of agency and risk. Their social context is also more uncertain – not only has planning

(active decision-making) become uncertain of its outcomes, but 'safe-playing' hardly seems a viable alternative in a basically insecure (labour market) environment. Perhaps 'surfing' is the better option, as it is based on a flexible attitude to life and chances where 'the risk of taking a risk' is downplayed. Whereas the parent generation invoked a sense of risk in relation to the possible negative outcome of choosing the 'wrong employer' (and not in choosing between different alternatives), the current generation senses a more fundamental uncertainty – a randomness they feel unable to command – the only certainty is the absence of lasting conditions. Their coping method is self-belief and self-reliance – the repeated utterance of 'I can do it', 'my responsibility', 'my choice', 'my decision'. From this perspective there is hardly any room for structures (they have become invisible or obscured, as posited by Furlong and Cartmel, 2007); individual agency is perceived as everything in a world fraught with insecurity.

The offspring generation appears to have responded to these conditions of uncertainty with both (Beck's) re-flex and (Giddens') re-action. These people leapt at sudden opportunities or carefully planned their next strike. Following its erosion as the dominant behavioural concept, there has not been a wholesale replacement of 'safe-playing' by active planning and development of self-determined careers. Instead, 'surfing', experimenting and 'going with the flow' have emerged alongside active planning and decision-making as a prominent strategy for career construction and identity formation. While some place planning, progression and self-correction at the centre of their identity, others seek identity in more experimental ways through flexibility, adaptability and adjustment. Re-flex as well as re-action become viable alternative options for constructing one's (career) biography in late modern risk society. Neither is a feature unique to risk society. What is new is the framework and context in which re-flex and re-action occur: the modern risk regime with its profound uncertainties.

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Note

1. Cartmel (2004) has found the same to be true today among young people in rural labour markets in Scotland. Grieco (1987) has argued that kinship networks are particularly important for individuals from working-class backgrounds who seek employment.

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Deprofessionalization of a female occupation: Challenges for the sociology of professions

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Abstract
This article argues that Norwegian public health nurses, after a long period of professionalization, have recently undergone a process of deprofessionalization. Public health nurses' jurisdiction has become heavily circumscribed. They have lost duties linked with power and respect in the local community and they have lost monopoly on duties originally ascribed to the profession. Despite these changes, this study indicates a conspicuous lack of open disputes, conflicts or demands centred on jurisdiction and jurisdictional claims. In other words, the manner in which public health nurses cope with recent changes in their job structure does not seem to follow an easily explainable pattern in terms of prevailing sociological theories on professions. It is argued that the sociology of professions needs to develop theories that can explain why deprofessionalization sometimes occurs without resistance.

Keywords
deprofessionalization, female occupations, Norwegian context, professionalization, sociology of professions

Introduction

The neo-Weberian theory of closure has had a strong impact on the sociology of professions. Within this framework professional organizations are understood as guards of self-interest, they claim monopoly on duties, strive to expand their area of jurisdiction and protect their domains. Collective interests are for instance pursued by responding defensively to the attempts of others to secure an advantage at their expense (Brante, 1988; Davies, 1996; Hellberg, 1999; Macdonald, 1995; Witz, 1992). Inspiration in such studies is sought in Max Weber's (1968) works, and his claims of social groups' inclination to

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maximize rewards and privileges with the purpose of closing off social and economic opportunities to outsiders. Writers distinguish between different strategies: exclusionary closure is used in intra-occupational relationships often when an occupational group is trying to achieve upward mobility in a professional hierarchical setting. Demarcationary closure aims for inter-occupational control over the affairs of related or adjacent occupations (Macdonald, 1995; Witz, 1990: 678). Inter-occupational conflicts are among Andrew Abbott's (1988) subject matters. Abbott turns the focus towards the actual work that professions perform within a specific division of labour, and towards, as he says: 'a fundamental fact of professional life – inter-professional competition' (Abbott, 1988: 2).[1] In this competition occupations struggle to obtain control over work, and to defend and if possible to extend their boundaries. Abbott conceptualizes the link between professions and the work they control by the notion of jurisdiction.

Here, we follow up Abbott's concern with what is going on in the room occupied by more than one group of workers. The arena is public health services in Norwegian municipalities, and the actors are predominantly female professionals. Within this context we have singled out one particular profession which is public health nurses (PHNs). Through a thorough examination of their work we have uncovered changes which could be understood as a *deprofessionalization* of this occupational group.[2] Over a short period of time PHNs have lost several duties and lost their monopoly over others. The profession has also lost some of its former status and power. This transformation is in part due to legislative changes, health care reforms and a number of other occupational groups competing for some of PHNs' traditional tasks. We have also looked into the ways in which PHNs deal with the challenges they face that could be understood as a threat to their profession. Our data lend no support to the closure theory. PHNs seem not to follow the course of action which, according to this perspective, is seen as normal when competition for 'livelihood' develops, e.g. defending niches of their work. In this article we discuss possible ways of understanding such lack of resistance towards significant changes, especially the importance of gender.

By drawing attention to processes at play between professionals in neighbouring occupations dominated by women on an equal footing in terms of educational background, we not only contribute to a broader understanding of inter-professional processes and occupational change, we also add to the body of knowledge on gendered dimensions of professional work. In the 1970s, feminist scholars raised awareness around the inherent androcentrism of sociological perspectives on professions (e.g. Crompton, 1987; Kanter, 1977; Witz, 1990, 1992). At the time theories and concepts reflected male values and male experiences, and neither patriarchal practices nor mechanisms of male dominance were recognized. This critique has been supported by studies of agents positioned within gender relations of dominance and subordination, for instance in the medical division of labour, health care services included (e.g. Benoit, 1994; Dahle, 2003; Davies, 1996; Witz, 1990, 1992). In her discussion of the complex and varied processes of gendered occupational closure, Anne Witz (1990, 1992) has unpacked how male professionals, as part of their professional project, have blocked careers of female professionals, or stopped them from entering into the profession or into certain domains of the profession, by for instance controlling access to

education. Witz locates the ways in which demarcation and exclusionary strategies operate to sustain patriarchal modes of closure, but she also unfolds how women, in their usurpation struggle, have successfully mobilized counterstrategies, by for instance parliamentary means. The concept of *dual closure*, as used by Witz, indicates a two-way exercise of power, and captures countervailing responses of occupational groups hit by demarcationary strategies and these groups' exclusionary strategies over their subordinates.[3] Here Witz demonstrates that women also apply various exclusionary strategies, a subject Rannveig Dahle (2003) pursues. Celia Davies (1996) lingers on the gender-blindness that Crompton (1987) and others are concerned with. Davies argues that features of work involved in values traditionally associated with masculinity and femininity, respectively, have not been fully recognized in theoretical perspectives. Historically, values embedded in the notion of professional practice reflected a masculine project and repressed or denied qualities culturally assigned to femininity (Davies, 1996: 669). Autonomy, Davies underscores, still stands at the very heart of the concept of profession, and of cultural concepts of masculinity, whereas connectedness, which culturally has been associated with femininity, is a less prestigious feature of professional work.[4]

Profession, as a concept, is variously defined in sociology. Lack of agreement is expressed in positions taken by, for instance, Abbott (1988, 2002), who, briefly, claims that any expert occupation that competes for workplace jurisdiction is a profession, and David Sciulli (2005), for whom monopoly over specialized knowledge is crucial. Sciulli argues for the necessity to distinguish between professions and other middle-class occupations because of the different role these groups play in society.[5] We use the term profession, with reference to public health nurses, to capture and explicate occupational changes. This is in line with Eliot Freidson (2001), who contends that the idea of professionalism is an intellectual construct, intended to serve as a stable standard for analytical purposes. Our use of the concept also follows Norwegian sociologist Ulf Torgersen. He defines a profession as an occupation based on 'a specialized education, in which everyone undergoing the education seeks to engage in a specific occupation, and that this occupation exclusively recruits persons with the specialized education' (Torgersen, 1972: 10). Torgersen (1972) and Abbott (1988) both stress that monopolizing duties is critical for an occupational group's successfully becoming professionalized. If the opposite occurs, that is, when a certain occupation's jurisdiction or area of responsibility is reduced, and when occupational duties become less specialized, then we may speak of *deprofessionalization*.[6]

In order to present an adequate picture of the development which we view as a deprofessionalization process and to understand what has happened over the last decades, it is necessary to look at the history of how the Norwegian PHN occupation was established. Thus, we first present a rough outline of the occupation's development in the first half of the 20th century, which we characterize as a *professionalization process*. We are looking into processes leading up to monopoly on duties and to a certain jurisdiction within the field of public health. Processes that follow other key professional traits such as attaining prestige are also emphasized. We identify a turning point in the early 1980s, when the opposite process began to take place.

PHNs' professionalization process

Successful struggle for competence and duties

Formal education for PHNs in Norway was established after intensive debates and battles in the interwar period. Medical doctors called for qualified nurses to take care of a backlog of unfinished tasks and a mounting workload within the field of public health, and they took the initiative to set up a separate education for PHNs. Some of the duties in question had for several decades been carried out by nurses, deaconesses, 'parish sisters' and district midwives, but no occupational group was considered qualified for all the urgent activities. The prospect for a PHN education was first discussed in a County Medical Officer's meeting in 1922 (Andersen, 1938; Wiik, 1997). Reports and proposals were then drawn up, and after repeated delays a final plan was approved. There were several reasons for the delays. One was a disagreement on routes to certification. The Norwegian Nurses' Organization (NNO) strived to ensure a high qualification level of nursing education and voiced claims on both admission requirements and training of PHNs. A three-year education for all registered nurses had been on the agenda since 1912, when the organization was founded (Martinsen, 1991). The NNO also demanded that studies for various branches of nursing be built on an unabridged three-year basic education. On this issue the nurses met resistance. Prior to proposals for PHN education there had been a prolonged debate on education for district nurses. The NNO's women fought battles against the male elite within the medical establishment, the Norwegian Medical Association and the National Health Authorities. Doctors argued in favour of an abbreviated nursing training as entry requirement for education of district nurses. Their reasoning was legitimated by sociopolitical concerns: the need for a large number of nurses over a short period of time (Melby, 1990: 77). The NNO met the arguments for more nurses with arguments for better qualified nurses. Representatives of the NNO argued that many weakly qualified nurses were beneficial neither for society nor for registered nurses. Service quality was crucial to these women. Yet at the same time, they were concerned with the occupation's status and with building professional prestige. They managed to delay the parliament's approval of authorization for nurses until it was clear that a Bill on three-year basic education would pass (Melby, 1990).

The NNO also fought against opposing forces in the case of PHN education. Both the Norwegian Medical Association and voluntary organizations running nursing schools voiced counterarguments (Martinsen and Wærness, 1978). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, nurses were offered short-term courses in PHN work. Conflicts around qualifications resulted in competitive courses. The NNO set up its own courses which built on the three-year nursing education, while doctors and voluntary organizations ran courses building on shorter education. The arguments for recommending abridged nursing studies for this education echoed the arguments in the case of district nurses, i.e. the need to educate as many PHNs as possible in the shortest possible length of time. This model was adopted from the Rockefeller Committee's report and recommendations for PHN education in the US (Andersen, 1938; Martinsen, 1991).[7]

Other issues were also under debate in the interwar years. Among these were questions such as which competencies were necessary for performing pressing preventive

tasks, and if all tasks should be performed by one single occupational group. In the 1930s, an open dispute broke out between nurses and midwives, over which of the two occupational groups was best qualified to run infant control clinics (Martinsen, 1991; Sandvik, 1995). With infant control clinics increasing in number, the need for qualified personnel was great. According to the planned scheme, educated PHNs were supposed to carry out this work. Yet at the time, due to the declining birth rate and a decrease in the number of home births, there was an excess of midwives. The Norwegian Midwives' Association therefore fought intense battles in order for its members to formally be considered qualified for carrying out such duties. With support from obstetricians, particularly the younger guard, midwives to some extent prevailed in their arguments. Changes in the 1937 Midwifery Act allowed midwives to work in infant control clinics and also to perform other PHN work *if* the District Medical Officer (hereafter referred to as DMO) found reason for it. This led to intense protests from the NNO, which was adamant that a midwife's one-year education did not sufficiently qualify her for carrying out such work. The battle between midwives and nurses was not restricted to Norway, but also played out in other European countries (Sandvik, 1995). In the end, the Norwegian nurses prevailed. Backed by paediatricians, DMOs, county medical officers, voluntary organizations and, finally, Karl Evang, the legendary director of the National Board of Health, the contested duties were defined as duties for registered nurses.

In the battle over a minimum three-year basic nurse's training for those to be enrolled in PHN courses, the NNO refused to give up its demand, and in 1934 the Norwegian Medical Association capitulated. Also in negotiations with the Norwegian central government, the nurses prevailed in their demand. The Ministry of Social Affairs drew up recommendations for PHN education in 1937 as well as 1946. Both proposals were founded on an unabbreviated three-year nursing school. When it came to parliament the first proposal was voted down (Andersen, 1938). In 1946, however, the mood among politically elected officials had changed, and a one-year PHN course built on the back of a full-length nurse's training was approved. While, at the time, education of registered nurses was run by either hospitals or voluntary organizations, education of public health nurses was placed under state control (Evang, 1947, 1972; NOU, 1984:28). The first students matriculated in January 1947. Ten years later, through the 1957 Public Health Nursing Service Act, it was prescribed that PHN services should be made available on a national scale.

Enlarging the scope of practice

The Public Health Nursing Service Act of 1957 outlined two main areas upon which PHNs should focus: (1) health-related work, which, in relation to public health laws or in some other way, naturally fell under the rubric of public health, and (2) information (health education) and counselling activities with a view towards strengthening and assuring community health, partly through initiatives for improving the cleanliness of the environment, and partly through educational outreach to mothers, youth and other vulnerable population groups, on the subject of personal hygiene (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1974). Among the key themes were nutrition, personal and domestic hygiene, postnatal care and child care, assessing infant health and home visits to families with

newborn children. In the early years high priority was given to tasks such as tuberculin-testing and vaccination of the entire population (to stop in particular poliomyelitis and tuberculosis from spreading). Environmental hygiene included several duties of both a technical-hygienic and a social-medical nature. Food safety testing comprised a significant part of the activity. Testing drinking water was included, as was inspection of kitchens in hotels and restaurants, dairies, slaughter houses and freezers in food stores. Further duties were uncovering sanitary defects and inspecting hygienic conditions at hotels, inns, hair salons and the like, and also testing soil contamination, sometimes accomplished by taking samples of silage effluents.

During the first decades PHNs' scope of practice expanded. Some of the added tasks were regulated by law, either the 1957 Public Health Nursing Service Act or the Parent and Child Health Service Act of 1972 (Ot.prp. 65, 1970–1).[8] PHNs were given responsibility for assessing families wanting to adopt children, helping people who needed homes, passing on help to the functionally disabled and overseeing the care of mental illness sufferers living in the local community. The Parent and Child Health Service Act gave PHNs the legal right to take care of duties concerned with family planning and contraception. These were duties district midwives used to have – but which now, by law, were designated as PHN duties.[9]

The initial conception of the Norwegian PHN was for her to be the DMO's 'right hand' and to *assist* him/her in tasks concerning public health (NOU, 1984:28). Meanwhile, many of the duties the PHN and DMO were supposed to carry out in partnership, fell, in practice, solely on the PHN, because the DMO, who was also often the only medical doctor in the district, found himself heavily encumbered with curative duties. In other words, *in practice*, the PHN functioned minimally as the DMO's assistant, and was actually quite independent, especially in rural districts (Glavin and Kvarme, 2003).

PHN as an authority figure

From an early stage PHNs were in close proximity to decision-making bodies, both at the regional and the local level. They had their workplace in municipalities, but they were all employed by the County Medical Office with a County Public Health Nursing Officer as administrative leader and a close collaborating partner. At the municipality level PHNs had an influential position, both through their close collaboration with the DMO and through their involvement in ***health councils***. This institution processed, for instance, cases concerning environmental hygiene and sanitation. The DMO was chairperson of the council, and the PHN acted as council secretary. Responsibility for carrying out duties allocated to the health councils fell, to a great extent, on the DMO and other functionaries in the health council, among them the PHN. In small municipalities the health council consisted of only the PHN and the DMO. Through health council duties the PHN became both a visible and a power-wielding figure in the municipality (Paulsen, 1990). Norway was the only Nordic country to add technical-hygiene testing and sanitary inspections to PHN work (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1974). Although an unmistakeable element of power lay inherent in several PHN duties, the occupation's power was toned down in the sense that it was described as mild in character; it was to be founded on care and concern and exercised in a gentle manner. PHNs were cognizant that their occupation

entailed exercising force on behalf of the public sector. The challenge was to conduct oneself in such a way so as to simultaneously act with authority and yet engender a relationship of trust within the community (see Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

Through a process of deprofessionalization

Organizational changes

The Municipal Health Services Act of 1982 (Ot.prp. 66, 1981–2)[10] allocated responsibility for primary health care, PHNs' services included, from central to local government. For PHNs, decentralized management led to dissolution of their previous organizational framework. Municipalities took over employer responsibilities for this occupational group – a responsibility the 19 Norwegian counties had been charged with since 1957. Thus the close bond between PHNs and County Public Health Nursing Officers was severed. PHNs' collaboration with DMOs also came to an end because the post as DMO was discontinued. The Chief Municipal Medical Officer, who replaced the central-government appointed DMO, was given a role in the municipality that differed from that previously played by the DMO, partly because administrative responsibilities for primary health care were now divorced from the medical profession's responsibilities.

In the course of this reorganization PHNs lost their closest collaborators and superiors: the County Public Health Nursing Officer and the DMO. With these ties broken, PHNs lost proximity to decision-making bodies. Their new superiors were more distanced both organizationally in terms of location in the organizational structure and professionally in terms of educational background. PHNs' services also became less visible when they were enrolled into the local administrative system. Municipalities rearranged their formal organization to include health care services that now fell under their responsibility. Most chose to construct an aggregated department or unit for health and social affairs, under a joint leadership. Management of these units was delegated to their heads – positions that mostly are held by people with backgrounds in social work, studies. Some municipalities set up separate units for these services. In those cases the position as head of the health care unit was for the most part allotted to medical doctors.[11]

While the Municipal Health Services Act was being prepared, the NNO proposed setting up a collective nursing service in the municipalities, under whose jurisdiction PHN services would fall. The objective was to enhance nursing services *in toto*. This suggestion was strongly opposed by PHNs and their Association. Officially, they feared that preventive tasks and initiatives would fall in the shadow of, or be swallowed up by, traditional nursing and care services, e.g. ministering to the sick or infirm (Martinsen, 1991; Romøren, 1987). PHNs sought to retain their close relationship to the medical establishment, and were able to do so when the law was finally passed.

Further restructuring of PHN services followed the Municipality Act of 1992 (Ot.prp. 42, 1991–2), which gave municipalities the freedom to organize services as they themselves saw fit. Some found it functional to coordinate services for children and families and conjoined the Parent and Child Health Service, the Child Protection Service and the Preschool Service in an interdisciplinary public service unit. This unit's leader most often has an educational background as a teacher (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

Jurisdiction gradually circumscribed

Losing duties. In 1988, the local health councils were discontinued (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1989–90). The council's mandate was partly transferred to the Committee for Healthcare and Social Affairs, which was established as a new political organization at the municipality level. Committee seats were given to democratically elected members of local government. It was no longer legitimate for professionals, e.g. medical doctors, to chair political committees (Schiøtz, 2003). When health councils terminated so also did the PHN's secretarial function. Also tasks concerning environmental hygiene and technical-hygiene controls, such as testing food quality, were removed from the PHN's field of practice (NOU, 1984:28). Throughout the 1970s and 1980 these duties were gradually reallocated to engineers in technical service departments, and from 1988 onwards, they were definitively outside the PHNs' normal jurisdiction (Ot.prp. 40, 1986–7). A number of other PHN duties were also taken over by other occupational groups and other services, duties such as assessing adoption and housing applications (see Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

PHN duties today have mainly come to involve work within Parent and Child Health Services and School Health Services.[12] While duties in total shrank, duties in these two services increased. In the early 1980s the prescheduled programme for Parent and Child Health Services expanded to cover children from birth up until school age, and provisions of the Municipal Health Services Act indicated considerable expansion of primary objectives in particular for this service. Overarching goals are: to help improve the life situation and growth conditions for all children – physically, psychologically and socially (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1983). Initiatives designed to hinder the development of mental problems were stressed far more heavily than in previous Acts. In efforts to prevent developmental imbalances, be they physical, mental or social, there are now several more issues to deal with and conditions to map, i.e. everything from the child's motor skills, language and emotional development to the relationship between the child's parents.

Losing monopoly on duties. As pointed out in the previous section, PHNs' scope of practice expanded within Parent and Child Health Services. Also duties within School Health Services increased because this service now covers students up until the end of senior high school. Yet PHNs' jurisdiction did not correspondingly expand because several duties are no longer their sole responsibility. Mandatory duties, for these services, are now outlined without reference to specific occupational groups except for in a passage on immunization where the PHN and GP are particularly mentioned. Mandatory personnel have also expanded from PHNs and GPs as the only occupational groups listed in provisions of the Municipal Health Services Act of 1982 (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1983). Through an addendum to this Act, effective 1 January 1995, midwives became mandatory employees of municipalities (Ot. prp. 60, 1993–4). Physiotherapists were also added after the original law text was formulated in 1982. Other occupational groups – psychologists, social workers, teachers and personnel with an interdisciplinary educational background – could either be directly employed by the municipal health service, or associated with it as consultants (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003; Norwegian Board of Health, 1998).

Midwives' primary duty in the municipal health care service is to monitor and follow up pregnant women. Yet they want also to be involved in activities such as family planning, contraception counselling, counselling on matters of interpersonal relationships and helping new mothers with breast feeding techniques (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).[13] In other words, midwives want to recoup some of the duties the old district midwives once had, which PHNs gradually took over, and in 1974, were lawfully mandated to perform. Inasmuch as mothers' length of stay at birth clinics has decreased, it has also become relevant for midwives to make home visits to families with newborn infants. Prior to this, home visitation was more or less the prerogative of PHNs.

A shift of mandate within social welfare services has also affected PHNs' work. The 1992 Child Welfare Act outlined new duties for the Child Welfare Service, among others, duties moving the service more clearly in the direction of primary prevention (Ofstad and Skar, 1994). In essence, the Child Welfare Service is now expected to involve itself in initiatives for preventing problems from arising or developing further. The idea is to add the new duties to traditional child welfare duties – 'core child welfare' – which involve processing cases, e.g. evaluating who needs help and what sort of help they need, and placing children in out-of-home care. The outlined primary preventive measures include (but are not limited to) different forms of parent counselling. Thus, the Parent and Child Health Service and the Child Welfare Service are both responsible for hindering lapses in child care, and this responsibility is stipulated in the two separate sets of laws. If we define 'health' as physical, psychological and social well-being, in line with the World Health Organization's recommendation, social problems and health problems become different aspects of the same entity. The two services are also placed on equal footing in the municipal organizational structure. Nevertheless, in regard to some tasks PHNs' responsibility is subordinate to their colleagues at the Child Welfare Service.[14]

Losing monopoly of leadership positions. A further shorn responsibility is the sole right to administer the Parent and Child Health Services. From an early stage PHNs were assigned leadership positions both at the regional level and at the local level. The County Public Health Nursing Officer held responsibility for Parent and Child Health Services throughout the county, while PHNs administered this service in the individual municipality. Now, however, the County PHN Officer has been discontinued as an occupational category at the office of the County Medical Officer, and PHNs have lost exclusive positions at the local level. Three sets of laws from 1957 onwards, the Public Health Nursing Service Act, the 1972 Parent and Child Health Service Act and the Municipal Health Services Act of 1982 gave PHNs responsibility for being the administrative leader for Parent and Child Health Services. If a municipality did not have its own PHN, the law allowed other occupational groups to take on this leadership function, e.g. medical doctors in a full-time position, or registered nurses without PHN training. In 1997 there was a change in the provisions of the Municipal Health Services Act, now also allowing midwives to formally take on leader responsibilities in Parent and Child Health Services, on a par with PHNs (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

Losing characteristics of a profession

The changes described in the preceding sections, we believe, indicate a *process of deprofessionalization*. Although PHNs were formally subordinate to DMOs they had sole responsibility for carrying out a number of tasks. From a position of running Parent and Child Health Services and School Health Services alone, PHNs must now share duties with a number of other occupational groups from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, and they have become almost invisible in existing legal texts. Local government is charged with the responsibility of employing mandatory personnel and figuring out a reasonable distribution of tasks between them (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003). Some of the duties PHNs have lost engendered prominence and prestige in the local community, e.g. technical-hygiene duties and sanitary inspections. They were also the DMO and health council chairperson's 'right hand'. Through these duties and positions PHNs were in close proximity to decision-making bodies, and had a certain power and influence over those with power to wield, all of which is now lost. Also, their almost total monopoly on Parent and Child Health Service leadership has been dissolved both at the regional and the local level. We assume these changes entail an attenuation of power and authority. Because, in practice, PHNs no longer monopolize a whole series of duties, they are bereft of one of the most important characteristics for being a profession according to dominant positions within the sociology of professions (see e.g. Abbott, 1988; Macdonald, 1995; Torgersen, 1972). The duties they have gained have not led to a corresponding jurisdictional expansion, because they share these duties with other occupational groups. Through losing monopoly on duties, the exclusive character of their occupation has vanished. Put differently, the occupational group has lost privileges and thus lost what Ole Berg (1979) calls a 'secondary profession characteristic'.

Dealing with changes

During preparation of the Municipal Health Services Act of 1982, as pointed out in a previous section, the National Association of Public Health Nurses protested against the NNO, the labour union of which the Association of PHNs is a subdivision, and avoided being linked to the traditional nursing and care-providing sector.[15] Aside from this, the National Association of Public Health Nurses seems to have chosen a restrained strategy in coping with the processes of change that have transpired. There is no sign of a united strategy in dealing with challenges due to duties the occupational group has completely lost, as well as the ones they have lost sole responsibility for. It looks as though they have accepted the state of affairs without officially protesting, more or less regardless of which occupational group they have lost terrain to. Few *if any* PHNs want to regain technical-hygiene controls. For many PHNs these duties involved an attendant distaste. Many also found it hard to balance different obligations such as making efforts to build a trustful relationship with parents, one day, and the next day helping local authorities close down those same people's business (Andrews and Wærness, 2004). In some cases, however, PHNs have raised objections concerning duties they now required to share. Their (re) actions seem, however, to be of a local character and look rather to be played out vocally than practically, as illustrated in the following examples.

When midwives received a formal role in Parent and Child Health Services in the 1990s, after they in principle were shoved out of the field when PHN education was first established, there was no sign of open dispute such as the dispute that was seen in the 1930s. Yet the beginnings of a conflict convened at the local level. In some districts PHNs happily welcomed their new colleagues, while in others, PHNs were less enthusiastic. PHNs in the latter group were dissatisfied mostly due to friction that arose between the two occupational groups because of midwives' intention to be involved in postnatal care and visit families after the birth of a child (Andrews and Wærness, 2004). PHNs' attempts to define duties for midwives, including stopping them from making home visits, failed because midwives were on the offensive, supported by an active labour union, and insisted on defining their own occupational duties. Midwives refuse to be directed by PHNs. Nor will they allow themselves to function according to terms laid down by PHNs. In contrast to the battle over duties that raged in the 1930s, there is no longer talk of midwives not being sufficiently qualified. Today's midwives and PHNs are two branches of registered nurses, both having an additional one-year education, to some extent overlapping.

In the preliminary work on the law change in 1993, in which midwife services became mandatory, the two midwifery labour unions held differing views on the question of which form of affiliation to the Parent and Child Health Service was best for midwives. The NNO (1991), under whose auspices a group of midwives is organized (so also is the PHN labour union), held that giving equal status to midwives and PHNs was the most practical solution, albeit under the leadership of the head public health nurse, who again was subject to direction by the head of the health care unit or the head of the health and social affairs unit. Notwithstanding, the Norwegian Midwives' Association (1993) supported the view that the midwife position should be directly under the jurisdiction of the head of the health care unit or the head of the health and social affairs unit, all according to the organizational model of the municipality. This group of midwives' argument was that, just as with other groups of health professionals, midwives should have the right to steer their own professional field.[16] As of today, there is no comprehensive overview of which solution the individual municipalities have chosen. Some PHNs expected a conflict of interests when midwives were legally entitled to hold leadership positions at the Parent and Child Health Services. Yet such a conflict never materialized (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

Our data on the ways in which PHNs relate to professionals within social services point in different directions. As in the case with midwives, potential conflicts seem to have been played out at a local level, although the extent to which this has happened is somewhat unclear. We found examples of active inclusion, where social service workers were invited as close collaborators within the Parent and Child Health Services. Most PHNs, however, disapproved of the idea of opening their work arena to social workers. Rather than letting social workers define their own duties or offer services directly to parents, PHNs preferred to keep control and refer parents to social services when they (PHNs) found it necessary, as they traditionally had done. We interpret PHNs' utterances more as expressed wishes for their work environment than an active defence against competition from social workers, because we found no strategic action that could help reserve positions within Parent and Child Health Services for health professionals.

If PHNs in some districts have taken steps to keep social workers out of their territory, their strategies have not been successful.[17] Larger municipalities have set up separate positions for family counsellors at parent and child health clinics (most administered by PHNs). The position is not designed for any particular occupational group and neither is there any overview over those employed in this position. Yet in the municipalities we have had contact with, some have employed college-trained social workers and others have employed PHNs or preschool teachers as family counsellors (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).

Gender-specific strategies?

As indicated earlier, there is little to suggest that PHNs view their lost duties as a problem for their occupational group. This is regardless of the duties having given them prominence in the local community. The fact that reductions in jurisdiction occur without protest indicates that PHNs have silently accepted the state of affairs. How can we understand this passivity on the part of this occupational group?

One question is of course: what means did they have at their disposal to resist fragmentation of tasks and responsibilities? The ability of a profession to both achieve and maintain monopoly is in part due to its power relative to other professions (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1994). Recent government policies have run contrary to PHNs' interests in the sense that other occupational groups are given responsibility for tasks within PHNs' field of practice. Gains made by one profession are often at the expense of another, and in previous decades PHNs were among the professions that gained privileges. The formative years of this occupation and the period up until the early 1980s could be understood as a successful professional project according to common perspectives within the sociology of professions (see e.g. Macdonald, 1995; Witz, 1992).[18] The NNO managed to determine the standard for entry requirements for PHN training, and attain monopoly on duties. The ways in which the NNO kept out from the field of public health those occupational groups considered unqualified clearly involve elements of exclusionary closure. By legalistic means and substantial state support, in particular provided by the director of the National Board of Health, Karl Evang, PHNs managed to establish what Weber (1968: 342) describes in terms of a 'legal order that limits competition through formal monopolies'. The NNO's articulated goal was to ensure high quality of the profession and its services. Yet, at the same time, the quest for professional status was important.

The strategic action that was taken in the early decades is not replicated in recent years. Individual PHNs voice dissatisfaction over some of the ground that they have lost. Yet, no active attempts of closing the borders or efforts to protect themselves from competition are seen. PHNs obviously avoid open disputes or conflicts. Are they willing to fight for quality of the service but not for privileges of the profession? Or, could lack of strategic action be due to particular values attached to open conflicts? Kari Melby (1990) notes that during the struggle around admission requirements for education within the various branches of nursing, the women of the NNO broke with norms on modest female behaviour. Melby (1990: 78) describes the battles that the NNO fought in the interwar period in terms of both a gender fight and a demonstration of female power.

Officially PHNs do not view other occupational groups as competitors or as groups threatening their position. Rather, in many cases PHNs welcome other professions as collaborative partners or as professionals who can help ease the pressure of having to yield the best possible service to users. PHNs demonstrate an interest in serving users and performing high quality work. For many practitioners the users' view of their service provision matters most in day-to-day work (Andrews, 2006; Andrews and Wærness, 2004). We do not interpret this 'asserted commitment to doing good work', which for Freidson (2001: 127) is one element of the ideal-type professionalism, as an indication of altruism on the part of PHNs and support of a functionalist perspective. Evetts (2006: 136) identifies recent developments within the sociology of professions as 'a return to professionalism as normative value', though with more balanced assessments. Indicative of a new direction, Evetts continues, is Mike Saks' contribution. He argues that self-interest and public interest are not necessarily at opposite ends of a continuum and that the pursuit of self-interest may be compatible with advancing the public interest. Seen from our point of view work orientation seen as either an altruistic or a self-serving logic of action is too simple. For PHNs *content of work* seems to be more important than monopoly. They benefit from teamwork and find the tasks over which they no longer can claim a monopoly as more attractive and challenging than previous prestige-bearing duties,[19] and they do not ignore or misrepresent the work of others, which they must have done in order to claim monopoly (see Davies, 1996: 670).

It is unclear what this profession sees as an attack on their turf or if they have valid concerns about deprofessionalizing pressures and the future prospect for their profession. PHNs still play a key role within public health, but the field faces rapid transformation. A number of professions operate at the PHN fringes. Midwives and social workers are two that can be mentioned. Professions with a background in physiotherapy, nutrition and psychology, for example, have also had success in expanding into PHNs' traditional scope of practice due to both a shortage of personnel and ongoing efforts to restructure the delivery of services. New educational groups are also emerging with university studies in health promotion (BA, MA). However, PHNs do not feel they are running out of work. No other occupational group has yet laid claim to the immunization programme which is the organizing principle for PHNs' work and a key reason for inviting all parents of infants and young children to follow a prescheduled programme at the Parent and Child Health Clinic.

Whether or not gender explains the modes of action or the repertoire that we have identified is difficult to tell based on this case study. While PHNs avoid defensive action and conflict, midwives have taken a different approach, and are in a position where they 'attack' PHNs' field of practice. This indicates that various processes are at play in this particular field of practice, and these processes are difficult to explain based on prevailing theories within the sociology of professions. Sociological writing on gender and professions has mainly dealt with asymmetrical forms of relations or relations located within patriarchal structures. We have expanded both the work situations that are examined and the forms of relation by exploring occupations dominated by women in symmetrical relationships. This issue has not been previously addressed within studies of professions, and we see the need for more context-sensitive concepts to be developed where gender is taken more carefully into consideration, and which allow more space for variety to be captured and registered.

Concluding comments

In this article we have pointed to theoretical shortcomings within the sociology of professions. Prevailing theories prove to be too narrow in order to explain processes of deprofessionalization that seem to occur without resistance, as indicated in our case study of Norwegian public health nurses. This occupational group has gone through a great transformation, from a process of professionalization, which reached an apogee, and thereafter a deprofessionalization process, which grew particularly strong after the Norwegian municipal health care reform in 1984. PHNs have lost power, authority and monopoly on duties. These changes might threaten PHNs' status, but they have not been actively instigated by those within the field itself, and they have happened without leading to open inter-occupational conflicts. A series of occupations dominated by women within the sector of health and social affairs are today experiencing similar processes. This field therefore offers interesting research questions for the sociology of professions.

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Notes

1. We follow Abbott (1988), and other scholars, and use the terms occupational group and profession interchangeably (see text later).
2. Here we take our analysis a step further from Andrews and Wærness (2004), where we describe the actual changes in greater detail. The article builds on various sources. We draw on interviews from studies by the first author over a period of 10 years from 1994 to 2004, predominantly with PHNs, but also with midwives and social workers. The interview material is supplemented with analysis of policy documents such as White Papers, Green Papers, legal documents and official guidelines for public health services. Secondary data from Norwegian historical studies are also used.
3. Dual closure as a concept is developed by Frank Parkin (Murphy, 1984. 554).
4. Needless to say, there is no one-to-one correspondence between men and masculine values and women and feminine values.
5. In her counterarguments, Julia Evetts (2006) does not see any need for such a distinction for research within the field.
6. Marie Haug (1988) discusses the notion of deprofessionalization primarily with reference to loss of monopoly over a specific body of knowledge. Haug sees challenges as a result of an increasingly educated public demanding greater accountability of professionals, and the evolution of technology and availability of information, which closes the knowledge gap between the public and professionals. PHNs are susceptible to an increasingly educated public challenging their expertise (Andrews, 1999). The present article, however, does not cover changes of the relationship between PHNs and service users. It concerns only inter-professional relationships and changes of the tasks PHNs perform. In his analysis of the development of the medical profession, Ole Berg (1979) speaks of deprofesionalization both in terms of fragmentation of tasks and loss of authority as a result of democratization processes.
7. The Rockefeller Foundation helped fund the education of health personnel engaged in the field of public health (Andersen, 1938; Martinsen, 1991).

8. Through the Parent and Child Health Services Act of 1972, municipalities took over responsibility for Parent and Child Health Service Clinics which up until that time had mainly been run by voluntary organizations.
9. From 1948 onwards, midwives were required to take nursing training as a preliminary requirement for midwife studies. Midwives were therefore allowed to take up positions as PHNs because the number of qualified PHNs was insufficient to meet demand, and positions as district midwifes was discontinued. Many midwives also enrolled in PHN courses (Kjølsrød, 1992).
10. Passed in 1982, the law became effective 1 January 1984.
11. PHNs have also held the position of Chief Municipal Health Officer.
12. Norwegian Parent and Child Health Services are universal and provided free of charge to all families with children from birth up until school age.
13. PHNs and midwives have both gained ground without gaining control by encroaching on the medical profession's exclusive territory through their delegated right to prescribe contraceptive pills to teenage girls.
14. The Child Welfare Service has the authority to contest or reconsider PHNs' assessments or decisions in cases where the two occupational groups should be equally qualified, such as assessing whether or not a child should go to preschool to improve his/her health and well-being (Andrews and Wærness, 2004).
15. The Norwegian National Association of Public Health Nurses was established in 1955.
16. Formal discussions between the two occupational groups yielded organizational structure, only. Distribution of tasks was not negotiated.
17. Ellefsen (1998, 2001) found that PHNs in a few districts defended their borders and kept social workers at a distance, but she does not document the specific strategies that were taken.
18. Dingwall et al.'s (1988) and Davies's (1988) analyses of health visiting in the UK indicate some similarities.
19. To some extent this supports Marshall's (1939: 329–30) claims on professional practice and teamwork which serves users, while we, as noted, interpret this orientation as serving both self-interests and user-interests.

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The impact of transnational migration on gender and marriage in sending communities of Vietnam

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Abstract

The recent, rapid increase in cross-border marriages between women from Southeast Asia and men from East Asia is creating a new international migration flow of 'marriage migrants' in the region. This article documents how marriage migration reconfigures gender power relations in three migrant-sending communities in Southern Vietnam. Analyses of data collected in 2007 indicate changes in the status of daughters and sons and a significant transformation of the marriage market. Emigrant daughters experienced enhanced status and power at home, mostly through remittances, to the extent that villagers expressed an increased preference for having girls rather than boys. Young women's emigration has created a skewed marriage market, which gives village women and their families more bargaining power in marriage transactions. Getting married is difficult for many single men in the village due to the perceived greater value of foreign men, higher bride-prices and a shortage of potential brides. Overall, villagers view marriage migration as contributing to significant social transformations with respect to gender and power relations in households and in the marriage market.

Keywords

gender, marriage, power, transnational migration, Vietnam

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Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, increasing numbers of young Vietnamese women have married foreign spouses and migrated to their husbands' country of residence. While some women married members of the Vietnamese diasporic community or other men from Europe, Australia and North America (Thai, 2008), most marriage migrants during the 1995–2009 period married Taiwanese and South Korean men. In the province of Can Tho in Vietnam, where most migrants originated from between 1995 and 2002, 90 percent of registered marriages between a Vietnamese woman and a foreign spouse were with men from these two East Asian countries (Tran, 2008). In Taiwan and South Korea between 1990 and 2007, Vietnamese women represented the second largest group of female foreign spouses after women from mainland China (Bélanger et al., 2010). Estimates are that approximately 110,000 Vietnamese women have married in Taiwan and 25,000 in South Korea over the past decade. Factors leading to these marriages include the development of networks created after two decades of transnational business ties with Southeast Asian countries, the strength of an international marriage industry that works transnationally, a high rate of female singlehood and the omnipresent social pressure on East Asian men to marry at any cost.

The aim of this article is to explore the significance of this recent migration for gender relations in the marriage migrants' communities of origin. How migration might or might not contribute to reconfiguring gender in Asia has been the subject of recent enquiries that examine migration as a factor of social transformation. Studies investigating the nexus of marriage, migration and mobility have been conducted in the context of Asia's increasing share of women within its international migrant population, a phenomenon usually called the 'feminization of migration' (Hugo, 2005). Gender, as a structuring element of the entire process and experience of migration, has been studied from various angles, but generally related to examples of labour migration. In this study, we focus on how women's emigration following marriage alters the gendered positioning of migrants in the eyes of families and community members and how it affects the lives of men and women in the migrants' home communities. Our analysis relies on a study we conducted in 2007 in three southern communities of Vietnam that are notorious for having sent large numbers of migrant wives to Taiwan and South Korea over the past decade. A survey of 400 households interviews with 37 individuals were collected to explore community members' perspectives on how marriage migration affects the social fabric of their families and localities. These data give a voice to migrant families and other community members (non-migrant families and leaders) in their roles as 'actors of change', rather than 'subjects of change'. As such, this article puts migrant families and other community members centre stage in assessing how migration impacts them and their localities.

Our findings point to an overall significant impact on gender and power relations within households and on the local marriage market. Narratives and survey results suggest that remittances significantly increase emigrant daughters' status and power in their native households. Results also indicate that young women have increased opportunities regarding marriage options (local or international), upward socioeconomic mobility and international migration, which provides them and their families with enhanced bargaining power in local marriage transactions. In contrast, young men, particularly those deemed to have

little value on the marriage market, such as the poorer and unemployed ones, find themselves disadvantaged and experience marriage migration negatively. Overall, the 'gender balance sheet' suggests significant social transformation and a reconfiguration of gender and power relations attributable, in part, to international marriage migration. In this gendered accounting of the impact of marriage migration, power is generally obtained by groups who have economic resources (remittances in the case of marriage migrants or income in the case of single Vietnamese men), although social position, as defined by age, sex and marital status, also confers increased power to some groups over others independent of their access to economic assets (to non-migrant single women for instance).

Conceptually, this article makes two important points. First, at the macro level, our findings provide support for the idea of interlinked 'marriage economies', whereby transnational marriage of one group provokes another 'corridor' of international marriage in the marriage migrants' area of origin. Diverse marital strategies to 'marry up' or to simply marry create a domino effect that we call the 'global marital and reproductive chain'. This expression echoes the notion of a 'care chain' that describes the chain migration of domestic and childcare workers across and within nations. Second, this analysis provides an illustration of gender and power relations as being complex, unstable and multifaceted. By examining the dynamics between men and women in various age groups and at different stages of their life course, in other words by adopting an intersectional approach to the study of power and gender, we provide an account of power and gender relations beyond a simple patriarchal model or a hierarchical model within women's spheres.

Gender, migration and social change in sending communities

This research draws from a body of literature putting 'gender' squarely on the shoulders of migration studies. The gendered nature of migration is situated within a gendered political economy and a global patriarchal system (Piper and Roces, 2003), which, in turn, creates transnational gendered spaces (Danneker, 2005). Gender is a constitutive element of migration because 'gender permeates a variety of practices, identities, and institutions' (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000: 117). The conceptualization of migration as a factor of social transformation is also central to this study (Schuerkens, 2005). Social change brought about by international migration includes the reconfiguration of gender relations and norms (Danneker, 2005, 2009; Rahman, 2009). Although international emigrants and immigrants may only account for small proportions of national populations in Asia, the local impact they have on gender and other aspects of social change can be significant.

Also informing this analysis are recent debates about the relationship between migration and development. Piper (2009) calls for a more comprehensive 'social perspective' departing from the prevailing one that focuses mostly on remittances and the economic impact of migration. She argues that recently there has been a shift away from examining 'the impact of migration on development' to exploring 'migrants' contribution to development' (Piper, 2009: 94). The effects of migration on the social fabric of origin countries fall under the 'social development approach to migration' (Piper, 2009: 94). In our analysis, we use this new lens and focus on how emigration is experienced by the households and communities of migrants, an approach adopted by Rahman (2009) in a longitudinal study on how labour migration impacts sending communities in Bangladesh.

Studies scrutinize whether the out-migration of male relatives and remittance sending play a part in empowering and emancipating women who remain at home, since they are likely to take on the productive roles previously carried out by their husbands prior to migration. Women are no longer perceived as being passive and dependent on male relatives, but as being more active and autonomous in the management of family affairs (see, for instance, the studies of Go and Postrado, 1986; Gulati, 1986; Rahman, 2009). A number of studies assessing women's role in decision-making have documented increased power over family resources, especially overseas remittances sent home by male relatives. Hadi's (2001) study on Bangladesh reveals that flows of remittances from overseas tacitly undermine the traditional domains of men, while significantly modifying gender roles and, hence, women's decision-making capacity. Remittances provide women with direct access to resources and greater control over spending that subsequently enables them to change their position. Evidence from existing literature also shows that the capacity to control remittances enables the wives who are left behind to ease their physical labour burden by hiring others to perform domestic and farm work (see the review by De Haas, 2007). Overall, in the absence of husbands or other adult males, women seem to enjoy increased freedom and autonomy in managing their households (Rahman, 2009). In the contexts of countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India and the Philippines, evidence indicates that women experience enhanced self-confidence and personal growth when men migrate abroad (Arnold, 1992; Lucas, 2005).

Notwithstanding, contrary evidence in the literature challenges the gender-equalizing effect of migration. Although women gain some autonomy through participating in family decision-making, controlling the use of remittances and heading the family, the increases in power might be temporary. Despite the long distance, male migrants can still control the use of remittances and make the important decisions within households. In addition, some research suggests that gender relations revert back to what they were prior to migration as soon as the men return home (Arnold, 1992; Arnold and Shah, 1984; De Haas, 2007; Hadi, 2001). Taking the multiple roles and additional responsibilities of temporary household head, decision-maker and primary family labourer does not necessarily mean that women's reproductive role is reduced or eased; rather, physical and emotional burdens might be greater for them.

Few studies have examined the impact of female migration on sending areas. One study on Filipino women migrants indicates that men remaining home in the country of origin do not take on the roles that female emigrants left behind. Instead, these roles become a burden placed on the shoulders of other women in the migrant family (Asis Maruja, 2001, 2003). Conversely, Danneker (2005, 2009) discusses how international migration opportunities in the manufacturing and service sectors have challenged gender norms and initiated transformations of gender relations in Islamic societies, like Bangladesh. Because many employers prefer female workers, the demand for women migrant workers puts pressure on societies to accept the idea that women can migrate and cross borders without male guardians. Danneker (2005: 657) discusses transnational influences that result in 'the transformations and renegotiations of gender relations'. She further argues that the 'transformation of gender relations is an intrinsic part of the global and regional migration movements and that it is still neglected by much of the mainstream literature on migration, as well as by policy-makers worldwide' (Danneker, 2005:

658). The present analysis contributes to filling this gap. While Hugo and Nguyen (2007) documented some of the positive (and negative) aspects of marriage migration for Vietnamese families of emigrant spouses, they did not provide an analysis of its significance for gender and family relations.

Gender change can emerge from shifts in marital practices and opportunities provoked by emigration. Observations in the context of India show that single men who have worked in the Middle East are considered to be 'at a premium' and 'prized bridegrooms', compared to the local men, because of their higher earnings and prestige within the community. At the same time, these men's criteria in choosing their partners are also subject to change. For instance, bachelor migrant workers are less interested in the practice of dowry; rather, their potential brides' family status, education and appearance seem to be more important to them (Gulati, 1986). Hadi (2001) finds a rejection or reduction of dowries in marriages among migrant families. Male migrants' agency in choosing their own marriage partners is also documented in Bangladesh; being less financially dependent on their parents, single men are more likely to refuse an arranged marriage (Rahman, 2009).

This robust body of research on the relationship between migration and gender in migrants' communities of origin in Asia focuses on the labour migration of men and, to a lesser extent, women. The phenomenon of marriage migration – a female-dominated migration flow whereby the mode of entry is family reunification and not a work contract – has mostly garnered studies on processes in receiving countries (see, for instance, Lee, 2008; Lu, 2008; Wang, 2007; Wang and Bélanger, 2008). A bulk of research examines difficulties encountered by marriage migrants who immigrate to East Asian countries with patchwork programmes and policies to promote successful integration. More importantly, media representations, public opinion and social perceptions of marriage migrants from developing countries and their local husbands tend to be negative and stereotypical (Hsia, 2007). Negative perceptions are illustrated by families' fears that their foreign daughters-in-law will 'run away'. This prompts many families to monitor women carefully and to confiscate IDs (Bélanger, 2007). Despite difficulties encountered by these migrants, research also highlights their agency in carving a space of their own in a repressive family and social space (Wang, 2007). Given the emphasis of research in destination countries of marriage migrants, Jones and Shen (2007) call for more research on the social consequences of this migration for sending areas.

In Vietnam, labour migration is celebrated as a development strategy, while marriage migration is criticized for being 'trafficking' or 'women's commodification'; migrants themselves are labelled by state voices as the 'shame of the nation' and 'undutiful daughters not fulfilling their duties towards their country and families' (Bélanger et al., 2009). Departing from these negative accounts stands a body of recent research putting marriage migrants forward as 'agents' of their own lives, as opposed to victims of trafficking (Constable, 2003, 2005; Nakamatsu, 2005; Wang, 2007), and criticizing how the labels of 'marriage migrants' or 'foreign brides' overshadow women's lives and contributions as workers and citizens in destination countries (Piper and Roces, 2003). That women who supposedly 'marry up' are the main beneficiaries of these international marriages is also questioned. Farrer (2008), for instance, shows how international marriages in China result in a 'status exchange' whereby both spouses gain from marrying a foreigner and

how the notion of who marries 'up' and who marries 'down' needs to be reconsidered. Echoing the complex gendered impact of international marriage in this study, Charsley (2005) provides evidence on how Pakistani men who migrate to the UK as foreign spouses can be disempowered by cross-border marriages.

The study

This study aims to document the impact of cross-border Asian marriages and migration on the social development in the migrants' communities of origin. We collected data in August 2007 in three rural communes of Thot Not District in Can Tho City (Mekong River Delta region, southwest of Vietnam). We chose this area because large numbers of marriage migrants had left this region over the past decade. Commune-level marriage data were available for one of the three communes. Of 1117 marriages that took place between 1999 and 2003 in this commune, nearly one-half (45 percent) were to foreign grooms (mostly Taiwanese). Still in the same commune, an additional 765 women migrated abroad (the total female population 18–35 years was 3125 in 2008) following marriage to foreign men between 1999 and 2006 (proportion of total marriages not available for this period). Most internationally married daughters of the surveyed households were young (average age 21 years), had little education (60 percent completed primary education or less) and had married through a broker (over 50 percent). There was no other significant flow of international migration from these communities, but some male temporary and circular migration to nearby urban areas and to the city of Ho Chi Minh did occur.

We conducted a survey with 250 marriage migrant-sending households (referred to as 'migrant households' hereafter) and 150 non-migrant households (control group). Migrant households were defined as those households where a daughter had married a foreign man from Taiwan or South Korea and moved to one of the two countries. Based on the lists of households provided by local administrators, we randomly selected the households with one or more migrants and those without. From every household included in the sample, one adult respondent (usually the father or mother of the migrant) was selected. We designed two questionnaires. The questionnaire designed for migrant households included detailed questions on (1) general information about the household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, (2) information about the migrant and her international marriage, (3) assessment on the impact of marriage migration on the household, particularly information about remittances (amounts, frequency and use) and (4) information on the household living conditions. The questionnaire designed for non-migrant households was shorter and included a module on attitudes towards migrant households and the household living conditions.

We also conducted interviews -with individuals and with groups-, reaching a total of 37 villagers. Individual interviews were conducted with mothers, younger sisters of marriage migrants and local political leaders; focus group discussions were conducted with representatives of non-migrant households and local young, single men and women. The fieldwork also involved participant observation of community and household relations and informal discussions about cross-border marriages and migration. All data collected inform the present analysis, although we particularly bring forward our qualitative evidence. Interviews were transcribed in Vietnamese and a content analysis was done using N-Vivo.

This study is limited in various ways. First, we cannot assess the role of other types of emigration from the village (for instance, internal migration to urban areas). Some of the changes we document also likely resulted from local socioeconomic changes brought about by Vietnam's rapid development over the past decade. Second, our study was only conducted at one point in time, and we asked study participants to think retrospectively when assessing changes following the wave of marriage migration from their communities. This approach could introduce biases due to an exaggerated assessment of the impact of migration. Third, we focused our analysis on communities particularly affected by this migration flow in terms of the proportion of young women getting married to foreigners. Fourth, we mostly document the experiences and perceptions of migrant households. Non-migrant households might not experience as much change as migrant households do, although some aspects of the impact (such as the female shortage) are felt by the entire community. Despite these study limitations, the voices of migrants' parents, sisters and brothers indicate that villagers interpret the phenomenon as having a very significant impact on village life, family and gender relations, the marriage market and marriage transactions. This alone is valuable, since it will likely inform family decisions with respect to future migration and marriage.

The reconfiguration of gender

The emigrant daughters

Our survey results show that nearly 90 percent of migrant households received remittances from their emigrant daughters during the 12 months preceding the survey,[1] and these amounts contributed significantly to the household income (for more details on remittances from this study, see Bélanger and Tran, forthcoming; Tran, 2008). Women's financial contributions led to a reconfiguration of power and gender relations within migrant households; in particular, migrants actively participate in decision-making, as expressed by this mother of an emigrant:

> Before, when my daughter did not earn any money, I never asked her anything I used to make every decision on my own. . . . Now, since she is the one who supports the whole family, I have to discuss with her about family affairs, such as buying valuable furniture, building a house, organizing a wedding for my son, or opening a small shop. . Thereby, she will send money to me. (Hoa, aged 48 years)

Daughters who married abroad not only participated in decisions associated with the economic welfare of the family, such as purchasing land, buying expensive household assets, or building houses, they also exerted some authority in social aspects of family life, including education, health and the marriages of other family members. Cuc, an emigrant spouse's younger sister, expressed her appreciation of her sister's sacrifice and investment in her schooling:

Interviewer: In the past, did your family refer to your sister's opinion regarding family affairs?
Cuc: Rarely.

Interviewer: What about now?

Cuc We often ask her about my schooling. . . . She said if I still want to continue my schooling, she will create good conditions for me. My family used to face a lot of economic problems. My sister had to sacrifice, so we did not have to drop out of school. . . She encourages me to study well at school so that I will be able to be independent in the future. (Cuc, aged 20 years)

Interviewer: Did you refer to your daughter's opinion regarding your son's marriage?

Ai Of course. We discussed together. It was all her money that we spent to celebrate her brother's wedding. Certainly, my son could not have gotten married without her money. (Ai, aged 59 years)

Emigrant daughters gained some power, through their involvement in family decision-making and also through their control over the use of remittances in their families of origin, as described by Ai:

> Normally, if I need to buy or do something using her money . . . or give some money to her brother, I will ask her [her daughter who married abroad] so that she won't wonder why I use up the money. . . . Sometimes she tells me to buy what I don't want and says no to what I want to buy. . . . If I spend to buy something for myself, she never allows it. (Ai, an emigrant spouse's mother, aged 59 years)

The accounts of non-migrant households and other local people gathered through focus group discussions confirmed the widely held conviction that emigrant women have influence in their natal families. Focus group participants made reference to the remarkable change in the position of daughters as a result of their international marriage – from powerless to empowered – with statements, such as 'now since the daughter sends home a lot of money, everything must be approved by her and everybody in the family has to obey her'; 'having money means having prestige and authority'; and 'if the family wants to buy or do something, they have to phone her to ask for money'.

In some cases, emigrant daughters who failed to send remittances were criticized by their family members who resented not receiving money like other families:

> There is one case just close to my house. The poor family married their daughter to a Taiwanese man. . . . When receiving the daughter at the station many years after she left, the mother anxiously enquired to see if she had brought anything home But when her daughter said that she did not bring any money home, the mother did not speak to her anymore. Thereafter, she went back to Taiwan and did not send any money back home for six or seven years. (Participant 2; FGD with non-migrant households)

The accounts from focus group discussions pointed to various manifestations of intergenerational tension during migrants' visits related to the migrants' expressed sense of entitlement as family breadwinners. Familial tensions can also stem from the lack of appreciation and careless use of remittances among family members in the source country, as in the following example:

Table 1. Assessment of household women's role in family decision-making since the marriage migration of a household member (in percentages, $N = 250$)

	Emigrant women	The other women at home
Better/increased	32.9	10.9
No influence/the same	61.6	85.6
Worse/reduced	5.4	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0

> I know some women who cried a lot when they visited their home. They asked whether the parents knew that they were over [their] head and ears in work in the place of destination in order to earn enough money to send home . . . those remaining home did not appreciate how difficult it is for them to make and send these earnings back home. Some families do not work anymore; they just play and spend the remittances unwisely. They never care about saving money . . . I feel pity for these women. They keep on crying. (Participant 9; FGD with non-migrant households)

In remittance-receiving households, in the villages where we conducted our fieldwork, families depended on remittances for daily expenditures, there was less incentive to find work and levels of consumption among family members of migrant households exceeded those of non-migrant households (Bélanger and Tran, forthcoming; Tran, 2008). These consequences may create pressure on women to remit more over a longer period of time. Consistent with Rahman's (2009) findings in his research on male Bangladeshi temporary migrant workers in Singapore, there is a belief among some remittance-receiving households that 'foreign earnings' are easily earned and, therefore, can also be easily spent.

Migrants' post-migration status did not only depend on remittances. As we describe later, migrants serve as role models for other young, single women who aspire to be as worldly and modern as emigrant spouses living in wealthy nations of the region. Since status is associated with being a resident or citizen of a developed country – in these cases with 'living in South Korea' or 'being married in Taiwan' – women's position at home is affected.

Women in migrant households

While international migration and remittances empower some emigrant women, do they also challenge patriarchal gender relations within the family of origin and, hence, serve to empower other female family members at home? To address this question, we asked survey respondents from migrant households to compare the role of emigrant women and other women in the family on decision-making before and after migration. As indicated in Table 1, the perceived change in women's decision-making power was much greater among emigrant woman than among women who stayed at home.

To a survey question on who controls remittances sent home, 40 percent of the households responded that it was a female family member and 55 percent said a male family

member. Results from interviews suggest that female family members who controlled remittances were mostly senior women, generally the mothers of the emigrating spouses, and never the adult sisters. For example, the following interview with Van, a younger sister of an emigrant spouse, reflects this:

Interviewer: Who mainly receives remittances sent by your sister [who married abroad]?
Van: My Mom is the one who receives and keeps money.
Interviewer: Who mainly makes decision on spending remittances?
Van: My Mom often consults my Dad, for example, regarding buying a motor scooter. But the main decision-maker is my Mom
Interviewer: Does your Mom often refer to your opinion regarding family affairs?
Van: Rarely. For example, if my Mom wants to give some money to me or my brothers, she will have to call my sister. Then as my sister agrees, my Mom just decides. (Van, aged 18 years)

Interviewees also discussed how emigrants' female family members, especially sisters, have increased workloads, as a result of marriage migration. In the absence of her sister, for example, Cuc stated that she had to take on additional domestic work, which was previously done by her migrant sister:

> My sister [who married abroad] used to work half a day and helped my Mom with housework the rest of the day. She was very dutiful and diligent. . . . When she left my family had to reorganize everything My siblings were already married and live away from home. Now only my Mom and I live here. Therefore, I had to take responsibility for what my sister did before, such as cooking, cleaning the house, and helping my Mom with her small shop. (Cuc, aged 20 years)

In sum, control over remittances followed intergenerational power relations, according precedence to seniority. Young women remaining at home, mostly sisters of the emigrant women, did not seem to benefit from their sisters' emigration as far as household life and work were concerned. They usually had to fill in for the absent sister; whereas, if their sister had married locally, they would have been able to provide in-kind help, but certainly not as much economic support.

Young single women

Narratives collected reveal that sisters of emigrant women have a strong desire to marry abroad. For example, Van and Tham, who had recently graduated from high school, preferred marrying a Taiwanese man over other options:

> Sometimes I told my sister [who married abroad] to find someone suitable for me because I can live close to my sister, help my family, and broaden my vision as she has done. . . . I also told my mother that when I am old enough [in a position to do so], I will go abroad like my sister. (Van, aged 18 years)

> I would rather marry a foreign man because I can help my parents more. . . . I [would] like to go abroad. . . . But I haven't met any suitable one yet. I will marry and go soon thereafter. My sister also wants me to marry a Taiwanese man like her so that we can stay side by side. (Tham, aged 20 years)

Perceived successful international marriages contributed to the increasing desire among single village women to marry abroad. These women idealized their sisters' international marriages. They envisioned their sisters' lives as being modern and worldly:

> I feel like my sister is prettier, fatter [positive attribute] and dressier than before. She told me she has travelled to many beautiful places . . . I wish I could do the same as her in the future. (Tham, aged 20 years)

Likewise, the following quote from the interview with Cuc suggests that she had acquired positive perceptions of foreign husbands from her sister and started to imagine a promising life abroad:

> I miss and worry about her [the sister who married abroad] a lot, but I feel happy for her, since her dream has come true. . . . I prefer foreign men because my sister told me that they care more for the family. In addition, I can learn a lot of new things: a new foreign language and a new lifestyle. (Cuc, aged 20 years)

Women's international migration transforms marriage prospects for young women in migrant households, in particular, and for local women within the community, in general. The higher family social and economic status of migrant households opens up better marriage prospects for their young female kin. Both sisters and parents of emigrant women tend to have higher expectations when choosing potential grooms, compared to women in non-migrant households. Households receiving remittances experience socio-economic mobility, which allows them to consider better positioned potential husbands for their other daughters. For example, Van, whose sister married internationally, expressed how she wanted her prospective husband to be:

> Most importantly, he has to have a stable job . . . He doesn't need to be handsome. It will be far better if he comes from a well-to-do family so that I will be able to help my family. . . . His family must not be worse than mine [in terms of social and economic status]. I don't know whether I will be able to support my family as much as my sister has done or not. (Van, aged 18 years)

Van's criteria for her prospective spouse indicated that she valued employment, financial security and a similar social status. Likewise, when asked if she would prefer to choose a Vietnamese or Taiwanese man as a groom for her daughter, Ai, a mother of an emigrant spouse, expressed similar desires:

> If my daughter wants to marry a local man here, I will only allow her to marry if her potential husband is decent and a little bit well-off; otherwise, I prefer a Taiwanese son-in-law. (Ai, aged 59 years)

Another mother, whose daughter married abroad, described how her two marriageable-age daughters were becoming more fastidious than before:

> Besides the one who married abroad, I have two other daughters aged 23 and 24, who are working in the factory. They all told me that they want to marry foreign men. They insist on not marrying Vietnamese men. People have introduced one of the two to a police officer, who is said to have the rank of second lieutenant, but she still refused. . . . I guess, in the past, since my family was poor, they might not have dared to be picky like that. (Tham, aged 59 years)

At the community level, international marriage migration thus gains momentum and becomes a legitimate life course option. The widening of marital options (international or local) and the favourable marriage prospects for women marrying locally are linked to economic and demographic changes brought about by migration. Women in our study sites have many opportunities to marry, but men do not. This transformation is reflected clearly in the following group discussions:

> Now women are more valuable No matter how illiterate and poor you are, you can easily marry a Taiwanese man. . . . Women can choose either marrying foreign men or Vietnamese men. . . In our village there are nearly no spinsters left. The majority of young, beautiful women have been already selected by foreign men; whereas, the rest are married to Vietnamese men. (Participant 9)

> In general, women today have rights to choose husbands. If they marry Vietnamese husbands, they have to select those who have money or jobs. It is better to marry a Taiwanese man than have a poor Vietnamese husband. (Participant 8; FGD with non-migrant households)

The shortage of young, single women created by recent emigration has transformed power relations in marriage transactions. Young women and their parents began to contest local marriage practices by bargaining a higher bride-price (or 'indirect dowry' because the payment provided by the groom's family is used for the new couple to start a household) for themselves and their families if marrying local men, which they did not have power to do prior to the emergence of international marriage migration. Study participants commented on the recent escalation of the bride-price and wedding cost for the groom's family. For example, Tham explained the increasing bride-price in her commune:

> The bride's family now might ask for a higher bride-price. For example, they require two taels of gold, rather than one. . In the past, the bride's family used to accept any bride-price provided by groom's family They never required anything. (Tham, aged 20 years)

Tham further emphasized that the availability of Taiwanese grooms and the perceived high value of local women have pushed up the values of the bride-price. Another dramatic account in this regard was offered by one participant in our focus group discussion with non-migrant households:

> Some uneducated men had to go to remote areas to find wives. Some of my nephews did so. My nephews could not marry local women here because the requirements of brides' families

were so high.... In this area, it costs men about three or four taels of gold to get married. With little money, men have difficulty in getting married. Moreover, women here no longer accept uneducated men. (Participant 9; FGD with non-migrant households)

Young single men

Another frequently mentioned reason that many local women prefer foreign husbands is that Vietnamese men are seen as being undesirable marriage partners. Local men were frequently categorized as being 'men of pleasure', 'drunken men', 'irresponsible men', or 'violent men' by women and their parents. Women compared opportunities offered to them when marrying foreign men and local men. Cuc's portrayal of local men echoed that of others:

I would rather marry a foreign man than a Vietnamese guy.... Well, Vietnamese men here often play and drink alcohol a lot. They never care about the family They even beat their wife and children when they get drunk ... Frankly speaking, if I marry a foreign man, I can have a better life and help my family as well. (Cuc, aged 18 years)

From the view of the older generation, Tham, mother of an emigrant spouse, also expressed her discontent with local men:

My god! Vietnamese guys only know how to indulge in pleasure and engage in drinking alcohol all the time, but don't know to earn money. They even beat their wives and children. Therefore, women here are utterly discontented with them. (Tham, aged 59 years)

Taken together, women's international migration through marriage reinforces the desire to marry abroad and transforms marriage prospects among local women. This, in turn, has challenged pre-existing gender relations and increased women's position at both the household and community levels. To study villagers' perceptions about whether international marriage migration of local women has any impact on the marriages of local men, we asked one question on this issue in the questionnaires for both migrant and non-migrant households. As shown in Table 2, among 400 households, one-half (36.7 + 13.3 = 50 percent) reported that young men had difficulty getting married in the village or that they had to search for a wife outside the community.

Individual interviews and group discussions indicate that many respondents experienced an increasingly tight marriage market for local men. Our accounts from focus group discussions revealed that single local men suffer feelings of depression due to a massive out-migration of local women and are anxious about their limited marriage prospects:[2]

I feel really sad. Almost all young pretty local women [are] already married abroad. We – poor men – really have difficulty in getting married. I sit 'on the shelf' (I am getting older and remain unmarried).... Many of my friends fall into such an ironical situation like that Many of them had to find wives in Dong Thap or An Giang Province or other nearby communes I am also thinking about that. (Participant 1)

Table 2. Assessment of the impact of female marriage migration on marriage of household and village men

	%
No influence	48.7
Married in the community but with difficulty	36.7
Had to find a wife outside the community	13.3
Other	1.3
Total	100

> Women here, honestly . . . for example, since I am poor and don't have a stable life, of course, no one wants to marry me. They speak frankly to me because my life is not stable and I cannot provide for them, they would rather marry foreign men in order to have a better life and support their family as well. There is no need for them to work hard if they do so. . . . Meanwhile, Vietnamese husbands here can only earn little money every month. . . . As a result, we – Vietnamese men – have to accept that bitter truth. . . . Many of my friends fall into the same situation as me. (Participant 4; FGD with single local men)

As revealed in the quotes above, the dramatic increase in female out-migration has led to higher expectations of prospective grooms' economic and employment status. The higher bride-price is making it more difficult for poor men, who are perceived to be inferior and undesirable, to marry. Particularly striking is the perception of some of these men as being 'on the shelf'. The alternative strategy for such men is to seek 'cheaper' wives in other areas, generally remote areas, where young women are still available and little, or no, bride-price is required:

> In the past, women used to be 'left on the shelf'. Now this situation often happens to men. We don't have women to marry; more men here tend to be left 'on the shelf'. . . . Some have to go to the mountain to find wives, for example Uncle Tu's son. (Participant 6)

Migrant households face a contradictory situation; daughters marry foreign men and parents face difficulties in finding brides for their sons:

> Sometimes I also think, for example, it will be difficult for me if I want to find a wife for my son, since it seems that all of women here already married foreigners. Perhaps women are still available in other communes. (A1, aged 59 years)

One local leader expressed concerns about the transformations in the local marriage market and talked about the imbalance in sex ratios within the community:

> For me, I am worried about the phenomenon of international marriage migration. Because many women marry abroad, there seems to be an imbalanced sex ratio in our commune. Men are becoming redundant, while there is a lack of women. As a result, men are facing difficulties in getting married. For example, those whose families have difficult situations cannot find any wife. (Phuong, commune official of Justice Office)

Vietnamese men in our study sites are experiencing a 'marriage squeeze', just as are Taiwanese and South Korean men who are 'importing' foreign brides (because of high female singlehood in their countries). Vietnamese men in the community we studied did not have the possibility of finding a spouse in the transnational marriage market (Palriwala and Uberoi, 2005); rather, they were only able to find wives in other nearby areas within the country, usually in poorer communities than their own.

Sons and daughters redefined

The gender 'accounting' of the impact of marriage migration on the local communities studied emerged powerfully in villagers' assessments of the relative value and status of sons vs daughters. Study participants suggested that son preference has weakened because daughters have the possibility of migrating internationally and supporting their parents:

> In my opinion, daughters nowadays are preferable than sons just because daughters can marry Taiwanese men and help families economically. Sons are more interested in playing than helping [their] families. (Participant 3)

> That's true. Now having daughters is more profitable. (Participant 2; FGD with non-migrant households)

In the communes studied, both villagers and local authorities reported the perception that females were preferred, as described by Hue:

> Recently, local parents tend to prefer daughters than sons, since daughters can earn money and support the family more. (Hue, president of a commune women's union)

Despite discussions about the benefits of having daughters because of their ability to support their parents economically, sons' symbolic value continued to be cited by study participants:

> From my point of view, daughters married abroad reside away from home. They earn money and send money to support their families. But sons are still needed to maintain the continuity of the family line and take care of parents at home. This must be equal. (Participant 6; FGD with non-migrant households)

Given Vietnam's well-documented preference for sons and rising sex ratios at birth since the mid 2000 (Bélanger and Khuat, 2009), the emerging desire for a daughter, linked to her opportunities for international migration, points to the potential for migration to transform social constructions of the value of sons and daughters.

Discussion and conclusion

On the one hand, the findings from our study contribute to the evidence suggesting that the international migration of women can be a powerful element in transforming

gender and power relations in sending communities. On the other hand, it could be argued that women's strong sense of responsibility towards their native family and sustained efforts to send remittances reproduce gender inequalities and daughters' subordination. In fact, women may find themselves in a more patriarchal environment once in the receiving country. Taiwan and South Korea have lower female labour force participation rates than Vietnam. Brokers market Vietnamese brides as being docile, submissive and pure, which can lead to conflict when women wish to work outside the household and gain independence (Lu, 2008). The age difference between spouses is high, particularly in South Korea where women are, on average, 17 years younger than their husbands (data for 2004; see Kim, 2007). In many cases, the husband and his parents are eager for the woman to have a child and prefer that she stays home and acts as a domestic worker (Bélanger et al., 2009). Fears that she will escape also leads a family to confiscate the foreign spouse's passport and, in the worse cases, prohibit her from going out and networking (Bélanger, 2007; Wang, 2007). The enhanced status of emigrant women experienced at home does not necessarily parallel a similar shift in the receiving country. Differences in the gendered dimension of the migration experience at home and in the destination country need to be kept in perspective when discussing the position of migrant women at home.

Despite these words of caution concerning women migrants themselves, social change at the local level is significant and strongly suggests that migration favours women over men. Poor young men suffer the most from this migration. Our results corroborate other studies arguing that international migration, of men or women, can reduce gender inequalities and enhance women's status in households and communities in some cases. The path to this change, however, differs in the case we studied. By depleting villages of women of marriageable age and increasing the income of migrant-sending households, the entire social fabric of communities is affected. From a gender perspective, we observe changes in relations between men and women within and between households. The situation we documented in the three communities we studied suggests the emergence of a 'global marital and reproductive chain' within Asia, whereby the 'bride deficit' in one zone will create a migration flow in another.

Studying and documenting aspects of the social impact of marriage migration on source areas is a beginning in acquiring a more complete picture of the significance of this migration for the Asian region. The social development lens that we used to conduct our study uncovered micro-level dynamics that would have remained invisible with a strictly economic approach. While theories and frameworks concerning the effects of migration based on labour migration examples are useful, our study suggests specificities of marriage migration that need to be further investigated.

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Notes

1. The survey analysed by Hugo and Nguyen, based on a larger sample of households, reported that 88 percent of households received remittances from their daughters (Hugo and Nguyen, 2005: 382). This study also reported a significant impact of remittances on total household income.
2. Hugo and Nguyen reported a similar sentiment expressed by single men in their study site. See Hugo and Nguyen (2005: 384).

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Childcare needs and childcare policies: A multidimensional issue

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Abstract
Childcare has become a much-debated issue in all developed countries. Who should care for children, how, how much and for how long are the questions at the centre of value conflicts that shape not only policies and struggles around policies, but also individual and family choices. This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it presents an up-to-date overview of the different childcare packages offered by the 27 EU countries, indicating how they represent quite different understandings of proper care, as well as of proper behaviour by mothers and fathers. Second, it attempts to unravel the different dimensions implicated in the debate, going beyond the simplification of the mother's care vs non-family care dichotomy. It concludes that an integrated research agenda, focusing both on the outcomes for labour markets and for children's well-being, is necessary in order to develop policies that address the complex issues of choice, rights and social inequality involved in child-caring patterns.

Keywords
childcare, childcare policies, gender roles, working mothers

Premise

Debates about what is the proper care setting for very young children are increasingly entering the public/political arena. National and supranational bodies, such as the European Union, set specific targets that simultaneously regard women's labour force participation rates and childcare coverage by collective services, thus joining the already numerous – though disparate – norm-setting groups in this field: churches, child psychologists, paediatricians and experts of all kinds, including grandmothers and mothers-in-law.

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There has always been tension, conflict and negotiation around the question as to who should care for young children. But this friction used to remain implicit in the public sphere, instead being acted out at the microlevel of interpersonal relations and everyday organization and decision-making by parents (mothers) against the background of available opportunities, experts' advice and constraints, as well as own preferences and values. In recent years, however, contrasting positions have gained public visibility. National governments and international organizations (EU, OECD) have explicitly or implicitly formulated a kind of normative model both for mothers' behaviour and for childcare that supersedes those established until recently by policies (or the lack of them) in many countries, as well those held by many parents. Mothers are increasingly expected to participate in the labour market; fathers are increasingly expected to be involved in the care of very young children; children are increasingly expected to be partly cared for in non-family formal settings from a very young age onwards (UNICEF, 2008).

These developments, on the one hand, raise the issue of the degree to which there should be a publicly enforced or sponsored normative model for childcare, particularly in the face of the growing value attributed to freedom of choice in individualized and multicultural societies. On the other hand, they open the way to a discussion about the different dimensions involved in addressing the childcare needs of very young children: mothers' labour market participation in societies where the nuclear household is the prevalent household pattern, the gender division of labour in parental responsibilities, workplace demands and expectations and social and family inequalities among children.

In order to address these various dimensions, I pull together strands of literature, research and debates that are usually separated into specialized fields and around distinct topics: mothers' labour force participation and work–family reconciliation policies, equal opportunities between men and women, inequalities among children and child poverty. My focus is mostly on the EU27 and Norway, since this is a political and cultural area where childcare policies have a longer tradition and in many cases (e.g. maternity and parental leave) are statutory. Moreover, it is an area which is increasingly regulated at both the legal and discursive supranational level.

I first describe the different publicly supported childcare packages offered by the EU countries in the form of various combinations of leave and state-funded services. My aim is to discuss the implicit and explicit assumptions on how best to meet the care needs of preschool children embodied in these different packages and the specific risks for children's welfare and for inequalities among children. Against this background, I discuss the many unexamined assumptions that inform both the debate and much research on childcare preferences and on the impact of a working mother and of (also) receiving non-family care when very young on a child's well-being. In so doing, I also discuss how these debates address the issue of social inequality among mothers, families and children. In the conclusion, I tie together these various themes and argue that childcare needs and the issue of proper childcare cannot be reduced to a simplistic alternative between family (mother's) care and non-family care. On the contrary, they involve multiple dimensions and actors. Both policies and research should therefore take more seriously the multilayered and differentiated context in which childcare needs arise.

The politics and policies of childcare in Europe: An overview

Across the EU, the items that make up public social-care packages for preschool children differ widely (see also Del Boca and Wetzels, 2007; Hantrais, 2004). This concerns length and compensation of maternity leave (although the 1996 European Parental Leave Directive has set a minimum threshold for both dimensions), length and compensation of parental leave, whether and in what form the latter is opened up to fathers (and in some countries, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, also to grandparents), coverage through services for children aged under three and coverage through services for children aged three to school age. Further differences are found regarding school-age children, whose need for care and supervision does not end when they enter primary school and is met by quite dissimilar modes of organization by and around schools. These combinations, on the one hand, create different options for parents (mothers) and different possible experiences for children. On the other, they define different responsibilities between mothers and fathers, and between families and society. Figures 1 and 2, based on data collected for the EU-funded Multilinks project (Multilinks, 2009; Saraceno and Keck, 2008; Saraceno and Keck, 2010), show the substantial breadth of some these differences (length of leave and childcare coverage).

There are important cross-country variations regarding both overall length, and duration and level of compensation of maternity and parental leave, on the one hand (see also Wall, 2007), and childcare coverage through services for children aged under three, on the other, confirming that this is an area where there is no consensus across countries. On




Figure 1. Length of maternity and parental leave in weeks and total level of compensation, irrespective of level of compensation in the EU and Norway; data from around 2007
Source: Saraceno and Keck (2008), on the basis of various sources (Keck et al., 2009).




Figure 2. Childcare coverage (through publicly provided or supported services only) in the EU and Norway for children under three and between three and school age; data from around 2007
Source: Keck et al. (2009).

the contrary, the wide coverage of services for children aged three to school age indicates that for this age bracket some kind of formal, non-family care and education is framed as a normal, even necessary, experience and resource for growing up, irrespective of the

parents' working status. The partial exceptions are Ireland, with coverage below 50 percent, and Malta and Poland, whose coverage is less than 60 percent. Another difference is the availability or not of an incentivizing, specially reserved quota of parental leave for fathers, thus increasing both overall parental caring time and specifically fathers' time (Leira, 2006). This quota exists in various forms in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.

Because leave and services for children of working parents and particularly working mothers represent two different ways of dealing with the caring needs of very young children (under-threes), it is important to see how the overall package is organized in each country and how much is left to families (and through them to the market) with no support whatsoever. In order to do so, not only the length of leave, but also the levels of compensation must be taken into account, since a long leave with little or no compensation does allow time off paid work, but at a very high financial cost, particularly when a family is growing. For this reason, in order to assess 'effective leave' in terms of compensation,[1] the duration of leave was weighted on the basis of the compensation level, taking as a reference the average wage in each country. Figure 3 offers a synthetic overview of the different ways policies frame family and public responsibilities for the care of preschool children.

The greatest difference concerns the degree to which parents (mothers) are left with no kind of support in their responsibility to care for their children, particularly in the first three years of life. Poland, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and – to a lesser degree – the Netherlands are the countries where support of any kind is least available for children under three. In Poland this is also true for children aged three to six. These are the countries where mothers have fewer options and where exclusive family/mother care is normative not because of explicit incentives, but because of a lack of publicly financed alternatives. The only alternatives are the market (for those who can afford it) and extended family solidarity (grandmothers, if they are available). Another clear message that emerges from Figure 3 is that not only are there quite different levels of overall publicly supported coverage of young children's care needs across the EU, but the same level of coverage may be obtained through diverse means, that is, through different combinations of paid leaves and services. This in turn shapes different models of addressing childcare needs (see also Mahon, 2002). The countries with the longest effective leave all belong to the former Communist bloc. The long leave periods in these countries might represent both a reaction to negative experiences with childcare services in the past combined with long working hours for parents, and a way of dealing with unemployment. These countries, however, do not offer any incentive to fathers to take at least part of the leave. Given the prevalent gender division of labour in families, as well as gender-specific cultural models that were left unchanged during the Communist regimes with regard to responsibilities for care and domestic work (e.g. ILO, 1980; Robila, 2004), this lack of incentives implicitly supports a strong gender division of responsibilities between mothers and fathers. Coupled with the encouragement to take long leave, this may result in a long-term negative impact on mothers' chances in the labour market and on poverty risks for households and children.

The different combinations of care arrangements presented in Figure 3 only partly overlap with patterns of women's/mothers' labour market participation, so that we may find high levels of women's labour force participation in countries, such as Portugal, where effective leave is short and services scarce. Clearly, in this case, it is the extended




Figure 3. Childcare coverage through 'effective leave' and publicly financed services, in working weeks, EU and Norway 2003–7

Source: Multilinks (2009); Keck et al. (2009). Data for Romania and Malta are unavailable.

family that supports working mothers. There is also an expanding formal and informal care market (Wall, 2008). The role of the extended family, together with that of a growing formal care market, is also important in Italy (Blome et al., 2009), where women's labour force participation is lower than the European average, but involves over half of all mothers of small children and is mostly full-time. Contrast this with the Netherlands, where mothers mostly work part-time, and also Sweden and Norway (though not Denmark and Finland), where mothers often temporarily shift to long part-time work, returning to full-time positions when the child is older (e.g. Lewis et al., 2008).

In other words, substantial coverage through effective leave and services supports conciliation between paid work and childcare for women, since it encourages women's labour force participation while at the same time offering childcare support. But the reverse is not always true. Also, when coverage is scant, mothers may decide or need to be in paid work and then be obliged to find other (family, or formal or informal market solutions) for childcare while they are at work. Furthermore, combining work and care may involve different combinations: part-time use of non-family care with part-time work, full-time use of non-family care with full-time work, various combinations of non-parental with parental care and so forth.

The picture becomes even more complex if childcare allowances are considered. In some countries, in fact, at the end of the parental leave period, an option is formally given between receiving an allowance to stay at home to care for one's own child or using non-family childcare. This is the case in Finland, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Greece and (from the second child onwards) France. This approach is currently being discussed in Germany. These allowances are usually a flat rate and much lower than the average wage. Not everywhere do they also include social security coverage and pension contributions. As Leira (1998) has observed, these allowances represent quite a distinct and to some degree opposite approach to that represented not only by services but also by fathers' quotas in parental leave. Services and fathers' quotas promote a dual-earner/dual-carer model, while carer allowances, although couched in gender-neutral terms, de facto strengthen mothers' role as the main carers. Care allowances may also strengthen social class differences among mothers and their children, insofar as it is more likely that low-income rather than high-income mothers will opt to stay at home to care in exchange for the (comparatively low) allowance. They may also strengthen the informal care market, since the allowance may be used to pay for informal care.

The different policy packages, together with the different strategies developed by families and particularly by mothers to deal with childcare needs, result in different experiences and also risks for women and children. From the point of view of women's labour force participation and fathers' participation in care-giving, existing research indicates, first, that the longer and the less compensated the leave, the more it is feminized (even when in theory it is also open to fathers) and the more it produces polarized behaviours among women, mostly based on social class/education (e.g. Korpi, 2000; UNICEF, 2008, for an overview). Second, the longer the leave actually taken by one parent – de facto the mother – the more difficult it is for her to re-enter the labour market and in any case the higher the so-called 'child penalty' (Del Boca and Wetzels, 2007; Gornick and Meyers, 2003). Third, specifically with regard to fathers' involvement in early childcare, it is not enough to allow fathers to take part of the parental leave. If there is not a 'use it

or lose it' quota, they are not likely to take leave (also because their entitlement is weaker in the eyes of employers). Leave-taking among Swedish and Norwegian fathers substantially increased when the 'use it or lose it' rule was introduced. In Denmark, where this rule has been abolished, fathers tend not to take any leave, although the level of compensation is very similar to that in the other two Scandinavian countries (Morgan, 2008). In Italy, where there is a 'use it or lose it' rule, but compensation for parental leave is low (only 30 percent of lost pay), fathers rarely take it. Fourth, the possibility to use parental leave in a flexible and part-time way encourages both leave-sharing among parents and mothers' labour market attachment, also reducing the demand for (particularly full-time) care for very young children. Fifth, the cost of childcare affects usage more among low- than high-income families, although there are cross-country variations depending on degree of coverage (Del Boca and Vuri, 2006). Subsidized care, therefore, has an important redistributive effect. Finally, the quality of childcare, together with its quantity, strongly affects legitimization and acceptance.

Should mothers of young children work? Behaviours and preferences in context

The idea that there may be a conflict between young children's needs and mothers' labour market participation is the result of complex sociohistorical developments. On the one hand, there is the historical 'discovery of childhood' – dating before psychoanalysis and child psychology (Ariès, 1962) – as a specific stage of life with its attendant needs. This discovery initially only changed the lives of children of the higher classes. But in the second half of the 20th century, childhood as a protected stage of life became a widespread value across social classes and in many countries was intertwined with the 'invention' of motherhood as a specific and overarching role. At the same time, the development of the industrial economy and the social organization of paid work, together with the development of the nuclear family, made it more difficult for women to combine childcare with working – as many women of the peasant and working classes had done for centuries. This development also contributed to separating the world and needs of the workplace from those of the family and particularly from the needs of care-receiving and care-giving. The creation of the male-breadwinner family, where fathers were removed from any responsibility for the care of children and mothers removed from participation in the labour market, was both the consequence and the means of this separation (Crouch, 1999; Moen and Roehling, 2005; Saraceno, 1997). Incompatibility between mothers' paid work and children's care and relational needs was therefore the outcome of both the organization of paid work and the gender division of work within the household. Both these dimensions must be addressed not only in order to overcome this incompatibility, but also in order to critically understand why childcare and relational needs are framed almost exclusively as concerning mothers and not also fathers, and why only mothers' and not fathers' paid work is perceived as possibly harmful for children's well-being. In fact, a non-working father is more likely to be perceived as a liability for his child/ren.

There are several grounds on which one may criticize an idea of gender equality based on giving women the opportunity to adopt what are prevalently male behaviours and priorities. But similar criticisms may be levied against the idea of male (fathers') behaviour

and priorities as ontologically given and immutable and of fathers' care as irrelevant for a child's well-being (as implicitly suggested, among others, by Gilbert [2008] and, in a more problematic way, by Pleck [2007] and to some degree also by Esping Andersen [2009]). Of course, given the prevalent gender division of family responsibilities, any study will find that fathers' participation in paid work does not negatively affect children's well-being, while, on the contrary, fathers' unemployment may have a negative impact. In addition, there is not (yet) empirical evidence that demonstrates the benefits of receiving a father's care. But this does not demonstrate per se that fathers' care is irrelevant and that shared parental care is not an adequate substitute for mother-only care.

Many feminist scholars have criticized the European employment policy and the work–family conciliation discourse specifically because, with its narrow focus on women's employment participation, it downplays the quality and organization of work, on the one hand, and time for caring and the quality of non-family care, on the other (see e.g. Knijn and Ostner, 2008; Lewis, 2006; Saraceno, 2008; Stratigaki, 2004). Mothers' increasing labour market participation in all developed countries, in fact, unbalances the organization of both the market and the family premised on the male-breadwinner/female-carer model. Simply integrating mothers into the labour market without changing the rules of that complex organization is bound to create tension. This is clearly visible in the way having a small child affects women's labour market participation, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, even when mothers do not altogether exit the labour force when they have one or more children, they still often work part-time, either temporarily (e.g. in the Scandinavian countries) or on a long-term basis, as happens more often in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK.

But the cross-country differences are as great as the gender differences. In addition to the impact of childcare and work–family conciliation policies, explanations point to differences in national family and gender cultures. Historical and sociological studies, for instance, have documented the different degrees to which households are embedded in




Figure 4. Employment impact of parenthood for men and women with and without children < 6 years, Europe 2007

Source: 2007 EU Labour Force Surveys, provisional data, Sweden and Denmark not available.

kin networks across Europe, exemplified, among other things, by the different degree of geographical proximity between children's and parents' households (see e.g. Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008; Reher, 1998; Saraceno, 2007). This explains the higher availability of grandparental support in dealing with childcare needs in the Southern European countries, which allows Portuguese mothers, for instance, to remain in the labour force when they have a small child even though formal childcare services are scarce.

Comparative survey data also offer some evidence of the existence of nationally specific gender cultures. In the 1999 European Value Survey, the level of moderate or strong agreement with the – overly generic[2] – statement, 'a preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother works', ranged from over 80 percent in Malta, Austria and Italy, to 17 percent in Denmark. Only in 10 countries out of 30 did fewer than 50 percent of respondents agree. These included, in addition to Denmark and with substantially higher levels of agreement, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Slovenia, Romania and the Czech Republic. The 2006 European Social Survey, conducted in a smaller number of countries, requested a response to a somewhat different and more specific statement: 'How much do you approve or disapprove if a woman has a full-time job while she has children aged under 3?' In this case, too, the variation is very high, ranging from 58 percent of disapproval in Ukraine and Switzerland to 16–17 percent in Finland, Cyprus and Denmark (see Figure 5). Interestingly, the Netherlands and Romania, which in the more generic European Value Survey question showed a high level of disagreement with the idea that a preschool child would suffer if the mother works, give a much less positive evaluation when confronted with a very small child and a full-time job in the European Social Survey. The perceived alternative seems, therefore, not to be between working and not working, but to be between working full-time or part-time. Morgan (2008) also found that in most countries only a minority – albeit gradually increasing – of respondents agree that a mother of a preschool child might work full-time without impeding on her child's well-being. It should be noted, however, that both in the European Value Survey and in the European Social Survey the percentage of respondents who answer neither/nor to these questions is substantial and in some case, as shown in Figure 5, greater than that of those who approve, indicating that opinions are far from being neatly divided into supporters and opponents.

The same statement in the European Social Survey, when referred to a man with a child under three working full-time, not surprisingly did not yield a comparable level of differentiation. Percentages of disapproval ranged from less than 5 percent in Denmark to around 15–17 percent in Ukraine, Slovenia, Switzerland Austria and Bulgaria. Cross-country differences are larger in the percentage of respondents who neither agree nor disagree, suggesting that also with regard to the impact of fathers' caring on a child's well-being there may be a less univocal view than assumed. This insight is also supported by national data on behaviour and time use, which show that in recent years fathers of infants have been taking care of their children more often than 10 years ago, although not always cutting their working time but instead their free time in order to do so (e.g. on Italy see Bruzzese and Romano, 2006).

Neither differences in policies nor differences in family and gender cultures, however, fully explain either the similarities or differences shown in Figure 5. They do not explain,




Figure 5. Approval/disapproval of a woman with a child under three having a full-time job
Source: European Social Survey 2006.

for instance, the difference between Portugal, on the one hand, and Spain and Italy, on the other, or the similarity between Italy and the Netherlands or the high negative impact of having a small child in many of the former Communist countries, where women have high labour force participation rates and where the extended family is more widespread than elsewhere (Saraceno, 2007).

Kangas and Rostgaard (2007), based on the 2002 International Social Survey data on seven European countries with different childcare arrangements, conclude that, of course, opinions matter, including those of the male partners. But opinions are constrained by opportunity structures, which are not the same for all women across different countries. Opportunities, in turn, depend not only on characteristics such as social class or education, but also on the actual availability of day care. Lewis et al. (2008), based again on the European Social Survey data, further develop this argument, taking into consideration not only the availability of formal, but also informal care. They argue that cross-country differences are the outcome of a mixture of structural options both in the labour market and in social policies, of national (and social-group specific) cultural values concerning mothers' obligations and children's needs, of the relevance of kin networks and particularly of grandmothers, and so forth. Further research is needed to unravel these different dimensions at the comparative level.

Together with cross-national differences on the impact of having a very young child, there are also intra-national class differences. The negative impact of having a

young child on women's labour force participation is greater, within each country, for low-income, low-educated women (Crompton, 2006; Esping Andersen, 2009). It is difficult to explain this, following Hakim (2000), simply in terms of different individual preferences. They seem rather to be socially structured preferences, based both on individual inclinations and on the complex system of labour market conditions, class and gender-specific local cultures, class and gender-specific options, resources and constraints (see e.g. Crompton, 2006).

Two English studies (Duncan and Irwin, 2004; Himmelweit and Sigala, 2004), based on in-depth qualitative interviews, disagree with the idea of 'autonomous' subjectivities oriented only by values and show that there is, on the contrary, interdependence between subjectivities and context, and class-specific social relations. They found that mothers experience both internal (values, personal identities) and external constraints (the household's economic circumstances, working time) on their decisions concerning whether to leave or reduce their paid working time when they have a small child. They also found that neither external circumstances nor identities were fixed. Rather, behaviour and identities were adjusted to each other, giving rise to feedback effects at both the individual and the social levels. Among the constraints, also fathers' (non-)availability to care for their children must be considered. Again, further comparative research on these issues is needed.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a mother's participation in paid work does not necessarily imply a strong reduction in time devoted to caring and developing a relationship with her children – for at least two different reasons. First, working mothers often reduce the time they devote to household chores and social activities in order to have more time for their children. Second, when the mother is in paid work, fathers are more often involved in childcare and generally in activities with children. Thus, the children of working mothers have the benefit of a higher presence of fathers in their lives than children whose mothers are not in paid work (e.g. Bianchi, 2000; Bianchi and Raley, 2005; Sayer et al., 2004). Of course, once again, it is an issue of timing, and therefore of the most adequate length of parental leave, but also of time and of quality of work, as well as of overall resources: overly long working hours, overly tiring jobs, too many financial preoccupations – all of these strongly restrict the possibility of spending relaxed and serene time with one's own children. Ascribing every possible damage to children to the simple fact that the 'mother works' is a very simplistic way of looking at the context in which parents and children live and develop their relationships. It must be added that when mothers are not in paid work, they do not necessarily devote all their time to children. Caring for and watching over children is often mixed with other activities: household chores, shopping, time with friends and so forth.

Symmetrically, non-mother care may occur in a variety of settings and by a variety of actors. Together with formal services (provided by the state or the market), grandparents, other family members, privately paid babysitters and so forth may be involved, sometimes in alternation and sometime in combination. The availability of these resources is national, but also culture and family specific. It is shaped by public policies and by the marketing of services, but also by demography, by patterns of geographical proximity, cultural family and intergenerational models, as well as a family's economic means.

Should mothers of small children work? The issue of child poverty

We have seen that mothers are expected (and expect from themselves) to take the responsibility (and pleasure) of responding to the care and relational needs of small children, rearranging their modes of participation in the labour market. This, however, creates not only gender inequality in the labour market and in economic relationships within the couple, it also creates specific risks of poverty for mothers and children.

Mothers' labour market participation is, as a matter of fact, one of the most important means for protecting children from poverty. Although living in a household where no adult is in paid work presents the highest risk of poverty for children, the majority of children who are poor live in a household where at least one adult is in work (Danzinger and Haveman, 2001; UNICEF, 2007). Having both parents in paid work protects households and children from the loss of work by one parent, from inadequacy of individual work income and also from one of the main causes of children's poverty in many countries: partnership/marriage break-up. Gornick (2004), for instance, found that in the OECD countries she studied, the lower the share of the household income controlled (i.e. earned/owned) directly by the mother, the higher the vulnerability of children (as well as of mothers) to poverty. Moller and Misra (2005) found that the incidence of poverty among mothers and children, and particularly among lone mothers and their children, is lower in countries that actively support mothers' participation in paid work through a combination of paid leave and childcare services.

Policies have addressed the issue of lone mothers' higher vulnerability to poverty in two ways: (1) granting special protection and financial support to lone mothers defined as mainly carers, also exempting them from the requirement to be available for work when receiving social assistance; and (2) strongly encouraging and supporting them to work for pay, therefore to become breadwinners. In some countries, such as the UK, the Netherlands and in part Germany, where the first approach was once prevalent, in the last decade there has been a substantial shift from the first to the second approach. The requirement to be available for work has been tightened and the age of the youngest child that exempts from this requirement has been lowered (e.g. Knijn et al., 2007; Rowlingson and Millar, 2001). A similar move occurred in the US with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Chaudry, 2004). In this case, the need for alternative, non-family, affordable and qualitatively acceptable childcare arrangements is created by policies themselves.

The impact on children's well-being of non-family care and the issue of social inequality

Protecting children from poverty also protects them from inequalities among children in cognitive development and health, which many studies have found to be associated with living in poor households and environments, although the underlying mechanisms are complex (e.g. Gregg et al., 2007; Waldfogel, 2002). Empirical evidence on the outcome for overall children's well-being of attending formal childcare services when very young, however, presents a nuanced picture. Overall (see Loeb et al., 2007; Waldfogel, 2002,

2010: Chs 4 and 6; also the overview in UNICEF, 2008), they stress the importance of a stable and secure relational environment, thus of both an 'adequate' amount of parental (de facto mother) care and of a good quality and stable service environment. Negative effects of early non-family childcare are more likely the younger the age. But the positive effects on cognitive development are highest when early education starts at around age two rather than later. The quality of non-family care is, of course, important, as well as daily duration of attendance. But hours of work and overall mothers' (and fathers') work experience are equally important, insofar as they affect the quality and quantity of time spent with the child. The intensity of all these different effects varies depending on family income and other characteristics, such as race and migrant background.

The limit of these studies is, first, that they have been mainly developed in the US. It is a strange paradox that countries with a much more developed and more homogeneous childcare service system do not have a comparable tradition of studies on the short- and long-term impact on children. Second, these studies at best compare children attending and not attending formal childcare services. But not only formal services differ. So also do family and informal care. A research design on the impact of different childcare arrangements should better differentiate not only between different kinds of formal services, but also between different kinds of family and informal arrangements.

In recent years, issues concerning the social integration of migrant children have introduced a new focus in many countries on early childcare and education services as 'good for children', insofar as they are believed to favour the development of linguistic and relational competences in the country of migration, 'protecting' children from isolation in/of ethnic groups. For instance, in Germany the debate around the new *Betreuungsgeld* (care allowance) that the centre-right government coalition wants to introduce for parents who prefer not to send their child to a formal service, also concerns the risk that this would encourage parents living on social assistance and particularly migrant (Turkish) parents not to send their children to a formal service, thus weakening their chances for social integration.

The positive role of early non-family care and education services in addressing both inequalities among children and, more generally, children's rights has been argued in recent years from two partly different perspectives – that of children as the human capital of the future, therefore as a common good to be invested in and cared for (e.g. Esping Andersen, 2002, 2009), and that of children as citizens in their own right and therefore entitled to developmental and material resources not only on the basis of their family membership (Lister, 2008; Therborn, 1996). These two approaches stress different dimensions of the social justice issue with regard to children: the former is more focused on the outcome of social inequality for the life chances of children when adults, the latter is more focused on the rights and needs of children *qua* children, therefore in their present life. These different focuses offer (particularly lower-class) parents somewhat distinct – and differently persuasive – rationales for accepting and even valuing early non-family care and education for their children. The human capital approach in fact stresses the risk that low-educated, low-income parents (mothers), particularly if with a migrant background, are de facto a liability for their children, not providing enough income (therefore mothers should work) and not enough cognitive stimuli. Early childcare and education services, therefore, are perceived as a form of compensation for a disadvantaged family

background. The children as citizens approach, by contrast, stresses societal responsibility to grant all children adequate family care and time, as well as non-family resources for the full development of their capabilities. Early non-family childcare and education is only one – very important – item of a complex package of 'children's endowment', which also includes parents' time to care, a more family-friendly workplace organization and so forth.

Conclusion

Whether governments and policies should sponsor 'one best model' of early childcare and mother and father behaviour is certainly a very controversial question. In a democratic society that values individual freedom as well as equal opportunities for all and children's well-being, it is the range, quality of and access to options that counts. Different social groups refer to and elaborate alternative 'normatives'. These are embedded in mothers' and parents' value systems, which in turn emerge in specific social and geographic contexts (Duncan and Irwin, 2004; Duncan et al., 2004; Himmelweit and Sigala, 2004). It is not just a question of the quantity of childcare, but also of its quality and nature; and judgements about quality and nature vary socially and geographically. As indicated above, for instance, findings from both the European Value Survey and the European Social Survey show that in countries where both mothers' labour market participation (full- or part-time) and the availability of quality-controlled childcare are more widespread, the idea that children under school age are going to suffer if their mother works is less widespread than in countries where either mothers' labour market participation or childcare supply, or both, are low.

From this perspective, the more constrained situation for parents, mothers and children is that where any form of support and acknowledgement of the costs involved in adequately caring for a child is scarce. But the opposite situation may be just as constraining – where the focus is on participation in paid work and less so on care as a valued and valuable activity and as requiring significant attention regarding quality, organization and timing.

In any case, the mere provision of childcare is not an adequate policy response to the problems of combining caring for children with employment. It is also necessary to deal with expectations as to what is proper care in different social groups, particularly for very young children. Combining leave and childcare services in a flexible way is a partial way to deal with this. Another is to differentiate the kinds of services that are supported and also to direct attention not only to coverage rates but also to quality. Still another is to allow and encourage less asymmetrical care-sharing between mothers and fathers. None of these solutions stands alone. Together, these approaches involve not only redistributive policies, but also policies related to time – over the life course and in the workplace.

They also involve what we might define as an effort to negotiate different cultural models and expectations, not in a top-down way, but through offering accessible incentives to reflect upon, and eventually review, shared understandings concerning children's needs and rights, and family and particularly mothers' responsibilities. Restricting the focus only to equal opportunities between men and women is not sufficient, and even less so the argument that it is necessary to increase women's labour force participation rate for economic reasons. Both arguments underplay the children's perspective. More

promising, both from the point of view of social justice and from that of responding to parents' concern for their children, is the argument which integrates the gender equal-opportunity discourse with that of children's rights and equal opportunities among children. But in order to develop and argue for policies that (while addressing the issue of social justice and of equal opportunities for both women and children across social classes) may find support in increasingly diversified societies, a research agenda must be developed that integrates the distinct dimensions involved when discussing who should care for very small children, how much and under what conditions.

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Notes

1. The concept of 'effective leave' was first developed by Plantenga et al. (2008). But the point of reference used by these authors was the minimum wage, which in my opinion is too low in many countries to offer a realistic measure of actual compensation. Here the point of reference is the average wage.
2. This statement lumps together all children aged 0 to school age and does not distinguish between working time schedules.

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Résumés/Resúmenes

La rationalisation de la société civile

Apostolis Papakostas

On accepte presque universellement deux idées comme des réalités en sociologie politique. L'une est que presque toutes les associations voient leur nombre de membres décliner. On interprète habituellement ce phénomène comme un effet de l'individualisation. L'autre idée est que le caractère de l'action collective a changé. Cette idée, qui a été développée initialement par Touraine, Melucci et Castells, consiste à dire qu'une nouvelle catégorie historique de l'action sociale a émergé et qu'elle ressemble à l'action dans les groupes primaires plutôt que dans les organisations, et d'une certaine manière c'est une victoire sur la loi d'airain de l'oligarchie. Dans cet article, je mets en doute ces deux idées. J'ai l'intention de montrer qu'un autre processus historique est à l'œuvre ici, à savoir un processus de 'rationalisation inerte' des mouvements sociaux, des partis politiques et des associations, qui prend place en Europe avec différents points de départ et à différents rythmes. Le résultat de ce processus peut être résumé par: 'plus d'organisations avec moins de personnes'. La domination inhérente aux organisations oligarchiques est en train de se transformer par la création d'une nouvelle frontière organisationnelle entre l'élite (ou profession) et les membres. Ce qui est important, c'est que l'adhésion en elle-même, comme forme d'affiliation, est en train de disparaître, et pas seulement les adhérents. Cet article montre que c'est principalement dû au changement historique de mobilisation des ressources, d'une mobilisation des ressources tirées principalement des membres à celles tirées d'autres organisations. Enfin, cet article analyse l'importance des champs de pouvoir non structurés (ou espaces ouverts) créés par les processus de rationalisation, pour l'innovation sociale et les nouveaux mouvements sociaux.

Mots-clés: espaces ouverts, mouvements sociaux, nouvelles frontières d'exclusion, rationalisation, société civile

La racionalización de la sociedad civil

Apostolis Papakostas

Dos ideas son casi universalmente aceptadas como realidad en la sociología política. Una es que los números están declinando en casi todas las asociaciones de afiliados. La interpretación habitual de este fenómeno es que ocurre a causa de la individualización. La otra es que el carácter de la acción colectiva ha cambiado. Esta idea, que proviene

de Touraine, Melucci y Castells plantea que ha emergido una nueva categoría histórica de acción social, una que se asemeja a la acción en grupos primarios más que en organizaciones, y de cierta manera es una victoria sobre la ley de hierro de la oligarquía. En este artículo cuestiono ambas ideas. Mi intención es mostrar que otro proceso histórico está desempeñando un papel aquí, concretamente un proceso de 'racionalización inerte' en movimientos sociales, partidos políticos, y asociaciones, que está teniendo lugar en Europa con diferentes puntos de partida y en diferentes ritmos. El resultado de este proceso se puede resumir como 'más organización con menos gente'. La dominación, inherente a las organizaciones oligárquicas, está siendo transformada por la creación de una nueva línea divisoria organizacional entre élite (o profesión) y miembros. El hecho es que es la propia calidad de miembro como un modo de afiliación lo que está desapareciendo, no sólo sus miembros. El artículo argumenta que eso ocurre sobretodo porque las pautas de movilización de recursos han cambiado históricamente de una movilización de recursos trazada desde los miembros, a una movilización de los recursos trazada desde otras organizaciones. Finalmente, el artículo analiza la importancia para la innovación social y los nuevos movimientos sociales de los campos de poder (o espacios abiertos) no-estructurados creados por procesos de racionalización.

Palabras clave: espacios abiertos, movimientos sociales, nuevos límites de exclusión, racionalización, sociedad civil

Perceptions des risques sur le marché du travail: changements et continuités parmi les générations

Line Nyhagen Predelli et Andreas Cebulla

Selon la thèse de la société du risque, telle qu'elle a été remarquablement développée par Ulrich Beck et Anthony Giddens, le marché du travail joue un rôle clé dans les processus d'individualisation. Les générations antérieures trouvaient un accès au marché du travail et une mobilité sur ce marché grâce à des réseaux familiaux et personnels, et également grâce à des institutions publiques, tandis que l'on appréhende les cohortes qui entrent sur le marché du travail à partir des années 70 comme vivant dans un 'régime de risques' moderne, qui exige de chaque individu qu'il fasse des choix et prenne des décisions en fonction d'un marché qui ne fournit plus des emplois sur la base des relations de parenté ou d'amitié. A partir de données issues de 58 entretiens qualitatifs avec des parents et leurs enfants devenus adultes, nous examinons plus précisément ces changements supposés. Notre principale observation est que d'importants changements se sont produits d'une génération à l'autre, dans le sens d'une plus grande individualisation perçue. Bien qu'elles confirment l'écart affirmé par Beck entre un 'passé collectivisé' et un 'présent individualisé', nos données empiriques sur deux générations d'individus indiquent que cet écart est cependant plus trouble et plus complexe que ce que l'on pensait jusqu'alors.

Mots-clés: individualisation, générations, marché du travail, perceptions du risque, société du risque, trajectoire de vie

Percepciones de riesgos del mercado de trabajo: cambios y continuidades a través de las generaciones

Line Nyhagen Predelli y Andreas Cebulla

En la tesis de la sociedad del riesgo, prevista más notablemente por Ulrich Beck y Anthony Giddens, el mercado de trabajo desempeña un papel clave en procesos de individualización. Mientras para las generaciones previas, la familia y las redes personales, y también las instituciones gubernamentales, eran importantes al proveer acceso y movilidad en el mercado de trabajo, a partir de la década de 1970, los que siguieron entrando en el mercado de trabajo son percibidos como si viviesen en un moderno 'régimen de riesgo', lo que requiere que cada individuo elija y tome decisiones en relación con un mercado que ya no tiene cabida para el empleo fundado en parentesco y amistad. Basados en datos de 58 entrevistas cualitativas con padres y sus hijos adultos, examinamos más de cerca estos pretendidos cambios. Nuestra principal observación es que han tenido lugar, de una generación a la siguiente, cambios importantes hacia la cada vez mayor percepción de individualización. Mientras afirmamos la disyuntura propuesta por Beck entre un 'pasado colectivizado' y un 'presente individualizado', nuestra evidencia empírica de dos generaciones de individuos indica que la disyuntura es, sin embargo, más turbia y complicada de lo que se entendía previamente.

Palabras clave: curso de la vida, generaciones, individualización, mercado del trabajo. percepciones de riesgo, sociedad del riesgo

Déprofessionnalisation d'un métier féminin: défis pour la sociologie des professions

Therese Marie Andrews et Kari Wærness

Dans cet article, nous affirmons que les infirmières de santé publique norvégiennes qui ont connu une longue période de professionnalisation, ont subi récemment un processus de déprofessionnalisation. Leur juridiction a été étroitement circonscrite. Elles ont perdu des missions qui leur apportaient du pouvoir et du respect dans leur communauté locale, ainsi que le monopôle sur des tâches qui étaient à l'origine réservées à leur profession. Malgré ces changements, notre étude montre une absence flagrante de disputes, conflits ou demandes à propos de leur juridiction ou de revendications portant sur leur juridiction. En d'autres termes, la manière dont les infirmières de santé publique s'accommodent des changements récents dans la structure de leur métier ne semble pas correspondre à un modèle facilement interprétable selon les théories dominantes de la sociologie des professions. Nous soutenons que la sociologie des professions doit développer des théories qui peuvent expliquer pourquoi la déprofessionnalisation peut parfois se produire sans résistance.

Mots-clés: contexte norvégien, déprofessionnalisation, métiers féminins, professionnalisation, sociologie des professions

Desprofesionalización de una ocupación femenina: desafíos para la sociología de las profesiones

Therese Marie Andrews y Kari Waerness

En este artículo argumentamos que las enfermeras de la salud pública noruega, tras un prolongado periodo de profesionalización, han atravesado recientemente un proceso de desprofesionalización. La jurisdicción de las enfermeras de la salud pública se ha vuelto fuertemente circunscrita. Han perdido deberes relacionados con poder y respeto en la comunidad local y han perdido el monopolio sobre las tareas originalmente atribuidas a la profesión. A pesar de estos cambios, nuestro estudio indica una manifiesta falta de disputas abiertas, conflictos y demandas centradas en la jurisdicción y en reivindicaciones jurisdiccionales. En otras palabras, la manera cómo las enfermeras de salud pública hacen frente a los recientes cambios en su estructura de trabajo no parece seguir una pauta fácilmente explicable en términos de teorías sociológicas prevalecientes sobre las profesiones. Sostenemos que la sociología de las profesiones necesita desarrollar teorías que pueden explicar porqué la desprofesionalización ocurre a veces sin resistencia.

Palabras clave: contexto noruego, desprofesionalización, ocupaciones femeninas, profesionalización, sociología de las profesiones

L'impact de la migration internationale sur le genre et le mariage dans les communautés émigrantes du Vietnam

Danièle Bélanger et Tran Giang Linh

L'augmentation rapide et récente des mariages transfrontaliers entre les femmes d'Asie du Sud-Est et des hommes de l'Est de l'Asie crée un nouveau flux international de 'migrants matrimoniaux' dans la région. Cet article montre comment les migrations matrimoniales reconfigurent les relations de pouvoir entre les genres dans trois communautés du Sud du Vietnam qui exportent des migrants. Les analyses des données recueillies en 2007 indiquent des changements dans le statut des filles et des fils et une transformation significative du marché matrimonial. Les filles qui émigrent vivent une amélioration de leur statut et de leur pouvoir à la maison, principalement par le versement d'argent, au point que les villageois expriment de plus en plus leur préférence pour avoir des filles plutôt que des garçons. L'émigration des jeunes filles a créé un déséquilibre sur le marché matrimonial, qui donne aux femmes du village et à leur famille plus de pouvoir de négociation dans les transactions matrimoniales. Se marier est difficile pour de nombreux hommes célibataires du village à cause de la perception que les étrangers ont une plus grande valeur, du prix plus élevé des fiancées, et d'un manque de fiancées potentielles. D'une manière générale, les villageois considèrent que les migrations matrimoniales contribuent à créer des transformations sociales significatives en matière de genre et de relations de pouvoir dans les foyers et sur le marché du mariage.

Mots-clés: genre, mariage, migration internationale, pouvoir, Vietnam

El impacto de la migración transnacional sobre el género y el matrimonio, en comunidades remitentes de Vietnam

Danièle Bélanger y Tran Giang Linh

El reciente, rápido incremento de matrimonios interfronterizos entre mujeres del sudeste de Asia y hombres del este de Asia está creando un nuevo movimiento migratorio de 'emigrantes matrimoniales' en la región. Este artículo documenta cómo el matrimonio-emigración reconfigura relaciones de poder de género en tres comunidades remitentes de emigrantes en el sur de Vietnam. El análisis de datos colectados en 2007 indica cambios en el estatus de las hijas e hijos y una significante transformación del mercado matrimonial. Las hijas emigrantes experimentaron mejora de estatus y poder en el hogar, sobretodo a través de remesas, hasta el punto de que los habitantes de los pueblos expresaron un incremento de la preferencia por tener hijas que hijos. La emigración de mujeres jóvenes ha creado un mercado matrimonial sesgado que ofrece a las mujeres de las aldeas y a sus familias más poder de regateo en las transacciones matrimoniales. Conseguir casarse es difícil para muchos hombres solteros en la aldea debido a que los hombres extranjeros son percibidos como más valiosos, los mayores precios de las novias, y la escasez de novias potenciales. En general, los aldeanos ven la emigración matrimonial como algo que contribuye a transformaciones sociales significativas respecto a las relaciones de género y poder en los hogares, y en el mercado matrimonial.

Palabras clave: emigración transnacional, género, matrimonio, poder, Vietnam

Besoins et politiques en matière de garde d'enfants: un problème multidimensionnel

Chiara Saraceno

La garde des enfants est devenue un problème très débattu dans tous les pays développés. Qui doit s'occuper des enfants, comment, dans quelles proportions et pour combien de temps, sont des questions qui sont au centre de conflits de valeur qui donnent forme non seulement à des politiques et des conflits autour de ces politiques, mais aussi à des choix individuels et familiaux. Cet article contribue au débat de deux manières. Premièrement il présente un aperçu actualisé des différents modes de garde d'enfants offerts par les 27 pays européens, en montrant comment ils présentent des conceptions très différentes de ce qu'est un mode de garde adéquat, ainsi qu'un comportement adéquat des mères et des pères. En second, il essaie de dévoiler les différentes dimensions du débat, en allant au-delà de la dichotomie simplificatrice de la garde par la mère *versus* la garde en dehors de la famille. Il conclut à la nécessité d'avoir un agenda de recherches intégré, qui soit centré sur les résultats sur les marchés du travail mais aussi en matière de bien-être des enfants, pour développer des politiques qui puissent résoudre les problèmes complexes du choix, des droits et des inégalités sociales dans les modes de garde des enfants.

Mots-clés: garde d'enfants, mères de famille ayant une activité professionnelle, politiques en matière de garde d'enfants, rôles de genre

Necesidades del cuidado de los niños y políticas de cuidado de los niños: una cuestión multidimensional

Chiara Saraceno

El cuidado de los niños se ha convertido en un tema muy debatido en todos los países desarrollados. Quién debería de cuidar a los niños, cómo, cuanto y durante cuanto tiempo son las cuestiones que están en el centro de conflictos de valores que determinan no sólo políticas y luchas en torno de las políticas, sino también elecciones individuales y familiares. Este artículo contribuye al debate de dos maneras. Primero, presenta una perspectiva general actualizada de diferentes paquetes de cuidado de los niños ofrecidos por los 27 países de la Unión Europea, indicando cómo estos representan formas completamente diferentes de entender el cuidado adecuado, así como el comportamiento adecuado de madres y padres. Segundo, intenta desentrañar las diferentes dimensiones implicadas en el debate, yendo más allá de la simplificación de la dicotomía cuidado de la madre versus cuidado no-familiar. Concluye que es necesaria una prioridad de asuntos a investigar, que focalice tanto los resultados para los mercados del trabajo, como para el bienestar de los niños, para desarrollar políticas que se ocupen de los complicados asuntos de elección, derechos y desigualdad social que envuelven los modelos de cuidado de los niños.

Palabras clave: cuidado de los niños, madres trabajadoras, papeles de género, políticas de cuidado de los niños



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
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Values and culture in the social shaping of the future

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Abstract
This article introduces the *Current Sociology* monograph issue on Values and Culture. It discusses sociology's renewed interest in values and the general approach on which the contributors converge despite diverse theoretical backgrounds, areas of focus and social settings. It explains how the studies in this publication contribute to the understanding of the formation and operation of values on micro, meso and macro levels in an increasingly globalized world.

Keywords
culture, future, social change, values

The significance of values is the central theme of this collection of articles.[1] That values are important in the lives of individuals and societies is a basic assumption shared by the contributors. Many other sociologists and social scientists would agree. However, to date, social science has not produced a clear view of values, much less a consensus. As discussed below, the scholarly interest in values and moral concern is growing. This by itself is reason enough to feel encouraged in this line of research. The explicit goal of this monograph is to contribute towards the understanding of the issue of values; its implicit aim is concerned with the prospects for a better future. Sociology's evident needs for empirical and theoretical analysis should not be antithetical to normative engagements with the preconditions of a good society and social improvements.

This monograph issue approaches values and culture holistically, mostly through 'thick descriptions' and 'realist model-building'. The contributors attempt theoretical

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clarification of particular aspects of this subject by staying empirically grounded without drifting into abstract meta-theory. Although socially negative aspects in the lives of individuals are discussed, there is no intention of adding to the lament over a perceived decline of values and morality in modern societies. In some sense, individuals are often seen at the receiving end of cultural trends, influenced by the codes, interests and settings remote collectivities or institutions produce. Collective actors and (what would be then perceived as influential) individuals can generate attractive templates for behaviour. For good or bad, they set in motion within the minds of people aspirations, desires and expectations. In other words, what is valued or wanted is affected socially and culturally. The articles in this monograph discuss both the *formation* and the *operation* of values at three analytically distinct levels. These are characterized by different patterns of social interaction: the lives of individuals (micro), the actions of collective actors (meso) and the trends of globalizing culture(s) (macro).

The distinction of levels and patterns of interaction is the basis of the organization of this monograph. Part One discusses the formation of values in society. Part Two addresses culturally embedded values as an empirical reality that impacts people. It explores how the minds of people are being shaped by the values of institutions and cultural structures inherited from the past. Part Three considers the role of values on an intermediate level. More specifically, it focuses on corporations, political parties and the mass media as powerful institutions affecting all aspects of life. Part Four, broadest in scope, examines the interplay of values and culture at national and global levels. The Coda presents concluding reflections on values and the future.

In the following we present a few thoughts on the formation and operation of values and pinpoint the main features of values that emerge from this collection. We continue with a brief assessment of the state of sociology with respect to the study of values and a summary of the individual contributions. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the present series and conclude the introduction with a glance ahead.

Formation and operation of values

As referred to above, the *formation* and *operation* of values are considered on micro-, meso- and macro-sociological levels. Formation as a concept connotes action by human actors, while operation suggests that social phenomena incorporate a dynamic internal logic independent of human intentions. It is relatively easy to imagine and to understand agency, individual and collective, because we experience it in our own activities. Being independent of human will, operation is harder to grasp. For example, it is often difficult to understand how our own behaviour is socially conditioned. Also, it is hard to understand why there are unintended consequences to social action, and what they are. Thus, even if it is sufficiently clear that formation is associated with agency, what is the referent of operation? In sociological theory, operation or functioning is associated with structure. But having no observable features, structure as a concept tends to be elusive. It is discussed by Anthony Giddens (1979) as 'structural properties' that are at the same time 'medium and outcome' of the practices that constitute social reality. In this way, we see that agency and structure are inherently related dimensions. Following this view, we can recognize that the formation and operation of values are two distinct manifestations of sociocultural

life, two basic factors of its dynamism. 'Formation of values' thus refers to emergent value articulations as they are being shaped, reproduced or changed by social action, while 'operation of values' refers to the role value articulations play in the life of individuals and societies, that is, how they affect sociocultural life.

A peculiar point, responsible for ambiguity and complexity, which emerges from this volume is that social action shapes values in various ways. The view that life as such is the most basic value is taken up by Mike Featherstone, who draws in his article on Simmel's *Lebensphilosophie* ('philosophy of life'), and also by Shimazono Susumu in his contribution on bioethics. Values depend on life, although a healthy development is never guaranteed and the quality of life appears in constant danger of decline.

The ambivalent nature of values is one of the main points in Reimon Bachika's article on the operation of symbolism and values in the context of religion. Bachika argues that these elements of culture can have socially positive as well as negative effects. The negative impact is central in Scott North's contribution on the extreme stress of the Japanese work ethic, in which he shows how value orientations can have detrimental and even fatal consequences for individuals. It is this dark dimension that emerges with greater force from the articles focusing on the meso- and macro-social levels. It is conceptualized variously as the result of unintentionally adverse interaction, persuasion/manipulation, or open conflict.

Life as a social phenomenon is ambivalent and complex as well as fascinating. There is much to win and to lose, materially and spiritually. Sociologically speaking, the formation and operation of values is a sociocultural phenomenon that all authors of this collection are tackling. Let us now briefly look at the course sociology has taken in recent decades and the new concerns that are emerging.

Sociology and the study of values

Values have been studied and referred to in sociology since its beginnings but neither a universally accepted definition nor any generally accepted clarification of their significance has been arrived at. Sociology has been unfolding as a wide-ranging panorama of approaches to empirical research, conceptual analysis and normative theory. Cultural research guided by versions of structural-functionalism was mainstream in much of the 20th century and continues to exert influence. Its general view is that extant social structures are the hard surface reality and culture its more malleable software or undercurrent. This surface reality has received greater attention, while the cultural undercurrent was mostly thought to be of secondary relevance. This general view tends to be reversed in cultural studies and especially in cultural sociology, which posits culture's autonomy (Alexander, 2003).

The problems sociology is concerned with are located in the surface reality and in its undercurrent as well as in their dynamic interaction. Approaches to the study of society and culture have diversified in conjunction with the growing number of sociological subdisciplines and the recognition of new, and not so new, themes such as globalization, individualization, consumerism, migration, multiculturalism, feminism, communitarianism, new media, social movements, cosmopolitanism, biotechnology and the environment. Although enquiries in these fields do not converge on the study of values or ethics, it appears that after a long period of neglect, moral concern is growing again in the social sciences.

Among the works that helped stimulate the resurgence of value studies are theoretical (Bauman, 1993, 2000; Joas, 2000) and empirical enquiries employing qualitative (Bellah et al., 1985) and quantitative methods (including the global surveys by Inglehart, 1997; and the European Values Studies [EVS] 10-volume work published between 1994 and 2006, in particular Vol. VI, by Arts et al., 2003 and Vol. X, by Ester et al., 2006).

As Durkheim suggested, modern society has lost the integrating grip of past hierarchies and uniting world-views and thus depends more on cohesions derived from functional differentiation. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the contested nature of values or their interpretations motivate and even urge the scholarly study of values. Ethical uncertainty is heightened with the transition to the multiplying lifestyles of (post)modernity (e.g. Bauman, 2000; Beck et al., 1994; Featherstone, 1991, 1995). The public resurgence of religion shattered the widely held assumption of a quasi-automatic secularization (Casanova, 1994). Communitarianism addressed the shortfalls of self-absorbed individualism (e.g. Bellah et al., 1985; Walzer, 1983). Multiculturalism dismantled the myths of homogeneous national cultures, showed real-existing diversity and pointed to the benefits of pluralism (e.g. Kymlicka, 1996), while feminist critiques suggested tensions between purportedly traditional values and competing understandings of gender roles (e.g. Okin, 1998). Neoliberal versions of multiculturalism are easily compatible with the multiplicity of lifestyles among consumers and the relativization of values, but tensions mount when social inequalities force decisions about redistribution (cf. Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Global studies problematized the concept of nation as an unquestioned social universe or even as a unit of analysis and treated it rather as an outcome of specific practices that warranted explanations (Albrow, 1997; Robertson, 1992; Sklair, 1991). Cosmopolitanism enquired into the possibilities of human solidarity and globally common values (e.g. Albrow, 1997; Apel, 2000; Archibugi, 2000). Social movements research looked at the grassroots actors of social change, including subaltern efforts to weave networks of resistance across borders (cf. Schulz, 1998). New media research showed that incipient global publics are not only spheres of entertainment and commerce but also spaces for debating values, solidarities and the direction of future change (cf. Schulz, this issue). Fukuyama's (1992) prominently proclaimed 'end of ideology' might have been indeed the 'end of history' if the Washington consensus of neoliberally truncated democracy had passed by without contestation. But the economic and political model seems to have exhausted itself. The debates about the values of a new world society might have barely begun.

Short outline of the monograph

Mike Featherstone begins this series of articles with a broad examination of the dynamics of value formation on individual, cultural, societal, civilizational and epochal levels. Sharing with other authors the assumption of the significance and 'there-ness' of values, Featherstone explores how values are being transmitted, promoted, selected, accumulated, stored, changed and maintained. His particular interest is on the carriers of values, symbolic hierarchies and future prospects. Regarding national traditions, Featherstone argues that nations embody and endeavour to guarantee 'lasting symbols' but that these are also subject to challenges by individuals and groups who may envision cosmopolitan standpoints, retreat into identity movements, or try to detach themselves. Drawing from and elaborating further

on Georg Simmel's sociological approach and time-diagnosis, Featherstone points to the intensified cultural flux that tends to relativize values, tracking it to the onslaught of modernity, the effects of the money economy, the aestheticization of reality and the imbalance between objective and subjective culture. Featherstone diagnoses an array of profoundly contradictory trends: the economy has a rationalizing effect but ongoing adaptations bring uncertainty; the consumer culture is diversifying but may require a search for more meaningful lifestyles; identity becomes a matter of autonomous improvisation but value positions turn precarious. Featherstone links several other trends in contemporary life: the concerns for the body and physical fitness, for the environment and nature; growing global interdependence; accumulated knowledge in digitized archives; and an emerging planetary consciousness. Turning to Simmel's later work, Featherstone argues that his *Lebensphilosophie* offers a useful, albeit demanding platform for dealing with modernity's contingencies and ambiguities by treating life as such as the ultimate but indeterminate value that must be worked out by individuals. Featherstone stresses the role of education and academia in the formation of new values. He concludes that 'we need values as a preliminary means of orientation', even if 'these need not be considered to be of lasting duration'.

Tan Chee-Beng opens Part Two with an ethnographic reflection on daily life in small communities of indigenous people in East Malaysia and southern parts of post-Mao China. With lively descriptions from his field trips to these regions, he shows how traditional values are swept away by the globalizing capitalist market economy, or in other words, how values have ecological and political bases. More characteristically, he acknowledges how specific social groups benefited, e.g. from the big logging business in Malaysia, and subsequently developed growing economic activities among themselves through increased fishing, hunting and selling of those products. As a result, however, life becomes more and more commodified and the community relations thinner and thinner. For example, reciprocity, which used to be an important community value, becomes restricted to a small circle of relatives. Tan does not stop with a description of present situations. He forcefully reasons and advocates a new vision of 'ecological humanism' that could provide for a better and more sustainable future. Among other things, the values of sharing and responsibility should be reinvented and supported by institutions, in particular by the major religions, various NGOs and the mass media, all of which could relate better to the challenges of modern societies than has been the case in the past.

Scott North presents in his article an interesting case study of the 1991 death due to overwork (*karôshi*) of an Osaka stockbroker, in which he explores the unintended negative consequences of the Japanese work ethic for individuals and families. Japan's corporate work spirit is well known and largely responsible not only for the country's economic vitality but also for hardships in family life. Most Japanese have taken these things in their stride, but some consequences are too dire to overlook. North discusses this incident – there were hundreds, if not thousands of other cases per year – in the context of the collapse of the bubble economy that bears connections with the first Gulf War. This particular worker was publicly valorized as the embodiment of the ideal employee, devoted to values such as loyalty, dedication and deference. However, according to this author, the connections between corporate cultural values, international market forces and individual health outcomes are conspicuous. On the positive side, North suggests that, while globalization will further affect the negative potential of the work ethic,

it will simultaneously inspire cultural movements that emphasize the importance of various forms of care.

Shimazono Susumu opens Part Three by directing attention to the domain of biotechnology, where, stimulated by the development of cloning technology and stem cell research, great expectations are being voiced with respect to regenerative medical technology such as curing currently intractable diseases, replacing organs and damaged body tissues, selecting embryos and even improving genes. Many scientists and countries are competing fiercely in this development. The author raises questions about the profit motive in this area directly linked to the processes of life, about whether these advances in biotechnology will improve the happiness of humankind, and whether advanced medical science is not threatening the value of life that humankind has sustained thus far. Concerning the direction that biotechnology should take, Shimazono argues that one must take into account multiple value perspectives as well as the various religious cultures, which, to a considerable extent, have underpinned the value of life. He concludes that, in the present stage of growing globalization, one can no longer depend solely on the views concerning the value of life propagated by particular religious cultures. In other words, it appears imperative to formulate a vision of the value of life that includes but also transcends religious culture.

Lynne Ciochetto shows in the next article how advertising companies and television corporations use images for specific purposes: for selling products and serving the public by providing news coverage, respectively. She argues, however, that there is much more to this story. Ciochetto explains that, while contemporary advertising businesses constitute one of the pillars upholding the capitalistic economy, they at the same time promote materialism and cause significant shifts in cultural values such as an emphasis on individual self-gratification through enhanced consumption, the use of sexual imagery to sell products, the obsession with youth and physical appearance and a craze for the latest technological gadgets. Ciochetto argues for a more thorough awareness of the powerful role of media advertising and a better assessment of alternative options for changing the processes involved in order not to intensify the present unsustainable economic system.

David Graeber examines in his article the ideological controversies in the political discourse of the US as reflected in class-consciousness and conceptions of value and values. Graeber embarks from what many observers had described as a puzzle: the fact that in the 2004 elections significant parts of the American working class voted against their economic interests but in line with what they perceived to be their sociocultural values. He argues that large sectors of the white American working class were disappointed by liberal politicians, whom they associate with a cultural elite that pursues careers in the sciences, politics, journalism and the art world, and occupies positions in society that are largely closed to their own class. Interestingly, drawing on theoretical insights he gained in his anthropological studies of non-market societies (gift economies), Graeber makes the intellectually provocative argument that the 'culture wars' in the US can be interpreted as 'a struggle over access to the means to behave altruistically'. In other words, people at heart are strongly motivated by 'forms of value other than the economic'. Thus, with respect to values, moving beyond political and class controversies, he holds that current social involvements of the people also reflect a deeper value awareness according to which human fulfilment is more affected by satisfaction coming from devoting time to others and people in need rather than from maximizing economic self-interest.

Reimon Bachika opens Part Four and broadens the scope with an empirically based, theoretical discussion of two core components of culture: symbolism and values. After briefly discussing value orientations and expressive symbolism in Parsons and touching on the conceptions of values by several other authors, Bachika analyses the nature of values and symbolism. He argues that the experience of what is of value is part of action. Value, according to his view, is an ingredient or an aspect of individual and collective action. This experience is embedded in feelings and therefore non-rational, if not irrational. In contrast, 'symbolizations' (symbolic representations) are fashioned in the mind as cognitive, rational devices that are crucial to communication. Both values and 'symbolizations' are components of culture that support personal and collective identities respectively. The implications of this view are of particular significance in discussing religion and ethnic cultures in that 'symbolizations' and values harbour socially positive and negative functionality. Their characteristics imply that these core elements can be used for improving sociocultural life as well as for manipulation. Bachika suggests the possibility of religions to become more relevant to modern societies by fostering communality, that is, by creating a common outlook on values and the ethical aspects of life. This would limit religious diversity to symbolic expression and suppress conflict of values and amplify possibilities for cooperation towards constructive social goals.

In the next article, Kamlesh Mohan reflects on the particular situation of India's modernization as westernization. Mohan argues that globalization is not an inevitable process and that current trends should be contested. She admits that American capitalism greatly succeeded in creating a single market for unhampered access of their capital goods, trade and services into Asian, African and other untapped markets. In other words, the author argues that the US profited from deregulated markets and free trade in the Third World countries by being backed up as it was by its hegemonic political-economic agenda and by relying on a worldwide dissemination of American culture by way of telecommunications. The liberal mode of western culture in India endangers the preservation of the composite cultural tradition of the Indian people and their religious identities. The ideals of western modernity tend to replace Indian values and culture as seen in the commoditization of women and gender relations. Mohan argues that India should not surrender uncritically to consumer capitalism but resolve its predicament by fashioning a relevant modernity without suspending its dialogue with the West. In her view, the Indian paradigm of modernity should neither ignore the material aspect of human existence nor reject its own rich cultural heritage and its community-based social life.

Eleonora Barbieri Masini envisions in her contribution the world as a multicultural society. She argues that encounters of cultures have occurred at all times, but that currently they are intensifying considerably and will proliferate still in the future. The hypothesis therefore of the world moving towards a multicultural society should not be seen as far-fetched. According to Barbieri Masini, this hypothesis implies both great creative possibilities and serious tensions – possibly grave conflicts. To make her case, she chiefly focuses on the European Union, its enlargement process and the flows of immigration from different parts of the world: Africa, Asia and Latin America. She sees in Europe a plurality of cultures coming face to face with each other, some of which share common values and others which tend to highlight more their differences. Barbieri Masini points to the possibility of finding common ground and creating new ways of dialogue at the level of culture

and values. She suggests that the intercultural dialogue on values and the future could be a precondition for overcoming political and economic conflicts. In this vein, she stresses the need for social scientists to pay more attention to the effects of intercultural encounters, particularly their impact on values, choices and behavioural attitudes.

Markus Schulz argues in his article that the new media that made the current acceleration of globalization possible provide also the technical infrastructures for grassroots deliberation across borders about values and the mode in which globalization should take place. Rejecting resilient notions of technological determinism, Schulz analyses the processes through which the new mediascapes are being shaped by different social actors with diverging values and differential means of implementing these. His investigation of the rise of the Internet and the current trends of its development makes visible a series of mostly implicit value decisions. Schulz examines how the high hopes for globally equitable dialogue were gradually displaced by mounting scepticism and dystopian fears vis-a-vis intensifying commercialization, unequal diffusion patterns, usage restrictions and new surveillance mechanisms. Although corporate interests command superior resources and access to lawmakers and treaty negotiators, the users and civil society initiatives can enhance their leverage through creative imagination and appeals to shared values. Schulz uses the contrast between alternative trajectories to indicate the stakes and value choices available in creating platforms for future dialogue. He stresses that the prospects for a democratic world society are strongly related to the shapeable conditions of global communication.

José Casanova contrasts in his article three alternative conceptions of the emerging global order: 'cosmopolitanism', 'clash of civilization' and 'multiple modernities'. His work cuts across the major debates in the sociology of religion and current theorizations of the global order. He critiques the cosmopolitan project for being built upon developmental theories of modernization that assume this transformation to be a universal process of human development and implicitly a global expansion of western secular modernity. He rejects the view that the western path of secularization could be generalized across cultures and seen as a model for all societies. On the other hand, Casanova has even less sympathy for Huntington's model of supposedly incompatible civilizations formed around cores of world religions and doomed to clash with one another for global hegemony. He rejects this model as ahistorical, confounding cultures with territorially bounded geopolitical units and as normatively particularistic. He argues further that such essentialist interpretations blind this model to the possibility that Islam may find its own kind of *aggiornamento*, and warns that western hegemonic demands for Islam to become a private religion may only produce more violent responses. Casanova embraces the notion of 'multiple modernities' as a more adequate analytical framework that combines some of the universalistic claims of cosmopolitanism but avoids the pitfalls of western self-misunderstanding and secularist assumptions. He thus maintains that in the latter view the world religions continue to be relevant for the emerging global order, while they calibrate the balance between private and public values along differential trajectories.

The series of articles concludes with last reflections by Markus Schulz and by Reimon Bachika on the current state of research and the tasks ahead. Schulz discusses the emerging reconceptualizations of values and culture vis-a-vis central aspects of globalization, including the accelerated financial flows and neoliberal deregulation, transnational migration, social movements and incipient global publics. Stressing that the study of values is

not only about social cohesion but also about social transformation, Schulz points to the creative role of social actors searching for common ground to cooperate in future development. He argues that sociology should not shy away from reflecting on the future but use its critical imagination to push existing debates further. Bachika emphasizes in his final reflection the significance of values studies and points to the vital part values can play in improving the quality of life.

Limitations and contributions to the study of values

The contributions to this monograph resulted from cooperation towards a common theme, not from group discussion. Admittedly, this approach has some drawbacks but also some advantages. On the one hand, the scope is considerably broad as the studies touch on values and culture at various junctures. On the other hand, there is also a measure of consistency as the different analytical levels of research and their practical/theoretical implications complement one another. Regarding these complementary implications, several points can be made. First, as mentioned before, the negative, precarious aspects in the operation of values and their articulations seem to have come to the fore in this monograph most strongly. Several authors show, implicitly or explicitly, how views of what is important in life are tainted by commercialization, consumerism, unquestioned loyalties, misrecognition of others and deformed modes of communication. Regarding the negative side of the story, we cannot but conclude that the present publication adds to the index of social dangers and pathologies. Second, there is a contrasting lighter side. Several authors discuss life as a value, the quality of life and the possibilities for dialogue and solidarity. Some point to the necessity of countering socially negative trends and outline alternatives such as an ethics of 'ecological humanism' or the vision of a democratizing world society. Combined, the negative and positive aspects manifest a basic ambivalence and complexity of values: self-transcendence as well as degeneration with plenty of colours and shades in between.

In the individual articles, specific relevance of values is often only implicit, or merely postulated, as for example in Casanova's contribution. To repeat, he focuses on cultural dynamics in connection with the stirrings within world religions and conceptions of modernity, these phenomena are quite amenable to the study of values. The two models of the 'clash of civilizations' and narrowly conceived 'cosmopolitanism' imply conflicts between the values of different religions and secularism. The preferred third model of 'multiple modernities' avoids imposition of parameters for dialogue and thus offers a path towards convergence of value orientations. In his analysis of religious terrorism, Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) views the conflict between religious and secular values as paradigmatic. It would be a mistake to neglect political, economic and military dimensions but cultural value commitments do play a role. Islamic fundamentalists rally around religious identity, viewing secular/Christian hegemony as a threat to the values of their faith, family life, gender roles, sexual differentiation, their dress code as well as territorial autonomy. Islamic extremists felt it legitimate to attack not only prominent symbols of western economic and military supremacy such as the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, warships and embassies but also civilian planes, buses and trains, in every case accepting innocent casualties. At the same time, western societies allowed over vociferously voiced opposition, the undoing of the post-Cold War achievements with an open erosion of human rights, the revival of

torture and neoimperialist military invasions with yet much more innocent victims. The terror attacks seem to have swelled the ranks of insurgent networks and provided a convenient pretext for the pursuit of geostrategic and commercial interests as well as domestic objectives (Harvey, 2003). Yet, the politics of fear tends to exhaust itself. Whether hopes for value dialogues and reconciliation can soon become concrete remains to be seen.

Falling short of explicit clarification of values reflects the limitations of the subject of values in sociology in general, which, in substance, seems not to have moved beyond Max Weber (1917), who emphasized the relevance of values but insisted that their truth cannot be scientifically determined (see also Reckling, 2001). Since Weber's claim has not been redressed, sociologists continue to lend it credence. This issue cannot be elaborated here, but, like the case of geological fault-lines that are hidden underneath the surface, deeply entrenched theoretical assumptions look rarely inadequate. Values are human phenomena; their relevance is readily acknowledged. Values are objective components of culture and influential factors in life but not their sole determinants. The sociological task at hand is not to assess the truth of values but to track their impact and implications.

Thus, important questions about the operation of values remain unanswered. Can values be shared in increasingly individualized and fragmented postmodern societies? To what extent can values assert normative force for autonomous individuals and collectivities? Under what conditions can value conflicts be resolved, diminished, or de-escalated? Crucial unanswered theoretical questions pertain to the normative status of values (Joas, 2000: 1) and the degree to which values involve emotions and rationality (Boudon, 1997; Scheler, 1992; White, 1993). Value as a concept in sociology, economics and politics can be both theoretical and normative. A value concept that implies the possibility of transcendence and degeneration can hardly be neutral. Certainly, value fundamentalism is not an option, but could a sound view of socially embedded individual autonomy not lead to a kind of 'utopian realism'?

The road ahead

Considering the complex issues that have been touched upon in this monograph, the road ahead appears to be foggy. Notwithstanding, if values have a specific nature and an inner logic, one might take this logic as a clue to further theorize their relevance. When taking life itself as a starting point for thinking about values, new insights may be derived from biological metaphors such as birth, growth, germination as well as death, degeneration, or decomposition. The growth of life presupposes the intake of nutrients and their digestion. Degeneration suggests a failure in growth processes. The vital force implied in the metaphorical images of birth, growth and germination comes from the actualization of what is sensed to be of value. While being aware of the spectre of a negative side, the realization of what represents positive value points towards the transcendence of human existence and a greater quality of social life, ultimately in the form of better human welfare and greater human happiness.

As argued by Raymond Boudon (2002) and indicated by ample survey data (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart et al., 1998), many individuals in modern societies continue to believe in what they perceive as basic values pertaining to life, human relations and work. Individual and collective actors draw on values in their struggles for a better life. The study of values

and its incorporation in teaching can benefit our world and foster hope for the future. In this sense, the implicit goal of this monograph concerns the betterment of societies without feeling abashed about it. As Featherstone concludes in his article, 'we need values to start with', and as Bauman (2000: 16) asserts, 'There is no choice between "engaged" and "neutral" ways of doing sociology. A non-committal sociology is an impossibility.' The sociological study of values confronts a perplexing Janus with three faces: one benevolently accommodating but the other two disturbingly ambivalent and intimidating. And these faces undergo frequent changes: that is, they are affected by social and cultural contexts; they are seen and acted upon differently by individual and collective actors. This monograph aims to reinvigorate the much-needed debate on values and future transformation in this era of advanced globalization.

Note

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Societal value formation and the value of life

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Abstract
This article explores the formation of values on individual, cultural, societal, civilizational and epochal levels and discusses the carriers of values, symbolic hierarchies and future prospects. It demonstrates the continued conceptual and time-diagnostic usefulness of Georg Simmel's sociological approach to values and argues that his *Lebensphilosophie* ('philosophy of life') offers a platform for dealing with modernity's contingencies and ambiguities by treating life as such as the ultimate but indeterminate value that must be worked out by individuals. Values are needed as a preliminary means of orientation, even if these need not be considered to be of lasting duration.

Keywords
culture, globalization, modernity, Simmel, value formation, value of life, values

To raise the question of values takes us into a series of complex issues which cross the social sciences and humanities. The term is often used in a confusing number of ways to indicate something both individuals and societies have acquired or should have. There are many references to individual value commitment, the assumption that people will make a 'here I stand' type of decision or sacrifice themselves for their values. The individual's adherence to his or her own values, or that of a group, contrast with approaches which posit cultural values attached to particular societies. Here it is not societies which do the selection; rather values are seen as acquired gradually over time and sedimented into cultures (cf. Parsons, 1989). From this perspective values are distinctive and fit nation-state societies. These societal values could be gridded into a global set with contrasts and family resemblances – American values differ sharply from Chinese values, but are nearer to Western European or British values. It is also possible to up the unit of

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comparison and talk about civilizational values, with large units such as Western Europe and Asia (cf. Huntington, 1996).

But these formulations on cultural, societal, civilizational and epochal levels raise many questions about the formation, transmission, sustenance and loss of values. There are a related set of questions about the orientation and world-views of those who designate values: the implicit symbolic hierarchies, value positions and interests behind the attribution of clearly delineated value complexes to such units. This points us towards questions of practice, the extent to which values are explicit or implicit means of orientation in intellectual and wider social life. Linking the process of formation, dissemination, awareness and use of values in practice raises the question of the *carriers* of values. Can we identify specific groups which involve themselves with values construction and maintenance as a way of life? How are we to understand the emergence and decline, the trajectory of power accumulation and loss of such groups of knowledge specialists and intermediaries?

Is this to suggest that talk about values itself is in some way dependent upon the existence of such cultural specialists and intermediaries, with their own modes of social mobility, competition and conflict? Some of whom associate with or become value entrepreneurs, who seek to increase the circulation of particular values and/or generate widespread social discussion of values among publics and policy-makers. If we can talk about moral crusades and the re-moralization of society, is it also appropriate to think about value-crusades and the re-valuation of society? This also raises the question of the durability of values. Since Nietzsche many have spoken about the trans-valuation of values, a devaluation of values through increasing relativism in which people search for values and sample many varieties, but cannot find a lasting commitment. Some of these intellectual ideas have migrated into the popular consciousness via the public visibility of philosophical movements such as existentialism.

When we seek to address the question of the future of values, we face a demanding set of theoretical questions about the efficacy and durability of values. The scope and impact of our actions invariably become enlarged, the games we play expand over time and space to take in more players, which as games theory indicates, increases the volume of 'moves' and density of interactions, producing greater indeterminacy of outcomes (see Elias, 1978). Globalization may pull us together into each other's backyard, but it proves to be a complex backyard to map out, operate in and establish familiar pathways in.

Against those who hold that such a situation will lead to the reduction of values, that increased scope and speed of communications will result in a more pragmatic attitude in which the logic of the balance sheet becomes the sole value and cultural values give way to the pursuit of economic value, alternatives can be suggested. One argument is that we will increasingly need to rely on values as the scope and volume of our encounters become enlarged, in order to simplify complexity. Values will be needed to make our way through the vast accumulation of chains of means and ends and guide our actions, as well as helping to account for the actions and practices of distant others, now brought into our orbit. The extent to which the world moves through stages of relative stability, such as the Cold War period, to phases of instability as in our contemporary multipolar world, can also lead to shifts in the vitality, motility and mobility of values.

If we turn to the question of the emergent values for the future, one potential value could well be the value of life itself. Not that life has a singular meaning; rather it should be seen as a multifaceted and inherently contested concept. As human life in the

biological sense becomes increasingly dissected and subjected to technological invention, the constructability and reconstructability of human life becomes seen as the immanent grounds for all potential experience. Here we find a similar presentation of life within both biotechnology and consumer culture. The globalizing consumer culture which expands on the back of the extension of marketization and neoliberal economic policies offers the individual a series of renewable possibilities for experience, action and bodily pleasures. As these consumer culture pleasures are purchased through the market, it suggests an instrumentalization of the body and health. To maximize bodily possibilities and increase 'body value' and embodied lifetime, other values become dispensable and relativized. Yet as embodied human life becomes presented as the supreme value within consumer culture, life itself becomes subject to increasing commodification through biotechnologies with issues of patenting, intellectual property rights and artificial life.

These new orientations towards the life raise questions of bioethics and our wider relationship towards nature as the 'outer body' of human beings (Habermas, 2003; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998; Rabinow, 2003). As human survival becomes situated within a fragile and vulnerable nature, the web of interdependencies which has become globalized to include all human beings is seen to extend beyond human life. With nature seen as our outer body whose life has to become a value, we face the potential re-spiritualization and re-sacralization of nature. This means not just humanity as a value in the sense that Durkheim spoke of the religion of humanity, through the recognition of all other people as humans, as sharing the humanity of all, but recognition of the being of nature and interdependence of living species.

The invention of values in life can be linked to the consumer culture life. On one level, the consumer culture is antipathetic to values, favouring rational calculation and means over ends and is pragmatic towards values. Yet on another level, the emphasis upon self-realization and pleasure points more to an episodic life in search of excitement, something that resonates with the idea of a life of adventure, constant creation and self-invention (cf. Foucault, 1987; Robinson, 2003; Shusterman, 1988; Simmel, 1997d). If this ethic of self-creation is fostered within consumer culture, it gives us little sense of wider responsibilities and public values. It is argued that such values could well develop within the emergent global public sphere. A global public sphere would be a basis for a dialogical involvement with others. A key element in such a public dialogue is the recognition of the difference and diversity of others (see Lash and Featherstone, 2002). This suggests we do not need to specify binding values, but instead focus on the preconditions for value formation through dialogue (see Joas, 2000; Rorty, 1989).

A further dimension of the future of values which should be considered relates not just to the potential to be confronted by value choices deriving from globalization and the question of life, but pertains to the question of value transmission, storage and maintenance. Here we think of not just life and value in relation to biotechnological questions, but life and value in the context of information technologies and the production of knowledge. Georg Simmel (1997a), writing in the early decades of the 20th century, drew attention to the human capacity to accumulate culture. The production and storage of objective culture in written, print and imagistic forms produce an imbalance in the cultivation of human beings' subjective culture. He identified the problem about the selectivity of values as a result of the accumulation of cultural orientations and values on

offer, which relativized any particular value choice and made it appear a transitory and contingent position.

A public which has the potential to constitute itself as a global public sphere, capable of addressing the ethical and political questions of the day and the emerging citizenship responsibilities which come along with inhabiting the same life space, the world. These global archival and public spaces, it could be argued, are the sites of new forms of research practice, serendipity and dialogue, out of which the problem of how to form relevant global, or planetary, values can be tackled.

Value formation, experience and national commitment

When we approach the topic of values we immediately come across a series of questions. There is the clash between approaches which focus on the subjective creation of values and those which focus on cultural values operating at societal and civilizational levels, whose distinctiveness and efficacy is upheld, but whose origins are shrouded in mystery. There is the question of the relationship between the value question (the status of the value we give to our life and work) as something which emerges in intellectual life in the 19th century, especially after the writings of Nietzsche and the broader field of economic value (the basis for the generation of the value of entities and commodities in the market). The impact of this emphasis upon individual value commitment in the cultural sphere, in intellectual, artistic and academic life, especially in movements which drew on artistic modernism and bohemian themes, is also important to consider in terms of the valuing of the constant search for experiential immediacy and new values. The question of the 'where' of values, their spatial location and how they operate in practice needs to be addressed. The danger is that values might have relatively little purchase outside the groups actively engaged in value work, creation, maintenance and dissemination. It is important to consider the trajectory of values, the moments when they could be actively strengthened and gain articulation and widespread following and the potential waning of value commitment with increasing cynicism.

It is possible to specify cultural values which operate behind norms which are internalized to become means of orientation for action (see Joas, 2000: 17, for a discussion of Parsons). Yet such approaches operate at a high level of generality and separateness which start from clearly bounded and logically neat abstract typologies. There is the assumption of a high level of cultural integration and that people internalize cultural values and norms in socialization. We can ask the question whether or not we are 'puppets of cultural values', or whether in everyday situations vague values first need to be translated into the dynamic matrix of concrete orientations (Joas, 2000: 18). If values operate in practice, then we need more empirical accounts of specific situations. Robert Bellah et al. (1985) in *Habits of the Heart* do not directly speak of values or culture, but rather of traditions and practices. They give some insight into the process of breakdown of the sacred canopy of consensual values which bound together American society, as it becomes more overtly multicultural. Yet, a question remains in Bellah et al.'s (1985: 80) refusal of the terminology of values. While Bellah may not speak of values, his sociology is orientated around it, whereas Bourdieu (1977, 1984) seemed to consider values with suspicion and situate them within the cultural capital accumulation activities of particular

groups and class fractions. This points to the insight that discourse on values may intensify at the point in which they become more fragile. Values are more needed as guides to action, yet more difficult to operate with. They also become less monitored and imposed standards for social practice as a greater informality of conduct takes place, something which paradoxically sets off reactions on the part of traditionalists and conservative groups, fearful of the loss of values.

At the same time we should be aware that many of the calls for the re-installation of traditional values are often made by politicians and influential leaders who seek to justify a programme of modernization via recourse to the past. One of the most influential examples in recent years is Margaret Thatcher's call for the reintroduction of Victorian values in Britain in 1984. But as critics pointed out, Thatcher employed traditionalist rhetoric while engaging in a radical programme of modernization of British society.

We live in an age of the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). It has also been recognized that while traditions are constructed in modernity, the various fundamentalisms, which seek to impose a closure through presenting a part of a cultural tradition as a whole, are also modern inventions. Hence the rhetoric of a culture of fear (Glassner, 2003) is often employed to generate moral panics about the decline in morality, or unruliness of contemporary youth and rise of crime, which by many statistical indicators may be highly dubious. This has proved to be a consistent pattern of each age looking back to an earlier generation as embodying the observation of traditional moral values. The current time is presented as a fall from a golden age of respectability in which people adhered to socially cohesive and morally sound, traditional or 'perennial' values (Pearson, 1983).

We do not need to dwell on the difficulties of engineering a culture and producing desirable social changes, as the experiments in the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China testify to. We also know that such state formation processes and even those of the most centralized states which undertook modern integration, have only been partly successful. The modern nation-state is a project with its own mythology and rewriting of the past from the point of view of the present to encourage social integration. Yet this sense of membership of a national culture should be seen as more of a process, a sometimes slow, sometimes incomplete project or projection, rather than an established reality.

At the same time, the value people attach to national identity, the 'love of country', does not always spring directly out of experience. The nation as an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991) itself needs to feed off representations and narratives. It needs stories not just of national distinctiveness and mythologies of the key foundation moments, but heroic deeds in which national subjects and citizens sacrificed their lives for the nation. This provides the sense of the nation as value and motivator of heroic conduct consistent with the highest principles of communal sacrifice (see e.g. Swedberg, 2005).

Yet if we can find problems today with the extent to which globally branded nationalisms can be sustained to pull along the whole population, then there are even greater problems in assuming that the emotional investment in the nation has somehow been sublimated and pushed upwards into the global level. As Benedict Anderson (1991) and Richard Rorty (1989) have argued, common humanity is too weak a force to generate strong identifications and for most people there is nothing outside the nation that is worth dying for (Robbins, 1998: 4). What has hardly diminished in the post-9/11 state

of emergency world is the rhetoric of sacrifice for nation and nationalism. Yet does this prevent the cosmopolitan effort to conceive of humanity as a value, equally potent to that of the nation?

One argument put forward by Bryan Turner (2002) suggests that cosmopolitanism need not be based on a colourless 'amorality' which seeks to move beyond values; rather a commitment to patriotism should not be seen as an impediment. Introducing the notion of cosmopolitan virtue, he argues that this involves both respect for other cultures and an ironic stance towards one's own. Turner's starting point is citizenship theory and the lack of attempts to think citizenship above the nation-state level. Discussions of global governance and global citizenship frequently base their analysis on the extension of human rights discourse seen as akin to a new global religion capable of binding humanity together. Yet such discussions tend to often sidestep the related question of human obligations. Turner wants to explore the question of human rights obligations conceived as 'cosmopolitan virtue'. He points out that the notion of global citizenship, 'being a citizen of the world', has long been part of utopian imagery and the democratic thinking that can be traced back to the attempts to outline a vision of a world community. But if global citizenship is to emerge, Turner argues, we need to not only think about global rights, but how to evolve a language of obligation and virtue. Following Mazzini we should acknowledge that love of one's own country is not incompatible with commitment to humanity. Love of country should be seen as a preparation for love of others. Hence when we are asked the question, what are the obligations of a global citizen, the answer is a respect for other cultures. Modern cosmopolitanism is associated with the effects of globalization processes including the growth of forms of multiple and quasi-citizenship, multiculturalism and cultural hybridism.

Here we have an interesting formulation of the question of the formation of potential global values. We do not need to reject the emotional attachment to nation, place and locality as outmoded. Rather to be able to love in some ways involved the 'education of the senses', it does not have to entail a jealous exclusive love, but can be extended to others. This suggests we do not have to deride emotional involvement as a backward step in the quest for some form of cosmopolitan values. Values are generated in experiences which become charged with emotional involvement. Yet they can also be subjected to careful scrutiny, comparison and evaluation. As more values move across our everyday horizons of life through the processes of globalization, we need to develop a higher involvement–detachment balance. This entails a greater capacity to live with ambiguity and ambivalence. All knowledge of cultural reality for Weber (1948: 81) 'is always knowledge from particular points of view'. Hence although we have to accept the relativity of 'a patchwork of cultural values', our own value position makes the question of selectivity easier and simplifies the complexity of the world. In a world in which boundaries are more unstable and communications more intense, we cannot avoid being confronted by the complex ramifications of our actions and the chains of unintended consequences which pile up. We do not inhabit separate cultures, but inter-cultures (cf. Welsch, 1998). The complexity of moving between various levels of the value question from local, national and global dimensions and the practical needs to interact and work with people around the world increase the difficulties of adhering to 'ultimate' values. In one sense we need them to simplify complexity, to provide means of orientation as we move through

cultural diversity, yet we also need to acquire more skill for switching between values, for identifying with other positions, for a higher involvement–detachment balance. As the density of global interactions grows, this capacity is necessary not just on a theoretical level as an intellectual problem, but on a practical level of living together and interacting with many significant but distant others.

Simmel on modernity, value relativity and objective culture

Georg Simmel, although writing almost a century ago, has interesting things to say about the globalization of values and the impact of modernity on the development of values, along with the potential to create new values, which are relevant today (cf. Featherstone, 1991; Frisby and Featherstone, 1997). For Simmel modernity was associated with mobility and motion, with 'the dissolution of fixed contents in the fluid elements of the soul, from which all that is substantive is filtered and whose forms are merely forms of motion' (Simmel, 'Die Kunst Rodins', cited in Frisby, 1985: 46). The reduction of the external world to a ceaseless flux and fragmentary moments changed the quality of experience. Indeed, the essence of modernity for Simmel was psychologism, concern with inner experience. The flux and movement of modern life, the preoccupation with the 'new', not only in the arts, but in technology, fashion, consumer goods and all spheres of life, made it difficult to hang on to established beliefs and values. In addition, the speed and complexity of life in the modern metropolis which is manifest in the overloading of sensations, the complexity of scheduling and fragmented interactions, make the formation of values more difficult (Simmel, 1997b) and lead to a specifically urban blasé attitude (Simmel, 1997b: 187).

Simmel regards the metropolis as the seat of the money economy and developed his arguments about the effect of money on values in *The Philosophy of Money* (1990 [1900/1908]). Money put everything in motion; it provided a network, a vast labyrinth of exchange which pulled people together into society. All singularities became connected and interwoven as objects became reduced to a monetary quantitative value. This could lead to a reification of relationships, as calculative monetary value tends to dominate the valuation process. The mobility of exchange value, the capacity to purchase objects and relinquish them easily, to deal with objects from a distance and impersonally, indeed to determine their fate through the balance sheet projections of a third party versed in the financial system, led to a transposition of value, with one form of valuation, monetary value, consuming and relativizing all others.

At the same time, for Simmel this was not the whole story: the quantification, standardization and reification of social life through the capitalist monetary economy acted like an empty form which could encourage the projection of a multiplicity of subjective meanings. Economic monetary value, as the dominant form of valuation in modernity, eroded the efficacy of value complexes as societal or cultural values, but it did not lead to a secularization and disenchantment, an empty rationalized world bereft of values. Rather, the growing objectification of the monetary value form, which Simmel saw as the *a priori of* modernity, was accompanied by the subjectification of value and value relativity.

Simmel thought to radicalize the problem in his later work by making life itself the main value (Simmel, 1971, 1997c). If life is the value and there are no values outside life,

the generative process itself becomes valued; that is, the process of generating original experiences, especially in 'adventures' (Simmel, 1997d), usually through powerful affect and the power of will, but always subject to contingency. The immediacy of the involvement in this process is valued and is the source of formation of a value.

Consuming values and the value of life

Simmel's discussion of modernity, the social and cultural implications of the money economy, the expansion of the metropolis, the imbalance between objective and subjective culture and the impact on value formation, provides a useful platform to discuss the future of values. Simmel pointed to the rationalizing effect of the money economy, the increasing calculation, the lengthening of means–ends chain with its relativization and devaluation of values, and an ever larger web of interdependencies through the expansion of the world economy. This is true now more than ever. The creation of the global financial markets since the 1980s has increased the speed and volume of money circulation, and the distancing of exchange or abstract value to work separately from considerations of use value or human consequences has been increased with the mobility of capital, computer programmed selling, the purchasing of futures and derivatives (see Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002; Sassen, 1999).

The consequences of mobility of capital and capacity to draw on the cheapest global labour markets along with increasing calibration of work are something addressed by Richard Sennett (1999a, 1999b). He argues that the transformations accompanying the integration of the global economy have progressively exposed people to the consequences of the marketplace and erode their self-worth. Whereas strong stable institutions and bureaucratized work regimes favoured the values of purposiveness and responsibility – the basis for a coherent life narrative – today career pathways are replaced by jobs as we move towards a society without institutional shelters. In this context of uncertainty the need to belong to a particular place becomes increasingly valued. The problem with globalization is that capital is mobile and place has little to bargain with against multinational corporations which can easily find another node in the global network for their operations. Similar arguments about the erosion of values through the fluidity of capital have been made by Christopher Lasch and Zygmunt Bauman. Lasch (1996) argues that the new global elites are no longer attached to place and have dispensed with their sense of *noblesse oblige*, the values of duty and obligation to a locality and its people, in favour of mobility of capital and a mobile lifestyle moving around the globe. This is paralleled by Bauman's (2000) argument about the corrosive consequence of an increasingly globalized 'liquid modernity', in which social bonds and values are lost.

A similar intensification can be detected when we consider consumer culture. Simmel's writings on the metropolis, with its emphasis upon the specific qualities of modern urban life – the crowds, the traffic and labyrinthine nature of the city, the shocks and fleeting impressions, the enervation and neurasthenia – pointed to the difficulties of living with a rapidly changing over-stimulating environment. Yet this fragmentation and acceleration of life were also exacerbated by the world of goods, the ways in which in consumption, the money economy and aesthetics, calculation and good taste, economic value and cultural value, distinction and fashion, customized and mass production, clashed. The scope of goods, increasingly drawn from around the world, increased the sense of the style-less

quality of the times. The metaphor of the 'global cultural supermarket' has been developed to not only refer to consumer goods, but the search for values and a meaningful lifestyle (Featherstone, 2007). The post-Erickson stage development self-help literature has begun to value the need for 'composing a life', i.e. not following a life cycle but moving through life through constant improvisation (Bateson, 1990).

Embodied value and planetary values

While the adventurous life values life in the form of experience, there is a further sense of life which, given the absence of a transcendent religious framework, persistently returns: this is the durability of embodied life. While consumer culture may operate with a 'fun ethic' and values self-expression and the pursuit of the pleasures of the moment, it also emphasizes that these pleasures have to be paid for. Not only that they have to be purchases, but that the consuming body eventually consumes the body, that bodies abused can break down and wear out. These messages do not amount to an ethics, or an eschatology or integrated cosmology; there are no divines, theologians or cultural specialists who set about systematizing the content of the teachings of consumer culture. Put simply, in consumer culture, as Daniel Bell (1976) remarked, the good consumer should be 'a Puritan by day and a Playboy by night'. Yet consumption can no longer be seen as an innocent act; what is literally consumed through the mouth and taken into the body is the subject of a good deal of expert advice and discussion in the press, radio, television and now the Internet. In short, the consequences and risks of the pleasures of eating and drinking are subject to increasing calculation with the stark message that unless they are modulated and tempered there will be serious health risks.

It has been argued that we increasingly live in a global risk society (Beck, 1993, 1996) in which the public has become more aware of the negative consequences of modernity. This 'second' or 'reflexive modernity' involves a greater scrutiny of the costs of human industrial and technological progress. Not just in the sense that we can reflect on the risks and calculate the costs more easily; rather the contrary, that although the need for accountability and an active public is manifest, the complexities of the factors involved render calculations and planning more and more non-linear, contingent and perilous.

The Simmelian perception almost a century ago about the effects of the money economy being globalized and the means–ends chains bringing us together in greater interdependencies, becomes intensified once we add nature into the equation. Nature not just as an infinite resource base, as we find in earlier conceptions of western modernity in its earlier phase of expansion and colonization of the world. But nature now as a frail partner, which has been deeply marked and damaged by the actions of its human species, to the extent to which this threatens the survival capacity of human and other life forms. The shift in the image of nature pushes us towards a crossroads in terms of the time needed to act and the contrasting solutions offered.

The global public sphere and archival life

A number of possible scenarios seem to be feasible. We could see the active development of global social movements in reaction to the excesses and inequalities generated through the current phase of economic globalization and marketization. Here we think of

the responses to the Davos-based World Economic Forum with its agenda of spreading neoliberal economics around the world. The formation of the World Social Forum, a motley array of anti-globalization protesters, ecologists, human rights activists and others, which has met in Porto Alegre, Brazil and Mumbai, India along with regional meetings, has been seen as a first step towards the creation of a global civil society and public sphere. In one sense it can be seen as defensive, but in another sense it is seeking to explore and invent another level of social life. There is an overlap between some of these values and those characterized as emergent 'postmaterialist values', including concern for the natural environment (Inglehart, 1997).

The emergence of a global public sphere cannot of course presume the formation of a global civil society. It would be tempting to assume there is a process at work of the growing interdependency of humanity as we move from tribal bands to cities, states, empires and blocs and eventually a global state or federation of states, but there is no logic determining this process. In a similar manner it is wrong to assume some 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1993). Rather, what we are seeing is an increase in the webs of interdependencies between people around the world through the global economic system and electronic communications media such as the Internet. There is no reason to assume some inbuilt positive tendency for a progressive purposive dialogue leading to new syntheses; rather this is just one historical possibility of our times. It is salutary to note that the coming together into one world can equally lead to the clashing of values on the global stage which Weber and Simmel spoke of. Indeed, the use of Internet communications systems can equally be argued to have furthered nationalist movements around the world. Appadurai (1996), with his concept of 'post-national imagined communities', takes this position and argues that new communications technologies have helped to link together migrant nationals and others abroad who are supporters of a particular form of nationalism who can now more readily interfere in the politics of their former home community.

At the same time, the circulation of information in formal and informal channels is increasing the sense that we inhabit one world; the problem is whose definition of the world and which values will be sustained. The proclaimed '40 Year War' against terrorism, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq coincide with the debates about the decline of the American empire (Ferguson, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Vidal, 2002; Wallerstein, 2003). When this is coupled with predicted shortages of raw materials and necessities such as petroleum, water and food over the next 20 years, we face the prospect of a more unruly world in which nationalisms and the security of national values remain attractive means of orientation. Certainly, the rise of Asia in the late 20th century and the rapid expansion of the Chinese and Indian economies suggest that some long-term shift in the global balance of power is underway. If the current US foreign policy is seen by some commentators as an attempt to secure Middle Eastern and Central Asian oil supplies, which are vital in maintaining the high-consumption American way of life, then it raises the question not only of the politics of the struggles to control shortage, but the implications of the continuing 'imitation of the powerful' by Asian countries who seek to provide high-consumption economies and consumer culture for their own people. The question arises what are the planetary consequences if China and India developed their economies and adopted consumer culture values in the manner of the US? Dire, is the short answer from most pundits.

It seems reasonable to assume that in this context one would expect some new values to emerge. Perhaps, some form of post-consumption, or conserver society values, coupled with the emergence of planetary values. We are certainly moving into a space which is 'post' the image of boundless plenty and the ever-bountiful Earth, whose forests were limitless and oceans unfathomable. The new humanity–nature assemblage is a much more fragile entity. We could spend a long time outlining the necessary values for planetary survival, control of violence and living together with limited resources in a decreasing space. Here we think of the need for the emergence of a dialogue about values which go beyond western notions of market freedom, property ownership and human rights (cf. Featherstone, 2001, 2002; Santos de Sousa, 1999). If nature is to be considered a value, then we need to build in some sense of the Hindu Dharma view that our very interdependence as a species rests upon our fragile outer body, the life support system which is the planet Earth. Here we think of *Ahimsa*, the Hindu ideal of non-violence, which means 'not-forcing' and actively engaging in compassion (something which Gandhi advocated and sought to practise; see Gandhi, 1993; Lal, 2002). Dharma also points to the importance of the rights of future generations, which have no rights under western notions of human rights. Additionally important is the Islamic concept of *Ummah*, with its notion of the collective rights of groups, the idea that not just individuals, but groups, including ethnic minorities, have legal rights to maintain solidarities and obligations.

There are also broader formulations from a number of traditions about the importance of hospitality for strangers and also the general sense of indebtedness we should feel towards all past generations, that we do not own our own lives, which should provide value orientations for our conduct (Derrida, 2001; Dikeç, 2002). It would be possible to conceive of intercivilizational dialogues which would extend rights in planetary progressive directions. Of course, we need to consider the agents, the carriers of such a dialogue and their interests, not only in engaging with others and willingness to make concessions, but in conceding the relevance of emergent planetary values such as collective humanity and the interdependence of species, the right of non-human beings to exist and develop. Such a dialogue is one of the potentials of wider participation in the formation of a global public sphere.

An alternative route is not to attempt to specify values, but to ask the questions of how, where and why they could be potentially be formed. It is hard to predict long-term future changes, especially when some commentators are emphasizing non-linearity, vital processes and emergent creative properties in complex global systems which are always 'on the edge of chaos' (Urry, 2003). Rather, we need to explore the potential for a global public to be formed out of whatever new planetary values could potentially emerge. In the first place, we should see the global public sphere as a complex emergent space involving a range of practices and communication modes. Here we think of the activities of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which have rapidly increased over the last 20 years and many of which cannot be conceived as creatures of national governments (cf. Bach and Stark, 2004; Boli and Thomas, 1999). There are also the growing news groups and networks which use the Internet to provide a more rapid, globally de-centred coverage of news outside the monopolized positions of the major media corporations and conglomerates. Additionally, there are many informal networks working at a range of regional and global levels.

The higher education sector can be seen as one important part of this network. Universities may define their scope more narrowly as transmitters of specialist and professional knowledge. Indeed, with the emergence of the corporate university and their broader public, responsibilities become downgraded (Miyoshi, 2003). At the same time, digitalization has presented universities with potentially new public sphere opportunities through distance learning, multimedia and easier access to 'online' libraries and archives. Yet they face increased competition in this field by virtual universities which specialize in distance learning and multimedia. Also via culture industry corporations which adopt para-university functions, and provide 'edutainment' and 'disneyfication', such as the Discovery Channel. Their role as transmitters of national values also becomes blurred with globalization and students drawn from many parts of the world. Yet their emergent cosmopolitan agenda is compiled within corporate structures, with the emphasis upon the provision of technical, applied and abstract forms of knowledge (Robins and Webster, 2002).

This de-linking of the university from its national cultural context of local knowledge suggests the opportunity for developing new forms of cosmopolitan education which can address the questions of contextual local knowledge and emergent global values. Few have started to seriously consider this process; one exception is Martha Nussbaum (1996), who has made a call for 'cosmopolitan education'. This entails a focus on making people appreciate how common ends are embedded in various cultures in different ways. This should help people to imagine the constitution of differences through a mastery of substantive information and potentially stimulate in every person an overall 'process of world thinking' (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 21). Yet the emphasis upon separate cultures belies recent thinking which emphasizes the interpenetration of cultures and the potential for increased connectedness in an enlarged global frame of reference. The tendency of cosmopolitanism is towards particularity and dispersal, to knowledge of many forms and substantive content. The danger is that particular cultural contents will become reified and taken as fixed entities as in some forms of multiculturalist thinking and the power balances, interdependencies and interests behind the formation of cultures, which enable us to see them more as unstable fields of potentials, neglected.

As our field of study becomes enlarged, and includes new, unfamiliar and emergent phenomena, then it is to be anticipated that our disciplinary classifications will also shift. If we are to address the formation of a global social science or humanities, we not only face many dilemmas about which content to include and exclude, but also face threats to our existing taxonomies of knowledge, which increasingly become seen as constructed from within a particular time and place. In short, the process of globalization is reconstituting the archive of knowledge from which our disciplinary order and knowledge classification are taken. Clearly global shifts in the balance of power including the rise of East and South Asia also provide a further impetus for scholarship to dig in unfamiliar places and question existing western-based interpretations of the rise of modernity (Gunder Frank, 1998). China has not only risen to the status of a global power recently, its position in the curriculum and assessment of its role in the formation of global knowledge is also on the rise.

The construction of an unstable global archive which stands behind all knowledge formation has also gained impetus from the process of digitalization. The potential digital

databasing and hypertexting of existing national and private libraries, archives, art and music collections, newspapers, magazines and other sources create a veritable Borgesian library of Babel with resultant problems of classification and navigation. The archive is an unstable assemblage, it has possibilities for the preservation and conservation of knowledge which should enable alternative genealogies to be constructed and knowledges to surface which are forgotten or lost to humanity. It should also enable the freer exploration and creative connection of knowledge to invent new knowledge. Such an emergent global digital archive will have profound implications on the formation of knowledge through its capacity to facilitate new modes of researching and creative serendipity. Education has the potential to become less of a reproductive transmission process and more of a creative linking and questioning process.

Such an archive could be significant in relation to the question of value formation in a number of ways. First, it takes us back to Simmel's interest in the question of objective knowledge, the sheer volume and piling up of knowledge. It doesn't provide us with an answer, but allows us to pose the question of the relation of knowledge to values, within a context which much of knowledge was striving to address, the global and questions of universality. Second, there is a sense in which such knowledge systems can be seen as autopoietic, that digital information itself throws up new and interesting connections, that creativity is engendered by this new knowledge form and not exclusively by human originality, that information itself is a process and not a thing, that information is alive (Brouwer and Mulder, 2003). Yet, at the same time we have to consider the balance between the creative process of research and the process of initiation, of providing temporary maps and exemplary routes through the data. Third, that subject formation, the question of subjective knowledge, what can be assimilated and handled within the education process and indeed within the limits of the human lifespan, also relates back to objective knowledge and value formation. We need values as preliminary means of orientation with which to address the archive, but these value orientations need not be considered to be of lasting duration. Yet what type of educative formation process do we seek? Formerly education was to provide culturally formed national citizens. In the context of globalization and the urgent need to address questions of planetary values in order to discover better ways of living together for humans and all the other inhabitants of this Earth, ideally we need to think of how we form responsible tolerant global citizens who can find some of the answers. Fourth, such a process should take place both inside and outside the university. It is here that the public role of university education, of popular education, needs to be reconstructed. Education needs to be a central part of the global public sphere and global public life. It should seek to provide a field of possibilities out of which planetary values could emerge.

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
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
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Article



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Capitalist market values in East Malaysia and China

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Abstract

This article discusses the ecological and political bases of values, and their significance in our understanding of cultural life, through an ethnographic reflection of an indigenous minority in East Malaysia, the Badeng Kenyah's, encounter with capitalist markets. In addition, post-Mao China's encounter with the global capitalist market is also discussed to show the nature of values and social change and the need to reinvent values and create institutions to reinforce relevant values that will shape new cultural forms. Human values, including values that emphasize social welfare and harmony with nature, have their roots in the principle of reciprocity in egalitarian small-scale societies. However, values embedded in human cultural traditions are swept away by market forces in an increasingly globalized world. Ecological humanism is an emerging new worldview that influences the reinvention of values and fosters the formation of new cultural forms.

Keywords

China, commodification, culture, ecological humanism, indigenous people, Malaysia, modernization, religion, values

Introduction

Values are expressed in cultural forms. In fact, cultures are very much influenced by the values upheld in a society. For example, Chinese talk of *xiao* (filial piety), a value that emphasizes respecting parents and elderly people, but this value is expressed differently in different periods of Chinese history and in different Chinese societies (see Ikels, 2004). Authoritarian parental rule is not acceptable to today's younger generation of Chinese. In Malaysia, giving some of one's earning to parents is a common Chinese expression of filial piety, as is taking care of elderly or sick parents. There is thus a close relationship between values and cultural forms. And, as pointed out in the introduction

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by Reimon Bachika and Markus Schulz, 'conceptions of values are influential', as they are 'instrumental in fashioning sociocultural life'.

When values are used as ideology, as in Communism or religious fundamentalism, they appear to shape cultural expression. But, in a world dominated by global capitalism, values as ideology generally give way to interest in economic gain. In fact, even when values become ideological, and in fact cultural practices to an extent are ideological in their transmission, there are socioeconomic bases to their praxis. I discuss in this article the significance of reciprocity in human cultures and the socioeconomic bases of its existence. With an understanding of the socioeconomic bases of values, I reflect how, in our present global capitalist world, certain values are needed and need to be promoted. They play important roles in shaping our human future. The pursuit of profit and wealth in the capitalist market makes it necessary to have new rules and institutions to curb exploitation of humans and the environment and to uphold human dignity. Indeed, in modern and future human societies, laws and institutions play an important part in providing socioeconomic bases of value praxis. This article uses my observation of the Badeng Kenyah's encounter with capitalist markets and post-Mao China's encounter with the global capitalist market to show the nature of values and social change and the need to reinvent values and create institutions to reinforce relevant values that will shape new cultural forms. I suggest that an emerging new worldview called ecological humanism influences the reinvention of values and fosters the formation of new cultural forms.

Lessons from the Kenyah

The Kenyah is a category of indigenous people in Borneo, and the Badeng are one of the Kenyah groups in Sarawak, Malaysia. I first began my study of the Badeng in the Belaga District of Sarawak in 1992. Over the next few years, I conducted fieldtrips during university vacations. By the 1980s, the indigenous inland people of Sarawak were already seriously affected by logging. While destroying forests, logging also brought about economic and social changes. I could observe the increase of commodification over the years in the 1990s. With money earned from working at logging camps, many families were able to buy generators, and they received a free supply of petrol from the logging companies as part of the negotiation to log in their traditional territory. The Badeng that I was most familiar with were those of Long Geng in interior Belaga District. At that time, it took five to six hours by boat going downstream and passing over rapids to reach Belaga bazaar town; more time was needed when going upstream from Belaga. The bazaar town comprises two rows of shop houses and government offices nearby. It took almost a day to reach Belaga by boat from the downriver town of Kapit, which in turn took, and still takes, a few hours by express boat from the coastal city of Sibu. Because of the Bakun Dam project, 15 longhouse communities in this region, including Long Geng, had to be resettled to an area within easier reach of the coastal town of Bintulu. In November 1999, the Long Geng community (about 1200 people) was relocated to Sungai Koyan, which was more accessible from Bintulu.

Before relocation, not only did a number of families have generators, but a few had freezers, too. This allowed these enterprising families to catch and buy from others in the village the expensive fish called *nyebala* in Badeng, more popularly known throughout Sarawak as *empurau*. The fish was of little commercial value to the local people before

logging arrived in the 1980s, but the demand of the logging camps opened up the market for this fish not only at the camps but also in town. The white *empurau* (in contrast to the red variety) is more expensive. In 1992, a white *empurau* was sold at RM$45.00 a kilo at the logging camp but RM$57.00 in Belaga bazaar town. By 1995, the price in Belaga had increased to RM$100.00; then US$1 was about RM$2.40. An ideal size was 4–6 kg., and the price decreased when the fish was bigger than this range. Over-fishing led to a further increase in price, which further encouraged more fishing.

Other than *empurau,* which was for the well-off Chinese business people in particular, logging camps needed cheaper fish, fowl and vegetables for the workers and clerical and technical staff, especially the Chinese sent to the camps from towns. An impact of all this on Long Geng is the effect on reciprocity. This is evident from the remarks of my Long Geng friends: 'Nowadays there is no sharing, and people sell things to relatives.' In fact, families that had members working at a logging camp had money to buy food. Fewer families hunted game, so when someone returned with a deer, for instance, news spread among longhouse members, and the meat was sold quickly. In the past, a hunter was expected to share his game, at least with members of the same longhouse. This had changed, and as one Badeng informant remarked, '*nta du matu naki*', now the people do not distribute game anymore. However, there was still some sharing, limited to close family members such as brothers and sisters. The local demand and the presence of freezers encouraged hunters to hunt more. Freezers allowed meat (generally from wild pigs and the large Borneo deer called *payau*) to be kept until a trip could be made to Belaga bazaar town or to the coastal city Sibu, where one could sell the meat at a higher price. Commodification and modernization brought about many social changes in interior Sarawak, and they greatly affected the local ecology: over-fishing and over-hunting was occurring, and logging had contributed to the destruction of breeding grounds.

Reciprocity is common among indigenous people all over the world. It is not just a matter of good value but a strategy for survival, as anthropologists have demonstrated. Until there is commercialization and opportunities for selling, there is in fact no economic basis for the indigenous people to over-fish or over-kill. Thus, reciprocity as a social value in the form of sharing food among indigenous people and early humans developed as a strategy for mutual support for survival. Indigenous people are not more caring than people in industrial societies; their mode of production and consumption encourage the value of reciprocity. Commodification and access to the market as well as to new technology may change the practice of reciprocity, as we have seen in the case of the Badeng. However, not all groups of indigenous people respond to change similarly. Nicolaisen (1986) shows that the Sekapan, another group of indigenous people in Belaga District, insisted on sharing even the cash that they have earned. The custom of *pulut'le* entails the money and commodities that one has earned being generously shared (Nicolaisen, 1986: 104). This makes it 'nearly impossible for anyone to save money and plan his or her work' (Nicolaisen, 1986: 105). The value of reciprocity has developed into an ideology that has caused the people to be in 'a permanent state of bankruptcy' (Nicolaisen, 1986: 106). We do not know if a follow-up study would give us a different picture.

In my visit to the Penan community in Lusong Laku, also in interior Belaga District, in May 1995, I found that, because of greater interaction with Belaga bazaar town and the opportunity to earn cash at logging camps, the traditional value of reciprocity was expressed in buying alcoholic drinks to share with members of the longhouse community.

There was an increase in drinking stronger alcohol drinks, unlike in the past when drinking was confined to homemade rice wine. Other than beer, a popular strong alcoholic drink bought from towns is Chap Apɛh (the brand name); apɛh means 'old man' in Hokkien, the southern Fujian dialect. The increase in the consumption of bought alcoholic drinks after the arrival of logging is a common phenomenon throughout interior Sarawak. Obviously, different indigenous people have different responses to commercialization, but the differences may be a matter of different transitions as well as variations in local organization: the Sekapan stratified leadership is still more intact than is the Badeng leadership of Long Geng, whose local leaders had less control over individuals who could make their own decisions. There could be differences in local opportunities for commodification. The Badeng of Long Geng had more fish and game resources than the Sekapan, who lived not far downstream from Belaga bazaar town.

The accessibility of modern facilities and technology brings about convenience in living, but some new facilities can be used in ways harmful to the environment and, in the long run, to the local communities. An example is the electric generator that allows the indigenous people in the interior to have electricity for lighting and even to run freezers. However, some people, generally the younger ones, soon also started using the small generator for electric fishing. The Badeng Kenyah call this *ngaran*. It is derived from the English word 'current' and is often referred to in code as *kejating*, which describes the effect of being electrified. Wires are tied to the two handles of a fishing net to bring about the positive and negative poles, so that when the generator is turned on and the net is put into the water, electricity is produced to stun fish and other water life in the immediate area. This kind of fishing needs a party of four or five persons: two to carry the heavy generator on a shoulder pole, one person to handle the broad fishing net to which wires are attached, another person to hold a smaller round fishing net to scoop up the stunned fish, and one or more, following behind, to collect the fish caught and help catch as many as possible of those that have escaped the nets. When stunned, the larger fish will jump to the surface of the water. This kind of fishing is easier in upstream tributaries, where the water in the dry season is not deep and the party can walk upstream for two or three hours to *ngaran* all the way. Needless to say, many small fish are killed, and the tiny ones are not collected. Frogs and other life forms in the rivers are affected, too, although the bigger ones can recover after being stunned, i.e. if not caught or are thrown back into the river. In one such trip, I counted more than 20 kinds of fish that were caught, including a delicious frog called *sa-ai*; quite a number of poisonous frogs called *wangkok* were discarded. In deeper river, the *ngaran* fishing is done from a boat. Although bigger fish can be caught, it is not easy to scoop up stunned fish from a moving boat in a fast-flowing deep river. Thus many stunned fish are uncaught. This kind of fishing is not only ecologically destructive; it is also most wasteful.

The participants and the local people know that this kind of fishing is not only illegal; it is bad for the environment. This is why those who do this kind of fishing go a long distance from the local communities, to avoid the anger of the older people or people of nearby communities, and reduce the chance of being reported to the local authorities, who anyway are far away in the district town. There is another reason. The local people do care about their environment, and so the harmful fishing is practised in places far from their own community. In one Kenyah community in Belaga, called Long Bulan,

that I visited before it was relocated because of the dam development, the longhouse community imposed a penalty on anyone caught doing electric fishing. This community has an effective leadership that can check deviants. This shows the need for new rules and ethical conduct when a new technology is introduced, just like the use of the Internet needs new laws and an Internet culture. The creation of new rules supports the value of protecting the ecology, but this is also linked to the economic interest in protecting fish resources.

The study of indigenous people in remote regions allows us to see more clearly the impact of market economy and, with it, commodification and introduction of modern facilities and technology on local cultures and people's lives. We see that the basic value of sharing has environmental and economic bases. Faced with commercialization and the possibility of accumulating 'wealth' for the benefit of one's family, reciprocity becomes restricted to a smaller circle of close relatives, and in industrial societies, sharing is largely within the family. The global capitalist market encourages commodification and pursuing wealth for oneself or one's family rather than for a community. Nevertheless, sharing remains an important value in modern societies. In most countries, sharing is institutionalized in the public welfare systems. Modern knowledge and globalized media bring the lives of people all over the world closer to home, and common humanity is better appreciated. Making donations to famine victims in other countries is an expression of sharing. This act of giving is promoted by the idea of common humanity and of sharing with needy people, irrespective of ethnicity and religion. It is reciprocity globalized, albeit selectively.

My ethnographic examples show that the values of the indigenous people practising subsistence economy are affected by market forces and new technology. New rules need to be developed. In the modern world, values that are important for human societies need to be institutionalized. As shown in the case of the indigenous peoples in Sarawak, commodification sweeps away the ecological and economic bases of values, and new bases need to be developed. Although the Sekapan and Penan cases show that a value can be so entrenched that it continues to be insisted on even though it is impractical in a market economy, this is most likely to be a transitional phenomenon. The global market system influences life everywhere. Communism seeks to have an alternative utopia that replaces capitalism, but we now see that this is not a realistic pursuit. Even Communist China has become part and parcel of the global market economy. I now move on to note a few aspects of China's modernization.

Modernization and values in China

China is an interesting case for studying market-oriented development and values. Since 1978, China has opened up its market to the global economy and pursued a modernization programme that is in effect capitalist. While benefiting from the capitalist development, there are people who are nostalgic for the Maoist past, when the crime rate was low and there was little corruption. Today, most people, especially those in the economically more advanced coastal regions, live better; there are also wealthy people. But corruption is rampant, as anyone familiar with China knows. Factory workers are poorly paid and highly exploited. The demonstration by 3000 workers against an electronics factory in

Shenzhen in early October 2004 highlighted the problem. The workers were each paid only 230 yuan (about US$28.00) a month, well below the minimum wage of 574 yuan a month in Guangdong, and they had to work 14 hours a day, seven days a week (*South China Morning Post*, 7 October 2004: A4). The brave demonstration helped the workers to get a 170 percent pay rise as the company agreed to raise the basic salary to 620 yuan (*South China Morning Post*, 8 October 2004: A4). There have been many factory fires, too, but corruption allows business people to get away with little regard for workers' welfare and safety. Unscrupulous business people have even manufactured fake and sub-standard milk powder, which killed the babies that drank it.[1] Corruption and lack of a free press no doubt allowed these business people to get away with the deceit and make a profit, until the deaths were reported.

In post-Mao China, as far as ordinary people are concerned, Communism has collapsed as an ideological system that provides values for guiding behaviour. There has been a revival of traditional established religion such as Chinese popular religion, Buddhism, Christianity (both officially recognized churches and underground churches) and Islam, as well as new 'cults' such as Falun Gong. However, the 'profit' motive reigns supreme in post-Mao China: ordinary people think of ways to earn money and to get rich. My informants in a rural Fujian village, where I began my field investigation in 1998, lamented that graves in the village and in other villages in the county were being dug up by some local people in cooperation with outsiders in search of antiques, and old statues in the temples were being stolen. This could not have happened during the Maoist period. There seems to be a spiritual crisis in post-Mao China. Most Chinese either are not affiliated with any established religion or practise Chinese popular religion, which is largely utilitarian in its symbolism to bless worshippers rather than to promote ethical values. Chinese ethical values are found in such teachings as Confucianism and Taoism, which were neglected and even condemned in Maoist China and which are not promoted among ordinary people. In this sense, one can talk of a spiritual vacuum in post-Mao China: an alternative value system has not emerged to replace the largely discredited Communism.

Post-Mao Chinese governments have not only promoted modernization and market economy, they have actually also promoted *jingshen wenming*, 'spiritual civilization'. By itself it is not very successful, but in the context of specific campaigns there are good results. In fact, the national government has been concerned about civic consciousness and recognizes poor public facilities for cleanliness as well as citizens' lack of consciousness of environmental cleanliness and environmental protection. It recognizes spitting and littering as serious problems (see www.chinanews.com, 6 September 2004). The government has been supportive of international campaigns to 'Clean Up the World', launched by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to mobilize cleanliness campaigns in the country. From 1993 to September 2004, the government launched the 'Clean Up the World' campaign 11 times (www.chinanews.com, 6 September 2004). There are also national and local *Aiguo Weisheng Yundong Weiyuanhui*, or Patriotic Healthy Living Campaign Committees. The national committee lays down details about the campaign to select *guojia weisheng zhen*, national clean townships. These include inspection of garbage management and all kinds of health-related facilities as well as orderly traffic, green management and many other details. A township that has won the award of *guojia weisheng zhen* can keep the honour for five years, after which it needs

to participate in the competition again for selection. Such campaigns have been successful in creating clean townships and cities, as there is honour because it is a national competition, and local officials involved have the incentive to promote the campaign; they may be rewarded with promotions if the township succeeds in the competition.

In my visits to Fujian since 1996, I have often seen posters advising against spitting, and slogans promoting 'civilized living'. Xiamen, in southern Fujian Province, impressed me as a clean city when I first visited it in 1996. My local friends were proud to point out that it had been honoured as a clean city in a national competition. Indeed, it won the honour of *quanguo weisheng chengshi*, national clean city, in 1992 (www.xmwm.gov.cn/dsj/93.htm31K2003-9-23). I have been to Quanzhou more often since the 1990s, and I see the improvement in cleanliness. In 2001, this city also won the honour of *quanguo weisheng chengshi* (www.qzwb.com/gb/content/2003-03/12/content_739995.htm). What the national and local governments have done is to promote civic consciousness, stressing 'civilized' behaviour. The campaigns include greening, too. Such policies help to promote civic values, and in post-Mao China, the government plays an important role in promoting values necessary for healthy living and caring for the environment. Nevertheless, having a free press and curbing corruption remain crucial for more effective checks on seeking profit with disregard to community and the environment. The destruction of hills and mountains is a common sight in China. The lessons from the indigenous people exposed to a market economy and post-Mao China venturing into a market economy are similar. There is a need for new rules and regulations to uphold values for social living and for protecting the environment while people pursue profit and wealth and consume new and diverse products.

Values, religion and culture

In adjusting to change, all societies – indigenous people and those in industrial countries – develop or reinvent values and cultural forms, some doing better than others. For example, people adjust to office time, accepting the value of punctuality. This is not an easy matter. A Kelabit person whom I interviewed in Kuching, Sarawak, in the early 1990s, told me that, when she left her longhouse community to work in the city, she was at first not used to punctual time. Indeed, in employing indigenous people as labourers, a common complaint of employers is that they do not observe working time and show up for work when they like. Nagata (1997), for example, reports widespread absenteeism among the Orang Asli (aborigines in West Malaysia) wageworkers that he had studied. As well as having a different attitude to time, observing what Edward T Hall (1983: 46) calls polychronic time (P-time) rather than monochronic time (M-time), the Orang Asli have different priorities in their survival strategies. The difference between M-time and P-time is well illustrated in Okot p'Bitek's poem 'There Is No Fixed Time for Breast Feeding': 'I do not know/ How to keep the white man's time./. . ./ When the baby cries/ Let him suck milk/ From the breast./ There is no fixed time/ For breast feeding' (p'Bitek, 1966: 95–6).

The Chinese in Hong Kong observe monochronic time for office work, and punctuality is taken very seriously; but at the same time they keep Chinese time, which is polychronic, for non-work purposes, such as attending a wedding banquet. A Chinese wedding

banquet, whether in Malaysia or in Hong Kong, does not begin on time, and experienced persons do not attend a wedding dinner with an empty stomach.

Lining up is another simple example; not all societies have the habit of queuing. Chinese traditionally do not queue to wait their turn, as can still be observed in many parts of China. However, the habit of queuing in Hong Kong is impressive. People queue up patiently for all purposes – buying tickets, paying bills and so on. It has become part of the culture, so that violators are looked on with disapproval. According to Watson (1997: 93), queuing was not a habit when McDonald's opened in Hong Kong in 1975. Local managers stationed queue monitors to encourage queuing, and by the 1980s, orderly lines became the norm at McDonald's. Thus the new cultural form of queuing was formed after promotion. In opening up to the global market economy and in pursuing modernization, China needs to do a lot to promote values and cultural forms that are conducive to an orderly and harmonious society. Similarly, societies worldwide have to develop new values and cultural forms to cope with the negative effects of global capitalist markets.

To give an example, there is a global use of plastic bags of all sorts. These are convenient, light, fairly strong, waterproof and inexpensive. However, they are not environmentally friendly for, unlike paper bags, they last a long time even when discarded; and when discarded in the rivers and seas, they choke sea life. Environmental groups are calling for less use of plastic bags. Can people be made to cultivate the value of reducing the use of plastic bags to be environmentally friendly? Education and promotion have made people more socially conscious, and some individuals cultivate the habit of bringing shopping bags and finding ways to reduce the use of plastic bags. Yet they are so cheap and so convenient that it is difficult to reduce their use significantly. In Hong Kong, cashiers in supermarkets use many plastic bags when packing customers' goods, even though often they can pack more into each bag. This is a way of showing good service to please customers. Obviously, the value of protecting the environment by not using or reducing the use of plastic bags needs to be buttressed by sanctions that do not violate the right to modern convenience. One way to do this is to use the market itself to reduce consumption, such as making customers pay for the use of each bag, by imposing some kind of control so that shop-operators and supermarkets will be discouraged from giving plastic bags so freely. In the long run, this will help to cultivate the value of environmental protection by not using, or at least reducing the use of plastic bags. Similarly, ways need to be found to regulate the disposal of plastic bags and plastic materials. In Hong Kong, it is increasingly common to see facilities for recycling provided in universities and in residential areas. Nevertheless, it is still a challenge for modern societies to find ways to encourage the formation of new cultural forms conducive to the reduced use of plastic bags, without depriving people of the modern convenience made possible by them.

Can religion do anything about all these problems, emphasizing values needed for modern living? There is obviously a need for religions to relate to modern challenges, and indeed there are social activists who attempt to relate their faith to the modern challenges of environmental crises, ethnic tension, religious conflict and so on. More often than not, these are the 'converted', those who have embraced ecological humanism (see below). They can play an important role in influencing other religionists by relating their religion to modern challenges through reinterpreting religious teachings, thereby making

traditional religions relevant to modern societies. However, the dynamics of religion in modern societies have been rather conservative, mainly in fulfilling the primordial attachment of people, whether for group identification or for group relations (including mobilizing people in group conflicts), and these activities may even include an emphasis on fundamentalism. The rise of fundamentalism in all major religions since the 1980s went hand in hand with local and international conflict (the most prominent being the relations between the West and the Muslim world) and the globalization of capitalist markets. Fundamentalism is a way of coping with global capitalism and consumerism, and 'imperial' cultural dominance. Religion is, and will no doubt remain, important in human societies.

The reinvention and creation of values and the development of new cultural forms necessary for meeting modern environmental and social challenges are brought about by the increasing consciousness of common humanity and the interdependence of humans and nature promoted by scientific knowledge and the globalization of this knowledge, which provides the basis for the values of sharing and common responsibility in this globalized world. This knowledge-based worldview forms the new ethics of the modern world and the future. If a label is useful, it may be called ecological humanism. It is humanism in that there is acceptance of common humanity and seeing people worldwide as belonging to a global community. It is ecological in its concern over ecological crises which humans have created, and emphasizes harmony between humans and the rest of the universe. The education and spread of knowledge about humans and ecology help to cultivate and promote values needed to deal with the crises in a world dominated by capitalist markets. Ecological humanism provides the values that shape new cultural forms. It even influences the reinterpretation of religious teachings to make religions and transcendental teachings relevant to the present and future world. Bell (2002: 135) aptly calls for reaffirming 'the value of human life'. It is the consciousness of common humanity and the belief derived from ecological humanism that encourage people to support and work towards reaffirming the value of human life.

Conclusion

My ethnographic examples illustrate that the indigenous people are not nobler than people in modern industrial societies. All humans are similar in nobility and greed. Different subsistence systems and environments show their diversity. The value of reciprocity in indigenous societies seems altruistic, but it has ecological and economic bases. I have intentionally used simple examples of indigenous people encountering a market economy and new technology to show how values and cultures change and new measures are needed to cultivate values necessary for living in harmony with other humans and with nature. This is also true of people in industrial societies, only it is more complex and perhaps not so evident. Profit and greed are features of capitalist modernity. Relevant values need to be emphasized to ensure human well-being, but these need institutional support. The preaching of traditional values without new sanctions will not work. The Chinese may have their Confucian ethics of 'Do not do to others what you do not want others do to you', but in post-Mao market-driven China, this alone will not help prevent people using unscrupulous means to make profit. Indeed, as we have seen, the dark side

of China's development is that there are too many unscrupulous practices in the pursuit of profit; the sale of substandard baby formula that caused serious malnutrition and even death is just one example.

The China case shows the situation in a large complex society encountering the global market economy. The values of caring for others and the environment need to be promoted, and above all effective institutional checks need be introduced. The government needs to play an important role in ensuring these values are promoted. In China, which has a market economy in a socialist political system, the state can do a lot to promote social and ecological well-being. It is thus relevant that World Health Organization officials have urged China to implement an effective code of ethics on food safety, after the aforementioned scandal of the fake and substandard milk formula, which killed at least 12 babies (Woo, 2004). Local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are needed to ensure that the government pays attention to the human plight and to environmental problems.

In 'democratic' societies, NGOs have been playing important roles in checking government policies and corporate power. In other words, in the present and future world, NGOs are crucial for promoting social and environmental consciousness. Mass media are important, too, as is the United Nations. It is also important to incorporate the values of caring for others (such as the poor and marginalized people) as well as for the environment. Educational institutions recognize these concerns, and education in most of the world has included these to various extents. Ecological humanism provides institutions and individuals with the ideal and a charter for social action. Its values influence peoples of all faiths. In fact, ecological humanism provides them with a cultural ideal that transcends established religions but still enables them to be religious about humans and nature without having to subscribe to any established religion. Ecological humanism is significant for the future of human societies, coexisting with established religions, and at the same time influencing people of all faiths, including those not subscribing to any traditional religion. Nevertheless, it needs to be promoted to bring about new local cultural forms that are conducive to modern and future human living.

This is not to proclaim the death of religion. In fact, established religions will remain important for cultural identification and political mobilization. For instance, no matter how 'secular' the US has become, religion remains a powerful force for primordial attachment and political mobilization, as is obvious in the presidential election campaigns. Indeed, the US has become a country with increasing religious diversity, and there are many active religious groups all over the country (see Eck, 2001). The force of religion in Muslim societies is evident; so is Buddhism in Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka, for instance. Although sociologists have seen the devaluation of religion (see Bachika, 2002), this does not mean that it is becoming less significant in modern societies. José Casanova (1994: 5) argues about the 'deprivatization' of religion, pointing out that 'religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of the subsystems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from extraneous normative considerations' (Casanova, 1994: 5). Given the emotive force of religions, ecological humanism can, in fact, be promoted effectively through religious institutions and charismatic religious leaders; that is, if the ethical values in religion can be related to the concern of ecological humanism.

We can say that ecological humanism is becoming more meaningful to present and future societies. Even established religions have to respond to modern human challenges, such as ecological crises, to be relevant. The rise of ecological humanism is a human response to global consciousness about humanity and ecology and to challenges brought about by global capitalism. It is a response to the redefinition and globalization of values to serve multinational corporations. The promotion of ecological humanism is necessary for the future well-being of the human world, and it provides values that will shape new cultural forms. There is, however, the need for formal institution of values for present and future human societies, as values embedded in human cultural traditions are eroded by market forces in an increasingly globalized world. In this respect, both religion and legislation are relevant.

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Note

1. For a report in Chinese on this incident in Anhui, see news.163.com, 20 April 2004; for a report on the detention of seven people for producing 60 tonnes of fake and low-quality milk powder in Heilongjiang, see *South China Morning Post*, 18 October 2004: A6.

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Deadly virtues: Inner-worldly asceticism and *karôshi* in Japan

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Abstract

This article explores the relationship between Japanese workers' persistent inner-worldly asceticism and today's globalizing economy. The interplay of values and corporate cultural practices, global market forces and individual health outcomes is illustrated in the case of an Osaka stockbroker killed by overwork *(karôshi)* during the 1990 Gulf War and resultant collapse of Japan's 'bubble economy'. The analysis centres on corporate documents and events which publicly valorized the broker as the embodiment of the ideal employee. The tradition of discipline, dedication and deference that he came to symbolize interacted with inequalities in the global division of labour to produce tragic consequences for him and his family. Viewed through historical, micro and macro lenses, the negative potential of such ascetic work ethics comes into focus. But the analysis also shows how such cases become catalysts for social movements that emphasize the value of care.

Keywords

globalization, *karôshi* (death caused by being overworked), Japan, service overtime, work ethic, working life

Individual consequences of globalization

Development studies often emphasize national cultural strategies as determining variables (e.g. Bellah, 1957; Biernacki, 1995; Thompson, 1963; Weber, 1958). However, increasingly the fate of national economies also depends on developments in the global market. Disturbances abroad resonate domestically. The increasing speed, intensity and uniformity of work in the global mode of production are directly responsible for environmental degradation and diminished quality of life. Even white-collar workers suffer as the life world is colonized by market demands (Brennan, 2003). Employment instability, rising costs of living, benefit reductions and ad and credit-driven consumption expectations

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simultaneously fuel the pressure cooker of modern life and obscure awareness of the occupational roots of many illnesses.

Connections between global economic events and the fates of individuals and families are the raw material of the emerging global society. Although difficult to trace, such connections are nonetheless vital to a comprehensive understanding of the implications of globalization. This article specifies links between certain Japanese values and corporate cultural practices, the first Gulf War and the Japanese economy, and the *karôshi* (death from overwork) of a 26-year-old Osaka stockbroker, Kamei Shuji.[1] Like many other victims of *karôshi*, Mr Kamei's fate was the outcome of traditional values and cultural practices that pushed him into the path of the market juggernaut at the intersection of history and biography.

Defining karôshi

Karôshi, Japanese for 'death from overwork', is understood medically as stress-induced cardiovascular disease.[2] *Karôshi* results from long working hours, intensified workloads associated with industrial rationalization, and a lack of worker control over the work environment. *Karôshi* may rival automobile accidents as a cause of death in Japan (Kawahito, 1990: 9). *Karôshi* deaths recognized by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) have increased over the last 15 years. In 1995, only 15 percent of the just over 500 applications for compensation filed were approved. In 2006, 1757 claims were filed for death or major depression caused by overwork, with 560 approved, including 66 for suicide or attempted suicide, and 355 for circulatory ailments such as stroke and heart disease. Most recognized claims concerned men (94 percent). The majority of claims for psychological problems, including suicides, concerned men in their thirties. Recognized claims for psychological distress caused by overwork increased 61.4 percent over 2005 (*Nikkei Shimbun*, 2007). Due to revisions in the standards for recognizing these claims and the huge backlog of cases, increases in compensated claims are expected to continue.

Medical explanations for *karôshi* emphasize victims' excessive working hours. In 1989 approximately a quarter of Japanese males worked 3000–3500 hours per year (Morioka, 1995: 2). Despite campaigns to reduce working hours, they remain high.[3] The collapse of Japan's 'bubble economy' (1985–90) forced companies to cut costs by downsizing and switching to part-time workers, increasing workloads and stress for remaining full-time workers. Awareness of the danger from overwork was revealed in surveys. One polled workers at major Tokyo firms, finding that 46 percent of those questioned feared dying of *karôshi* and 9 percent felt there was a high possibility that they would die from overwork (Economic Planning Agency, 1994). Workers in transportation, sales, information technology, planning, finance, insurance and banking – primarily salaried, white-collar workers – comprise the majority of victims.

The overwork–stress–disease–death chain of causation called *karôshi* is widely and intuitively understood, even if the medical science behind it is debatable (e.g. Hooper, 1999). Rather than the medical epidemiology of *karôshi*, this article analyses its social origins. Probing the social epidemiology of *karôshi*, I seek to theorize how, amid the relative affluence and undeniable longevity of contemporary Japan, surprising numbers

of Japanese men and women in their prime are victimized by work. Mr Kamei's case provides an empirical context for the discussion.

Death of a salesman

During a weekend retreat and sales seminar with co-workers at a resort hotel in October 1990, Kamei Shuji experienced a fatal heart attack. The 26-year-old stockbroker had worked at least 2990 hours since January that year: an average of 10.17 hours per day, assuming no days off. In awarding his widow and children worker's compensation benefits, Japan's MHLW recognized overwork due to uncompensated 'service overtime' as the major contributing cause of death. This result was only possible because Mr Kamei had been such a successful stock salesman that his firm had published training materials that used him as an example of how an outstanding employee uses time. This crucial evidence contradicted the company's statements to the press that Mr Kamei's hard work was solely a product of self-interest, showing instead how the firm pressured workers to put in unpaid overtime and work far beyond the limits on working hours established by Japan's Labour Standards Law (LSL) (Sugeno, 1992).

The Japanese employment system

Upon graduation from university in 1987, Mr Kamei joined the Osaka branch of Ace Securities. Joining a major firm like Ace was considered a ticket to employment security and implied a prolonged mutual commitment. Mid-career hiring and horizontal movement of employees between firms in the first tier of Japan's dual economy were rare. Movement downward into the lower-paying second tier was, however, the common fate of less able workers, who were squeezed out as their cohort rose with seniority towards the apex of the corporate pyramid. In Japan's seniority-based system, continuous employment with a single firm was essential for reaping maximum career financial rewards. Seniority wage premiums and other benefits did not fully transfer when one changed employers.

A sales pioneer

Mr Kamei was assigned to outside sales. His job was to pioneer new individual accounts. It was arduous work. Salesmen were told to sell to their relatives and friends, to make cold calls on households and businesses. The goal of these calls was to explain the benefits of investing and to win the client's trust and money.

The difficulties of cold call selling are formidable in Japan. Establishing trust generally starts with a formal introduction by a responsible third party and lengthy periods of association before business can be gracefully discussed. To deepen the relationship, salesmen may repeatedly ply a prospective client with alcohol and polite conversation into the night, renewing the attack at the client's home early the next morning. Drafting elaborately polite, hand-written letters is another way salesmen impress clients with their trustworthy character. Once a client is recruited, the salesman works to promote the close relations essential for maintaining and expanding the account.

According to the Ace in-house newspaper, Mr Kamei's swift success in recruiting new clients was attributed to his 'positive and kindly' approach to prospective buyers. He concluded a new contract on his initial day of work after training, the first salesman to do so. His genius for keeping clients happy and increasing the amount of their money in the accounts he managed was attributed to his talents for caring and putting in long hours building trusting relationships with clients.

The working day

Scheduled hours at Ace were 8:40 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Mr Kamei, however, worked from 6:50 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., according to a timetable titled 'One Day for Mr Kamei', which the company distributed to incoming cohorts of salesmen. His wife recalled that he always worked on Saturdays and made calls from home on Sundays when he did not go to the office. 'One Day for Mr Kamei' detailed a continuous stream of activities including writing private, trust-building letters to clients, creating a 'newspaper' about new investment opportunities to be sent to established customers and prospects and making more than 200 telephone cold calls to drum up new leads. The timetable also showed sales meetings, in-person calls on nearby clients and prospective clients, deliveries of stock certificates, collection of payments and recordkeeping tasks. All items were scheduled as blocks of activity. There were no scheduled breaks or rest periods. The timetable noted that Mr Kamei was 'often too busy to eat lunch'.

Quotas

Ace set individual and work section quotas, called *noruma,* in yen for each of its products (stocks, investment trusts and bonds). Service charges on investment trusts were Ace's largest source of profit. Consequently, the firm was especially strict about those quotas being met. An unmet individual quota put pressure on other section members to make up the shortfall. Remuneration and bonuses were functions of both individual and section performance: it was man against man, section against section. Offices around Osaka competed against each other and Osaka faced off against Tokyo. Yet all were parts of the same whole, competing against other brokerages.

Under the bubble economy

Cultivating clients and exceeding quota were comparatively easy when Mr Kamei joined Ace. Buoyed by economic growth and lax financial regulations that allowed investors to buy shares on the margin, the stock market had been climbing steadily for many years. Taking 1968 as the base year (1968 = 100), the 1986 market index was 1324 and rising. In 1987, it was 1963, in 1988 2134, in 1989 2569 (Wakiyama, 1993: 123). Plotted on a graph, this index was a persuasive sales tool. Ace presented uninterrupted growth as a long-term trend, allowing salesmen to promise a high rate of return. Those promises fuelled a boom among private, non-institutional investors, such as those Mr Kamei recruited.

It's lonely at the top

Mr Kamei's sales record and account balances rose faster than the market, earning him fame within the firm. As the top salesman in his cohort, his techniques and tenacity were publicized in the company newspaper and training materials for new salesmen like 'One Day for Mr Kamei'. He was the first salesman in his cohort to reach *yokozuna* (grand champion) on the company-ranking charts. These charts, identical to the *banzuke* rankings of sumo wrestling, promoted competition by publicly displaying the status of all salesmen in the outside sales division. As with *noruma*, the firm set the yen amounts required for promotion to each rank.

Mr Kamei's account figures averaged two to three times quota, double the average of other salesmen in his office. Thus, he played a major role in helping his section meet its collective quota. His high marks on periodic employee evaluations established him as dependable and accomplished. Consequently, Ace ordered him to accompany weaker salesmen on sales calls, although some of them were his seniors. Towards the end of his short career, he was again selected over men with greater seniority to lecture to incoming cohorts.

Mr Kamei accepted these responsibilities graciously, but public recognition made him uneasy. Mentoring weaker salesmen and new recruits were jobs that should have gone first to more senior men. This made relationships with co-workers difficult. Section members appreciated his zeal, for their quota benefited, but other colleagues resented 'One Day for Mr Kamei' and the company newspaper stories quoting his sales pitches, because they made Mr. Kamei the standard by which they were judged and found wanting. He confessed to his wife that it was stressful to be singled out for additional duties ahead of his time. After receiving repeated phone calls where no one spoke to his home, he asked that his name not be used in the company paper and requested transfer to an office where he would not so clearly be the most productive salesman. Ace refused. His department head told him, 'It's because you are here that I can be so tough on the others.' Mr Kamei had become *shiritataki*, a stick for spanking children or prodding animals to move.

Despite the stresses of his job and relations with co-workers, Mr Kamei hoped that success would enable his rise to management. He told his wife that if he could endure his sales job for 10 years, their future would be assured. His confidence was borne out by comparison with elite salesmen posted to the Tokyo head office. Even in 1990, Mr Kamei was able to maintain a monthly average of ¥2100 million in his investment trust accounts (roughly US$21 million), about 180 percent of the amount held by his Tokyo counterparts.

The Gulf War comes to Japan

January 1990 brought political instability in the Middle East that threatened Japan's oil supply. Tokyo stocks faltered. The drop in prices forced salesmen to redouble their efforts to maintain investors' trust and funds. On brokers' advice, investors had purchased stock with partially secured loans. Collateral for these loans was often stock already owned. This, too, was often collateralized with stock and ultimately with real property, which conventional Japanese wisdom said could never decline in price because of its scarcity.

Relying on his clients' trust in him, Mr Kamei managed to maintain his account balances. He even increased the yen amount of stock transactions he handled in both percentage and yen terms relative to both his cohort and the head office salesmen in 1990. Top salesman Kamei's intense 15-hour or longer days enabled him to cope until September, when the market nosedived after Iraq invaded Kuwait and the world economy began fearing serious oil supply disruptions.

On 1 October 1990 the Tokyo Stock Exchange took the largest one-day drop in its recent history. This effectively terminated the possibility of fulfilling promises of guaranteed returns on investment. As the price of stock fell, so did the value of shares used as collateral to secure loans. The panic deepened when liquidity-seeking investors put land on the market, which drove its price down and further undermined the stability of equities. Under Japanese law, when the value of collateral falls to 30 percent of the value of the loan it is deemed insufficient. When it hits 20 percent the borrower must supply additional collateral or forfeit the loan (Wakiyama, 1993: 124).

Ace ordered salesmen to secure additional collateral from clients. Many were facing ruin. Mr Kamei's clients had punted on his advice. Now he encountered angry demands to make good his promised guaranteed returns and compensate them for losses. Major corporate investors were able to extort compensation from their brokers by threatening to take their business elsewhere after the market picked up again. This caused Ace to pressure salesmen like Mr Kamei to squeeze small customers. Notwithstanding the market's plunge, Ace kept quotas at pre-crash levels. Mr Kamei thus found himself in a three-way squeeze between quotas, customers and the bear market.

Deadly virtues

Mr Kamei's response to the crisis was to go to his clients and apologize sincerely. In personal letters and home visits, he told them he remained committed to their interests and pledged to help them through this difficulty. From some, he requested additional collateral. To others, he recommended cutting their losses. Both groups of client felt betrayed and demanded that Ace take responsibility. Many of them blamed the securities companies and institutionalized insider trading for the stock debacle.[4]

In these straits, many salesmen simply abandoned ship. Mr Kamei, however, continued to privilege his 300 clients' personal needs for care above his own discomfort. His top salesman's faith in the market's ability to recover was strong so, despite the stress, he increased his efforts to faithfully serve his assiduously cultivated accounts.

Japanese salesmen's ordinary lives, the obligatory drinking, long hours, irregular meals and lack of adequate rest or exercise extract a physical toll (Morioka, 1990). Five 15-hour days is a 75-hour week. But we know that Mr Kamei also worked weekends. Under the extraordinary circumstances of 1990, he felt compelled to put in even more hours to maintain his clients' trust and his status in the sales hierarchy. In the last week of his life he complained to his wife of extreme fatigue and of being chosen over more senior men to run training seminars. He told her he preferred being yelled at by his clients to teaching sales techniques. The morning of the day of his death he complained of feeling 'heavy' and said he wanted to rest at home rather than attend the weekend sales retreat. Nevertheless, because the trip organizer was in his cohort, he felt obliged to go. He boarded the bus with the others after work that afternoon, never to return.

Analytical autopsy

Thanks primarily to company-produced documents, such as 'One Day for Mr Kamei', the MHLW recognized his untimely death as having been caused by the stress of excessive overtime. His wife and children began receiving compensation in 1995. While every *karôshi* case has its peculiarities, winning compensation always requires concerted effort by victims' families and their supporters to convince authorities that work was the cause of death. The lengthy bureaucratic process requires considerable psychological and material support (North, 1999).

Mrs Kamei believed that Ace would support her application for compensation. Indeed, when she went to her husband's office to complete his 'retirement' process she received, in addition to his accumulated separation bonus, a 'special' ¥3 million payment in recognition of his outstanding work. Overwhelmed with grief and the birth of her second child, a boy, named after his father, Mrs Kamei relied on the firm to take the steps necessary to help her. However, nearly two years later, a colleague and friend of her husband's told Mrs Kamei of a company meeting at which it was announced that Ace would not support her application for worker's compensation nor should Ace employees have any contact with her. It later transpired that the ¥3 million payment was only 10 percent of the ¥30 million life insurance policy that the firm held on Mr Kamei.[5] Angered by these revelations, she consulted a lawyer.

Although some Japanese accepted the claim that Mr Kamei died because he was forced to overwork, others blamed his wife for his death and criticized her fight for compensation as a selfish indulgence. To understand his death and others like it we need to consider the *karôshi* problem's multiple contexts. Below I use three lenses to bring the phenomena of death from overwork into perspective.

Historical lens: Traditional values as vectors for karôshi

Pre-industrial Japan's religious traditions have been cited as the foundation of its exceptional industrial development. Robert Bellah's path-breaking account of Shingaku and other Tokugawa religions found that their doctrines promoted economic and political rationalization because they maintained and intensified people's devotion to core social values. Foremost among them was 'an ethic of inner-worldly asceticism which stressed diligence and economy' (Bellah, 1957: 194). Realizing these virtues was a journey requiring 'an obligation to hard, selfless labor and restraint of one's own desires for consumption' on a path towards identification with 'ultimate nature', which included the hierarchy of 'sacred and semi-sacred superiors' (Bellah, 1957: 194–6).

Like most Japanese firms, Ace Securities valorized devotion to customers and company. Suppressing his desires for food, sleep, time with family and other sorts of consumption, Mr Kamei came to embody the selfless worker ideal. The tradition of connecting to the sacred through obedience to hierarchy was reinforced through cohort age-grading: if Mr Kamei could wholeheartedly carry out his role for 10 years, he could become a senior member worthy of identification with the righteous ultimate reality that the hierarchy symbolized. Through the sumo-style *banzuke* chart, his devotion to inner-worldly asceticism could be measured.

The *banzuke* is particularly interesting, for sumo, known as the 'national sport', is deeply associated with Shinto, the state religion of the pre-war period. Just as sumo

retains elements of Shinto and its veneration of the Emperor as a deity, use of the *banzuke* at Ace was deliberate symbolism that lent a touch of the sacred to the pursuit of profit. In the United States, Weber noted, 'the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with the purely mundane passions, which actually give it the character of sport' (Weber, 1958: 182). In Japan, the use of the *banzuke* linked salesmen to the tradition of stoic self-deprecation, dogged persistence and unquestioned submission to hierarchy idealized in sumo. Importing these lingering religious associations from sumo gave the pursuit of wealth the character of the sacred that obscured the profanity and risks of casino capitalism.

The greater a sumo wrestler is, the more modest he should be. When praised, properly dignified wrestlers merely mutter '*ganbarimasu*', expressing the unending need to do still more, and acknowledging that the heart of a virtuous champion must be pure and selflessly devoted to pursuing his craft. He should always be able to dig deeper, to reach down and find more to give. In this way, the asceticism of the grand champion and the ideal worker are alike. When Mr Kamei won plaudits in the company newspaper for his success, he said simply, '*Mada mada kore kara desu. Ganbarimasu*' (I have only just begun. I will give it my all).

Micro lens: A disciplined corporate warrior

The *banzuke* is one example of how firms use traditional symbols to reproduce inner-worldly asceticism in the present. But we need to unpack how the *banzuke* and other symbolic representations of proper competitive attitude come to wield so much power. The work of Michel Foucault offers a lens for viewing the production of inner-worldly asceticism in corporate Japan.

Foucault (1979: 23) argued that power is an 'exorbitant singularity', an unwavering presence, whose guise is a function of the techniques through which it is exercised. *Discipline and Punish* detailed how the prison became the vector for modern techniques of power that produced disciplinary selves: bodies imprisoned by their own souls. Where once punitive power was gruesomely exercised by the sovereign on the bodies of his subjects through techniques of incarceration, torture and execution, there arose, along with the needs of the modern division of labour, an increase in disciplinary techniques of power that could produce individual souls programmed to meet those needs.

Originating in the prison, disciplinary power spread through other institutions: schools, churches, the military and industry (Foucault, 1979: 298). Its three basic techniques, 'humble modalities, minor procedures' Foucault called them (Foucault, 1979: 170), trained individuals to be objects and instruments of power:

Hierarchical observation. Surveillance chains silently extend power into all corners of an institution without the need for force, yet power's presence is forcibly felt because all individuals are bound by lines of sight to links of the chain. The 'multiple, automatic, and anonymous power' of business surveillance networks ensure profit maximization and minimal time loss (Foucault, 1979: 175).

Normalizing judgements. The hierarchical gaze compares individual behaviour with norms, averages, or rules. Approximation to norms is judged and rewards and punishments

are awarded according to arithmetic calculation of degrees of conformity to the normative standards prevailing in each level of the organization. The possibility of penalty is never absent. So even though the norm presupposes movement towards homogeneity, individual differences and absolute boundaries of acceptable behaviour are perpetually elaborated and redefined by normalizing judgements.

Examinations. A combination of surveillance and judgement, the examination is a 'normalizing gaze' (Foucault, 1979: 184). Employed as rituals, examinations constitute individuals as constantly visible objects of disciplinary power, while simultaneously masking the locus of that power. As these 'ceremonies of objectification' (Foucault, 1979: 187) become ever more continuous through recordkeeping, individuals are treated as cases which are themselves sites to extend the exercise of disciplinary power.

Using this lens, the micro-contextual basis for Mr Kamei's *karôshi* becomes apparent. Disciplinary power, exercised through normalizing discourses of time use, trust and duty, processes of objectification and techniques such as recordkeeping and public attribution of honours, produced Mr Kamei as a virtuous narrative with a logic that was rendered tragically Pyrrhic within the social structures and historical context of Japan in 1990. His identity was rescripted within the field of power exercised through the normalizing processes of the workplace.

The most prominent component of that identity was that of Mr Kamei as a standard to live up to. His daily schedule, promulgated as a public norm, objectified Mr Kamei as a dynamo, an ideal salesman. It was expected, and he expected of himself, that he would put in the hours necessary for cultivating profitable relations with customers. As a top salesman, a 'grand champion', he became a criterion for performance that management used to goad less gifted or less enthusiastic workers. As a mentor, he participated in the surveillance and evaluation of his fellows. As an instructor, he was a source of specialized knowledge.

Mr Kamei largely acquiesced in his fate because it was the product of processes of normalization that constituted him as an individual of particular standing. Moreover, there was elective affinity between those processes and ascetic cultural predispositions that sanctified suffering, endurance, patience and love of toil for its own sake. These predispositions were manifest in Mr Kamei's faithful, trustworthy and responsible attitude towards his business commitments. They were the mature fruit of seeds planted during childhood socialization, compulsory education and the struggle to survive 'examination hell' and gain university admission.

Mr Kamei could not help but labour as he did. With his time objectified as a power over and against him, Mr Kamei became alienated from the very substance of life. Thus objectified and alienated, he could not resist the terminal logic of his identity. In his last months, the temporal straitjacket he wore reduced the flow of blood to his heart even as he was pressured to persuade his fellow employees of the fashionable utility of the garment.

Foucault's notion of the production of disciplinary selves specifies how techniques of power in the Japanese capitalist context produce subjects susceptible to *karôshi*. However, while necessary for grasping how inner-worldly asceticism is produced, this micro lens is not in itself sufficient to theorize *karôshi*. After all, had the stock market not collapsed in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Mr Kamei might have survived, won

promotion and had the career that he described to his wife. To fill in the macro side and explore its links to inner-worldly asceticism, I rely on some neglected ideas from Book III of Emile Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* (1984).

Macro lens: No combat, no justice; no justice, no solidarity

Durkheim theorized that the division of labour promotes social solidarity. He postulated a transformation from mechanical solidarity, the social order of segmental tribal groups derived from similarity of consciousness, to organic solidarity, in which collective consciousness is gradually replaced by the interdependence of complementary functions derived from social members' increasingly dissimilar and specialized roles and a concomitant cult of the individual.

Increasing functional specialization and complementary interdependence simultaneously decrease penal (repressive) law and increase restitutive law, law which manifests and regulates the increasing interdependence between people. The ratio of restitutive law to penal law forms a solidarity index.

Durkheim's explanation for organic solidarity's failure to develop despite an advanced division of labour (as in late 19th-century France) relied on two abnormal forms: the anomic division of labour and the forced division of labour.

In the anomic division of labour, organic solidarity does not develop because legal regulation of competition caused by increasing specialization is thwarted by the *speed* of the transformation. The state's ability to establish rules that counter the dispersive effects of the division of labour is contingent on the pre-existence of a 'spontaneous consensus' regarding norms among those parts of the social organism the state wants to regulate (Durkheim, 1984: 297). This consensus depends, in turn, upon just access to shared practices between the parts and 'reciprocal relations within practices' (Rawls, 2003: 302).

Lax enforcement of Japanese laws regulating working hours and insider trading, as well as the virtual absence of statutes against buying on the margin, indicate the lack of a normative consensus that must prefigure the rise of enforceable state regulation. Japan's rapid economic growth outstripped the establishment of laws to regulate relations between specialized labour and management functions in the securities business. Mr Kamei was thus a casualty of the lack of struggle to determine how markets, relations between brokers and customers and labour–capital relations would be regulated.

Similarly, rapid change was responsible for discontinuities between nations in the global division of labour. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was emblematic of anomic relations between nations. Ripples from that conflict, whose origins are traceable to the imposition of external inequalities (colonial legacies, world oil market manipulation, religious intolerance), reached all the way to Japan, popping the Tokyo Stock Exchange asset bubble and subsequently drowning the hapless Mr Kamei.

In addition to speed, and even more important, Durkheim says the development of organic solidarity can be hampered by persistent external inequalities that prevent the division of labour from promoting spontaneous regulation of self-regulated practice (Durkheim, 1984: 309, n. 26). To overcome this forced division of labour, external inequalities must be eliminated and justice established. This does not mean that 'natural' inequalities in talent or ambition are eliminated. It only means that power derived from

outside sources, which deprives some groups, people, or institutions of their right to engage in conflict and *combat* on behalf of their interests, must be subordinated to social regulation to avoid subjugation of the many by the few. Unregulated external inequalities constrain conflicts that are essential to the promotion of organic solidarity, a contradictory condition of forced inequality that threatens the very existence of society for Durkheim (1984: 315–16; Rawls, 2003: 315).

Mr Kamei's right to fight for his interests was thwarted by persistent labour market structures that prevented the free movement of labour. Hiring practices that permitted only fresh college graduates to gain entry into career positions with large, top tier firms meant that there was no real seller's market for his labour. With monopoly control in the hands of employers, true organic solidarity did not develop. Opportunities to fight for social justice were also forestalled by traditions of enforced harmony. Salesmen of Mr Kamei's calibre should have been able to find better, less exploitative positions. That option did not exist, for the only way out in the employment structure was down. Mr Kamei was so inured to the inevitability of the forced division of labour that its deleterious effects were almost invisible to him. Even at close range, he was only vaguely aware of what hit him.

Corporate ideology injects an impeding confusion into the transition from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Increasing specialization should produce an increase in organic solidarity, a waning collective consciousness and concurrently emerging cult of the individual. In the Kamei case, however, solidarity was imposed via quotas that forced individuals to both compete against and help the others in their section. Unlike a truly spontaneous division of labour, this ideologically inseminated version gave birth to a stunted and deformed cult of the individual. It sacrificed heroes like Mr Kamei, even as it celebrated their ascetic diligence as a collective resource and an ideal to be imitated.

Findings of the inquest

Most people, including stockbrokers, survived the immediate collapse of the bubble economy. Consequently, it seems right to blame Mr Kamei's death on corporate disciplinary techniques (the timetable, quotas and rankings) that enhanced his tendency towards inner-worldly asceticism. Yet, in Mr Kamei's case, the lack of justice also structured his diminished options in the Japanese labour market. By refusing his request for transfer, Ace foreclosed on Mr Kamei's freedom to fight for his own interests. Quitting would have been career suicide.

Furthermore, global inequalities and discontinuities (the Gulf War) imposed powerful constraints on this individual. These macro forces could conceivably produce the context for *karôshi* irrespective of how disciplinary power produced individuals in the micro contexts. The global economy sits atop an emotional aquifer from which we all draw. When it is drained of empathy or polluted by greed and wilful cruelty, we all suffer. It triggered this particular *karôshi*.

Epitaph: *Karôshi* and the future of work

Karôshi has no single root cause. Particular incidents might have greater or lesser historical, micro, or macro attributes. My studies and interviews with lawyers, victims' families, doctors and labour activists over the last 14 years suggest that alienation (lack of control

over or ability to contest working hours, pace and volume of work), perceived humiliation (constant hazing, feelings of inferiority conferred by vertical relationships, fear of being out of conformity with one's received rules of membership) and lack of economic or political opportunities (chances for expression, conflict, validation, mobility – the power to make one's own sense of the world) make people in all walks of life susceptible to *karôshi* or its non-fatal variants

Karôshi occurs more readily when government institutions are weak, when regulatory law is not strong enough or not enforced, or when there is a shared understanding that the law is just a fig leaf. It can occur when unions are weak or non-existent. Moreover, acculturation to accept minimal levels of self-assertion as virtuous and appropriate can addict people to subordination. For workers in the present age, modesty and asceticism are potentially deadly virtues.

Hierarchical workplace relations coupled with economic anxiety can produce characteristics reminiscent of the Stockholm Syndrome or the principles of Alice Miller's psychoanalysis. There is a tendency for subordinates to expect benevolence from superiors and to interpret their actions as care. Japanese firms often use the family as a symbolic frame. Within that framework, care is expected and complaint is illegitimate (Hanami, 1985). Conflict, let along combat, is frowned upon and subject to sanctions that may not take effect until long after the conflict is over.

Mr Kamei's *karôshi* was in part due to his location in the global division of labour. As a Japanese stockbroker in a time of volatile change, he was exposed directly to its effects. As the pace of globalization increases, *karôshi* and other less visibly lethal manifestations of injustice are likely to increase. *Karôshi* victims like Mr Kamei are canaries in the coalmine, a warning that conditions for human civilization are deteriorating even in the well-heeled corners of the world.

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Notes

1. Mr Kamei's case achieved notoriety as the first *karôshi* case in which 'service overtime' (uncompensated overtime work) figured in the decision to award worker's compensation benefits to his family. This account draws on interviews with his co-workers and wife, her lawyers, and members of her supporters group, as well as published accounts of the case (Honda, 1993: Ch. 5), and documents submitted to the Labour Standards Office with the application for worker's compensation. Translations of Japanese documents are my own. Japanese names are given in Japanese order, family name first.
2. Dr Uehata Tetsunojo (1990: 98) of the National Institute of Public Health defines *karôshi* as 'a permanent disability of death brought on by worsening high blood pressure or arteriosclerosis resulting in diseases of the blood vessels in the brain such as cerebral haemorrhage, subarachnoidal haemorrhage and cerebral infarction and acute heart failure and myocardial infarction induced by conditions such as ischaemic heart disease (IHD)'. Dr Uehata coined the term *karôshi* in 1978.
3. MHLW surveys show Japanese working hours declining towards the target of 1800 hours per year. These surveys, however, rely only on voluntarily returned questionnaires distributed to

firms of 30 or more employees, thus omitting the roughly 42 percent of the Japanese workforce that works in smaller enterprises (Chalmers, 1989). The format ensures that companies whose working hours are in excess of the legal limits will not return the survey or will fudge the data. In contrast, the Prime Minister's Annual Labour Force Survey is sent randomly to workers, who fill it out at home. Respondents may consequently feel free to report actual working hours. In these surveys, working hours (excluding overtime) have remained above 2200 hours per annum since 1987 (see Morioka, 2007: Ch. 1).

4. These suspicions were warranted. It is known that securities companies were 'ramping', i.e. promoting selected stocks which they or favoured clients held. Ramping drove up prices and created a buzz that stimulated further investment that further increased the price. At some point, the original holders of the stock cashed out and took their profits, leaving the latecomers holding the empty bag. Along with buying shares on the margin, ramping was a characteristic practice of the American market in the years just prior to the Great Crash of 1929.
5. It is now illegal for firms to designate themselves as beneficiaries on life insurance policies taken out on their employees.

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Article

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The ethical issues of biotechnology: Religious culture and the value of life

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Abstract
Advances in biotechnology and medical science, especially breakthroughs in cloning and stem cell research, have raised great expectations for curing diseases, repairing damaged body tissue and organs, enabling conception at advanced age and selecting embryos based on genetic diagnosis. However, the question arises whether these advances will improve the happiness of humankind or whether human bodies are being assaulted as development resources in order to procure greater profits. This article investigates how the value of life is conceptualized by religious cultures vis-a-vis the emerging threats. With regard to the early embryonic stage of human life, the Catholic Church, for example, has raised a loud voice against the artificial termination of pregnancy. As a matter of fact, various religious cultures have showed and underpinned to a considerable extent the value of life and the direction that science and technology should take in this respect. It is argued that the globalized competition in science and technology makes it necessary to transcend the views concerning the value of life propagated by particular religious cultures.

Keywords
biotechnology, ethics, eugenics, religion, reproductive medicine, value of life

The development of bioscience and the future of human society

Since the 1990s, the governments of industrialized countries have strengthened policies promoting bioscience and advanced medicine. This rapid development was prompted by recent evolutions in bioscience and medical technologies. One of the most notable areas is progress in decoding the human genome and enrichment of knowledge on genes, and another is expansion of the possibility of manipulation and use of the human germline,

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i.e. embryos and gametes (sperm and eggs), by technological intervention. The latter became possible after embryos came to be manipulated outside the womb. The first in vitro fertilization made history in Britain in 1978; it triggered rapid progress in assisted reproduction technology, particularly births by surrogate mothers. The cloning of Dolly the sheep in 1996 was another breakthrough, which was followed by the cultivation of human embryo-stem cells (ES cells) in 1998.

As for assisted reproductive medicine, which relates to people's diverse ways of life and family structures, there are great differences among countries and regions as to how far it can be permitted. For example, the provision of eggs and sperm is legally conducted in the US for the purposes of artificial fertilization and in vitro fertilization. There are people who offer their eggs with profiles explaining their physical characteristics, careers and so on, and there is no legal regulation to restrict such practices. In Korea, where people tend strongly to prefer boys to carry on the patriarchal line, people are tolerant of using assisted reproduction technologies including surrogate mothers (Fuchigami, 2003). In Japan, where carrying on the patriarchal line is not a dominant priority, people have strong feelings against such technologies, and hence births by surrogate mothers are not authorized. It is said that couples looking for surrogate mothers visit the US or Korea.

Now that the selection of embryos and foetuses through prenatal genetic diagnosis or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (both can be termed 'prenatal genetic diagnosis' in a broad sense) is possible, a very sensitive question has arisen. Can 'selective abortion' of an embryo or foetus that has a hereditary determiner of a serious disease or disability be permitted? Or, can in vitro fertilization be permitted just for the purpose of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis? If so, how far are these practices that may affect the future of humankind permissible? Bioscientist Lee Silver in the US shocked the world with a book predicting that the world will be divided into two groups, 'gene rich' people who will enjoy healthy longevity and personal development through body transformation by the future advancement of bioscience and medical technology, and 'natural' people, who will not benefit from such advancement (Silver, 1998). Another American bioscientist, Gregory Stock, drew public attention with his prediction of the technical possibility and possible prevalence of human body transformation in the near future, arguing that there is no reason to restrain such a movement (Stock, 2002).

The technology of ES cells and cloning differs from assisted reproductive medicine in that it includes knowledge/techniques that would greatly affect the life of the world beyond national borders, and since scientific technology will increasingly involve international competition, potential economic benefits and science promotion policies will matter in each country. Many countries have been and are discussing this issue, and their responses vary. Britain, Israel, Korea and Singapore gave affirmative responses at an early stage, and Japan is following, while countries like France and Germany hold to policies of suppressing such application. In our globalizing world, excellent researchers will assemble in countries that take a permissive stance towards research on human embryos, and research institutes and corporations will obtain a number of patents to safeguard their economic gain. In contrast, countries that control the use of technology will fall behind competitor countries in the development of bioscience and advanced medicine and might suffer economic disadvantage. If other countries were to allow

unlimited research, medical technology would advance globally, making it meaningless for individual countries to restrict the development. Thus, unless restrictions are applied across the board in the international community, they will not be effective.

The most urgent question this article raises is the question whether it is right to promote unlimited development of bioscience that, no doubt, will ensue in manipulation of human life itself. It is a question that bears on the future of human societies. The thesis of the article is that bioscientific research should be informed by the concept of the value of life and, partially, by religious culture. However, the concept of the value of life is critical and religious culture quite diverse. How then can agreement be reached? What role will religious culture play in the process of forging agreement? Discussion of this issue in Japan is still insufficient and little is known about discussions in the rest of the world. This article attempts a clarification of the subject matter: first, by discussing the problems related to the use of human embryos and the emerging 'new eugenics', particularly by comparing the differences in the views on this matter held in Japan and within western culture; and second, by clarifying the conditions for a worldwide discussion of the issue.

The use of human embryos for research purposes

Regarding the use of human embryos for research purposes, two related matters are under deliberation. One is whether it should be permitted to use the surplus of externally fertilized embryos that are kept frozen to extract ES cells for research purposes. The other is whether it is permissible to produce cloned embryos by applying the technique of nuclear transplantation to human eggs and to use them for research purposes. If these two approaches are permitted, great possibilities will be open for regenerative medicine by producing ES cells from a cloned embryo to develop a tissue or organ for transplantation without risk of rejection. It might mean more effective treatment of spinal cord damage, Parkinson's and Alzheimer's disease, diabetes and so on. In the future, it might become possible that an organ with one's own genes can be produced within the body of an animal, and that the organ can be transferred to one's own body to treat a disease. If this becomes possible, it will be good news to people suffering from diseases of the heart, liver and other organs. With current organ transplant methods patients suffer the trauma of organ rejection, and the number of donor organs is far less than what is needed.

One apprehension about the use of ES cells and cloned human embryos is that both are used on the premise of the destruction of embryos that are the sources of human life. From this viewpoint, the Catholic Church and evangelical Protestants express the strongest opposition. The faithful of these churches believe that life begins at the moment of fertilization, and consider its destruction to be the same as murder. People taking a permissive attitude consider that embryos at an early stage have life but have not yet developed as human beings, and thus, can be used. They are in favour of the use of human embryos for research purposes even upon destruction in order to prevent human suffering from hard-to-cure diseases. In western countries, these two positions conflict squarely. These two arguments are considered to be primary.

It is obvious that this controversy is deeply related to the debate over induced abortion. Since the 1970s, the conflict between supporters of the pro-choice movement, promoting

the right of women to choose induced abortion and those of the pro-life movement, opposing the destruction of embryos or foetuses, has become increasingly serious. This conflict is connected with the conflict of ethics and values over family and society. In the US, it has developed into a political issue. The conflict between religious conservatives who advocate the family and the sanctity of life, and social reformists who respect the rights of women and minority groups, is sometimes referred to as a 'culture war'. The discussion over the use of human embryos for research is often conducted within the framework of this conflict in western countries, particularly the US. Those who favour traditional cultural values hold negative views, while those who favour social reform are morally permissive.

In Japan, the Council for Science and Technology, which determines the government's policies on science and technology, began dealing with this issue in 1997, and in 2000 it decided to allow cultivation of ES cells. The Council was renamed the Council for Science and Technology Policy under the Cabinet Office in 2001 after a major reorganization of the national administrative structure. Under the new organization, a special committee on bioethics was established to deliberate the issue of the treatment of human embryos, and its report was compiled in July 2004. The committee reached approval for the production of cloned embryos under certain conditions. However, the final conclusion was not a simple approval, as the opposition view was also attached that there was not sufficient ground to allow the production of cloned embryos at that point. Many media articles emphasized insufficient deliberation among the committee members. A certain level of support was given to those who were deliberately cautious in promoting research on human embryos and ES cells.

What, then, is the basis of this prudent view? There are people who are cautious about the culture of ES cells and the production of cloned embryos in Japan because of their religious beliefs. The Omoto, a Shinto group, has been expressing opposition to the use of human embryos. But, this organization is small in scale with a claimed number of 170,000 followers, and hence its opposition, based on its doctrine, does not have much influence on society. Even so, those who were hesitant had a certain force within the committee. It cannot be denied that this prudence had something to do with religious culture. In order to understand fully the nature of the caution shown by the committee, it should be considered what prudent views were advocated on what grounds, and how they were related to other discussions of bioethical issues (Shimazono et al., 2004).

Even those who take cautious positions in Japan do not oppose research on the use of human embryos. They would allow it for the sake of medical treatment to cure patients with certain kinds of difficult diseases. Herein lies a difference from the opposition by the Catholic Church and evangelical Protestants. The latter say that the preconditions to initiate research for such purposes are not met, and give reasons such as (1) the feasibility and necessity of the research have not been verified by tests on animals; (2) the feasibility of other methods of treating difficult-to-cure diseases has not been sufficiently examined; and (3) it is not clear whether it is possible to procure eggs without imposing risks on women.

These three points are widely discussed all around the world. A fourth point (4) might be specific to Japan. It has to do with the possible use of human embryos for purposes other than seeking treatment for difficult diseases, such as testing the efficacy of medicines

and developing ingredients for cosmetics. No examination has been made as to the appropriateness of various uses of human embryos, nor have conditions to prevent questionable use and research been discussed. Supposing that research is to be permitted, some assert that possible consequences should be predicted and that it should be determined whether they might violate human dignity.

In relation to this position, some express a fifth reason (5), according to which the basic point at issue in the use of human embryos is a concern about a threat to human dignity by using human life as a means (or resource). In addition to the question whether an embryo can be destroyed, the question for what purpose the destroyed embryo will be used must be asked. Here, the question arises whether the use of human life as a means is right or wrong. Some view the possible violation of human dignity not simply from the point of view of respecting the sanctity of life, whether the destruction of embryos is permitted or not, but also from the perspective of the whole picture of knowledge and practices to be explored by emerging bioscientific technologies. This viewpoint also finds strong support in Japan (Shimazono, 2009).

What is distinctive about the prudent view on the research and use of human embryos in Japan is that discussions do not go deeply into whether the 'destruction of human embryos' is considered as murder or not, but rather go in a different direction, looking into ways destroyed embryos are used and the entire picture of their practical use. This is related to considering the question of the research and use of human embryos from the viewpoint of the right and wrong of induced abortion. Induced abortion means the destruction of life at an early stage where no intention is involved to use embryos as resources. Thus, this induced abortion is not intended for human 'instrumentalization', and the question of using human embryos for that purpose is not asked. It is this question, as those who are cautious insist, that should be focused on squarely in the discussion of the use of human embryos. This shows an attitude of considering the dignity of life not limited to the viewpoint of 'the dignity of individual persons', but from the perspective of the question of the relations between human life and human body. This approach relates to the consideration of 'human dignity' in 'relation to others' (Shimazono, 2003, 2005).

The prudent view of the use of human life reflects the deliberations over organ transfer from a person whose brain has been declared dead. In Japan, organ transplant from the brain-dead condition is legally permitted. However, the definition of brain death as human death is not generally accepted. Organs can be transplanted only from persons holding a donor card on which they give permission for some of their organs to be removed for the purpose of transplantation upon being declared brain dead. In fact, there have been only a limited number of organ transplants from the bodies of brain-dead individuals.

Views regarding research on and the use of human embryos vary hugely between (formerly) Catholic-dominant and (formerly) Protestant-dominant regions, and between these regions and regions under Confucian and Buddhist influence. And even within the region under Confucian and Buddhist influence, people in China, Korea and Japan have different views, while Vietnam and Thailand may also have different ideas. Differences in values originating from religious cultures present various ethical responses to modern bioscience. These differences in concepts of the value of life might well pose a serious problem to the world in the future. In the following section, another example is given further consideration.

Resistance to 'new eugenics'

As mentioned at the outset, research on and the use of human embryos for the development of regenerative medicine are only a part of technological and medical intervention into the human reproductive process. Together with the expansion of knowledge of genes, interventions in the reproductive process open possibilities for medical development in the future. The resulting technologies might greatly change future societies. That is, the two terms, 'enhancement' and 'new eugenics', can be cited as representing characteristics of ongoing change of grave importance. Both terms imply intentional change. Also, both imply that medicine will be applied for purposes beyond what is inherently given to medicine. This can be termed the evolution of 'medicine beyond therapy'. (The expression 'beyond therapy' is the title of the report published by the President's Council on Bioethics under US President Bush in October 2003; see Cass, 2003.)

The term 'enhancement' implies the act of transforming one's body and brain functions intentionally by the use of medical technology. The term can be applied both to the transformation of one person and to that of future generations. Typical means for enhancement are the manipulation of human embryos and genes, but psychotropic drugs and muscle-building substances are often mentioned as examples. What will attract greater attention is enhancement that also affects future generations. Enhancement involving genetic manipulation might be widely used in the near future. At present, 'new eugenics', i.e. the 'selection of life' in the reproductive process, is being practised. This is the act of controlling the functions of the human body and brain of future generations through intervention in the reproductive and genetic transfer processes. While eugenics since the late 19th century has meant to select humans on the basis of hereditary predispositions under state control, new eugenics carries out selection of hereditary predispositions under the guise of 'individual self-determination'.

Thanks to the progress of bioscience, which makes enhancement and new eugenics possible, we have come to hold the capability to change dramatically the lifestyles of both ourselves and of future generations. But, is it right to permit these new technologies? Will they make humans happier in the future? If not, limitations should be imposed on 'beyond therapy' medicine. But if limitations are to be imposed, what kinds of limitations can be established, and on what grounds?

What, then, is the basic concept of the 'value of life'? We are not able to describe it precisely at this moment. For sure, we face different views that reflect divergences in religion, culture and the historic experience of peoples. I return to this concept in the following sections. In the following I discuss prenatal genetic diagnosis that is inherently related to the point of view of new eugenics.

Prenatal genetic diagnosis has been practised since the 1960s. A growing trend among expectant mothers and couples in recent years is to examine the chromosomes or genes of a foetus of a certain number of months on the premise that if some grave disorder is found, they can have the foetus aborted artificially at their discretion. This act of allowing a foetus with some negative properties to be excluded is called selective abortion. Prenatal genetic diagnosis is often carried out to determine whether to have selective abortion. Although some are in favour of selective abortion based on the sex of the foetus, many are critical of it. Wider acceptance is given to induced abortion of a foetus with a (potential) disorder due to hereditary factors.

Spina bifida and Down's syndrome are typical disorders that frequently lead to abortion as a result of detection in prenatal genetic diagnosis. Prenatal diagnoses have been made by villus test, amniotic fluid test and ultrasonic echo test. Since the 1990s, when a blood serum marker test to detect possible disorders from the mother's blood was developed, the range of prenatal diagnosis has been broadened markedly. Since a great number of expectant mothers have undergone prenatal diagnosis as a matter of routine upon recommendation by their doctors, prenatal diagnosis has become a type of mass screening. Unless this is challenged from an ethical point of view, more accurate testing methods will be developed and mass screening will be more widely practised.

Under the legal systems of Britain, France and the US, the 'foetus clause' (allowing artificial abortion in cases where a grave disorder is discovered in a foetus) is accepted as appropriate. In these countries, public resistance to prenatal genetic diagnosis is small, and prenatal genetic diagnosis through mass screening is spreading rapidly. In some regions, the number of babies born with a disorder is actually decreasing. Once mass screening is publicly promoted, the social trend of considering that foetuses with a disorder should be aborted will be fostered. As a consequence, in such a society, disabled people are considered unwelcome. But are disabled persons individuals who ought not to be born and, consequently, ought to be excluded from society?

Disabled persons and their families in Japan have insisted that the medical community should not support such a view (Tateiwa, 2000). The Eugenic Protection Law of 1948, allowing induced abortion, contained a clause that allowed sterilization and abortion to prevent babies with hereditary diseases from being delivered. Long-time criticism against these clauses continued to gain supporters until the law was revised as the Mothers' Body Protection Law in 1996, in which the eugenic clause was deleted. Around the time when prenatal genetic diagnosis was beginning to spread in Britain, France and the US, advocacy to protect the human rights of the disabled was recognized in Japan, and at the same time, the notion permitting prenatal genetic diagnosis lost its legal expression.

With the spread of eugenics since the beginning of the 20th century and social policies by governments, marriages of mentally disabled people were prevented or the couples were sterilized under the instruction of medical doctors both in western countries and in Japan (Kevles, 1985; Trombley, 1988; Yonemoto et al., 2000). It was not only the Nazis that promoted medical intervention to prevent the birth of mentally disabled children, it was practised widely in industrialized countries over several decades from the 1920s. Although different in form, the prenatal genetic diagnosis, which is currently on the rise, is similar to the past practice in that it is meant to avoid the birth of disabled people. Many concerned Japanese, who have gathered supporters from a wide range of people, insist that it is inappropriate to spread this kind of medicine that can be termed new eugenics (Tamai, 1999a, 1999b).

The proportion of expectant mothers receiving prenatal genetic diagnosis is not very high in Japan and certainly not all couples in other countries have their foetuses aborted upon learning that they have disorders. Certain parents say that the disorder of a child is simply one of the characteristics of the child. Who will benefit from detecting disorders? Doctors should not actively encourage their clients to take prenatal genetic diagnosis. Even if they perform prenatal genetic diagnosis for their clients and discover some foetal disorder, they should not encourage mothers to terminate the mother-and-child relation

that has developed to that point. Rather, doctors should explain fully that it is possible to develop an appropriate attitude to overcome the shock of hearing that one's baby will be born with a disorder and to live positively with a child having a disorder. Support was given to this notion, and, as a result, the prevalence of prenatal genetic diagnosis is quite low. (According to statistics around 1996, fewer than 10 percent of foetuses with a predisposition to Down's syndrome were aborted in Japan, while it was nearly 50 percent in both Britain and France [Sato, 1999].) Mass screening has not been conducted in Japan, and hence no decrease in the number of children with disorders has occurred.

What reasons underlie the difference in bioethical stance on prenatal genetic diagnosis between Japan and western countries such as Britain, France and the US? Among the western countries, Germany is closer to Japan in the sense that people share a prudent stance towards prenatal genetic diagnosis, but in this article, provisionally, the comparison is limited to Britain, France and the US on the one hand, and Japan on the other. The main reasons can be found in differences in the two regions in the history of deliberations over induced abortion and population control and in historic experiences influenced by population problems in these nations in their modernization processes. Furthermore, differences in religion and culture might be reflected. My hypothesis as to the differences is as follows.

In western countries, people are always conscious of the view of Christian conservatives who do not accept induced abortion. For those who allow induced abortion, any reasons were welcome as long as abortion can be justified. So, the right of pregnant women to determine whether to deliver their babies or not, that is, the concept of 'pro-choice', is strongly advocated, and along with this concept, selective abortion is also accepted as permissible. While both parties valued human dignity with respect to individuals, conservative Christians advocating 'the sanctity of the life of the individual' oppose the Enlightenment-inclined progressivism advocating the right of people to self-determination. Public opinion is divided into the former group valuing life and the latter group valuing the right of individual choice, and because of this conflict, a solid framework was formed to the effect that the bioethics concerning the 'beginning of life' should not be settled based on these conflicting values (Ogino, 2001).

In Japan, in contrast, neither was there strong opposition to induced abortion on religious grounds such as those of the Catholic Church in western countries, nor did the advocates of induced abortion under the concept of the 'right to choose' obtain much support. Even before the modernization process began, it appears that people in Japan concluded that population control could not be avoided. In order for a large population to survive on its limited land area with limited natural resources, abortions and infanticides were considered inevitable. The Buddhist view of morality appears to have supported this consideration. Rather than pushing people to observe moral norms, Buddhist views tend to admit the inevitable reality by emphasizing human conditions in which persons cannot practise moral norms. The tradition of folk religions believing that the souls of dead foetuses and infants return to the other world nearby and are reborn might also have influenced Japanese thinking (Chiba and Otsu, 1983; Namihira, 1996; Sawayama, 1998; Shimazono, 2003; Shinmura, 1996).

The Japanese view on population control is closely related to the nation's historic experience in modern times. The Asia and Pacific War that Japan committed itself to

from 1931 had the expansionist purpose of solving its population and resource problems. A critical view against expansionism was widely shared in postwar Japan. It was also affected by eugenic progressivism, which already had a large group of supporters at the beginning of the 20th century. Due to this, the practice of induced abortion was quite smoothly accepted soon after the war as an appropriate means to control population. Enlightenment-inclined progressivism in the neo-Malthusianism line remained influential from the 1910s and led to the enactment of the National Eugenic Law in 1940. But, apart from eugenic thinking imported from the West, the long-held consciousness of the inevitability of population control of the nation along with critical reflection on the government's expansionist policies perhaps facilitated the enactment of the Eugenic Protection Law in 1947 (Fujime, 1999; Fujino, 1998). After the 1970s, voices gradually mounted criticizing the eugenic concept, which was legalized and widely supported during wartime, and the concept of advocating the human rights of the disabled has gained strength.

In contrast, in the industrialized countries of the West, particularly in those belonging to the Protestant sphere, which saw themselves as leaders of the modernization of the world, the neo-Malthusianism-oriented concept of birth control tended to have a eugenic inclination led by Enlightenment-inclined progressivism (Yonemoto et al., 2000). Movements to protect women's rights were linked with the ideals of democratic society in which self-reliant individuals are considered as the model. A rationalist concept emphasizing social welfare costs prevailed, and, as seen in Scandinavia, the rights of the disabled, and above all, of the mentally disabled, who did not correspond with the model of self-reliant individuals, tended to be suppressed. Further, people thought that totalitarianism such as Nazism was responsible for the vices of eugenics. But self-critical reflection on eugenics did not have much influence on the protection of the disabled. In discussions on the protection of the life of foetuses, those who adhered to Christian principles of dealing with all foetuses equally were dominant. As a result, movements specifically to protect the interests of the disabled, who were discriminated, did not grow.

From the viewpoint of the value of life the comparison between Japan and western countries can be summarized as follows. A tendency to universalism or individualism to consider the value of life from the point of view of human dignity of the individual is strong in the West. The Christian position of believing in the sanctity of life as well as the modernist and social reformist positions elevating individuals' human rights share common ground on this point. This view was supported by the Christian tradition that, being created in the image of God, humans have a soul that is able to obtain eternal life; this has been bolstered by modern philosophy and modern ethics that define the characteristics of humans as including intelligence and ethical initiative. But under the concept of human dignity that values rational individuals, beings without clear consciousness and strong self-identity are considered to be imperfect entities. In arguing for induced abortion, it is often pointed out that foetuses have not developed their personalities and are not beings that can claim rights. Since even healthy foetuses are considered to be imperfect beings, it is natural to conclude that foetuses with mental disorders are not eligible to claim rights.

In Japan, it is thought that the religious culture and traditional family structure have played a certain role in that they see the bond of affection between parents and children to be very strong to the point of being inseparable. It is easily agreed that even if the

foetus is found to have a disorder, the unbreakable bond of affection has already been developed between parents and child. Families having children with Down's syndrome made an appeal to revise the Eugenic Protection Law, perhaps based on the above sentiment, and protested against the institution of prenatal genetic mass screening; and they have come to hold political strength (Sakai, 1999; Sato, 1999). Behind this development is the concept of respecting the value of life, referred to above, and of affirming the human rights of the disabled. In addition, a concept that emphasizes 'living together' is clearly seen, that one can live through developing bonds and interacting with others. The ideal of diverse people living together was strongly advocated and was considered to be the supporting principle promoting the cause of normalization through which the disabled are not treated differently from other people. The feminist movement in Japan, since the 1970s, has attached weight to collaboration with movements criticizing discrimination against and exclusion of the disabled (Morioka, 2001). In the feminist movement, attitudes valuing bonds among closely related people, and the ideal of diverse people living together, have played a certain role along with claims for individual rights.

International consultation on the value of life and religious culture

Human society faces many sensitive problems over the value of life as a result of the advancement of bioethics and medical technologies. Some of these problems can be settled within individual countries. Because of differences in religion and culture among countries, the maintenance of different systems in different countries cannot be avoided. On the other hand, there are more and more problems that must be solved by consultation among the international community. Research on potential uses of human embryos is one of them. The issue of 'genetic enhancement' and 'new eugenics' will also require an institutional framework common to all people. In this field, human society is faced with challenges that are as difficult as the environmental issues.

It is not easy to reach an international agreement on these points. The major reason for the difficulty is a lack of international systems that, while ensuring ethics and respecting mutual interests, regulate governments, corporations and research communities intent on earning profits and protecting their gains in the name of the freedom of research. Freedom of research has a strong tradition, particularly among scientists. Aside from experiments on the human body that clearly put someone at risk, it has been thought difficult to limit research activities with good purposes. Recently, however, mechanisms are being established in industrialized countries whereby governments give strong support to biotechnical industries and bioscientific research institutes. Researchers in related fields are increasingly attracted into research fields that might lead to economic profit in the future. Modern sciences are becoming increasingly subordinated to the objectives of economic development and national interests. Bioscience and medicine sometimes appear to push forward the development of scientific technologies even in disregard of contemplation of the ethical questions involved.

Various people view with apprehension the current development of bioscience, which might bring unpredictable risks to future societies. Past attempts to control the development of bioscience on the grounds of the value of life have been made mainly by religious groups and individuals, based on their religious traditions. Along with the rapid

development of bioscience, movements to impose limitations on the development of bioscience by non-religious communities have become conspicuous too. As for discussions of organ transplants from brain-dead donors, many scholars and writers have opposed it and have won the sympathy of the public. Many are in favour of imposing limits on the production of cloned individuals and the transformation of human genes.

With regard to research on human embryos and enhancement, for example, US political philosopher Francis Fukuyama emphasized the need for political regulation (Fukuyama, 2002). According to him, contemporary bioscientific technology can violate the ideals of humanity and human dignity that we all share. Human society so far has believed that all people share certain basic characteristics and have dignity as such; it is thought that various rights emerge from the concept of dignity. However, modern scientific technologies have crossed the threshold and hold the capability of producing non-human entities. Hence, the critical problem emerges as to draw the line beyond which we should not go.

Fukuyama states that it is the ideals of humanity and human dignity that constitute the basis of social ethics in the modern world. Contemporary bioscientific technologies have produced cloned animals and artificial chimeras, and medicines that can alter the behaviour, emotions and thinking that have been the conditions of human life. They now have the potential to manipulate genes to create new species different from humans. There is an unpredictable degree of risk, and there is no denying that the consequences might be terrible. Fukuyama proposes that a political code be applied to such scientific technologies that hold potential dangers, similar to the one now applied to scientific technologies concerning the use of atomic nuclei. In the globalizing world of today, he says, to be effective, such a code must be instituted and implemented on a global scale.

I agree with Fukuyama's proposal for the institution of international regulations on bioscientific technologies. It is welcome that such a proposal has been made in the US, where freedom of research is strongly advocated. What criteria, then, can control science? The President's Council of Bioethics, of which Fukuyama was a member, has examined this issue under the chairmanship of Leon Cass (2003). Although the Council does not make direct reference to Christianity and Judaism/Christianity as a premise for discussion, western philosophies and American traditional values are frequently referred to, and the discussion is structured on the basis of these principles. Moreover, Fukuyama voices concern over religious cultures in Asia being tolerant with respect to bioscientific technologies. It is natural in a sense that a specific cultural and religious tradition is referred to when a question concerning the fundamentals of bioethics is discussed. In other words, as far as the value and the dignity of life are concerned, we ought not to carry on our discussion based on rational inferences only; we have to take into account cultural and religious observations closely related to people's ways of life. But again, cultural and religious observations of different peoples often include incompatible views. Will human societies then never reach agreement on the various questions of the value of life?

This is not inevitable. Just as the international community has signed the Kyoto Protocol and come to a global agreement to solve environmental problems, a more comprehensive agreement might be reached on various problems centring on the value of life by making compromises and advancing mutual understanding on each individual problem that occurs as we go forward. Further, now that it is clear that bioscientific technologies have the potential to change human societies, we cannot avoid seeking such an agreement.

For the moment, we should share this recognition and agree to establish forums to discuss the value of life in order to prepare for the creation of the international regulations required for bioscience and advanced medical technologies. A difficult point is that the contemporary world tends to vest superiority in the freedom to gain strength through competition rather than the freedom to respect diversity. In other words, the modern world considers competitive freedom to be the driving force to achieve civilizational progress. Notwithstanding, it is inauspicious that various premises in modern sciences are understood to show affinity with such simple competitive values.

As long as the values that unilaterally give precedence to competitive freedom dominate, there will be no bright future for human societies with regard to the value of life. Modern sciences too easily go hand in hand with expanding freedom. As far as the value of life is concerned, the future of humanity will open up only if people become more conscious of the limits of the dominance of reasoning power and understand existing religious and cultural diversity concerning that crucial value. Redoubling our efforts to find a path towards dialogue and compromise will be most crucial.

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Advertising and value formation: The power of multinational companies

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Abstract
Contemporary advertising images in the media play an important role in promoting and sustaining contemporary consumer culture and provide one of the pillars upholding and furthering contemporary capitalism. Though one of its key roles is to promote materialism, advertising imagery also plays a role in cultural and value change at both the surface, selling products, and structural levels, causing shifts in cultural values such as an increasing emphasis on self-gratification through consumption, acceptance of increasing use of sexuality to sell products, obsession with youth, appearance and body image, and overwhelming obsession with modernity and the latest technology. There needs to be greater acknowledgement of these processes or the probable future will be an intensification of the present unsustainable economic system. Preferable options for the future need to take cognizance of the powerful role advertising and the media play in society and assess the possible options for changing those roles.

Keywords
advertising, culture, globalization, value formation

Advertising

Advertising can be defined as 'any paid form for non-personal presentation and promotion of ideas, goods or services by an identified sponsor' (American Marketing Association, cited in Monye, 2000: 117). Advertising has evolved and developed in the 20th century in response to changes in technology, and those changes have been reflected in the increasing importance of the visual image in the media and in advertising. By linking customers to products, advertising links culture and the economy. It is driven by economic imperatives but works in the cultural domain and uses values to give products worth and meaning to

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consumers. As both advertising and values are cultural constructs, exploration of the relationship between advertising images and value formation is closely related to the concept of culture. Gertz views culture as 'a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions – for the governing of behaviour' (1973, cited in De Mooij, 2004: 26). Rice has defined culture as being 'the values, attitudes, beliefs, artifacts and other meaningful symbols represented in the pattern of life adopted by people that help them interpret, evaluate and communicate as members of society' (Rice, 1993, cited in De Mooij, 1998). As culture is largely unconscious, people tend to perceive life through a personal cultural map (De Mooij, 1998) and in contemporary society advertising plays an important role in defining that cultural map.

The advertising industry

Lund summarized the task of advertising in the 1940s as: attracting attention, arousing interest, stimulating desire, creating conviction and stimulating action (Lund, 1947, cited in Vestergaard and Schroder, 1985) and these are still the key goals of advertising, though practices have changed dramatically in recent years. Advertising has become increasingly complex and has evolved into a huge industry employing large numbers of professionals to do market and consumer research, copy testing, media planning as well as sophisticated design and execution (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). Since the 1970s, advertising in industrialized countries has been working in a saturated market where people don't need most of the products advertised and product differentiation diminishes as products within categories become increasingly similar. Having little to work with in terms of product uniqueness, advertising has been increasingly working in the cultural domain to create uniqueness by associating products with emotions and values.

Since the 1980s, the accelerated expansion of foreign businesses and products into new markets in emerging economies has been accompanied by multinational advertising agencies which have also grown through mergers and acquisitions that include foreign agency takeovers of local agencies. In many markets the top international advertising firms dominate local advertising and foreign products dominate advertising product profiles. During the period of international expansion in the 1980s, theorists and advertisers promoted standardized advertising, one campaign used worldwide, and predicted it would soon dominate international advertising practice (Levitt, 1983). The advertising industry further consolidated in the 1990s, and the largest global conglomerate companies became groupings of independent agencies. The top media agency companies in 2006 were: Starcom Mediavest, OMD Worldwide, Mindshare, Carat and ZenithOptimedia all with worldwide billings over US$19 billion (Adbrands, 2007). Strategies became closely tied to market research and focused on niche market groups. Strategies differed depending on product type and markets, and customization to local markets was found to be more successful than standardized imported campaigns for most product types. The predicted dominance of standardized advertising failed to eventuate (Belch and Belch, 2007).

Advertising: The economy and culture

The driving forces behind the creation of contemporary images in the media are the forces of contemporary international capitalism and the globalization of business. Any

attempt to critically evaluate contemporary advertising needs to acknowledge these economic imperatives: advertising campaigns are the source of enormous corporate profits as they link consumers with products, stimulate consumer purchasing and are crucial to corporate growth and viability. The goal of advertising is to sell products and to deliver consumers to producers (Bennet, 2000). Audiences are bought by advertisers on the basis of income, age, sex, ethnicity and class (Stevenson, 1995). Advertising functions to create a desire for products beyond the satisfaction of basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. Once these basic needs have been satisfied advertising works to stimulate demand for non-necessary products. Advertising functions, especially in the contemporary era, to make much of small differences and to stimulate over-consumption or unnecessary consumption. In recent decades there has been expansion in local and small-scale advertising but more important has been the massive expansion of corporate advertising, especially that of transnational corporations and their presence is increasingly dominating all facets of daily life. The images presented in advertising play an important role in this process. According to Schiller (1992) western industrialized society in the 20th century has experienced a decline in traditional forms of socialization: the family, religion and education and the media have come to play an increasingly important role in socializing people into society's value systems and one of those key values is the 'culture-ideology of consumerism' (Sklair, 2002).

Advertising agency culture

The internal working dynamics of the major advertising agencies also impact on the role of advertising through the types of advertising campaigns developed and the strategies used. The head offices of the top agencies in the world are located in the capitals of industrialized countries. Nixon's overview of the evolution of London agencies in the 1990s revealed an agency culture driven by the ideals of creativity, youth and competitiveness, very male dominated, and motivated by the demands of insecure career paths where success is measured by advertising awards. There is enormous pressure to be new, different and create impact in a highly saturated marketplace which often results in a default back to the old standby 'sex sells'. The frontiers of the acceptable are constantly being challenged (Nixon, 2003). There is also a strong element of 'west is best' ethnocentricism underpinning agency practices. Local branches of agencies often have to defer to decisions made by head office (as I personally experienced during my research).

Strategies

In spite of the growth in standardized advertising, strategies need to be responsive to local cultural values if they are to be successful. The international standardization of advertising has never reached predicted levels and has never been the predominant form of advertising. Some product categories such as airline travel, luxury goods, perfume and cars tend to be more often standardized (Belch and Belch, 2007). In the last decade there has been greater emphasis placed on understanding consumers in emerging markets such as India and China, especially as cultural values have come to be acknowledged as crucial to expanding market share. Research in the last two decades has placed more

emphasis on eastern cultural values, and failures in advertising campaigns have made advertisers increasingly aware of cultural differences. This trend has been accompanied by increasing levels of customization to local markets. Often this takes the form of using local models in an externally conceived campaign, for example in India a local cricket star was used by Adidas (Chawla, 1999), and Miss India was used to promote hair products by L'Oréal along with Cindy Crawford (Fannin, 1999). In China the market has been harder to enter and there has been a definite trend towards local products and the promotion of traditional values in marketing products. Foreign agencies are marketing products in such a way that people think they are local: for example, two of the top foreign products in China, Head and Shoulders and Santana (Schlevogt, 2000). Advertisers are tending to target specific groups such as very young children. In the film *The Corporation*, a spokesperson described how Initiative Corporation spends US$22 billion worldwide placing advertising for clients in a wide range of media. One of their goals was to help corporations to design their advertising and promotion so that children would nag their parents more effectively for products (*The Corporation*, 2004).

Branding

Since the 1980s, the brief of major advertising agencies has become more than the traditional roles of persuasion and selling and expanded into 'establishing an elaborate set of emotional meanings and values around products, enticing the consumer through desire' (Nixon, 1999, cited in Nixon, 2003: 40). Branding has been one of the marketing strategies developed in response to the saturation of western markets and the increased focus of corporations on international expansion. There was a massive expansion in the development of branded products in the 1980s. Branding is a strategy used by multinational corporations to reinforce their position and domination of international markets. It is an extremely expensive exercise and the worth of top international brands is on a par with the GNP of some nation-states; for example, in 2006 Coca Cola was valued at US$67 billion (Interbrand, 2007).

The essence of branding is to create a personality for a product or company that enables people to identify with brand values in buying a product. Emotions and values are attached to a product, so that consumers feel that they are buying into that profile or value system when they buy or wear the product. If culture is seen to work on an unconscious level of deeply held values, this is reflected in responses to contemporary branding, and people proudly wear branded products as a means of making personal statements of identity. David Boyle (2003) cites *Elle* magazine as coining the term 'logophilia, I am who I wear'. Branding is a process that can be applied both to companies like Coca Cola and Nike, and to the products that they sell. Often when these companies take over local brands to consolidate market share they leave the local brand intact, which creates a false sense of market diversity and hides consolidation of ownership, as Coca Cola has done in many markets. In new markets branded products can be valued for their assurance of quality, often compared to the poor quality of local products, but also as a means of status as these products are more expensive, and on another level they can be seen as buying into dreams and fantasies associated with the product such as the American Dream. It has to be acknowledged as a real branding achievement that multinational clothing and

sports firms can promote their products in terms of individuality, and consumers can define their individual identities, by buying the most standardized mass-produced goods ever made. As Naomi Klein has stated it is 'brands, not intellectuals, activists or religious leaders that are the principle truth tellers in the corporate age' (Klein, 2004: 64). Multinational corporations are tapping into core values to promote their products. Nike markets its products with ideals of transcendence, Starbucks works to create a community space and Benetton promises virtue and social engagement, none of which the product can deliver. Brands are also becoming cultural real estate claiming our public spaces with billboards so high they cover entire buildings (Klein, 2004).

The cultural effects of advertising in the West and the Third World

There have been a number of different approaches investigating the relationship between advertising, culture and changing values. It is interesting to compare perspectives from opposing ends of the spectrum: those who advocate using and understanding culture to advance the success of advertising cross-culturally, represented by De Mooij, a key author and proponent in international advertising (De Mooij, 1990, 1994, 2000), and the critical perspective reflected in the works of Richard Pollay (1986, 1989; Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). Both positions support the conclusion that culture and values play a key role in advertising.

Many proponents from the field of advertising, including the American Advertising Association, claim that advertising does not change values (Belch and Belch, 2007: 732) and this idea is implicit in the work of De Mooij, who sees values to be enduring. However, there are numerous examples from advertising agencies who are clear in their stated intention to change values to stimulate product purchases, for example in India Hindustan Lever embarked on a deliberate campaign to change the Indian perception of beauty in order to sell lipsticks (Gupta, 2002) and J Walter Thompson campaigned to promote Indian women's rights (Bhandarkar, 1995). Campaigns with a focus on empowering youth and reinforcing individuality, fun and hedonism, such as the McDonald's 'I'm loving it' campaign, are designed to associate values of youth and independence with products. The most notable feature about cultural values and advertising is that there is no direct link between values and products. The same product can be sold with many different values. Soap can be sold as inexpensive, pure, sweet smelling, modern, popular and promoting cleanliness, which in turn can be related to social acceptance, economic success, sexuality or health (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). The spectrum of approaches to advertising and culture extend from those documenting, analysing and critiquing the values represented, to those such as De Mooij, who recommends the study of values as a means of creating more effective advertising.

Advertising and value formation

On one level, advertising can be seen as reinforcing the macro-level system of contemporary capitalism: planned obsolescence; quick turnover of fashion trends and styles; the creation of niche markets; the celebration of small differences; and the marketing of

products with lifestyle references and associations often bearing no relation to the products use whatsoever (e.g. cigarette advertising). Advertising functions as propaganda for consumption, along with the values that support consumption: individualism, personal gratification and definitions of identity through products and services such as cosmetics, clothing, holidays and technical products such as home computers. Advertising promotes modernity defined through new technology and the latest products such as cell phones, which are heavily advertised. It also defines our personal lives: for example the commercialization of the calendar: Christmas Day, Valentine's Day and Mother's Day, and the advertising jingles and slogans that have become part of daily life such as 'Say it with flowers', 'Diamonds are a girl's best friend' and L'Oréal's 'Because you're worth it'. According to Prendergast, Coca Cola's marketing strategy in the 1930s helped define the way Christmas is represented in the West. Previously, the representation of the European Saint Nicholas was diverse and he was depicted in various clothing and with different body types. After a series of very successful illustrations done in the 1930s for Coca Cola, Father Christmas was established as a large, fat, happy figure dressed in Coca Cola red (Prendergast, 1993: 181).

The export of media and programming throughout the world by multinational media corporations has impacted on culture and value formation. The expansion of international business and advertising even in the 1960s was viewed with concern by Third World countries and seen by many as a form of neocolonialism or cultural imperialism, both economic and cultural, carried out by foreign businesses. These concerns prompted the United Nations (UNICEF) to commission the MacBride Report (1980). This report validated the concerns that massive cultural change was occurring in the Third World, caused by the expansion of western business and cultural products, led by western media, news, entertainment and advertising. The US withdrew its support from UNICEF in 1984, which meant a major loss of funding, and since the MacBride Report there have been few major studies of the cultural impact of advertising at that level (Schiller, 1992). Though the simplistic models of 'cultural imperialism' such as those of Tomlinson (1991) have been discounted and it has been acknowledged that cultural processes involve complex reworking, filtering, resistance and incorporation, there can be no denying the fact that massive cultural changes are taking place at an accelerating rate with the globalization of communication and the media since the 1980s, and that advertising plays a key role in this process.

Pollay (1989) has documented the wide range of scholars from many disciplines who have published their concerns regarding the cultural effects of advertising and the distortion of value systems caused by advertising. Advertising works through repetition on a massive scale. The impact of advertising comes about through volume, complexity, subtlety and diversity, as well as through its entertainment value. A Harvard Graduate School of Business study reported the average American was exposed to 500 advertisements per day in the mid-1990s (Biagi, 1996: 221). World advertising expanded from US$300 billion in 1990 (Belch and Belch, 1990) to US$423 billion in 2006 (ZenithOptimedia, 2006). Consumers are exposed to thousands of advertising messages and the repetition of common themes is inevitable and apparent. Advertising influences awareness, perceptions, attitudes, feelings, preferences and behaviour. It presents a distorted mirror of society by focusing on a certain narrow range of values, and has a

strong bias towards consumer values and the promotion of materialism and consumption (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). Advertising works in a symbiotic relationship with programming, mutually reinforcing values and content. Furthermore programme content and scheduling are often dictated by advertisers (Matellart, 1991). Advertising is a major source of funding for the media.

Values that are reinforced in advertising

Pollay and Gallagher (1990) investigated values in magazine advertising in North America from 1900 to 1980 and identified 25 key values. They found little change in the incidence of those values over eight decades (Appendix 1). They see that the effects of advertising and possible consequences to be the promotion of: materialism; submission and seduction; selfishness and greed; simplistic symbols; conformity; pornography; chronic anxieties; envy; competitiveness; disrespect of elders; disrespect of tradition; and the creation of dissatisfaction. Cheng and Schweitzer (1996), comparing Chinese and American advertisements, found many of the values to be similar, with Chinese advertisements also reflecting family, technology and tradition as important values, as well as modernity and youth, also displayed by American advertisements. Jib Fowles has documented 15 appeals that advertisers use to sell products, what he calls an 'inventory of human motives' (cited in Biagi, 1996: 221–2). De Mooij often cites Hofstede's study done between 1967 and 1973 for IBM in Europe, which investigated the role of values in relation to failures in standardized advertising campaigns. He came up with a typology of five core values: masculinity/femininity; power distance; collectivism/individualism; uncertainty avoidance; and long-term orientation (Hofstede, 1980; see Appendix 2). De Mooij advocates the usefulness of these values to analyse markets and recommends that they be used to develop more effective campaigns which reflect cultural differences, these differences being stable and enduring (De Mooij, 2000).

Values that are omitted in advertising

Some of the key values that are notably absent in advertising are those of social justice and racial equality, except for campaigns that are promoted by social and government agencies and the NGO sector. Environmental values have become prominent in corporate advertising strategies only very recently and then have often been found to be 'greenwash', especially those of oil companies (see Pearce, 2009). Values are also conveyed through the lifestyles and activities represented. There is naturally a strong emphasis on consumption, but also self-gratification and leisure activities, defined by product use, rather than the promotion of the ethics of hard work, study, educational achievement, community values, social justice and social responsibility. Pollay listed some of the distorting features of advertising: it invades the judgement of children; pushes the boundaries of intimacy; promotes simplistic stereotypes and poor role models; exploits ageism and social insecurities; and functions as a major propaganda for consumption (Pollay, 1986, 1989).

The total role of advertising in society and its relation to consumer decision-making is complex, subtle and often indirect. The fact that all advertising does not work does

not mean that it does not work at all. Advertising is accepted as an inevitable part of contemporary life in a capitalist society and the feeling that one is immune from advertising, though common, is misplaced (Pollay, 1986; Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). Advertising is often seen as irritating, repellent, laughable and manipulative, but inevitable, and though one would perhaps like to see less, there is a sense that it is not going to go away. Changing attitudes are reflected in a poll conducted in Australia after the war commenced in Iraq. After all the reasons for invading Iraq had been publicly discounted, respondents claimed that they felt more confident about advertising than politics because at least the agenda of advertising was transparent (Mackay, 2004). This confidence ignores the layers of messages that are subsumed beyond the immediate selling message. The ongoing encroachment of advertising in all facets of daily life needs to be addressed in any models for the future of society.

Possible futures

In recent decades, growing awareness and concern about the impact of advertising on society have generated a number of responses to multinational advertising and business practices. People can make a difference, and there is growing evidence of the success of mass and individual action that is facilitated by the empowering possibilities of new technology and communication (Sklair, 2002). The political and socioeconomic effects of the contemporary focus on consumption have important implications for the depletion of sustainable resources as well as cultural change. Social movements that have arisen in recent decades provide options for exploring alternatives to the expansion of consumer society through unfettered corporate expansion.

Through the power of consumer and political resistance people can have a voice and effect social change. One of the first victorious grassroots campaigns was the legal action against the cigarette companies in the US. Another successful campaign against commercial practices was against the marketing strategies of Nestlé and other companies in Africa in the 1970s. In recent years the movements promoting organic food and those opposed to genetic engineering of food products have gained significant momentum and have had significant effects on agricultural production and retailing in industrialized countries. A more recent development has been the criticism of the advertising practices of the multinational fast food companies in response to the obesity epidemic that is spreading in industrialized and developing countries (The US Surgeon General, 2001). In most countries the power of the vote is another important means for bringing about change. In India in 2004, the BJP Party lost the elections as it failed to address the needs of the poor. Their 'India shining' advertising campaign failed to move those who saw them as a party only interested in furthering the emerging middle classes and ignoring the needs of the poor. There is evidence of a growth in consumer resistance, that is part of, or parallel to, the anti-globalization movement.

Probable futures

If there is not a dramatic shift in society away from consumption as the main goal of individuals in society, then the probable future will be a continuation and expansion of

present trends and power structures. One needs to be mindful that global military spending budgets could feed and provide for the basic needs of everyone on the planet. The food stockpiled on the planet could feed everyone on it. The problem of world hunger is not the lack of food but the inability to pay the prices vendors want for it and this has been the case for decades (George, 1977; Lupien, cited in FAO, 1998). Continued and expanding depletion of sustainable resources will occur as the massive populations of the emerging economies, most notably India and China, pursue growth aimed at achieving the standards of living of the western industrialized societies, while those countries are trying to maintain the standards they have already achieved. This focus on consumption is closely tied to the massive marketing and advertising campaigns that are undertaken by multinational corporations. Multinational corporations have been minimizing their spending on production costs and often spend vast amounts on promotion and marketing, for example Nike paid US$20 million to Michael Jordan in 1998 to promote its products and US$10 million on the Indonesian workers who produced them (Klein, 2004). Organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (WTO) hold debtor countries to ransom and impose liberalization policies while supporting the protection of European and American farmers and tax relief for multinational corporations (Stiglitz, 2006).

In the environmental realm, the issues of global warming, depletion of resources, pollution and the ratification of the Kyoto Agreement are all bound up with corporate expansion, planned obsolescence and the influence of the business lobby over the branches of the United Nations, where the US plays a key role. It is a chilling thought that the export economies of many countries are dependent on consumer exports and thus on advertising-driven over-consumption in the US. A downturn in consumer spending has knock-on effects in the supplier countries. There is a need for alternative markets which could be stimulated by debt relief for poorer nations. WTO regulations could curtail the exploitation of Third World workers, while removing the protection of US farmers and the subsidizing of their production would benefit Third World agricultural producers. The WTO could also regulate the operations of multinational corporations producing in emerging economies and ensure that living wages are paid to workers, even if they are subcontracted rather than directly employed by the company. The WTO fails to address these issues (Stiglitz, 2006).

Many facets of private life and public spaces have been colonized by advertising. In the industrialized countries, led by the US, where 6 percent of the population of the world are exposed to over 50 percent of world advertising and consume 20 percent of the world's resources, advertising has led to over-consumption and an epidemic of obesity where 66 percent of the adult population is obese (Wang and Beydoun, 2007). Ironically this trend is paralleled by an increasingly body-conscious society. In the US shopping has become a major form of leisure activity, associated with vast shopping malls and a dependence on the automobile. Over-consumption in the industrialized world is leading the world into environmental crisis, which is paralleled elsewhere by widespread poverty and a large proportion of the world's population without the basic necessities of life (food, water, shelter, employment and a clean environment). An estimated 2.7 billion people still live on less than US$2 per day, which is nearly half the world population (Human Development Report, 2003).

The international expansion in the media in recent decades has been accompanied by the promotion of the values of consumer culture that are epitomized in American society. Advertising and marketing campaigns undertaken by multinational corporations to sell their products play a key role in promoting consumer society. Among the values most promoted are modernity, materialism and consumption. Though advertising is only one of many possible influences on value formation it is increasingly invasive in contemporary life. Public space is being commercialized, and branding by multinational companies is increasingly invading public and private spheres.

Preferable futures

A society based upon social justice and sustainable development entails the rejection of the rampant consumerism that is reinforced by the advertising campaigns of multinational corporations. Contemporary capitalism is based on economic growth models that support the interests of big business, which in turn are backed by governments and the international organizations. Sustainable economic and social development needs to be the goal of contemporary societies, both industrialized and developing. Action needs to be multifaceted at the micro-level of individual action and the macro-level, at both national and international levels where the UN plays an important role. As Hertz (2001) pointed out, the combination of consumer activism and political protest can be extremely effective. The power of the vote and mass movements need to be combined with regional initiatives and individual consumer and political actions.

Consumers and shareholders in the First World need to hold companies accountable for their labour, environmental and marketing practices. Sustainable production, environmental impact analyses, fair wages to workers of the Third World and limitations on advertising and marketing need to be incorporated into multinational corporate practices. Goals can be achieved through consumer boycotting, lobbying and the use of voting power, but a mass response is required.

How can changes in the media and advertising contribute to the creation of alternative and preferable futures? New images in the media are required to promote sustainable development and consumption levels. Beyond basic needs, new economic models are required as alternatives to growth and market-led models which incorporate a re-evaluation of the roles played by the media and advertising in contemporary capitalism. The media need a new funding model to replace advertising. In the realm of the media is it not time to reinstate a form of state-owned media ownership once exemplified by the BBC?

Appendix I

List of values most often found in advertising in magazines 1900–80:

1. practicality, 2. ornamentality, 3. cheapness, 4. uniqueness, 5. popularity, 6. tradition. 7. modernity, 8. naturalness, 9. technology, 10. wisdom, 11. magic, 12. productivity, 13. leisure, 14. maturity, 15.youth, 16. mildness, 17. wildness, 18. sexiness/vanity, 19. pride, 20. status, 21. belonging, 22. family, 23. community, 24. health, 25. neatness (Pollay and Gallager, 1990).

Appendix 2: Five dimensions of culture

1. *Power distance:* reflects a wide division of power in society which is unequal and is reflected in attitudes towards authority, and is associated with a higher acceptance of authority.
2. *Uncertainty avoidance:* refers to the responses of societies towards unknown aspects of the future. High uncertainty avoidance cultures display little tolerance for ambiguity, and low uncertainty avoidance cultures have a higher acceptance of ambiguity. Societies with high levels of uncertainty avoidance desire more information.
3. *Collectivity/individualism:* refers to the relationship between the individual and the collective grouping society, and which takes precedence: collective or individual goals. One of the implications of a high level of individualism in a society is the greater focus on individual enjoyment and pleasure, and self-gratification.
4. *Masculinity (assertiveness)/ femininity (nurturing)* is reflected in the degree of male dominance in society.
5. *Long-term orientation* is the degree to which a society is future oriented rather than having a historic or short-term point of view. (Hofstede, 1980).

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Value, politics and democracy in the United States

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Abstract

This article examines the role of values in the political discourse of the last decade in the US. It embarks from what many observers had described as a puzzle: the fact that significant parts of the American working class voted against their economic interests but in line with what they perceived to be their values. As a result, a president had been re-elected who cut taxes for the rich while waging an expensive war in Iraq and increasing public debt to historically unprecedented levels. It is argued that large sectors of the white American working class were disappointed with liberal politicians because they associated them with a cultural elite that occupied positions in society that allowed them to pursue careers of intrinsic value in the arts, science, or politics but which were largely closed to the working class. It is thus suggested that the 'culture wars' in the US are better interpreted as a struggle over access to the means to behave altruistically. The article rejects the widespread assumption that individuals are narrowly conceived economic self-interest maximizers. Rather, it suggests that human fulfilment can be related to the satisfaction derived from working for the common good.

Keywords

political culture, political discourse, social class, USA, values, voting

What follows might be considered a kind of experiment in the political relevance of social theory. It is an attempt to apply somewhat technical forms of value theory (cf. Graeber, 2001) to a very concrete, immediate political question: the strange appeal of right-wing populism to large sections of the American working class. Authors like Tom Frank, in *What's The Matter With Kansas*, laid out the problem: in much of the US, insofar as the white working class is drawn to radical politics of any sort, it is far more likely to be the

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far Right than the far Left. This question became unavoidable with 2004 re-election of George W Bush.

The structure of this article is simple. I begin by setting out the problem, and then propose a political-economic explanation. It is, I think, a pretty good one, and true as far as it goes. Still, I hope to show that the very logic of the explanation illuminates the limits of any purely political-economic approach and pushes towards something beyond it. The second half is an attempt to move beyond those limits by applying the results of value theory.

A political-economic hypothesis

In October 2004, American presidential candidates George W Bush and John Kerry held a series of debates. Polls held afterwards overwhelmingly found that most Americans felt Kerry had won the argument. Then a few weeks later, a majority of those same Americans voted for Bush anyway.

I think it was the debates more than anything else that left most of the American liberal intelligentsia reeling, because they took it as proof of what they had suspected: that all things they most hated about Bush were exactly what so many Americans liked about him. It was hard to escape the impression that, in the end, Kerry's articulate presentation, his skill with words and arguments, actually counted against him. It appeared to reflect something fundamental about Bush's popular appeal: that the very qualities they interpreted as pig-headed stupidity – the stubborn determination to take simple policy positions and then stick with them no matter how unwise, disastrous, or simply factually incorrect their basis may turn out to be – seemed to be interpreted, instead, as moral strength or decisive leadership.

In one sense, one might say the liberal intelligentsia, by their confusion, was proving its opponents point: demonstrating just how out of touch with most Americans they really were. Still, there is a legitimate puzzle here. After all, Bush does hail from one of the most elite families in the country; he attended Andover, Yale and Harvard; he has been known to refer to the wealthiest class of Americans as his 'base'. How could such a man ever be taken as a 'man of the people'? Stories of dramatic class mobility through academic accomplishment are increasingly rare in the US. And I think this is precisely where to look for an explanation. For many of its citizens, America is beginning to look more and more like a caste society, and the higher education system, and related institutions, rather than seeming a plausible means of social mobility, appears as the very apparatus of exclusion. What I want to ultimately argue then is that it's the very liberal elites who find Bush so repellent who have to bear much of the blame for this. Bush-style populism is the final result of their own stacking of the deck in favour of their own children. Hence my political-economic hypothesis. Let me lay it out in very brief – and therefore, necessarily crude and somewhat simplified – form.

Americans have always seen the United States as a land of opportunity. Neither can it be denied that from the perspective of an immigrant from Haiti or Bangladesh, it continues to be one. But America has always been a country built on the promise of *unlimited* upward mobility. Here, the remarkable thing is how little the discourse has changed with the changing statistical reality. Free market enthusiasts (a category that includes basically

all purveyors of mainstream social and economic discourse in the US) continue to insist that the US is, as one recently put it, 'the most upwardly mobile country in history' (Elder, 2007). However, class mobility in the US had peaked in the 1960s and declined ever since, leaving the US with the lowest rate of intergenerational class mobility among industrialized democracies (see e.g. Beller and Hout, 2006; Blanden et al., 2005). This appears to be partly because the gap between rich and poor is so vast, in the US, that it is increasingly difficult to cross it; partly because of the increasing cost of higher education.

The working-class condition had been traditionally seen as a way station: something individuals or families pass through on the road to something better. This is actually a conception that goes back at least to the late Middle Ages (Graeber, 1997; Laslett, 1972), where working for others was considered essential to the status of youth, but the frontier allowed the US to manage to maintain this vision of their own society far longer than almost anywhere else. Abraham Lincoln for example would regularly respond to Southern arguments that Northern wage-slavery was little different from the more literal variety by arguing that wage labour, in the North, was in no sense a permanent condition. Factory work in particular was seen as the province of first-generation immigrants, whose children, at the very least, could be expected to pass on to something else – at the very least to acquire some land and become a homesteader on the frontier. What matters here is not so much whether this was actually true, but that it seemed plausible to most Americans at the time.

Every time that road is broadly perceived to be clogged, profound unrest ensues. The closing of the frontier led to bitter labour struggles, and over the course of the 20th century, the steady and rapid expansion of the American university system could be seen as a kind of substitute. Particularly after the Second World War, huge resources were poured into expanding the higher education system, which grew very rapidly. The government promoted all this quite intentionally as a means of social mobility. The Cold War social contract was not just a matter of offering a comfortable life to the working classes; it was also a matter of offering at least a plausible chance that their children would not be working class.

From the point of view of the governing elites, however, there are some obvious problems with this approach. First of all, a higher education system cannot be expanded forever. Second, there quickly comes a point where you end up with far more educated people than you can employ at anything remotely like the level to which they have been trained, and at which they expect to be operating. At a certain point one ends up with a significant portion of the population unable to find work even remotely in line with their qualifications, who have every reason to be angry about their situation, and who have access to the entire history of radical thought. During the 20th century, this was precisely the situation most likely to spark urban revolts and insurrections. Revolutionary heroes in the global South, from Chairman Mao to Fidel Castro, almost invariably turn out to be children of modest families who scrimped and saved to get their children a bourgeois education, only to discover that a bourgeois education does not, in itself, allow entry into the bourgeoisie. The campus unrest of the 1960s and 1970s began at exactly the point where the expansion of the university system hit a dead end.

What we see afterwards, it seems to me, is best considered as a kind of settlement. On the one hand, most campus radicals were reabsorbed into the university (in the late 1970s

and early 1980s it often seemed all liberal disciplines were dominated by self-proclaimed radicals). On the other, what those radicals ended up actually doing was largely a work of class reproduction. As the cost of education skyrocketed, and financial aid and student loan programmes were cut back or eliminated, the prospect of social mobility through education gradually declined. The number of working-class kids in college, which had been steadily growing until the late 1960s or even 1970s, began to decline, and has been declining ever since. This is true even if we consider the matter in purely economic terms. It is all the more true when one considers that class mobility was never primarily a matter of income. Consider, here, the phenomenon of unpaid (or effectively unpaid) internships. It has become a fact of life in the US that if one chooses a career for any reason other than the money – if one wishes to become part of the world of books, or charities, the art world, to be an idealist working for an NGO an activist, an investigative reporter – for the first year or two, you will not be paid. This effectively seals off any such career for the vast majority of poor kids who actually do make it through college. Such structures of exclusion had always existed of course, especially at the top, but in recent years fences have become fortresses.

I think it's impossible to understand the 'culture wars' outside this framework. The identities being celebrated in 'identity politics' correspond almost exclusively to those groups whose members still see the higher education system as a potential means of social advancement: African-Americans, various immigrant groups, Queers, Native-Americans. (One might even add women, since by now women are attending universities at far higher rates than men.) These are also the groups that most reliably vote Democratic. Dramatically lacking in debates about identity politics are identities like, say, 'Baptist', or 'Redneck' – that is, those that encompass the bulk of the American working class, who are made to vanish rhetorically at the same time as their children are, in fact, largely excluded from college campuses and all the social and cultural worlds college opens up.

The reaction is, predictably, a tendency to see social class as largely a matter of education, and an indignant rejection of the very values from which one is effectively excluded. As Tom Frank has recently reminded us, the hard Right in the US is largely a working-class movement, full of explicit class resentment. Most working-class Bush fans don't have a lot good to say about corporate executives, but to the frustration of progressives everywhere, corporate executives never seem to become the principal targets of their ire. Instead, their hatred is directed above all at the 'liberal elite' (with its various branches: the 'Hollywood elite', the 'journalistic elite', 'university elite', 'fancy lawyers', 'the medical establishment'). The sort of people who live in big coastal cities, watch PBS or listen to NPR, or even more, who might be appearing in or producing programming for PBS or NPR.

Why, then, do working-class Bush voters resent intellectuals as a class more than rich people? It seems to me the answer is obvious. They do because they can imagine a scenario in which one of their children might become rich, but cannot possibly imagine one in which their children, no matter how talented, would become a member of the liberal intelligentsia. If you think about it that's not an unreasonable assessment. The child of an air conditioner repairman from Nebraska might not have very much chance of becoming a millionaire, but it could happen. Certainly, it's much more likely than his ever becoming an international human rights lawyer, or drama critic for *The New York Times*. Such jobs

go almost exclusively to children of privilege. Insofar as there are not quite enough children of privilege to go around – since elites almost never produce enough offspring to reproduce themselves demographically – the jobs are likely to go to the most remarkable children of immigrants. Executives with Bank of America, or Enron, when facing a similar demographic problem, are much more likely to recruit from poorer white folk like themselves. This is partly because of racism; partly, too, because corporations tend to encourage a broadly anti-intellectual climate themselves. It is well known at Yale, where I have worked, that executive recruiters tend to prefer to hire Yale's 'B' students, since they are more likely to be people 'they'll feel comfortable with'.

This opens up what's the most difficult and divisive aspect of this conflict: the racism, the homophobia, the fundamentalism. Obviously none of these things have been brought into being by current directions in educational policy; they have all been around for a long time. The question is why at this particular moment so many people are using them as a basis for voting, even if it means voting against their own economic interests. Here I might ask a parallel question. Why does one not see a similar anti-intellectual politics among, say, African-Americans, or in immigrant communities? I can't myself think of a single elected black official who got into office by appealing to this sort of sentiment. To the contrary, around the same time as the Bush–Kerry debate, the US witnessed an outpouring of debate, among the African-American cultural and political leadership, about what to do with the problem of 'black anti-intellectualism'. In fact, the phenomenon in question seems to come down to little more than the fact that black high school students often mock those who spend much of their time studying as 'trying to be white' – in other words, that like any other American teenager, they make fun of nerds. The very fact that in black America this is considered a crisis is telling in itself, considering the complete absence of any parallel debate about white anti-intellectualism. Certainly, it's hard to think of a single African-American, or Asian or Latino politician, who panders to anti-intellectualism in the manner of George W Bush – a patrician who, as noted earlier, appears to have built his claim to being a 'man of the people' largely by acting like the sort of person who, in high school, would have himself made fun of nerds.

It seems to me the only explanation is because these are populations who continue to see the higher education system as a plausible means of social advancement. After all, it was precisely around the time (in the 1970s and 1980s) that tuitions began to rise precipitously, government grants for higher education began to be replaced with student loans, as interest rates on those loans skyrocketed and were increasingly aggressively enforced, that many of those that had previously been excluded from the system entirely were – in however limited a fashion – welcomed (cf. Kamenetz, 2006). The GI Bill of Rights, after all, had been effectively limited to white males. Poor white folk saw a rapidly shrinking pie of public funds and innumerable barriers, and for the most part, their understandable reaction is to say that the sorts of knowledge and attainment higher education offers isn't all it's cracked up to be anyway – that religious wisdom, or commercial savvy, patriotism or moral virtues are really worth a thousand times more. Religion in particular offers an explicit critique of dominant forms of knowledge: a radical challenge to assumptions about what's really important or valuable in life and what sort of people have the right to make judgements on such matters. But here we begin to move outside the domain of what can be explained simply in terms of political economy, and into what in the US has

come to be referred to as the 'Culture Wars'. If people vote against their obvious economic interests, then, it can only be because one cannot, really, separate the economic issues from social and cultural ones. Liberal commentators' insistence on separating these two is precisely what makes it difficult for them to see what's really going on.

In the next section, then, I begin by fast-forwarding two years to 2006 – the year the Democrats finally won – to another tell-tale clash between Bush and Kerry. I think examining that clash opens up possibilities for a way to transcend the division. This is what I argued in my *Harper's* article (Graeber, 2007), which forms the basis for the second part of this article.

Value transformation and the liberal ideal

Let us fast-forward, then, to the 2006 congressional elections in which the Democratic Party, riding a wage of popular fury of Bush's bungled and interminable war in Iraq, finally swept back into control of both houses of Congress. The one fleeting moment of hope for Republicans during that particular campaign was afforded by a lame joke by Senator John Kerry – a joke pretty obviously aimed at George Bush – which they took to suggest that Kerry thought that only those who flunked out of school end up in the military. It was all very disingenuous. Most knew perfectly well Kerry's real point was to suggest the president wasn't very bright. But the Right smelled blood. The problem with 'aristo-slackers' like Kerry, wrote one National Review blogger, is that they assume 'the troops are in Iraq not because they are deeply committed to the mission (they need to deny that) but rather because of a system that takes advantage of their lack of social and economic opportunities. . . . We should clobber them with that ruthlessly until the day of the election – just like we did in '04 – because it is the most basic reason they deserve to lose.'

As it turned out, it did not make a lot of difference. Most Americans had apparently by that time decided they were not deeply committed to the mission either (insofar as they were even sure what that mission was). But I think this particular exchange – ironically, between a perceived member of the 'liberal elite' who was a genuine war-hero, and a president who had when of military age managed to use his elite connections to avoid having ever gone to war at all – is particularly telling. Right-wing populism, in fact, tends to invariably combine hostility to the 'liberal elite' described earlier with an endless call to 'support our troops', who that same liberal elite is invariably accused of disrespecting. It strikes me this argument in particular is a perfect example of the pointlessness of reducing all such issues to an either/or: patriotism vs opportunity, values vs bread-and-butter issues like jobs and education. Do working-class Americans join the Army because they are deprived of opportunities? This seems undeniable. But the real question to be asking is: opportunities to do what?

Americans do not see themselves as a nation of frustrated altruists. Quite the opposite: our normal habits of thought tend towards a rough and ready cynicism. The world is a giant marketplace; everyone is in it for a buck; if you want to understand why something happened, first ask who stands to gain by it. The same attitudes expressed in the back rooms of bars are echoed in the highest reaches of social science. America's great contribution to the world in the latter respect has been the development of 'rational choice'

theories, which proceed from the assumption that all human behaviour can be understood as a matter of economic calculation, of rational actors trying to get as much as possible out of any given situation with the least cost to themselves. As a result, in most fields, the very existence of altruistic behaviour is considered a kind of puzzle, and everyone from economists to evolutionary biologists have made themselves famous through attempts to 'solve' it – that is, to explain the mystery of why bees sacrifice themselves for hives or human beings hold open doors and give correct street directions to total strangers. At the same time, the case of the military bases suggests the possibility that in fact Americans, particularly the less affluent ones, are haunted by frustrated desires to do good in the world.

It would not be difficult to assemble evidence that this is the case. Studies of charitable giving, for example, have always shown the poor to be the most generous. Moreover, charity represents only a tiny part of the picture. If one were to break down what the typical American wage-earner does with his/her money one would likely find they give most of it away. Take a typical male head of household. About a third of his annual income is likely to end up being redistributed to strangers, through taxes and charity; another third he is likely to give in one way or another to his children; of the remainder, probably the largest part is given to or shared with others: presents, trips, parties, the six-pack of beer for the local softball game. One might object that this latter is more a reflection of the real nature of pleasure than anything else (who would want to eat a delicious meal at an expensive restaurant all by themselves?) but itself this is half the point. Even our self-indulgences tend to be dominated by the logic of the gift. Similarly, many would certainly argue that shelling out a small fortune to send one's children to an exclusive kindergarten is more about status than altruism. Clearly there is something to this. But if you look at what happens over the course of people's actual lives, it soon becomes apparent this kind of behaviour fulfils an identical psychological need. How many youthful idealists throughout history have managed to finally come to terms with a world based on selfishness and greed the moment they start a family? If one were to assume altruism was the primary human motivation, this would make perfect sense: the only way they can convince themselves to abandon their desire to do right by the world as a whole is to substitute an even more powerful desire to do right by their children.

What all this suggests to me is that American society might well work completely differently than we tend to assume. Imagine, for a moment, that the US as it exists today was the creation of some ingenious social engineer. What assumptions about human nature could we say this engineer must have been working with? Certainly nothing like rational choice theory. For clearly our social engineer understands that the only way to convince human beings to enter into the world of work and the marketplace (that is, of mind-numbing labour and cut-throat competition) is to dangle the prospect of thereby being able to lavish money on one's children, buy drinks for one's friends and, if one hits the jackpot, to be able to spend the rest of one's life endowing museums and providing AIDS medications to impoverished countries in Africa. Where our theorists are constantly trying to strip away the veil of appearances and show how all such apparently selfless gestures really mask some kind of self-interested strategy, in reality, American society is better conceived as a battle over access to the means to behave altruistically. Selflessness – or at least, the right to engage in high-minded activity – is not the strategy. It is the prize.

If nothing else, I think this helps us understand why the Right has been so much better, in recent years, at playing to populist sentiments than the Left. Essentially, they do it by accusing liberals of cutting ordinary Americans off from the right to do good in the world. Let me explain what I mean here by throwing out a series of propositions.

Proposition I: Neither egoism nor altruism are natural urges; they in fact arise in relation to one another and neither would be conceivable without the market. First of all, I should make clear that I do not believe that either egoism or altruism is somehow inherent to human nature. Actually, I do not believe they are particularly useful theoretical terms at all: rarely are they useful explanations for concrete forms of human interaction. Ordinary human motivations tend to be far more possible. Rather egoism or altruism are ideas we have about human nature. Historically, one tends to arise in response to the other. In the ancient world, for example, it is precisely at the times and places that one sees the emergence of money and impersonal markets that one also sees the rise of world religions: Buddhism, Christianity and later Islam. If one sets aside a space and says, 'Here you shall think only about acquiring material things for yourself', then it is hardly surprising that before long someone else will set aside a countervailing space, declaring, in effect: 'Yes, but *here,* we must contemplate the fact that the self, and material things, are ultimately unimportant.' It was these latter institutions, of course, that first developed our modern notions of charity.

Even today, when we operate outside the domain of the market or of religion, very few of our actions could be said to be motivated by anything so simple as untrammelled greed or selfless generosity. When we are dealing not with strangers but with friends, relatives, or enemies, a much more complicated set of motivations will generally come into play: envy, solidarity, pride, self-destructive grief, loyalty, romantic obsession, resentment, spite, shame, conviviality, the anticipation of shared enjoyment, the desire to show up a rival and so on. These are the motivations that impel the major dramas of our lives, but that social theorists, for some reason, tend to ignore. If one travels to parts of the world where money and markets do not exist – say, to certain parts of New Guinea or Amazonia – such complicated webs of motivation are precisely what one still finds. In societies where most people live in small communities, where almost everyone they know is either a friend, a relative or an enemy, the languages spoken tend even to lack words that correspond to 'self-interest' or 'altruism', while including very subtle vocabularies for describing envy, solidarity, pride and the like (cf. Mauss, 1925). Their economic dealings with one another likewise tend to be based on much more subtle principles. Anthropologists have created a vast literature to try to fathom the dynamics of these apparently exotic 'gift economies', but if it seems odd to us to see, say, important men conniving with their cousins to finagle vast wealth, which they then present as gifts to bitter enemies in order to publicly humiliate them, it is because we are so used to operating inside impersonal markets that it never occurs to us to think how we would act if we had an economic system where we treated people based on how we actually felt about them.

Nowadays, the work of destroying such ways of life, whether in the Andes or highlands of Papua New Guinea, is largely left to missionaries – representatives of those very world religions that originally sprung up in reaction to the market long ago. Almost invariably, they end up trying to convince people to be more selfish, and more altruistic, at the

same time. On the one hand, they set out to teach the 'natives' proper work discipline, and to try to get them involved with buying and selling products on the market, so as to better their material lot. At the same time, they explain to them that ultimately, material things are unimportant, and lecture on the value of the higher things, such as selfless devotion to others.

Proposition II: The political Right has always tried to enhance this division, and thus claim to be champions of both egoism and altruism simultaneously. The Left has tried to efface it. Might this not help to explain why the US, the most market-driven industrialized society on earth, is also the most religious? Or, even more strikingly, why the country that produced Tolstoy and Dostoevsky spent much of the 20th century trying to eradicate both the market and religion entirely?

Where the political Left has always tried to efface this distinction – whether by trying to create economic systems that are not driven by the profit motive, or by replacing private charity with one or another form of community support – the political Right has always thrived on it. In the US, for example, the Republican Party is dominated by two ideological wings: the libertarians and the 'Christian right'. At one extreme, Republicans are free market fundamentalists and advocates of individual liberties; on the other, they are fundamentalists of a more literal variety, suspicious of most individual liberties but enthusiastic about biblical injunctions, 'family values' and charitable good works. At first glance it might seem remarkable such an alliance manages to hold together at all. But in fact right-wing coalitions almost always take some variation of this form. One might say that the conservative approach always has been to release the dogs of the market, throwing all traditional verities into disarray; and then, in this tumult of insecurity, offering themselves up as the last bastion of order and hierarchy, the stalwart defenders of the authority of churches and fathers against the barbarians they have themselves unleashed. A scam it may be, but a remarkably effective one; and one effect is that the right ends up seeming to have a monopoly on value. They manage, we might say, to occupy both positions, on either side of the divide: extreme egoism and extreme altruism.

Consider, now, the word 'value' itself (cf. Graeber, 2001). When economists speak about value they are really talking about money – or more precisely, about whatever it is that money is measuring; also, whatever it is that economic actors are assumed to be pursuing. When we are working for a living, or buying and selling things, we are rewarded with money. But whenever we are not working or buying or selling, when we are motivated by pretty much anything other than the desire to get money, we suddenly find ourselves in the domain of 'values'. The most commonly invoked of these are of course 'family values', but we also talk about religious values, political values, the values that attach themselves to art or patriotism – one could even, perhaps, count loyalty to one's favourite basketball team. All are seen as commitments that are, or ought to be, uncorrupted by the market. At the same time, they are also seen as utterly unique; where money makes all things comparable, 'values' such as beauty, devotion, or integrity cannot, by definition, be compared. There is no mathematic formula that could possibly allow one to calculate just how much personal integrity it is right to sacrifice in the pursuit of art, or how to balance responsibilities to your family with responsibilities to your God. One might put it this way: if value is simply what one considers important, then money allows importance to take a liquid form, enables us to compare precise quantities of

importance and trade one off against the other. On the other hand, its very liquidity, its undifferentiated nature, has always made such value seem somewhat tawdry. After all, if someone does accumulate a very large amount of money, the first thing they are likely to do is to try to convert it into something unique, whether it be Monet's *Water Lilies*, a prize-winning race-horse, or an endowed chair at a university.

What is really at stake here in any market economy is precisely the ability to make these trades, to convert 'value' into 'values'. We all are striving to put ourselves in a position where we can dedicate ourselves to something larger than ourselves. The moment you put it that way, though, it becomes clear that conservatives do not really have a monopoly on value at all. Liberalism, in its heyday, stood for precisely the ability to make this transition. After all what is the point of a welfare state if not to free people to think about more important things?

Proposition III: The real problem of the American Left is that while it does try in certain ways to efface the division between egoism and altruism, value and values, it largely does so for its own children. This has allowed the Right to paradoxically represent itself as the champions of the working class. All this might help explain why the Left in America finds it so difficult to rally mass popular support. Far from promoting new visions of effacing the difference between egoism and altruism, value and values, or providing a model for passing from one to the other, progressives cannot even seem to think their way past it. Hence the pointlessness about the debate about the importance of 'cultural' vs 'bread and butter' issues. After the 2004 presidential election, the big debate in progressive circles was the relative importance of economic issues vs what was called 'the culture wars'. Did the Democrats lose because they were not able to spell out any plausible economic alternatives, or did the Republicans win because they successfully mobilized conservative Christians around the issue of gay marriage? As I say, the very fact that progressives frame the question this way not only shows they are trapped in the Right's terms of analysis. It demonstrates they do not understand how America really works.

Let us return, in this light, to consider those unpaid internships – the ones which so effectively freeze working-class kids out of the best or most fulfilling jobs – and understand a little better what's really going on. Earlier, I said these policies lock the vast majority of Americans out from careers one would want for 'any reason other than the money'. We can perhaps rephrase this now. What we are really talking about are jobs that open the way to the (legitimate, professional) pursuit of any forms of value other than the economic. Whether it's the art world, or charity, or political engagement as in, say, journalism, or activism – that is, whether we are talking about Love or Truth or Beauty – we are speaking of ways that one can dedicate oneself to something other than the pursuit of money (and compensatory consumerism). If one does not possess a certain degree of wealth to start out with, or at the very least the right kind of social networks and cultural capital, one is simply not allowed to break into this world. Ultimately, what one is being excluded from is nobility.

Critical social theorists have a tendency to overlook all this, I think, because their theoretical terms still tend to draw on the very cynical assumptions I have been trying to challenge. In looking at structures of exclusion, for example, perhaps the most popular theoretical terms have been those developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 1984, 1990), and that speak of different social fields (such as the economic, the political, the academic

field, the art world), and the way social actors deploy economic, social and cultural capital to move within and between them. I think Bourdieu's theories are very useful here. At the same time, they have their limits. By reducing everything to forms of capital, Bourdieu ends up arguing that all fields are organized, at least tacitly, in the same way as the economic field: each is an arena of struggle between a collection of maximizing individuals. The only thing that really sets the economic field apart according to Bourdieu is that there's no work of euphemization: in market behaviour, all the selfish motives and maximizing strategies that are covered up in other fields become utterly explicit. But all fields are not fields of competition. Some areas are valued precisely because they are not. Neither can this simply be reduced to the fact that – as Bourdieu sometimes rather cynically suggests – those best able to play such maximizing games are those who manage to convince themselves they are doing something else. To the contrary, what we are seeing here, above all else, is a battle over access to the right to behave altruistically.

With this in mind, we can return again to the working-class Republican who cannot imagine his or her son or daughter becoming part of the 'liberal elite'. This is precisely what we are seeing here. Exclusion from access to higher forms of value – what might be called 'nobility'. If that air conditioner mechanic's son – or daughter – wishes to go beyond merely making a good living, to pursue something higher, more noble, for a career, what options doe they she really have? Likely just two. They can seek employment with their local church, which is hard to get. Or they can join the Army.

This is, of course, the secret of nobility. To be noble is to be generous, high-minded, altruistic, to pursue higher forms of value. But it is also to be able to do so because one does not really have to think too much about money. This is precisely what our soldiers are doing when they give free dental examinations to villagers: they are being paid (modestly, but adequately) to do good in the world. Seen in this light, it is also easier to see what really happened at universities in the wake of the 1960s – the 'settlement' I mentioned above. Campus radicals set out to create a new society that destroyed the distinction between egoism and altruism, value and values. It did not work out, but they were, effectively, offered a kind of compensation: the privilege to use the university system to create lives that did so, in their own little ways; the opportunity to be supported in one's material needs while pursuing virtue, truth and beauty; and above all, to pass that privilege on to their own children. One cannot blame them for accepting the offer. But neither can one blame the rest of the country for resenting them. Not because they reject the project: as I say, this is what America is all about.

As I always tell activists engaged in the peace movement and counter-recruitment campaigns: why do working-class kids join the Army anyway? Because like any teenager, they want to escape the world of tedious work and meaningless consumerism, to live a life of adventure and camaraderie in which they believe they are doing something genuinely noble. They join the Army because they want to be like you.

Struggles over the production of human beings and social relations

Let me end with some brief thoughts about the larger theoretical implications – particularly with regard to the distinction between the domains of value and values, 'the market' and other forms of life.

In political economy terms, this is often treated as the difference between the domain of production and consumption (seen as equivalent to that of domestic life). Obviously, this is only true if one thinks what is really significant in the world is the history of manufactured objects, but it has become, over the last 200 years, our favoured way of looking at economic and, therefore, social systems. We are, in other words, in that strange fetishized world Marx described where we continually forget that the point of life is actually the creation of certain sorts of people, and that the same system can equally well be seen as consisting of a sphere for the making of human beings, that are then in effect consumed again in the workplace. One can hardly underestimate how deep this fetishism runs. In Africa and Asia, for example, it's perfectly unexceptional to hear government officials remarking that HIV infection rates are a serious crisis in their country, because the fact that in certain regions half the population is dying of AIDS is going to have devastating effects on the economy. There was a time when 'the economy' was seen primarily as the system through which people acquire the means to stay alive. We have reached such a pass that in many parts of the world, at least, the best reason to object to people dying is that it might interfere with economic growth rates. The thing to ask, it seems to me, is what has it taken to put us in a place where public officials can make statements like this without being immediately put away as raving lunatics.

Ultimately life is about the production of people. I mean this not just in the physical sense implied by the term 'reproduction', especially if that's reduced to pregnancy and childbirth. I mean it more in the sense that human beings are constantly shaping and fashioning one another, training and socializing one another for new roles, educating and healing and befriending and rivalling and courting one another. This is as mentioned earlier what life is actually about and it can never, by definition, be reduced to any simple utilitarian calculus. What's more, in most human societies – and in any not dominated by market relations – the forms of labour entailed in all this are recognized to be the most important ones. The production of material necessities, or material wealth, is usually seen as at best a subordinate moment in the overall process of creating the right sort of human beings. Hence the most important value forms in most societies are those that emerge from that process of ongoing mutual creation. Certainly, this might involve all sorts of fetishism in their own right, as tokens of honour not only inspire, but come to seem the source of, honourable behaviour; tokens of piety become the source of religious devotion; tokens of wisdom become the source of learning, and so on. But it seems to me these forms of fetishism are relatively minor – at least, in comparison with the kind of grandiose, ultimate fetishism that capitalism promulgates, that places the world of objects as a whole above that of human beings (cf. Graeber, 2005b, 2006).

In the US, though, if one looks at the matter institutionally, one begins to notice something very interesting. America is by no means a deindustrialized society. Nonetheless, factory labour has increasingly been relegated to immigrants and pushed away from the centres of major cities. At the same time, as Denning (2005) pointed out, any number of such cities are in the process of being reorganized, economically, almost entirely around hospitals and universities. This is not only true of longstanding university towns like Ann Arbor or New Haven but major cities like Baltimore, and even, to a surprising degree, global financial capitals like New York. (New York's largest employers are banks, but Columbia and NYU are numbers 3 and 5 respectively.) In other words, as commodity production increasingly moves overseas, we are seeing communities

organized around what are, effectively, factories for the production of persons: divided, in good Cartesian fashion, into those which aim at improving mind, and those which aim at maintaining the body.

Both hospitals and universities were, once, institutions largely insulated from market logic. Now both are increasingly being forced to reorganize themselves on corporate lines. Both are sites of intense social struggle. For the Left, they have become the major new centres for labour organizing in recent decades. For the populist Right, they have been the special targets of rage and resentment. Right-wing populists see universities as the very locus for the production of the 'liberal elite', and tend to wage specific campaigns – most obviously, the campaign against the theory of evolution – to undermine the basis of their claims to authority. Radical anti-abortionists see the medical establishment, in turn, as the very locus of evil – an engine not of the creation of health but for the mass murder of babies. In a broader sense, what the Right is waging is a broad assault on the ability of the liberal elite – from which their constituents have been so effectively excluded – to control what in classic Marxist terms would be called the terms of social reproduction. To return to the 2004 elections again: conventional wisdom has it that Bush won re-election largely because the Republican Party was so effective in mobilizing his base; it did so by ensuring that so many swing states had referendums on the ballot concerning a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. The gay marriage issue is in fact a perfect illustration of the real stakes. Ultimately, the battle is over the apparatus for the creation of persons, and the forms of value created in the process. Even beyond the question of whether universities and hospitals are to be forced to submit to the profit motive – that is, whether they themselves will be forced to abandon any notion that they represent autonomous domains of value – there is the question of whether they can maintain their role as the primary institutions regulating the self-creation of human beings at all, or whether they are ultimately to be replaced by churches, prisons and the military. The battle is lopsided on most fronts. Left populists stand little chance of radically changing the nature of US nationalism; Right populists stand little chance of having much say in determining what is art – though in neither case for lack of trying. The point is that the economic structures and strategies are not an autonomous domain here, but are part and parcel of the way each side protects its ability to control the legitimation of different forms of publicly recognized value.

All this does not, perhaps, provide a comprehensive explanation for the effectiveness of right-wing populism or the current directions of political debate in the US in the early 21st century. But if nothing else, it demonstrates that anthropological value theory can still provide important insights into the working of contemporary social systems, and the interest generated by some of these arguments in activist circles, in turn, suggests that critical social theory in general can still make itself relevant to the most important political debates.

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Symbolism and values: Rationality and irrationality of culture

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Abstract
Values tend to be taken for granted by communitarian politicians and religiously thinking people as well as by various sociologists, that is insofar as certain aspects of social life underscore the belief in the importance of values. However, other social phenomena, particularly ethnic and religious conflicts, seem more affected by the symbolism of culture than by values. This article attempts to trace the logic of symbolism and values in various cultural settings. It contends that these core components of culture are of much consequence but may be problematic as well, due to their ambivalence and conflation. It concludes that symbolism and values may invert their inherent nature of reason and affect, rationality and irrationality.

Keywords
ethnic/religious conflict, interests, rationality/irrationality, symbolism, symbolization, 'symbolizations', valuation, 'valuations', value, values

Belfast, Jerusalem and Ayodhya

Our present world has reached a high degree of civilization but is still troubled with many instances of religiously aggravated conflict. Certainly, social situations are never quite simple and many bones of contention are fought over in particular situations. Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine are cases in point. Belfast, moving towards reconciliation recently, has been the scene of violent religious conflicts for several decades, a historical petering out of a religious war waged at the end of the 17th century between Protestants and Catholics, first cousins in terms of religious faith. The controversy around Jerusalem as the capital of both a Jewish and a Palestinian state is much more complex due to heavier

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economic and political considerations and greater religious diversity. In addition, Jerusalem has considerable symbolic meaning to both Israelis and Palestinians, who have occupied the place for several centuries and therefore feel attached to it so as to want exclusive possession. Again, Jerusalem is a holy place to all Christians. To an outsider, the idea of Jerusalem as a holy city for each of these three religions is a golden dream of peaceful coexistence. A similar fancy is not unthinkable with respect to a still more diverse religious world such as India, particularly in Ayodhya, where Muslims and Hindus have contested the site of a mosque since the middle of the 19th century. This mosque was destroyed in 1992 and is being rebuilt as a Hindu temple. In all three cases, many people have been killed during various outbursts of unholy anger.

Some authors argue that the 'religious factor' somewhere contains a defective gene as it were. In other words, they contend that particular religious writings are fraught with expressions that suggest violence (Eslinger and Kawamura, 2005; Juergensmeyer, 2001). Words like the following sound ominous enough: crusade; jihad; martyr; struggle between good and evil; apocalypse; cosmic war, etc. These expressions convey at the same time metaphorical religious meaning and harsh realities. As Juergensmeyer (2001: 161) notes, 'This symbiosis between symbolic and real violence is profound and goes to the very heart of the religious imagination.' However, the obverse side of the religious coin, as represented by organized religions today, is more reassuring than ever. Their practice concerns individual salvation and community celebrations. They overwhelmingly express peaceful intentions for humanity as a whole. The reasons why religious sentiments have been at odds in the past and why religious conflict still occurs today seem not yet fully known. This article discuses the positive and negative consequentiality of symbolism and values that, as paramount features of religion, seem problematic in particular cases. In the final analysis, it enquires into the rationality and irrationality of these core components of all culture. The approach attempted here is phenomenological in that the article is intended as a sociological reflection on experiences/awareness of symbolism and values in everyday life.

Individual and collective identities

Values appear to have greater significance for personal identity, while the symbolic features of life have greater weight for cultural identities. As for values, it is easily understood that, for example, work and various organizational and/or cultural achievements are central to one's sense of self-fulfilment and self-respect. Closely related are the financial gain and social prestige that usually ensue from playing central roles in an organization. On a different level, as American politicians tend to express, people involved in religion usually evaluate highly their particular religious faith and sense of morality for their public life. Thus, work, achievements, social status and particular instances of faith can be seen as representing experiences of value that enhance one's sense of personal well-being and identity. In contrast, while also personally gratifying to a certain degree, symbolic features and things that are held in common with others within a class, a status or an age group tend to be features of cultural identities.

It is well known that religious and ethnic groups hold a number of cultural features in common that incorporate symbolic meaning. Think of particular pieces of garb, specific head coverings, turbans, veils, beards and other hair growth or its shaving in different cases. Similarly, we know that many ethnic groups have their own language and observe particular

culinary practices. Most churches enjoy particular religious celebrations, practise specific forms of ritual and follow their own religious customs. The older churches, Buddhist, Shinto, Roman and Orthodox Christianity, stick to a traditional ritual or liturgy, using numerous symbolic objects (objects are symbolic when they refer to a reality commonly not associated with these objects). Their shrines and temples are built in a specific architectural style. But newer and new religions tend to have less specific religious culture or ritual. Thus, some religions rely heavily on symbolism, while others do not. The latter probably derive greater meaning from other religious practices, meetings, social activities, etc. Later in the article, I return to the differential dependence on symbolism.

The referred to cultural particularities, pieces of clothing, instances of ritual and specific patterns of behaviour constitute distinct cultural practices that have symbolic meaning. People feel at home with these practices if they have been exposed to them since childhood or if they have consciously chosen to identify with them at a later stage of life. Sociologically, however, it is important to note that, for the people involved, what we call ritual and custom is merely a natural part of their religious or daily life. In other words, people participating as believers in religious services and other customary practices are not much aware of ritual or custom, or of what is symbolic in that action. Stated differently, there is discontinuity between awareness in daily life and sociological reflection. As Emile Durkheim observed a long time ago, symbolism makes social life possible. It does its work without the believers being aware of its existence, playing a considerable part in fashioning the subjectivity of the participants and their cultural outlook on life. Ethnic/religious communities often are ritual communities, *real* communities as compared with nation-states that sometimes are said to be *imagined* communities. It is clear that a whole array of cultural practices tend to produce quite distinctive cultural identities. Thus, insofar as cultural integration in community life is a desirable objective, the symbolic features of ethnic/religious life held in common are significant cultural devices, which, in effect however, are not constant in meaning. In the present age of growing globalization and the formation of multicultural societies that make seclusion virtually impossible, people may become painfully aware of and feel uneasy about the differences of their own and others' ethnic/religious identities. This awareness, no doubt, is at its strongest in confrontational relationships, when taking part in ethnic/religious strife as in the aforementioned cases of Belfast, Jerusalem and Ayodhya. People, who in their daily lives and occupations are husbands, fathers, barbers, railroad workers, sales persons, teachers, business persons and so on, during their manifestations and confrontations become just marching Protestants, protesting Catholics, feuding and fighting Israelis, Palestinians, Hindus and Muslims. In continuous confrontation, personal and cultural identities fall into disaccord, and identities become one-dimensional. In severe conflict situations, identities so to speak are locked in conflict. People, particularly the powerless, who are economically and politically subordinated, tend to attribute great significance to their cultural distinctness. In other words, the symbolic elements that fashion the subjectivity of the in-group are highly treasured by that group, while those of the out-group are seen as mere markers of difference and signs of segregation. Similarly, excessively adhered to values may become sources of dislike, distrust and contempt. In this case, it is quite conceivable that the well-being of the community is evaluated as higher in rank than the individual's life, so that killing opponents and occasionally sacrificing one's own life are implicitly legitimated or quasi self-evident to particular persons in these groups.

Thesis

The thesis I am suggesting concerning the socially positive and negative consequentiality of symbolic features and values is as follows. First, symbolism, ritual and other symbolic behaviours are very important as means of formation of a community and a particular religious experience. Symbolic features therefore are important cultural elements and worthy of mutual respect. This is the positive side. Second, the reverse and negative side is that symbolic features can be reinforced as things of great value, resulting in 'unhealthy' invigoration of collective identities. Third, values may function in unhealthy ways when they are imposed as norms, or on the contrary, when all values are professed to be totally relative in nature. Fourth, values function personally and socially in a positive way, as sources of inspiration. The problem at hand is that symbolism and valuation can be conflated. In the following sections we focus on the nature of these cultural components, beginning with a short review of this subject in the sociological literature.

The study of values and symbolism

As referred to in the introduction of this monograph, new sensibilities are being expressed and developed in social science together with a new awareness of what matters in modern societies (Bauman, 2000, 2001; Beck, 1986, 1997; Featherstone, 1991; Giddens, 1990, 1992). Further, among other new orientations, several authors have contributed substantially to the discussion of morality and ethics (Apel, 2000; Bauman, 1993; Joas, 2000; several others are mentioned in Strydom, 2000: 133–6). Again, empirical studies of values have flourished since the 1980s, particularly the European Values Studies (EVS), which were extended into the World Values Surveys (WVS) (Arts et al., 2003; Ester et al., 2006; Halman, 2001; Inglehart, 2003). These studies have greatly increased knowledge about the differences in values held in everyday life on a worldwide scale. However, the concepts of value and in mainstream sociology appear to remain under the influence of mid-20th-century anthropology and sociology, having inherited, so to speak, the structural-functional study approach that focused on objective features of societies and culture but lost sight of the subject. The impression one gets of the social and cultural systems as analysed by Parsons (1951, 1961) is that the features of these systems appear to be reified to a certain extent. A leaning towards reification is still more in evidence in those authors who, in monographic studies, focus either on values (Gross, 1985; Rokeach, 1983; Shils, 1988) or on symbolism (Duncan, 1968; Hatas, 2002; Wagner, 1986). These studies show a reifying tendency that is apparent in their concern for a classification of the functions of values as if they were isolated occurrences or for a single functionality as in the case of symbolism. In other words, though not stated explicitly, values are treated as factors that explain behaviour, self and society, or are considered as guides or measures of behaviour, useful for enhancement of self-esteem as well as for social integration. In addition to a reifying tendency, values are conceptualized as part and parcel of symbol systems, where values appear to be subordinated to symbols. Clifford Geertz (1973: 89–90) holds a similar view concerning the primacy of symbolism. A contemporary author, who fundamentally differs from the Parsonian view, is Kenneth Boulding (1969). He suggests a non-reifying approach in his study of values and technology. He finds that the development of technology in any

society is closely related with what is valued, because both values (preference functions) and technology (a production function) are created and transmitted by a common learning process. In the perspective developed below, it is crucial to understand, first of all, not objective symbols and values, but symbolization and valuation as distinct capabilities of the human mind that affect the creation of culture and meaning. In anticipation, symbolization lies at the origin of *meaning* in its broadest sense, while valuation basically represents *evaluation of meaning*.

A different approach needs different concepts. The central terms in this article are conceived of as follows. *Value* in the singular refers to what is valuable in various concrete ways; as an abstraction *value* is seen as one aspect of an act. As suggested already, in operation, *valuation* refers to the process of valuing, and *valuations* indicate values within individual minds. The commonly used concept of *values* here refers to linguistically externalized ideas about what is of value. *Interests* are distinguished from values. Interests can be said to be rationalized values that are the object of pursuit by organizations, particularly in economic and political action. In contrast, the concept of *symbolism* is very different from that of value in the singular. As a generic concept, it denotes the whole matter of symbolic meaning as well as the symbolic representations that result from the *process of symbolization* (a concept parallel to the process or mechanism of valuation). Symbolic representations are referred to as '*symbolizations*', that emerge either in a verbal form or as symbolic objects as well as standardized forms of action (ritual). The term 'symbolizations' is preferred over the more common term *symbols*, which refer primarily to symbolic objects (Bachika, 1993, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). In the following, I argue that language is the prototype of symbolism, which insinuates its nature and its logic.

Language and symbolism

Symbolism is a heavyweight topic in the study of culture (Duncan, 1968; Geertz, 1973; Wagner, 1986). The following is an interesting observation: 'a single phenomenon or principle *constitutes* human culture and cultural capability. I have called this phenomenon "trope" for its most familiar manifestation as the perception of meaning within cultural reference points' (Wagner, 1986: 126). This anthropologist discusses trope, or metaphor, as the main source from which culture springs and meaning is elicited. The word 'trope' derives from the Greek for 'to turn', suggesting change of meaning. The same holds for the term 'metaphor', and, in my view, for all symbolism that is effected through association and substitution. In other words, I see association and substitution as the master keys of symbolism, as mechanisms through which new meaning is created or extended. This mechanism as such is simple but its highly variable applications extend into the boundless complexities of thought, action and culture.

How are association and substitution basic to symbolism? Let us return to some examples of symbolic cultural features. As referred to earlier, a headscarf is a piece of cloth that in Islam has acquired a particular social and religious meaning for women, and that is religiously sanctioned by this religion. A little earring, worn as a kind of insignia by a modern male individual, represents an extension of meaning from an object belonging to female culture, now in part transferred to male culture. Thus the earring and the headscarf show a particular association with manhood and womanhood. Another good example is the lotus

flower, which is the cherished symbol of enlightenment in Buddhism. The association of the natural beauty of a flower that flourishes in mud pools with the spiritual beauty of enlightenment effects a new meaning. Other ways of association are to be noticed in the focal symbols of Christianity and Buddhism: the cross and the wheel (of the Law). The Christian cross and the Buddhist war-chariot wheel in particular are powerful metaphors, because common-sense perception is left far behind and symbolic, spiritual meaning is created. In contrast, the white seamless garment that the Hajji pilgrims don at the Mecca mosque is a very powerful social symbol associated with the equality of all Muslims. Is it not in these instances of creating or affecting new meaning that we really witness 'the heart of religious imagination'? (As I conclude later, this imagination is substantially different from the human imagination pertaining to values, which is more significant for social life than that of symbolism.)

In all the above examples – even in the last – it is not sharing or group reference that brings about symbolism. It is a mind process that engenders special meaning through 'trope' as mentioned by Wagner: the turning around of things, activating a new perception and eliciting new meaning that transcends common-sense perception. But it is sharing that invigorates symbolism and makes it work.

Generally speaking, language is a system of representation, substitution and association and can therefore be seen as the prototype of symbolism. All words are symbolic in a broad sense. Things, actions, relationships, functions, and whatever, are represented by sounds and written characters. Words have no 'intrinsic meaning' (Karp and Yoels, 1979: 35); that is, there is no intrinsic relationship between those sounds/characters and the things, actions, etc., that are represented in that way.

These short observations constitute what I see as the mother tree in the forest of symbolism. My main interest in this context, explained below, concerns the fundamental characteristics of symbolism. One crucial point is that symbolism starts in the mind. Fundamentally, therefore, *symbolizations are cognitive devices* that, similar to the vocabulary of a language, exist in several categories and in great variety. This wide variation and versatility in the domain of symbolization is due to the broad range of thought that roams in every direction. It is also conditioned by the great variety in the physical world as the object of thought. As for language itself, the primary social function of symbolizations is expression and communication of meaning for which sharing is the main condition that is necessary for their operation.

Valuation and values

In contrast to symbolizations that primarily are cognitive devices, I argue that valuations, while imparting also cognition, primarily are evaluation of meaning that is rooted in affect. Rootage in feeling is assumed to be the case, because gratification informs valuation. That gratification is the core of valuation may appear as a paraphrasing of Parsons' starting point of his theory: action is engaged in as gratification of need-dispositions. However, there is quite a difference. It suggests that value is inherent in action itself. Adopting that proposition implies that, by acting and experimenting, people find out what is useful or effective for realizing goals and what is satisfying in terms of experience. A crucial point here is that value is inherent in an act. It is its own reward. What is experienced as gratifying tends to be repeated and to become a habit.

The assumption that gratification is the core of valuation and that value is an aspect of an act has several significant implications. It suggests, first, that valuation, as originating within action, acquires a different cognitive status as compared to symbolization that germinates in thinking. In other words, like cognition and evaluation, symbolization and valuation are distinct categories of perception. Second, if gratification is the core of valuation, it follows that value is not a moral concept. Anything may be felt to be gratifying to an individual. Thus either being honest or dishonest, being loyal to others or deceitful, being thrifty or lazy, doing good or ill to others can be gratifying for a particular individual. Third, if gratification is the core of valuation, it follows that valuation initially is conditioned not through rationality but through feeling. The idea of rationality suggests continuity or accumulation. The various forms of rationality can be seen as different degrees of the same. In contrast, feelings suggest discontinuity. In other words, the various emotions appear to be of a distinct nature. This might be the reason why Max Scheler maintains that values belong to different ranks or spheres (Frings, 1997: 26–34; Scheler, 1992: 221–34) and why others observe that our various values are not harmonious (Rokeach, 1983; Shils, 1988).

Particularly important in the above is that morality and rationality are not necessarily given in individual action. This can also be inferred from the condition of human nature as an emergent existence, which initially is non-socialized and never will be totally socialized. Ways of thinking and behaving, that benefit society, tend to become positively evaluated and therefore legitimated by collectivities as common patterns of behaviour and culture. Thus the properties of morality and rationality are most relevant at the collective level. They are acquired through reflection and social negotiation.

The chemistry of everyday life

To everyday consciousness, symbolization and valuation are not given as distinct human capabilities. Like thinking and acting, they do not function independently of each other. Notwithstanding, again like thinking and acting, these capabilities are distinct operationally; they process sense data differently. In other words, they must be understood as different mechanisms that yield a divergent cultural output, having distinct properties. Though a little obsolete as an analogy, one could speak of a river as an image of sociocultural life, alluding to its fluid and ever-changing state, but the substance of a river is simply water that, in its molecular form, is rightly described as H_2O, a fusion of hydrogen and oxygen gases. Since physical substances and their component elements have totally different properties, one cannot compare them with changeable cultural elements that do without fixed interdependency, but this should not mean that regularities in relationships among such core components of culture are totally absent. They cannot operate randomly. I argue that the processes or mechanisms of symbolization and valuation show respectively a definite logic. Hypothetically, I see them as constituting twin processes or mechanisms, the internal human agencies that produce culture in the broadest sense of the term and that, in isolation, can be described as follows.

In essence, symbolization is a mechanism for the construction, expression and fixation or closure of meaning. Symbolizations can be characterized as 'partial modes of being' and 'images of behaviour', that materialize indeed as *images*, but at the same time also as symbolic objects, ritual and other forms of symbolic behaviour. They constitute the

observable, particular elements of the human cultural content, which play a primary role in the formation of cultural identities. The dominant characteristic of symbolizations is cognition, and their primary social function serves communication. Due to this functionality and the definite, *fixed* meaning they convey, symbolizations are highly useful in education as means for transmitting knowledge and improving understanding. As for their fixation of meaning, they resemble the grammatical present perfect of the passive voice. Symbolizations show that 'something has been done; something has been revealed'. People *embody* and *live* their symbolizations *collectively* in traditional societies (e.g. wearing veils, sporting a particular style of clothing, repeatedly participating in ritual) and more *individually* in modern societies and its subcultures (earrings, shaven heads, fashion styles, etc.). The attraction of symbolic elements in traditional and modern settings derives mainly from sharing and from newness respectively.

As cognitive devices, similar to all knowledge, symbolizations are apt to develop and multiply. An obvious example is the highly differentiated state of religion, which is a result of much experimenting with the production of symbolic meaning over long periods of time. Not unlike items of fashion, any symbolization seems as viable as any other. In other words, symbolizations seem to involve a similar logic, serve a similar purpose, and therefore must be *functionally equivalent.*

In contrast, the mechanism of valuation basically is evaluation of meaning that is realized in acting. As such, valuation is a mechanism central to the formation of self and social institutions. Values, as elements of culture, are abstractions derived from individual and collective behaviour. They are objectivated as ideas that become particular categories of thought, that is, they become predominantly conceptual, core elements of culture (in contrast to symbolizations that can be seen as structural core elements). As manifestations of evaluation, values involve hierarchy (Dumont, 1983). If hierarchy is an inherent attribute of values, any particular value cannot be the equivalent of any other. As a manifestation of gratification and feeling, valuation also implies a substantial difference that is objectivated in the various categories of values that therefore are *substantially different.* Seen concretely, this seems evident when one compares actions engaged in for material/economic gain, for social/political prestige and power, or for spiritual/religious/moral benefits. However, due to substantial differences among values, one also understands that values are *complementary.* In plain language, many things and actions are useful, interesting and therefore desirable. Consequently, due to the aspects of priority and hierarchy, and depending on the distinctness of values, they can neither be totally relative nor totally absolute.

Further, values have an open horizon. In grammatical language, valuation resembles the present progressive tense: 'I am doing something; something is gratifying to me or to others'. Values then are useful to education, not for transmitting or improving established knowledge but for providing ideas and inspiring people. In aspiring to, and following up on these ideas/ideals, people work on their identities and what they can become.

In this conception, one may see how symbolizations and values overlap as *images/modes* of behaviour and being and *ideas* of behaviour and being. Symbolizations resemble images that represent themselves as facts to which one is present. Adopting symbolizations is like wearing clothes. Newness is their great attraction in modern societies. Values in contrast are intangible and represent themselves as visions of what can be realized. People can be said to *live* values, too, but they do not easily incarnate values. In everyday life, people look for what is of value in various ways and in various circumstances. In the best of cases,

they enjoy the simple pleasures of life, enjoy being honest, hard working, having good human relations, love nature and so on, but all this is in the present progressive tense. People in modern societies have different priorities at different times. Also, they repeat what is useful, meaningful, gratifying in an individualized manner but, at the same time, they are under the influence of sociocultural climate, particularly of consumer culture as argued by Featherstone (1991) and by Ciochetto and Mohan in this monograph. One would think that the quality of life is all what matters but this is a very precarious assumption in the present age.

Seen theoretically, both symbolizations and values are cognitive in nature. Both involve concepts, show a particular content and are used for communicating meaning but, like images and ideas, they are not interchangeable. These cultural phenomena are distinct in nature. They must operate differently.

Distinctness/ambivalence of symbolism and values

Symbolizations and values, which are part of the same reality, have divergent properties and therefore can be used in various ways. In other words, in sociocultural life, values can be used for good and bad, while symbolic features can be misused, often to bolster the culture and behaviour they are part of.

Symbolizations (including symbolic objects, social and religious ritual), as modes/images of behaviour and being and as observable cultural elements, show a certain degree of objectivity that may function as constraint. Due to these properties, symbolizations are *par excellence* means of social integration and possibly of manipulation. Within a particular culture, symbolizations are easily understood and accepted. However, as primarily cognitive elements, symbolizations are apt to differentiate in the same manner as knowledge. These two characteristics, solid objectivity and a high degree of differentiation, imply opposing tendencies. Symbolizations can be reinforced or made normative based on their constraint and their usefulness as means of communication and domination, but due to their tendency of differentiation and lack of hierarchy, imposing symbolizations appears to be against their nature. This has become evident in modern, differentiated settings. Symbolizations may cause suspicion, especially to outsiders of a culture, because of their constraining force, while their tendency towards differentiation may diminish that attitude. Thus, the possibility of differentiation of symbolizations seems to counteract their constraint. Discarding them in certain cases is of no great consequence on the same account. That certain religions rely heavily on symbolism while others do not illustrates its relative nature and its ambivalence, which may be a cause of conflict.

Valuations show a high degree of subjectivity for several reasons. For a start, value is an aspect of an act that becomes more strongly internalized the more a specific act is repeated. Specific valuations then become elements of personal identity, which, however, do not ascertain the integration of identity, because contradictory values may be internalized. Valuations, which are internalized and become elements of individual identity, are not easily discarded. However, values as ideas and conceptual elements of culture have a low degree of constraint in contrast to symbolizations. As conceptual elements, and due to their property of hierarchy as well as their limited possibility of differentiation (they are relatively few in number), values are apt to be conceived of as highly normative and

are easily imposed, as religious organizations tend to do. However, because of the complementary nature of values, no one value in particular should be propagated as the highest in rank. Absolutizing specific values could create an unacceptable bias. Individual autonomy must be guaranteed. Values, due to their open horizon, serve best as human ideals and sources of inspiration. As such, they are more durable and not easily exhausted, and in contrast to symbolic features, values are not easily discarded without serious consequences. In turn, values may be resented because of their property of hierarchy and their substantial differences that derive from a different type of affect. If all these characteristics hold true, one understands that values too are highly ambivalent and may operate in fuelling conflict.

Significance/conflation of symbolism and values

Particular symbolizations are important for ethic/religious life. Culture in all its diversity, like knowledge in all its diversity, is the treasure house of the world. The sharing of a territory, a language, particular customs, religious faith, social ritual, the wearing of particular clothes and so on, are important features of collective identity. Thus, the significance of symbolizations within a culture is beyond doubt. Regretfully, it is often overlooked that cultural differences are very meaningful overall. One can learn from different cultures, because they express differently the various meanings of life. It is in this sense that diversity may occasion respect. Without ascribing to a foreign culture, one can wonder about its particularities and appreciate these inventions of the human mind. However, symbolizations, that are basically cognitive in nature, may be contaminated by mistakenly attributing to them the status of value as such – even attributing higher meaning to symbolic features than to life itself – by loading them with affect and high-level hierarchy that brings about feelings of superiority over other ethnic/religious cultures. This constitutes, empirically and theoretically, conflation of symbolization and valuation. It leads to excessive particularism. Symbolizations are easily manipulated. Culturally 'manipulated', people become highly aware of external differences and may develop a considerable degree of antagonism towards other groups. Symbolizations, that are cognitive in nature, are shareable in principle but need not be shared.

The importance of values is more widely recognized. Neither individuals nor collectivities can do without making decisions about what is of value in various situations. Most cultures treasure a positive evaluation of human relations, the family, devotion to work, respect for authority, love for nature, reverence of life itself as well as the simple pleasures of everyday living. It is in the domain of values, which, as a whole, is much narrower than the domain of symbolism, that one can look for universalizing tendencies and a sense of unity of culture, even a world culture. As seen in the present context, the major pitfalls on the road to a world culture are attempts at imposing a set of values, and, as is more often the case, declaring that all values are of equal significance. Imposing values represents pseudo universality. Values as ideas open to the future that are substantially different and show shifting priority are not fit to be imposed. As for putting all values on a par, this would lead to excessive particularism and arbitrariness. It would make 'black holes' of particular cultures from which no sense of commonality can emanate. Due to the property of hierarchy and the distinct feelings to which values correspond, values cannot be equivalent. Further, to be useful to societies and individuals, values need not be narrowly defined.

The aforementioned values of work, love for people and nature, reverence for authority, etc., can be realized in various ways and need not and should not lead to uniformity.

Basic inferences

What then are the workings of symbolism and values in conflict situations? Stated in phenomenological terminology, a basic inference from the above is that the inner logic of these core components of culture primarily impacts 'the natural attitude' (Natanson, 1973) of the actors, not their action. Interests, particularly economic and political objectives, are the main motivation for social action. In other words, people know what they want but, as suggested earlier, they are usually not aware of the operation either of symbolism or of values. However, mindsets are affected. In the natural attitude, values, that are complementary in nature, are not inherently prone to stimulate struggle, neither do symbolic features fuel conflict. It is in conflict situations that mindsets are negatively affected: these mindsets impede the resolution of conflict. This is the more so, because symbolic cultural features and values are ambivalent and because their logic may be hopelessly mixed up and backfire, so to speak.

When symbolic features become the main fare of identities, values lose their chance of becoming more significant. Mind conditions may be problematic in any case, but not necessarily so, particularly at the individual level. At this level, no inherent difficulty is felt to exist in improving one's understanding and empathy for a foreign culture or a religion one is not affiliated with. As a matter of fact, numerous adult individuals in various cultures convert to a culturally different religion or, as is more common, engage without any difficulties in friendly relations with individuals of an ethnically or religiously different stripe. The same is true for many churches and religious organizations new and old, which show a fundamental attitude for tolerance and, in better cases still, mutual respect. Organizations are able to act like individuals. However, ethnic/religious collectivities are quite different as agents, whose 'mindsets' are much more complicated. Ethnicities are embedded in macro sociocultural reality, and a collective will is non-existent. Therefore, entangled ethnic/religious relations cannot easily be improved. Conflicts tend to fester for long periods of time. When conflict is at its fiercest, negative feelings towards the enemy run high and the cycle of violence feeds off itself: unhappiness, resentment, anger, revenge, fear. These negative feelings fuel each other. In other words, emotional responses are quasi-automatic responses and self-reflexivity is almost impossible, even for individuals.

In great contrast, being deeply concerned with caring for what is inherently of value tends to stimulate self-reflexivity, which evidently is not an automatic, uncontrolled mind process. Self-reflexivity stands for rational thinking. The paradox then of the inference of this article is that symbolization and valuation, which originate in thought and feeling respectively, reverse their initial nature: symbolizations that inherently are cognitive devices tend to become loaded with affect in a collective setting, while values that emerge from gut feelings tend to be rationalized as ideas and to be transformed into interests.

Stated in a normative mode, values must get a chance of getting the better of people. When values are positively cultivated as sources of inspiration and means for enhancing individual identities, external symbolic features lose much of their attraction. But, as in the case of symbolic features, it is *sharing* that enhances the force of values. How, then, can

values be shared in modern societies? This is *the* question. Interests are more or less easily shared within organizations, while they are often a source of conflict among different organizations and collectivities. Values, as sources of inspiration and enhancement of personal quality, are not conflicting. Moral values, which can be simply defined as positive feelings for others, should be more easily shared, in that they are beneficial to the whole of humanity.

Again paradoxically, a beneficial effect of becoming aware of common ground concerning moral values is that mutual differences, deriving from adhering to a different culture, may be seen more positively. Without sharing values, particularistic symbolic features tend to be divisive. In opting for a common outlook on values and adhering to a common ethical view of life, every culture and religion may be encouraged to maintain its own ritual community and symbolic universe. In other words, in recognizing a common humanity in terms of moral values, symbolic features cease to be marks of difference and signs of segregation.

Insofar as cultural and religious symbolism is seen as relative in nature, the impact of cultural diversity decreases and relations among religious and ethnic groups should become much more harmonious and graceful. Thus, is it not values that we need to think about in order to stimulate the religious imagination for the benefit of future societies? To quote an enlightened sentence from a work on values and selfhood by a senior psychologist: 'As an endangered species and an endangering one, we need, collectively, all the self-understanding and self-direction that we can muster' (Smith, 1991: 34). If this statement still is not plausible enough, the benefit of cultivating values by individual people should be beyond doubt. Nurturing values that are embedded in feelings is the same as cultivating fine human feelings.

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Cultural values and globalization: India's dilemma

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Abstract

The argument in this article is twofold. First, the Euro-American project of creating a world market is underpinned by its hegemonic agenda. Second, this has serious implications for the preservation of India's composite cultural tradition and religious identities. Related to this is the commoditization of women and gender relations. The crucial relevance of grafting the ideals of western modernity for the success of the project of globalization is demonstrated. However, the argument regarding the inevitability of globalization and by implication of western modernity must be contested. The paradigm of modernity for India neither ignores the material aspects of human existence, nor advocates rejection of its rich cultural heritage or withdrawal from community-based social life.

Keywords

consumer capitalism, gender, India, media, modernity, values

The globalization of economy, coupled with the fast-paced communication revolution with its lightening speed and information flow through digital streams, has impinged upon the politico-economic sovereignty and cultural features of Third World countries. A number of scholars have discussed the positive and negative implications for various sectors of these countries' economies, e.g. agriculture, trade, industry and business within the framework of modernization but from the Euro-centric perspective. Yet consequent sociocultural changes, anxieties and discontentment have not been documented.

This article is an attempt to explain the extent and nature of changes in material culture affected by satellite television and cable networks, which have become powerful sources and instruments of value formation for global entrepreneurs in finance/business, the entertainment industry, health and religious faith organizations. It must be noted that material culture has a continuous and interactive relationship with cultural tradition, that

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is, practices and values from the historical past. It is argued that the persistent exposure of illiterate as well as educated classes to colourful and seductive images of consumerist products and lifestyles through transnational flows of information and programming (primarily from the US) has brought drastic changes not only in the cultural environment but also in mentalities, i.e. new ways of seeing and thinking.

The argument presented in this article is twofold. First, the inverted relationship between conspicuous consumption and social development, democratic institutions, human rights and so on driven by vested interests has played a critical role in vitiating the perspective of various religious communities regarding composite cultural traditions and values. Second, the strategic partnership between global entrepreneurs in the economy and the media has created a provocative situation for teenagers and young adults in all social segments; they have been forced to live in a transitional world, characterized by a dislocation of sensibilities, values and reference points embedded in the ideals of Indian culture that is known for its diversity and richness.

Ideals of Indian culture

A brief explanation of the ideals of Indian culture should be helpful to capture its inherently different orientation, its worldview and values as compared with the values of the consumerist culture. This should enable us to understand the tensions and dilemma(s) arising from its somewhat protracted encounter with western modernity in its new garb.

However, it is not easy to generalize about Indian culture for three reasons. First, it is an amalgam of diverse traditions (Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist and Jainist), religious symbols, languages and creative accomplishments of multiple ethnic imaginations. Second, it is constantly in-the-making, strenuously contested and reconstituted. Being dynamic and open-ended, it is best described by the Persian word *ravayaat,* i.e. flowing or constantly in motion. Indian culture, constantly engaged in the process of experimentation and self-renewal, has been redirecting its social energy throughout its evolution from ancient to modern times (Mohan, 1999: 317). Third, production of knowledge about Indian society and culture by Indians and others remains burdened by the assumptions of Orientalists' scholarship. For example, Euro-American academicians have articulated a stereotyped understanding of caste, gender inequalities, nationalism or communalism through paradigms such as 'hierarchy' in the case of Indian society, 'filial piety' for China, and 'honour and shame' for the Mediterranean region (Appadurai, 1986: 157).

The dominant ideology of Hindutva (Hindu identity) has also appropriated the homogenizing agenda of the Orientalists and thus glossed over the complexity of our cultural and ideological formations. By projecting the Indian culture as monolithic and unchanging, its protagonists have distorted its original spirit and character. Despite these problems and the complex nature of Indian tradition, it is possible to identify its essential ideals: (1) communitarianism, (2) spiritual ethos, worldly concerns and moral values and (3) creativity and the spirit of accommodation.

The communitarian ideal

The most striking feature of Indian culture is the location of each individual in the network of powerful communitarian relationships such as the family, kinship and caste

(Mandelbaum, 1972, 1984: 33–180). Community had positive implications for social cohesiveness, now transformed into a political asset. The patriarchal family as the reproductive unit was continuously used as a site for the socialization of the girl-child and for the transmission of cultural values, practices and traditions of major religions. The entire complex of community networks was (is) utilized, not only for schooling its members in discipline, work culture and social and religious values, but also for protecting and reinforcing the structures of land relations. The major reason underlying the communitarian orientation and practice was the country's agrarian economy. Primarily comprising huge stretches of well-irrigated plains and the advantage of ample sunshine for the greater part of the year, India has maintained an agrarian economy over the past 5000 years. The British government exploited and developed this potential with minimum financial investment and technological input in order to feed and expand its industrial empire. Such a policy introduced many complexities in the stratification of the peasant society.

A major characteristic of the peasant society is that it values the communitarian ideal and cultivates this orientation. Historically speaking, Indians are known for their deep loyalty to the village, family and *jati*. Another major feature of this society is its relatively peaceful and close relationship with the rhythm of cyclic seasons. A distinct emphasis upon coexistence, peace and harmony – rather than an obsession with overpowering, controlling and exploiting nature – characterizes the attitudes of the agricultural community. Cultivation of a nature-friendly attitude is crucial in view of the growing awareness of the depletion of environmental resources.

Spiritual ethos, worldly concerns and moral values

The second important dimension of the Indian cultural heritage is its emphasis upon the realization of an ultimate spiritual ideal, i.e. unity with the cosmos without undermining material achievements. The pervasive presence of a spiritual ethos in the Indian culture does not imply negation of the other aspects of life. The characterization by western scholars of the Indian outlook as pessimistic and other-worldly is exaggerated. In fact, one of the main concepts underlying the ancient Indian civilization was harmony of spiritual life with worldly life. For example, the Hindu religion has emphasized a balanced albeit gender-biased approach to the four objectives of humankind, namely *dharma, artha, kama and moksha dharma.* These are the ideal principles or norms that people should adhere to in the course of their worldly activities; they provide primary motivation in the pursuit of material gain and pleasure (De Bary, 1972 [1958]: 211–366). For example, referring to *rajdharma* (a king's moral duty), the *Law Book of Yajnavalkya* states that where there is conflict between the principle and policy, righteousness and material gain/advantage, that is, between *dharma and artha*, the former should prevail.

For *kama*, i.e. love of pleasure, control by *dharma* is the rule. The Hindu ideal does not preach total abstinence from pleasure; rather it preaches, universally, the ideal of chaste love or pleasure, regulated by considerations of both morality and well-being. In more than one authoritative text, the householder's life is considered to be the most important of the four stages of life. Hinduism does not hold up monasticism or hermitism as the desired ideal for all. It is through this view of harmony that the strains and trials of household management, family life and social obligations discipline people and prepare

them for *moksha* (liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth). The pursuit of *moksha* is placed last, in the retirement stage of life. Spiritual endeavour is the final and ultimate aspiration of the human being in the Hindu scheme of values. Originally, no aspect of life was considered unimportant, nothing was denied or repressed. Instead, all that appears to be lower could be integrated with the higher according to Hindu philosophy. There was no distinction between the sacred and profane.

Islam developed a positive interaction with Hindu culture from the 13th century onwards and was firmly rooted in the material world despite its dominant spiritual ethos (Hussain, 1961: 66), while the Sikh tradition from the 15th to 17th century still more aligned religious goals with worldly concerns (Kaur, 1990: 70–159).

The Hindu scriptures also deal with social and individual moral values. However, the position of Hinduism on this issue is as ambiguous as on any other matter owing to the wide variety of these scriptures and the breadth of interpretation accepted by various authorities.

Creativity and the spirit of accommodation

The great strength of Indian culture is its dynamism, its creativity, its ability to accommodate and synthesize multiple currents and traditions. A close scrutiny of the process of its evolution shows that the resilience of the inner core has helped it to protect its fundamental values. Its openness has enabled it to respond to new currents of thought and transform them into a source of energy for new patterns of development and growth. Many voices of dissent have enriched its fabric: while Indian culture has learned important lessons from Buddhism and Jainism, it was influenced in a different way by the challenge of Islam (Hussain, 1992: 81–121; Mujeeb, 1972: 65). Islam's message of egalitarianism, democracy and rights of women, though within a patriarchal framework, had been incorporated in the social vision of Hinduism in order to make it more responsive to the changing cultural ethos and popular aspirations.

It may be said that these three ideals of Indian culture ought to be regarded as ideals to be aspired to. I would not argue that Indians were always community-oriented, peaceful, spiritual and tolerant. India has also passed through phases of violence, hatred and war. India also does not lack people with materialistic and individualist ambitions. However, irrespective of differences in religious faith and practice and times of cultural upheaval, the primacy of the cultural ideals held the people together, particularly so during the British occupation and hopefully also now in the present age dominated by avaricious multinational corporations.

Indian response to the onslaught of westernism/modernity

With the coming of the West through British colonialism in India, radical departures occurred in the manner of redefinition of society, polity, family and gender, rendering the 18th-century praxis irrelevant. In other words, a drastic change in the balance of politico-economic power against Indians and a blockade of the channels of sociocultural communication made them insular and robbed them of creative thinking for more than a century.

I wish to focus briefly on the predicament of the 19th-century Indian reformers, whose development as an intellectual community had been facilitated by the objective conditions created by the colonial rule, but whose bonding matured in the course of their social struggles (Panikkar, 1989: 2150). This suggests some clues about shifts in perspectives on westernism/modernity in the era of liberalization.

In the 19th century, the British weakened the traditional Indian social order and inferiorized its culture, its worldview and the people as a race. They induced them to launch cultural, ideological struggles at two levels: one against caste discrimination and women's oppression, and another against cultural hegemonization by the colonial state. While the reformers had found traditional culture inadequate to meet the challenges of western modernity, they were not inclined to adopt the bourgeois liberal model *in toto* as the cultural and intellectual engineering had caused anxiety among them about the survival of tradition itself. Thus, ambivalence and contradiction in their attitude towards tradition and modernity, which is characteristic of colonial consciousness, surfaces repeatedly in their ideological formulations throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Further, it may be added that India's encounter with western modernity, capitalism and imperialism as well as the compelling need to articulate its complex response had fuelled a search for an appropriate vocabulary and the borrowing of new words such as rights, nation, secular and the like (Alam, 1999: 56–7). This was reinforced by the Indian leadership's keen sense of responsibility to communicate an aspiration for freedom from political bondage, economic exploitation and cultural hegemony of the colonial rulers. Here we notice India's dilemma of how to borrow without submitting to the hierarchical relationship with the West despite the earlier experience of humiliating domination and demoralization.

However, a critical attitude has not been lacking. Nearer present times, Gandhi's insightful and creative reading of Indian and western traditions had urged him to reject social reformers' alternative whether in terms of ideology or borrowed conceptual vocabulary. By mobilizing latent cultural resources, he had been able to turn *satyagraha* and *ahimsa* into effective strategies for social and political struggles. Thus, he had launched a 'transcultural' protest against the materialist and hyper-masculine worldview of colonial modernity (Nandy, 1983: 48).

The Indian attitude towards modernity acquired more criticality, clarity and sharpness when Gandhi pulled the intellectual community out of the orbit of bourgeois values through his powerful critique of western civilization. In his pamphlet *Hind Swaraj* (1909), he indicted the West for its stance of arrogant superiority over its material achievements, barbarity and irreligiousness (Gandhi, 1909, 1910). His cultural agenda was based on such principles that hardly coincide with the ideals of western modernity, dividing societies into traditional or modern (modernization regarded as synonymous with westernization and secularism) and putting exclusive emphasis upon value-neutral, scientific and universalistic rationality (Baykan, 1991: 138). In this worldview, modernity has become gender-biased not only by continuing the gender division of labour but also by the monopoly of men in public affairs, e.g. the administration, politics, sciences and arts (Van Vucht Tijssen, 1991: 151). Gandhi rejected not only this worldview but also condemned the objectification of nature and the ruthless exploitation of resources. Above all, his keen awareness of the untapped potential of India's rich cultural heritage,

particularly folk resources and relevant elements of modernity, has been recognized not only by the advocates of western modernity including feminists but also by the traditionalists.

However, the decolonization process, initiated by Gandhi, has lost much of its force as his thought and practice could not fully capture India's urge for a 'relevant' modernity in terms of the multiple needs of its fast-growing population and its national aspirations. The changing parameters of global economy and the civilizing mission in the hands of corporate capitalists and the inability of India to resist multinational corporate pressures for liberalization have once again made people vulnerable to the alluring promises of western modernity. In this context, Giddens' description of globalization as an 'enlargement of modernity from society to the world' (Giddens, 1993) is appropriate.

It can be said that the powerful current of western modernity, especially its ultra-consumerist orientation, is now affecting numerous sensitive teenagers and youth with full force, owing to the deep penetration of satellite television and cable networks in urban as well as rural areas and slums.

Television and the dissemination of consumerist culture

The preceding discussion shows that the Indian response to the challenges posed by western modernity and civilization as affected by British colonialism was a knotty combination of admiration and disapproval ranging from Raja Ram Mohan Roy to Gandhi. In the present phase of aggressive globalization of corporate capitalism and its consumerist values advocated through various media (specifically satellite television and cable networks), the project of western modernity has remained central as it underpins the philosophy of consumer capitalism. In other words, modernity as a grand system relies for its success upon efficient interconnections between the worldwide dissemination of 'global culture', telecommunications and deregulation of markets and free trade in the Third World. Thus, globalization, despite its obvious economic agenda, poses a serious threat to cultural autonomy because conditioning and fixation of human choice and values is a crucial facilitator of economic development. The era of liberalization has forced an overhaul of the existing value system in order to link the tastes of the average person, particularly the young and adolescents of the middle classes, with their counterparts in Western Europe and North America. The underlying logic is that the global market economy will create interlinkages between 'forward' and 'backward' societies (Kar, 1996: 8).

It is easy to understand the argument of the advocates of globalization in view of the fact that India's burgeoning middle class forms about one-third of the country's population of around 400 million. This chunk of the population is more than the entire population of Europe (excluding the former Soviet Union). Its purchasing power makes India a country with a rich marketing potential. This expectation prompts Euro-American countries to yearn for the Indian domestic market, which, they believe, is largely untapped. Capturing this market will be much easier when there is a corresponding change in the value pattern of the targeted society. In other words, the target groups among Indians have to be attuned to the ethos of global culture. It is even more tactical for large-scale cultural penetration to capture the hearts and minds of the adolescents and the young.

The Euro-American nations, due to their tremendous techno-economic power, have appropriated the privilege of defining and dictating the contents of global culture, popularly known as consumerist culture. Claiming to be based on the ideals of modernity and western rationality, it seeks to bridge the gap between all cultures and generate a set of uniform and liberal responses as well as expectations. Using the latest communication technologies as instruments, the Euro-American industry in collaboration with multinational business managers is transmitting words, images and symbols of a consumerist culture into our world.

What is this consumerist culture? Consumerism assumes the form of a culture when its function is stretched beyond the fulfilment of basic needs of each member of society, arising from biological demands. Its salient features, based on the insights of the French scholar Jean Baudrillard (1983, 1998), may be specified as follows. (1) In the ethos of consumerism, a successful life is equated with having everything; not having something implies failure and loss of status. Obviously, the people living in the ethos of a consumerist culture perpetually suffer from a sense of insecurity and nervous tension and an incessant craving for the latest model of products, fashions and fads. In the long run, they get addicted to the excitement of instant achievement and success and are alienated from their history and culture, particularly folk-memories. (2) The growing lure of consumerist culture breeds fear of solitude and unpopularity among teenagers and young adults who are constantly driven to eat, dress and behave like their peer group. (3) The target of consumerism is the creation of a mass culture, which requires standardization of perceptions about fun, lifestyle, behaviour patterns and choices of products for daily use on the basis of opinion polls. Mass culture, while moulding and catering to average taste, de-individualizes as required by the techniques of mass production and marketing. (4) As mass culture creates addiction to prefabricated experiences or emotions, the majority of the people are deprived of remaining possibilities of autonomous growth and enrichment and, as pointed out by Van Dan Haag (1971: 85–92), their lives become even more boring and unfulfilled.

Without going into a detailed discussion of the perspectives of massification, I focus briefly upon one relevant hypothesis for better understanding the Indian situation. Peterson and DiMaggio (1975: 497–506) have broken up the mass culture argument into two parts: the first consists of the forces of modernization that significantly reduce cultural diversity, and the second creates an increasingly homogeneous mass culture. It is fact that much ethnic and regional cultural diversity has been destroyed in postindustrial American society. In India, a different course of development can be chartered as it is far from being an industrial society that may skip various stages in its search for 'relevant' modernity.

As Indian society is not a monolith, the existence of several taste cultures is likely to resist the total massification of Indian culture. The selectivity of choice, which has been empirically documented in the American case (Shils, 1960: 89), shows that the development of a homogeneous culture may be uneven in such a vast country as India. However, it may be conceded that, during the past one decade, consumerism has gradually tightened its grip on India, especially the middle classes.

What are the long-term implications of consumerism for Indian society and its cultural values? For a realistic assessment, three particularities of India's situation must be kept

in view. First, the presence of 100 million illiterates in the 15–35 age group makes India an ideal testing ground for the power of teleadvertising in moulding the mental ethos of such a huge chunk of the population. Their sense of discrimination may gradually be blunted owing to its narcotic effect over time. Second, the huge numbers of Indian middle class, especially of sensitive adolescents and young men and women, are seen by the commercial interests as the potential purchasing agents whose systematic conditioning would ensure long-term control. Third, new communication technologies in the hands of avaricious multinational capitalists are no longer amenable to check or control either by the developed or developing countries, especially when illiteracy rules out the intervention of books (Mohan, 1999: 330).

Anyone familiar with the media scene knows how easy it is to captivate the hearts and minds of uncritical viewers and persuade them to regard the consumerist culture as their own. Constantly exposed to the values and attitudes of a dominant culture, the illiterate and impressionable adolescents as well as the young tend to copy the sexual behaviour and lifestyles of glamorous men and women. By watching images and advertisements of expensive clothes, cars, gadgets and luxurious houses on television, members of the middle classes with limited means and the poor people get frustrated as the 'hyper real world', to use a phrase from Baudrillard (1984: 108), is beyond their reach. Free circulation of seductive visions of affluence in the absence of democratization of economic resources breeds imitative tendencies and all sorts of pathological complexes among the economically weak sections who happen to be illiterate also.

In order to substantiate my argument regarding the role of media in the penetration of the consumerist culture, I could draw on my fieldwork in the Union Territory Chandigarh, the capital of the state of Haryana and Punjab (Mohan, 2001: 92–7); however, for space constraints, I cannot do so in great detail. My research shows that constant viewing of seductive and colourful advertisements, interspersed with entertainment programmes, evokes an intense craving for new products among 57.24 percent of respondents and a negative response among 42.76 percent of respondents. The motives underlying their favourable response were varied.

In an emerging metropolitan city like Chandigarh, the conventional meaning of status (whether by blood or culture) has been replaced by the new criteria of wealth and material possessions. In a consumerist set-up, 'social differentiation' as conceptualized by Jean Baudrillard (1998 [1983]) and myself (Mohan, 2001: 106–9), is signified by monetary power and ownership of glamorous homes, expensive consumer durables including the latest gadgetry, mobile phones, branded television sets for each member of the family, customized cars, etc. Other objects include designer clothes, shoes and accessories with American labels.

It must be pointed out that social differentiation may take the form of rejection of objects of consumption by the rich elite, who continue to remain the model for emulation in consumption for the lower social classes. By distancing themselves from objects used by the broad category of middle class, the upper segment continues to impose limits upon those who are likely to become their peers. They adopt new objects which are limited in number, such as authentic antiques or paintings, branded cut glass and gadgets. In short, hierarchy of social class has been transferred to the realm of objects, often used as status symbols.

Impact on lifestyle: Home space, food habits and body culture

Again, my empirical research shows that globalization of the electronic media, particularly of television driven by effective market advertisement strategies, has played a major role in shaping a hedonist mentality and blurring the distinction between basic needs and 'conspicuous consumption'. Technology has brought the world closer to home, but it has separated family members, especially senior citizens. It has effected change in people's sense of personal space. With every new channel in the post-satellite age, the middle-class families, having less discretionary income than the rich, are facing a dilemma. If one member wants to watch an India–Pakistan match, another wants to continue with a channel featuring the love affairs and lives of the *Bold and Beautiful* or the intrigues of the corporate families in *Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi* (Mother-in-Law Was at Some Time a Daughter-in-Law) and yet another may like to dance to MTV music, or watch *Sanskar* (a spiritual programme), or a news programme such as *Aaj Tak* (Hard Talk). Such different tastes regarding television programmes are likely to cause a clash of egos and interests. Obviously, everyone is asking for a private niche under one and the same roof.

Thus, these new demands, created by television as a tool of leisure that disseminates the consumerist culture, have created smaller homes within homes. The living and the dining room that used to be the centres of the house, are gradually becoming showpieces of a textbook picture of the happy family having similar tastes in food and leisure activities. The size and kind of family, whether large or small, extended or nuclear, no longer matter. Individual family members continue to grow bigger; the patriarch and the matriarch have moved to the margins, their children gravitate to the centre, and the grandchildren's egos become larger than life.

Apart from these walls within 'don't disturb zones', are coming up as increasing numbers of people choose to work at computers or writing desks in their apartments. Driven by market competition, young professionals prefer to communicate rather than commute. While communication within biological families has decreased, the trend of living isolated lives in close quarters has grown.

Bathrooms have also been turned into extravagant and whimsical statements as these are increasingly being put on display like living rooms. In the upper middle- and high-income homes, the doors of the bathrooms are usually left ajar in order to reveal the splendour of gold-plated plumbing and shining granite tiles. Thus, an ostentatious mind-set is increasingly evident in the lifestyle and homes of the rich elite as well as of the upper segment of the middle classes.

Another component of home space, influenced by glossy advertisement campaigns about hi-tech gadgetry, is the kitchen. As a result, architects, whether in high-rise, space-starved Mumbai, or more expansive Delhi, or the well-designed cities like Chandigarh, have been pushed to experiment with a variety of new kitchens: Italian, American or traditional Indian. Why? One of the major reasons is to accommodate expensive gadgets such as food processors, microwave ovens and refrigerators; another reason is the availability of abundant ready-made foodstuff and the need for cold storage; still another that different kinds of cuisines suit individual tastes in the family, again moulded by media-hype about the equation between a fashionable lifestyle and exotic food (Mohan, 2001: 113–18).

As for food habits, daily exposure to commercials about healthy foods, including easy-to-cook frozen vegetables or poultry, fruit juices and candies in colourful packing with images of non-stop enjoyment, has influenced the attitudes of viewers cutting across different age groups, social class and the rural–urban divide. It has led to a remarkable change in the composition of food and eating habits. The fast-spreading craze for buying food, fun and leisure-time in fast-food joints, restaurants, pubs, night clubs and discos indicates a drastic change in the notions of fun and social life.

The growth of so-called fast-food joints reflects the popular trend to 'grab a bite' at a place which provides exotic food items such as pizzas, hot dogs and burgers for shoppers in a hurry and young office workers who tend to eat out more often. It is being done in order to satisfy their craving for change from home-cooked or hostel food and to relax in cafes, snack bars and hot shops, where they can also listen to popular music, mostly imported western rock music. The popularity of fast-food joints can be attributed to a willingness to try new culinary delights as much as to the availability of sufficient income. No less important is the persistent craving for excitement, another ingredient of the consumerist mentality (Mohan, 2001: 119–24).

From the preceding discussion it is clear that over-consumption of food and eating out has become an integral part of the lifestyle of the affluent and upper middle-class segments of Chandigarh society as well as in other big cities. The cult of physical fitness, slenderness and cosmetic beauty has become another urgent need of the fast food consumers. It is not surprising that, during the past decade, the consumers' bodies and minds have become the sites of contest for the food entrepreneurs, the dispensers of health and beauty as well as for the fashion designers in this tinsel city. Thus, a large number of urban elites and the rich rural magnates in Asian countries have unwittingly become trapped in the consumerist whirlpool.

Television has played a crucial role in popularizing the display value of charmingly painted faces and perfectly shaped curvaceous female figures and athletic male bodies. Fashion and health magazines such as *Vogue*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Glad Rags*, *Femina* and city editions of vernacular and English-language dailies have sustained the campaigns for body culture through publication of colourful vignettes of models. That the media-savvy rich adults and their teenage sons and daughters are keenly receptive to the seductive messages is evident from the fast-growing clientele of six big health and beauty centres and 20 smaller ones established in residential units in various sectors of Chandigarh, suiting the pockets of different income groups.

It may be pointed out that in these centres of self-indulgence whether a food-joint or a fitness centre or a beauty parlour, emphasis is not on genuine qualities: beauty, natural charm, taste and self-worth but on conforming to a ready-made code or copying a model. Every one, man or woman, is constantly coaxed to find his or her own personality by living up to these models. It may also be noted that body maintenance routines, exercise, fitness, dieting, use of vitamin supplements, healthy foods, etc., are strongly marketed within consumer culture. These are important means to neutralize the consequences of excessive consumption of junk food and entertainment galore and to enable the revitalized consumer to enjoy endless rounds of sensual thrill and enjoyment (Berger, 2002: 23).

Conclusion

It is evident from the preceding discussion that ideals as well as values of Indian culture and those of the so-called global consumer culture are based on different worldviews, mental orientations, rhythms of life, perceptions of basic needs and goals. It has caused tensions between the advocates of the traditional outlook, beliefs, practices and lifestyles and the promoters of ceaseless adventure, novelty, excitement, fun and freedom of choice in material things. This represents 'individuation' in every moment of their lives rather than individualism (Berger and Huntington, 2002: 9).

Obviously, it is global corporate capitalism, the base of the formation of the global media system and its project of modernity, which has accentuated such cultural turbulence. The three great ideals of Indian culture are facing a serious challenge. First, the ethos of an ultra-urban industrial orientation militates against the ethos of an agricultural society and its close identification with local communities and family kinship ties. The mindset of a consumption-oriented and achievement-based view of life has disrupted the relatively peaceful character of community living. The colourful images of urban life on satellite television and Jeffrey Week's reference to legends of sexual encounters between strangers in trains, taxis and discos (Featherstone, 2004: 21), and their portrayals in films, magazines and novels have created a distaste for the simple pleasures of life and an urge for recasting values. Second, the externalization of modernity and its logic of technological manipulation of nature for humankind's continual well-being and value-neutral rationality go against the spiritual ethos of Indian culture. The process of objectification of nature, which is the most fundamental feature of modern scientific and technological enterprise, has not been integrated into the Indian outlook and way of life. Our cultural tradition views nature as an expression of cosmic order and not something to be objectified, controlled and exploited. As this tradition puts a premium on being environment-friendly, its relevance for alternative modernity cannot be doubted. Third, the ethos of western modernity, its cognitive arrogance, scientism and universality does not sit comfortably with heterogeneity, plurality and difference (Mohan, 1999: 221–2). Thus, there is an inherent clash between the homogenizing impulses of the highly consumption-oriented western modernity and the accommodative spirit of the Indian cultural tradition.

Trapped between the overweening ambition of grasping the glittering 'hyper real' world of affluence and the pulls of the familiar traditional world as well as the painful awareness of their limited material resources, the middle classes have been facing a dilemma. Among its upper segments, including the business elite, globe-trotting academicians, computer engineers, doctors and bureaucrats, the urge for adopting the western model in their professional careers is the strongest. While creating space for material status symbols and a variety of techno-objects in their personal lives, they have kept ideological and religious affiliations, marriage customs and other traditional aspects of their daily lives more or less separate and intact. This resistance to change in the inner domain has developed into a political and ideological struggle in Indian society. It has also been articulated by the potential aspirants to the 'Davos culture' in Samuel Huntington's phrase and the 'faculty club culture', i.e. the international business culture and world intellectual

culture (Berger and Huntington, 2002: 4–5). These people too are experiencing tensions owing to their uneasy location in the interstices between fantasy and reality. Thus, the middle classes, who have a 'demonstrative effect' on the lower social segments, are coping with a twofold dilemma: an intellectual and a pragmatic one.

First, let me analyse their multifaceted predicament at the intellectual level. In this context, Mike Featherstone's argument (in the present publication) is relevant for the resolution of this delicate problem. In his view, the process of globalization has facilitated by the means of digital communication the inclusion of new, emergent and unfamiliar issues and values in the ever-expanding storage capacity of global culture. It has also opened possibilities for reconstituting disciplinary boundaries and classification through increased interaction among intellectuals. Thus, development of this 'dialogical notion' of knowledge and values is crucial for the emergence of a new world order as well as liberal and gender-sensitive social formations in South Asia. The Euro-American nations, whose paradigm/perspectives on modernity and self-view as the guardians of ecological resources, global peace and progress have been put into question, need to be more responsive towards the poorer nations. Their being questioned has been intensified by the decisive shift in the balance of power in favour of South and East Asia. In view of their growing awareness regarding the relentless pursuit of militarist power and monopolization of biodiversity and energy resources, the western educated elite and non-resident Indians are not too sure in their advocacy of Euro-centric notions of market freedom, peace, development, human rights and global society.

Second, the intellectual predicament of the highly educated middle class elite is compounded by their pragmatic concerns and material interests such as luxurious lifestyles and lucrative jobs for their children as well as connections with political and business elites. Despite their critical view of the ideology underlying market fundamentalism and indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources by the developed countries, they tend to endorse the cultural power of the US that is transmitted through many channels. These are financial subsidies, research fellowships, academic exchange schemes, grants for research projects to university departments, NGOs and governments, and scholarships to individuals to study and train in American scientific and business institutions. While their keen ambition to become beneficiaries of these schemes obliges them to mute their criticism and follow codes and practices of the western (American) funding institutions and agencies, their personal lives remain firmly anchored in the traditional social norms, practices and cultural codes. Thus, they live in a transitional mode that leads to a feeling of 'homelessness' and alienation.

Further, tension between middle-class morality and the pull of hedonistic culture of the rich elite has resulted in teenage angst, anxiety and depression. A close reading of respondents' reactions revealed that the availability of high levels of excitement and fun in their leisure-time as children has invariably made the rich boys (and girls too) insensitive, aggressive and violent when denied anything by anybody.

As for the slum children and teenagers, while working as domestic servants and helpers in the homes of the affluent and the upper middle classes, they learn consumerist culture and behaviour. Living in this ethos, they also get infected by the incessant craving for more possessions, fashions and fads, because their well-off employers pass on to

them the discarded objects for daily use as status symbols. Thus, mass culture, which requires standardization of perceptions about fun, lifestyles, behaviour patterns and choice of products of daily use, spreads through the 'demonstrative effect'.

However, it would be unrealistic to conclude that all segments of the middle classes are lacking in critical temper, enterprise and cultural sensitivity. Being acutely conscious of contradictions and problems arising from the implementation of economic reforms, sensitive social scientists, environmentalists and professionals from various fields have, from the platform of World Social Forum and through the people's movements, consistently exposed the anti-poor, hedonistic and blatantly profit-oriented policies of the transnational companies and international agencies and institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and World Trade Organization. Their protest has been reinforced through sensitive exposition of Gandhi's sharp critique of highly consumption-oriented and exploitative industrial economy and its violent basis. Similarly, the growing appreciation of the positive Hindu view of the dependence of human welfare and prosperity on sustaining environmental resources has helped in setting up alternative strategies of development. It may be pointed out that the 'dialogic' process has been active throughout centuries in creating knowledge systems and the composite cultural tradition in India. As an integral part of the intellectual quest, the practice of theological discussion among competing religions facilitated the resolution of cultural and ideological predicaments flowing from encounters with different civilizations in India. In order to sustain the 'dialogic' process, development of cultural consciousness and awareness of strengths of other cultures, including western culture, is crucial.

The Indian response through the vehicles of popular culture to market fundamentalism as propagated by a variety of business enterprises (for example, Adidas, McDonald's, Disney, MTV and so on) is imaginative and worth mentioning. Despite the absence of media-hype in this case about ethnic eateries that provide pre-prepared items like pickles, *papad*, wafers and popular fast-food items such as *dosas*, *channa bhaturas* and popular north Indian curries, these businesses challenge Pizza Hut, McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and other rich multinational companies with their intensive advertisement campaigns in local idiom and flavour. They have made a niche in the US and Britain. Thus, as mentioned by Tulasi Srinivas, the indigenous food boom can be characterized as 'cultural emission' (cf. Berger and Huntington, 2002: 106).

Similarly, a variety of artistic Indian products such as jewellery, fabric designs, embroidered footwear and handicrafts have caught the imagination of world famous designers with an eye on potential business opportunities. Like the Indian calicoes (whose import was banned under the pressure of the textile manufacturers in Britain during the late 18th century), these artefacts have made a powerful cultural statement, while the western products, whether techno-objects, food, beverages or articles of personal use, disseminate the values of a 'throw-away' society: limitless craving for novelty, excitement and adventure. The Indian products are associated with an ever-renewing tradition, showing an intimate touch of manual skill and creative imagination that is replenished and enriched in the process of transmission from one generation to another.

It must be emphasized that the current conceptualization of globalization as linear and unilateral implantation of ideologies and values as a package with the transfer of

technologies, goods, trade and financial aid under the banner of 'development' and 'modernization' must be contested. I would like to draw attention to Gandhi's critique of British imperialism's version of globalization. While rejecting its underlying values, Gandhi has chartered a different path of modernity and value formation through creative experimentation and dialogue with other civilizations without being cut off from his roots. In this context, his insightful observation is instructive:

> I don't want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.

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Article

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Towards multicultural societies: The European experience

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Abstract

Migration at present produces, and will in the future, the encounter of populations belonging to cultures more diverse than ever before. Hence we are moving towards multicultural societies in different parts of the world. The article focuses on Europe and multicultural societies, as well as on the possibility of projects for intercultural societies. In such societies people belonging to different cultures learn to create dialogue by recognizing their own identity and that of other cultures. The article analyses the issue from the conceptual basis of unity and diversity. It also adopts a future-oriented perspective related to the capacity to devise 'seeds of change' which may generate visions and projects of and for multicultural or intercultural societies. It searches for evidence of European changes in relation to sociocultural dialogue among bearers of different identities and values leading to possible alternative sociocultural futures.

Keywords

cultures, Europe, intercultural societies, multicultural societies, values

The vision of multicultural societies is associated with hope for the future but also with fear and apprehension. Human societies may evolve towards much more peaceful coexistence of culturally diverse peoples, however ethnic and religious tensions, conflicts, instances of genocide and wars of the past as well as the conflicting trends in present societies are not reassuring. Theoretically I am concerned with the possibilities of unity and diversity of cultures, which have been debated in a variety of different ways and contexts (Barbieri Masini, 1993). Since the Second World War, we have witnessed much change in political and economic realities in the developed and developing countries. Political independence and freedom does not necessarily lead to social and economic freedom, and inversely, despite the hopes of many and visions of the future in

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terms of understanding differences, unity in economic issues does not necessarily extend to unity in social and political issues and much less so in cultural issues. It is here that the importance of values emerges as a beacon of new hope for the future.

The goal of this article is to trace and examine various trends that may affect multicultural or intercultural societies as well as the 'seeds of change' that are already visible particularly in Europe and in African countries and Latin America as well. Further, the article is much concerned with visions of the future as discussed in futures research. In my discussion of culture, I distinguish between *multiculturality* and *interculturality*. The article concludes with some thoughts on the conditions that will be necessary in order to stabilize development towards multicultural or intercultural societies. The two underlying assumptions of this thought on sociocultural life concern the qualities of unity and diversity of cultures that exist together and the idea of human agency. Culture and its change are human-made. Let us start with a definition of culture.

The UNESCO definition of culture

The definition of culture has changed since the 18th century from one related to knowledge to one focusing on anthropological understanding. The definition of culture embraced by UNESCO in Mexico City, which was later adopted by many authors, is as follows: 'Culture ought to be considered today as the collection of distinctive traits, spiritual and material, intellectual and affective which characterize a society or a social group. It comprises besides arts and letters, modes of life, human rights, value systems, traditions and beliefs' (UNESCO, 1982).

Culture understood in anthropological terms has the character of plurality and is supposed to be dynamic in nature. However, the above definition of culture apparently obscures the possibility of global ethics, that is, a global system of values, which is crucial for the future of the world. Focusing on social groups and the need to assert and solidify cultural identities leads to greater diversity. This trend is evident in many parts of the world. As a consequence of migration, expatriated ethnic and religious groups tend to assert themselves and their cultural diversities. This tendency impedes dialogue, which is difficult when identities are not mutually recognized.

A similar doubt arises from the thoughts of Eric Fromm (1956), who understands 'social character' as a system of values that, interiorized by all those belonging to a social group, guides its behaviour. The importance of the internalization of values is beyond doubt, but the question that arises is: How can people interiorize values in multicultural settings?

We can speak of two simultaneous trends in the world today, one towards more unity and another towards more diversity. As regards the first trend, western culture since the Second World War has become much more powerful, changing aspirations, values and behaviours. As the anthropologist and political scientist Denis Goulet has pointed out, there is a push towards the standardization of cultures and values that is driven by powerful forces. To quote: 'These forces homogenize, dilute and relegate diverse cultures to a purely ornamental, vestigial or marginal position in society' (Goulet, 1994: 30). According to his view, technology (including the technologies of mass media communication) is one such powerful force. Presently one has to add even more powerful forces that derive from 'convergence' in the fields of cognitive sciences, biotechnology, nanotechnology

and communication technologies that today are influencing human existence itself as well as human relations. Again according to Goulet, another force is the nation-state, which is legalistic, bureaucratized and centralized, and still another standardizing process is the managerial organization of corporations. These processes oppose globalization.

The second trend points towards the increase of differences between and within many parts of the world. Peoples and societies experience conflict due to diversity perceived in sociocultural terms. The instances of diversity range from economic polarization between the rich and poor to divergences in faith and religion, often resulting in tension, conflict, and in some cases, war.

Although we are much aware of rapid changes in the areas of technology, economy and politics, we often fail to realize that cultural changes are much slower; they lag behind and create psychological and social tensions. In the 1970s and 1980s, Aurelio Peccei, one of the founders of the Club of Rome, used to say that as human beings we constantly look for technological and economic renewal before we are ready for it. This still seems to be true today.

There is another issue concerning unity and diversity: Are civilizations destined to clash as Huntington (Huntington, 1996) suggests? Clashes are by no means excluded but, given the many differences in values, attitudes and behaviours in the various cultures, it is more accurate to see the different sociocultural contexts and to consider what I have called *the seeds of change* that may be beneficial to human development. Authors who have discussed seeds of change are Ashis Nandi and Giri Deshinkar (Nandi and Deshinkar, 1993). They stress the importance of looking for resistance to the erosion or destruction or assimilation of cultures. There are numerous examples of this reaction in the Middle East, in some Latin American countries, among the aboriginal populations of Australia and in Europe: the Basque region, Spain, the Balkans and even Romania and the Transylvanian people, who recognize themselves as Hungarian. These are only a few examples of seeds of change, some of which I discuss later. Certainly, cultural resistance may give rise to fragmentation, but such developments should be watched for their positive potential of creating alternative futures.

Seeds of change and visions of the future

Two aspects concerning sociocultural issues are important in futures research: examination of the seeds of change and visions of the future. First, futures research stresses a focus on the signs of change that are palpable in societies and may lead to better alternatives than those that are foreseeable as a continuation of a present trend. It is a serious mistake of analysts and of decision-makers not to consider the potential of those seeds of change that in the long run may lead to social improvements unthinkable at the moment. Examples of this type of thinking are Nyerere's proposal of cooperation between Africa and other developing countries (which perhaps came too early) and the initiatives for establishing peace by Mandela and Archbishop Tutu in South Africa. Similar significance can be attributed to the solidarity groups among women that emerged recently in Afghanistan, Iran, Palestine, Colombia and Rwanda (Barbieri Masini, 1999). Such seeds take time to grow, but change for the better always needs time. The point is that alternatives and opportunities are often overlooked. It is one task of futurists to discover the

seeds of change in a world of contradictions, to recognize and defuse those that may result in conflict and violence and support those that harbour a beneficial intention.

Second, 'visions of the future' are no less useful. To begin with, what are visions in this context? I proposed a definition with which I have worked for a long time in my futures research (Barbieri Masini, 1983). It runs as follows: 'Visions of the future are stimuli to change the present.' Today I would add: visions are thoughts based on the possibilities and non-possibilities one becomes aware of in the present, which may or may not lead to a desired result in the future but which should not be overlooked in terms of alternatives. This view of visions of the future is similar to that of the seeds of change referred to above, but it is more positive with respect to the future. It stresses the necessity of value change.

To further explain the point of value change, I describe what I consider to be the ethical and methodological basis of futures thinking in relation to culture, drawing on the work of the philosopher Peter Henrici (Henrici, 1977). According to Henrici, we must distinguish among three levels: (1) something is changing; (2) something may change; and (3) something must change. The first level, *something is changing*, refers to the past and the present. Here strong support of social sciences (history, sociology, etc.) is required in order to make careful analysis possible. It is at the second level, *something may change*, that futures thinking becomes particularly important. It is best described that change may occur *if*. Something may happen if such and such a trend continues, if such and such an event occurs, or if such and such a decision is taken in the present. It concerns a normative approach that includes values (this is the meaning of the normative in futures research) and can therefore spark an alternative vision. The third level, *something must change*, is the core of a vision. Here values are the most central point. It involves the search for something that must change on the basis of value selection and decision. It is here that the knowledge of the past and the present joins the desirable through choosing and structuring the future. In other words, it is a project for the future.

It must be stressed that visions are not static but dynamic. They change with sociocultural transformations, albeit not completely. There is always a component that does not change: human survival. But if a vision is to be fulfilled, it must become a project with a strong basis in the present and the past. It must be creative and able to effect change.

A comparative project worked out at the Gregorian University concerning the vision of peace in Colombia and visions of intercultural dialogue in Italy demonstrated that a vision must be based on careful interdisciplinary analysis of the past and the present (Angulo et al., 2000). A vision must be transformed into a project in order to realize that vision. Thus, such is the role of the futurist: transforming visions into projects of possible and probable developments that may lead to actual sociocultural change.

The sociocultural situation in Europe

Before discussing alternative futures of Europe and in terms of its present cultural situation, let us start by drawing a distinction between multiculturality and interculturality, two notions that refer to the sharing of one and the same territory.

First, the notion of multiculturality denotes an awareness of different ethnic groups that coexist in the same territory, who claim equal recognition. This notion emerged in

the mid-1980s in the US and then spread to Europe, where it affected social movements that were critical of traditional cultures. These movements promoted alternative lifestyles in a period that was characterized by extensive migration and intensification of the globalization process. Interrelation and intermixing of cultures occurs in all times but what is new today is that unrelated cultures coexist, each of them demanding equality and rejecting hegemony of one culture over the others. This situation characterizes a multicultural society. The ethnic groups in this case have neither intention nor desire for any kind of cultural exchange. It tends to occur when different ethnic collectivities, which enjoy no common history and no common culture, live in the same social space. There is tolerance and mutual respect but little exchange.

Second, interculturality involves not only tolerance and respect but also reciprocity and exchange. Interculturality does not come about by chance. It needs project action, for example specific intercultural education and proposals for interaction. Interculturality is seen as a process that tries to avoid confusion. It is a dynamic interchange because the involved collectivities remain in part true to their different cultural identities. It is a process that requires constant efforts to manage conflicts and reactivate cooperation. One might say that interculturality is a goal, an endeavour that might start from a multicultural situation of tolerance and respect and that develops the awareness that all are parts of the same whole. It connotes *the vision* of planetary human beings, adopting universal values.

Proceeding to our discussion of the European situation itself, it must be done in analytical and prescriptive terms. In other words, we need to describe and analyse the situation empirically and think of policies that are useful or necessary for managing cultural differences and interests. Simply put, we need to see and evaluate what is happening.

Two related phenomena appear to be highly relevant for the future of Europe: one concerns the various migrations from other countries and continents and the other concerns the demographic structure of Europe.

First, contemporary migrations are in part linked to the recent history of the countries involved. Cases in point are migrations from Pakistan and India to the UK, from Algeria and Tunisia to France and from Latin America and Morocco to Spain.

Migrations also have taken place from Turkey and Tunisia to Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall has affected much movement of people within and to Germany since 1989, especially from the Eastern European countries. As for migration to Italy, it started in the 1980s from the so-called colonial countries in Africa such as Somalia and Ethiopia and was followed by the extended immigration from Eastern Europe and more recently from various African countries, mainly channelled through Libya.

Second, migrations relate to the specific population structure of Europe. Some basic data illustrate this point. In 2008, the world population amounted to 7.055 billion, 28 percent of which were under the age of 15. In the same year, the population of the developed countries was 1.227 billion with 17 percent under 15, while the total population of the developing countries (including China) amounted to 5.479 billion, of which 30 percent are below 15 years of age (World Population Bureau, 2008). To be added to these enlightening figures is that 7 percent of the world's population is aged over 65, while that proportion in the developed countries is 16 percent and in the developing countries only 6 percent. We may therefore say that the global population structure shows very

clearly what lies behind the so-called push and pull factors of migration. The population of the developed world is ageing and needs labour, while that of the developing countries is young and needs food, education and jobs.

These facts are underlying the migration phenomenon, and its consequences are being felt. Looking at Europe in the world context as a whole we see that its population in 2008 was 736 million, of which 16 percent are below 15 years of age and 16 percent over 65. Here we see a clear indication of the low level of generation substitution. Although there has been a slight increase in the population under age 15 in the years 2005–6 owing to immigration, the population over 65 is exactly the same percentage as the youngest age bracket. It shows an ever decreasing number of people of working-age if not compensated by immigration. At the same time, it is evident that the burden of welfare is growing for the younger cohorts.

Then, looking at the future and the main indicator of total fertility rate (TFR) in 2008, we find that this is 2.6, at the world level, but at the European level it is only 1.5 and lower than in other developed parts of the world. These demographic data clearly show that Europe urgently requires immigration for its economic as well as social development.

Establishing permanent residence is a relatively recent phenomenon that started when large numbers of people began to leave Europe for the Americas and Australia at the start of the 20th century. It was then, in fact, that passports and visas were introduced to regulate the flow of people among the countries. The greatest waves of migration took place after the Second World War.

Migration is always related to push and pull factors. The above refers mainly to the former, but pull factors are equally important with respect to developed countries, particularly to Europe, given its demographic situation and its very low intergeneration substitution.

A classic example of the pull factor phenomenon was Germany in the 1960s, when this country encouraged immigrants to come and work in its manufacturing industries, but later found it difficult to regulate continuing immigration. A second striking example is the aforementioned migration from Eastern to Western Germany. Another pull factor of migration is the appeal of immigrant networks of families, who summon their kin and friends to join them in the host country when more jobs become available in the same area. Italy provides a good example of this case. This country has many networks of immigrants from the Philippines, from China and from regions such as the Magreb and Sri Lanka, and more recently, from other countries in North Africa as well as from Romania since that country's entry into the European Union.

Thus far, I have focused mainly on Europe, which is one of the strongest poles of migration after the US and Canada. The European countries with the highest levels of immigration are: Germany, the UK, France, Spain and Italy (Caritas, 2007). However, similar issues of culture exist in other parts of the world. Latin America is an interesting example. It has much internal movement of people and emigration to Central American countries and Mexico. The characteristics of this case are that these populations have a similar culture with common Christian roots as well as that migration tends to be caused by difficult political situations. The same applies more or less to movements within Africa, where also natural disasters play a major role.

What has the future in store? The United Nations Population Division reports that, at the world level in 1960, expatriated people amounted to 76 million; 175 million in 2000 and 191 million in 2005, almost 3 percent of the world's population, then, of 6.6 billion (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). To this, one may add that almost half of all migrants are women (49.6 percent) and that the main reasons for the increase in migrants are conflicts and environmental disasters. The UN estimates that migration flows will remain high until at least the middle of the 21st century, with a median increase at the global level of 2 million per year. Thus, this is a major trend that seems to be irreversible for a considerable time to come, so that it can be foreseen that migrants will have a considerable cultural impact on the local populations, while they themselves will be affected by living in different cultural settings.

Conditions of Europe's alternative development

For centuries different ethnic groups and cultures have settled in Europe. Is it likely that this continent will realize cultural integration, or instead proudly retreat to its past? Whatever the outcome, Europe has to start with the recognition of its present identity. If it is to find a new identity as the European Union, moving towards economic and political unity, incorporating a sense of cultural unity, of mutual belonging and common citizenship, the first condition is that it searches for values that can be shared. For many, a place to look for is the centrality of the human person, human rights as well as human responsibilities, and above all, peace in its own territory. It is a goal to be adopted at various levels of decision-making, by citizen groups, by social researchers and those developing social policies, and even more importantly, by educational institutions, where the issues can be debated in relation to an enlarging Europe. It is an urgent issue, given the fact that many young people from different cultures and religions are already living daily together.

Some signs of solidarity (Quaderni di Athenaeum, 2003) and what I called the seeds of change certainly point towards a multicultural Europe. We already have many mosques in Europe – in Catholic Italy there over 200 of them. In some cases these are set up in existing buildings with the support by local authorities. There is growing respect in Italy for religious practices that did not previously exist in the country. Furthermore, there are groups belonging to cultures from other parts of the world, for instance the Tunisian community in Sicily, which has its own schools and social services. This is also the case of Germany and the UK, where migrations of longer standing and their initiatives seem to be growing despite the hostility that is also daily expressed in the media.

Sociologist Saskia Sassen (Sassen, 1998) discusses the phenomenon of an increasingly close connection between the global and the local, which bypasses the national level and builds a new kind of citizenship. She looks at this possibility mainly in relation to socioeconomics in urban environments, in particular, the mega-city of Sao Paulo in Brazil. I believe that, in some way, her views extend to Europe in sociocultural terms. Sassen describes and focuses her analysis on the actual presence of workers from different ethnic groups in that city. Economically, these groups create links between the local and the global via a workforce composed of people of different cultures, thus creating a common citizenship. Extrapolating this with a stretch of the imagination to the European context, one may surmise that, given the

common problems and issues of survival related to the importance of the family, children's health, education and other problems that all people face, the coexistence of culturally diverse people who work and live at the local level might interconnect not only economically but also in sociocultural terms.

On top of the awareness that Europe's survival is threatened by demographic trends, those sociocultural considerations may mitigate national resistance to migrant labour. Another sign of the birth of a multicultural society is that the symbols of the nation-state are losing strength in Europe on the way towards unification. Ulrich Beck (2004), at a conference in Rome, mentioned that Europe, unlike the US, whose main preoccupation is with terrorism, is more concerned with climate change and related issues. However, the issues of sociocultural coexistence are similarly crucial. Given that Europe, after the US and Canada, has the third highest incidence of immigration in the world, it is vital that it should perceive itself in a more realistic global context from a sociocultural point of view.

The second condition for gradually moving away from conflict and realizing a multicultural society is 'informed dialogue' (Gidoomal, 2003). In other words, dialogue cannot proceed from mere perceptions of people. It must be based on who people actually are, on what they actually think and what they do. This means that both sides, receivers and migrants, must move beyond ignorance and prejudice as well as fear and oversimplification. But situations differ according to the receiving country. In the UK there are many immigrant people from the country's colonies, who have different customs and religious beliefs, but who generally speak English. This is also true for France but definitely not for Italy and Germany. The situation is different for migrants from Ukraine and Romania to Italy. Some weak historical and linguistic ties exist for Romania but not for Ukraine. When cultural ties are weak or absent, the potential for conflict is much greater.

A third condition can be said to be pertinent action at institutional and decision-making organizational levels. Educational and informal initiatives too are highly important. In fact, there are numerous examples of such efforts in all the European countries. If the European Commission could coordinate these efforts, they could even better contribute to the creation of a multicultural society, and in the long term, perhaps after two generations or so, to an intercultural society that mutually recognizes differing identities. This certainly would greatly increase the possibility of the second condition of dialogue.

A major challenge of the 21st century for Europe and for the world as a whole is a sociocultural one: the alternatives are a situation with continuing tension and conflict, or peaceful coexistence, or a situation that fosters reciprocal exchange. It is a matter of projects and decision-making. Yet, safeguarding its history and traditions and keeping a unique European identity in relation to the other continents is a challenge that requires understanding of the global context.

These are the challenges that sociologists and other social scientists should face. Instead of discussing culture in anthropological terms, it is crucial to analyse the sociocultural issues of the people in different contexts, from both descriptive and holistic approaches. Social scientists should engage in interdisciplinary approaches that are useful to decision-makers in order to prevent conflict and suffering. One specific

sociological concern is the individualization process in the present and foreseeing it in future societies; another is the analysis of values, that is, a concern for ethics and community with respect to the ongoing multicultural and intercultural efforts as well as their consequences.

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Values and the conditions of global communication

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Abstract

This article examines the role of values in the shaping of futures from the perspective of global communication. It argues that the prospects for a democratic world society depend on the creation of global deliberative publics as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition. It explores how the new media that facilitate globalization of trade and production can also provide technical infrastructures for grassroots dialogue across borders. The contrast between alternative trajectories is used to indicate the stakes and available value choices. Rejecting resilient notions of technological determinism, the article analyses how different social actors create the new mediascapes according to diverging values and abilities of involvement. Corporate interests command more resources and better access to law-makers and treaty negotiators, but users and civil society initiatives can increase leverage through imaginative practices and value appeals.

Keywords

deliberation, democracy, globalization, Internet, new media, publics, values

This article explores the role of values in the shaping of futures from the perspective of global communication. It focuses on the New Information and Communication Technologies (NICT), including the Internet and related media, as these are setting critical conditions for global social discourse. The emerging new mediascapes are at the very heart of the current wave of globalization. It is clear that they facilitate the global flows of financial values and the global coordination of production and services but to what extent do they also facilitate thriving global commons for debating the actual shape of globalization and the values that govern it? Insofar as democracy depends on the vitality of public debate it is important to analyse in this era of advanced globalization the very conditions of global communication. How are these being set and with what social implications?

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I argue that the rise of NICT does not simply follow some kind of automatic, merely technologically determined principles but rather involves a series of value decisions that could be made one way or another. I begin the article with brief discussions of the notion of values and the general expectations that were projected onto the new media. Next I examine fundamental empirical data to provide a sense of the magnitude of change and patterns of development over time. Thus prepared, I analyse the social shaping of the new publics with a focus on value decisions while connecting the micro, meso and macro levels. In the conclusion, I discuss the social implications of current NICT trends and point to the stakes of future development with the aim of orienting normatively relevant questions for social research.

Debating values

Before delving into the empirical investigations, a few cursory remarks about the meaning of values are necessary. This is of course not the occasion to develop a comprehensive theory of values or to even attempt at settling on a definition. Instead, the notion of values is used rather loosely as a cluster concept around meaning elements of normative importance. Individuals and collectivities define identities through values. Identities change as values change. Values are part of a larger 'cultural toolkit' (Swidler, 1986), inherently linked to social space (Harvey, 1997: 12), and typically interlaced with larger worldviews and styles (White, 1993). What sets values apart, at least analytically, if not empirically, is their normative content. Values are as diverse as authenticity, care, equality, freedom, justice, faith, respect, money, or any cherished commodities. Values and their interpretations may be in tension with one another. Existing values provide a simultaneously enabling and restraining repertoire for making sense of life and actions. At the same time, these repertoires can change, often almost unnoticeably slowly, but sometimes abruptly, such as during an individual's conversion to a religious faith or a cultural revolution advocated by a new generation. Values are created through different modes and scales of interaction, ranging from reflective moments of an individual's inner dialogue to decades-long cultural battles. The networks connecting the actors of value formations and transformations are in constant flux themselves. What interests here may be captured in the juxtaposition between cooperative values and exclusionary values. Whereas the former are associated with a culture of mutual recognition and sharing, the latter prioritize conflict and accumulation.

Sociology has been recurrently concerned since its beginnings with what could be described as an inversion of means and ends as a root cause of modern society's malaise. Albeit theorizing from different perspectives, classic writers from Marx (1955 [1867]) to Simmel (2004 [1900]) could be said to have converged in finding monetary values dominating over moral values, i.e. crystallized values over living values. Weber (2002 [1904/5]), who was equally concerned with the rise of the modern administrative state, spoke of an 'iron cage' of curtailed rationality. Habermas (1984/7 [1981]) later mobilized the vision of non-alienated communicative interaction as a counterforce to this 'colonization of the lifeworld'. Honneth (1996), more focused on deformations from within civil society, pointed to the need for mutual recognition in the 'moral grammar' of social struggles. Considering today's realities of violent geopolitics, neoliberal economics and continued group

discrimination, anything seems helpful that could foster dialogue among the multitude about ideas, values, visions, and the utopian moments to improve the present. In this sense, the new media seem to be particularly promising tools for connecting a wide range of actors across space and in a plurality of formats, including those that are less mobile in physical space due to restrictions such as travel costs or national borders.

Of course, the mere existence of a communication platform does not guarantee its being used to create harmony or even understanding. The availability of an accessible public sphere is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for democracy (Arendt, 1970; Calhoun, 1992; Dewey, 1927; Habermas, 1992 [1962]). As Tocqueville had already argued in his classic study *Democracy in America* (1990 [1835/40]), communication media are necessary to bridge the vast distances and facilitate a deliberative public as a safeguard against tyranny. While he had only the national spaces of one country in mind, the problems of today require a global public. Global development can hardly be democratized without thriving commons of global proportions. As important as national newspapers were for Tocqueville, a global media infrastructure is what is needed today. Such media must go beyond mere broadcasting of elite pronouncements and allow public deliberation.

Unresolved global problems demand global cooperation and raise the question of where the public dialogues about values could take place to orient global development (cf. Apel, 2000). Geopolitical and economic elites communicate through the channels of diplomacy and at venues such as the United Nations, the Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the boardrooms of transnational corporations. Global grassroots communication takes place in such diverse formats as international migration, tourism, activist gatherings, consumptive mass media and, increasingly important because of its global scale and interactive potential, the Internet.

New media expectations: From dreams to nightmares, and beyond

Great enthusiasm has accompanied the rise of the new media since their inception and especially since the Internet took off in the early 1990s. Since then, scepticism has replaced the earlier euphoria. The spectres of panoptic surveillance and commercial enclosures of the digital commons have dashed the high hopes for a harmonious 'global village' of culturally empowered citizen-users. Critics warned of the new media's repressive potential, pointing to a future of universal surveillance, not only by an Orwellian 'big brother' government but also by private corporations (Lyon, 2001; Sassen, 2000). The notion of an unavoidable 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) gained in popularity through the events associated with September 11, 2001. The fear of cyber-terrorism was employed to justify unprecedented security measures. The diffusion of the new media, which was once regarded as a virtual automatism, turned out to be a much more complicated matter.

Hopes for a better future are often projected onto the latest technologies. This was the case with railroads, airplanes, television, and now with the Internet. These technologies promised to connect people and thus foster mutual understanding, appreciation and cooperation. Disillusionment set in when these same technologies were employed in wars and for domination. Likewise, the idea that the Internet and related new media technologies

could provide the conditions for a more harmonious global future has lost much of its appeal. How can we assess empirically the new media's potential and their limitations? What role can it play in bridging local discourses over vast distances and across boundaries? What potential can it unleash in weaving the web of meaning through which human life and nature are experienced and through which the conditions of authority and the repertoires for struggles are assembled? The juxtaposition of sharply contrasting visions points to the high stakes in the making of these alternative futures and to the question of how the outcomes are being influenced. However, before delving into the complex processes that produce our technological conditions for global communication, let us first gain some empirical grounding in available data that show the extent and patterns of NICT's rise.

New media diffusion in global and comparative perspective

By the end of 2007, the global cyberspace of the Internet was populated by more than 1.3 billion users worldwide, according to the Miniwatts Marketing Group (2008), which based its estimates on figures published by Nielsen/NetRatings, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other respected sources. More reliable than estimated user numbers are counts of Internet host computers. A January 2008 count by Network Wizards put the figure for host computers worldwide at above 540 million (ISC, 2008). Less than three decades ago, in August 1981, there were only 213 hosts, which were accessed by not more than a few thousand users (ITU, 1999; Zakon, 2002). According to a widely shared assumption, the price for Internet access is bound to decline further with competitive mass production of the necessary hardware and, as a consequence, the number of the users is expected to continue its rapid rise. Current trends have been seen as strongly suggesting that Internet access will sooner or later be just as common in the industrialized zones of the world as newspaper, radio and television are today, while there may be at least a partial convergence of these media. However, prognoses that predicted constant annual growth rates of 100 percent for the early years of the new century (Odlyzko, 2001) have already proved wrong.

Although the Internet can already be accessed in virtually every country of the world, the distribution of access is very uneven. Internet access in the financially weaker countries still continues to be largely restricted to educated urban elites. This is especially true for African countries between Sahara and the Republic of South Africa. Latin America takes an intermediate position, as there are some countries with little infrastructure and others that are developing rapidly.

At the end of 2007, more than half of the world's estimated Internet users were based in wealthy member-countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but fewer than 10 percent in Latin America and, even fewer, under 4 percent, in all of Africa (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2008). A breakdown of the more reliable host counts shows a similar imbalance. At the end of 2004, an estimated 85 percent of the world's 265 million Internet host computers were in North America and Europe, but only 2.5 percent in Latin America and a mere 0.16 percent in Africa, where most were concentrated in the Republic of South Africa (ITU, 2005). Recent user estimates published by ITU (2005) indicate that as a worldwide average there are 13.86

Internet users per 100 persons. The corresponding figures for the US and Canada are 62 and 63 percent, for Europe 31.8, for Australia/Oceania 51.7, Asia 8.3 and Africa 2.6 percent. There are also great disparities within regions. Taking Latin America, for example, the corresponding user estimates range from 27.9 percent in Chile and 23.5 percent in Costa Rica down to 2.5 percent in Paraguay and 2.2 percent in Nicaragua, while the most populous countries, Brazil and Mexico, have averages of 12.1 and 13.4 percent respectively (ITU, 2005).

It can be expected that the share of less represented regions will rise as the penetration rates in North America and Europe approach saturation levels, yet these uneven distribution figures need to be kept in mind when discussing the rise of the new media. Until recently, only one-third of the world's Internet users resided outside OECD countries, while of the world's broadband users, it is less than a fifth (OECD, 2005). More striking yet is the imbalance when looking at the access opportunities in the poorest countries. As the OECD (2005) observed, the 45 least connected countries, together, have had no more international connectivity than a single high-end user with a 100 mega bits per second broadband line in Japan. Yet the meaning of centre and periphery does not neatly coincide with national borders, if it ever did. Educated urban elites in countries with softer currencies appear on the same side of the digital divide as the middle classes of wealthier countries. Digital inequalities exist across and within countries.

The problem of digital inequalities

Whereas much of the early sociology of cyberspace has focused on domestic aspects of leading OECD countries, this article advocates a global and comparative perspective that takes into account the experiences and conditions of both centre and periphery. The restructuring of communicative relations is global, though not globally uniform. Regulation, usage and impact of NICT vary widely between world regions, across and within countries. Current trends point to highly unequal chances for participating in the emerging network structures and public spheres of incipient global civil society (Castells, 1996; Luke, 2000; Sassen, 1997; Schulz, 2001a; Wellman, 1999). The modes of NICT implementation and regulation at national and global levels have a crucial impact upon the distribution of access chances, access quality and opportunities for usage.

Important studies of Internet access in the US during the late 1990s pointed to a 'digital divide' along the lines of income, education, age, gender and rural/urban (US Department of Commerce, 1995, 1998). According to more recent data, however, these divides are tending to disappear, except for the most disadvantaged parts of the population, including the poor and the disabled (US Department of Commerce, 2000). Yet digital inequalities are not only a matter of having or not having basic access, but also a qualitative issue that also has educational and socioeconomic aspects, beyond technological aspects narrowly conceived. What one can do with access depends on the bandwidth and speed, on navigational skills (Hargittai, 2003) and the capacities to process information critically and communicate effectively within multi-media environments. In addition, more and more commercial service sites require extra-payments for access. The expanding corporate intranets are password protected and off-limits to outsiders (Sassen, 1997). Whereas findings valid for the US case might not be totally different from those

for other postindustrial countries, these cannot be further generalized to cover the situation in the global South which seems to be strikingly different.

Why are digital inequalities a problem? Are there not more urgent concerns in countries in which basic needs for clean drinking water, nutrition, sanitation, shelter, healthcare and basic education are not met? Is not the diffusion of new technologies just a matter of the time it takes to trickle down to the late-comers? The problem we are witnessing is a widening of the gap between those who are well-off and those who are marginalized and excluded. Those who can connect to cyberspace can use it to their social, economic and political benefit. For example, marginalized producers have been able to find through the Internet international buyers for their goods, thus gaining the ability to get around powerful local intermediaries. A famous example for the political potential is the case of the Zapatista rebels in Chiapas, who gained worldwide attention and mobilized unprecedented solidarity when their cause was relayed by supporters onto the Internet (see Schulz, 1998, 2001b, 2001c for more detailed discussions). Cases such as these illustrate that access to global means of information and communication can translate into the political and economic strength necessary for improving existing living conditions.

The social distribution of formal and effective NICT access results from pronounced socioeconomic inequality and, at the same time, causes further inequality. Digital gaps emerge between the well- and best-connected vis-a-vis the under- or not-connected. Those who are excluded from access are at a disadvantage relative to those who are connected. This is true both economically, because they cannot access profitable knowledge and useful contacts, and politically, because they cannot use these media for generating communicative power. Digital inequality, thus, is not an irrelevant 'luxury' kind of inequality. It is not only an additional dimension of social inequality but it increases the existing inequalities. The already marginalized parts of the population are exposed to the acute danger that digital marginalization will marginalize them even further. Having pointed to the stakes involved in the formation of the new global mediascape, I now examine more closely the processes by which these are created.

Values, agency and technology

The theoretical perspective employed here rejects not only the resilient assumptions of technological determinism but also one-sided political-economic structuralism and outright voluntarism. To be sure, one-sided perspectives can have the heuristic merit of recognizing through exaggeration the significance of underappreciated factors, such as in White's (1966) seminal work on the stirrup's impact on feudal society. In their influential works, Innis (1951) and, later, McLuhan (1964), pointed out that all societies are profoundly shaped by the particular propensities of specific communication technologies. Ellul (1964) argued that in modernity, technology had taken over and turned humans into its servants. These types of arguments are enormously important not only for scientific discourse but also for the normative debate about what kinds of media technologies might have more preferable social implications. However, the problem with technological determinism, especially in its popular varieties, is that it lets technological change appear as a quasi-natural process that is beyond the reach of public deliberation. One-sided

economistic approaches fall into the same trap (see discussion in Elster, 1983). Equally, one-sided voluntaristic approaches exaggerate the role of individuals in genius inventor accounts and underestimate the power of structures.

These deficiencies can be overcome through a more holistic approach that balances structure and agency in its study of how social shaping processes are accomplished by diverse social actors who are embedded in institutional and structural contexts, which in turn provide both limits and resources for creative action. This approach is able to highlight contingent value decisions at crucial intersections of development and the power constellations that made them possible. The approach draws on technology studies by Latour (1987), Bijker (1995), Nissenbaum (1998), MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999) and, more generally, the agency and structure balancing work of Giddens (1984) and Emirbayer and Mische (1998) and the future-oriented approaches of Jouvenel (1967), Boulding (1969) and Bell (2003). How NICT are shaped is thus seen as the outcome of a complex interplay of social forces. These forces include socioeconomic structures, legal frameworks, political systems, cultural patterns, the options and constraints set by previous technologies and the agency locatable in a range of social actors with differential means of influence (see Kubicek et al. [1997] and Wilson and Kahin [1997] for the US and Europe; Herzog et al. [2002] and Schulz [2001a] for Latin America). Among the contextually embedded social actors involved in these more or less contentious shaping processes are transnational corporations with interests in software, hardware and e-commerce, intergovernmental organizations and international treaty frameworks, political-administrative elites, domestic legal frameworks and courts of jurisdiction, domestic corporations and lobby groups, NGOs, users, consumers and civil society initiatives, all with differential interests, resources, imaginary capacities and strategies acting in changing contexts and constellations. Several partly overlapping periods can be analytically distinguished in the development of the Internet according to which social actors took the lead, how they interacted and what underlying values shaped the technological outcomes.

Values and the social shaping of the Internet

The Internet's early history was shaped by cooperative values and public funding in the context of the Cold War. ARPAnet, the Internet predecessor, was funded by the US Department of Defense in an effort to bolster the American lead in research and technology after the Soviet Union's successful launching of Sputnik had indicated that the Cold War opponent was catching up. The concepts of a redundancy of links and the transmission of messages in smaller, flexibly switched packets had been developed in the 1960s at RAND, a think-tank close to the Pentagon, as part of a plan to set up a decentralized communication infrastructure that could survive the breakdown of some of its nodes in the scenario of a nuclear attack (Baran, 1964). Although initially hesitant to relinquish control over their computers by linking them to others, computer scientists rapidly recognized the benefits of such a network and developed a thriving culture of cooperation among colleagues at distant campuses (Abbate, 1999). ARPAnet was eventually transformed into the NSFnet, with funding provided by the National Science Foundation. The Cold War can thus be seen as having given impetus to the development of the Internet in

its early phase. The principle of publicly funded cooperation among research scientists was crucial. Moreover, the state-led development of ARPAnet and NSFnet has to be seen in connection with developments centred in the counter-culture of the Californian Silicon Valley and its ethics of sharing.

The values of free sharing, collaborative work and cosmopolitan outreach guided the second phase of computer networking in the 1970s to early 1990s. Silicon Valley computer scientists envisioned decentralized personal computers as alternatives to the big mainframes that only resource-rich institutions could afford. Linking their computers via conventional phonelines and modems, they developed an open culture of free content sharing and collaborative work on software codes. The sociable uses of the net gave rise to increasingly far-flung 'virtual communities', such as those on the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link, the electronic bulletin board system better known under its abbreviation as the WELL, which was founded in the Bay Area of San Francisco in 1985 by Stewart Brand and vividly described by Rheingold (1993). NGOs soon recognized the potential of these network technologies for their efforts to build linkages not only among activists across the US but also abroad. The San Francisco-based Association for Progressive Communication (APC) spearheaded outreach efforts to global civil society and played a pivotal role in setting up nodes in scores of countries around the world, in accordance with its cosmopolitan values.

Increased commercialization characterizes a third period in the Internet's development. It began in the early 1990s with the introduction of graphical user interfaces, which lowered the threshold of skills required for using a computer and facilitated navigation on the rapidly expanding World Wide Web. The Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), which was crucial for the construction of the World Wide Web, was developed with public funding in the European research centre CERN, but private companies took the lead in developing a plethora of software applications and in providing access to the net. America Online (AOL) and other companies became then the most popular access providers of the then privatized Internet for an exponentially increasing number of subscribers. The market for computers and software was soon dominated by IBM-compatible hardware and Microsoft's proprietary operating systems and applications. As the number of users began to represent an ever growing consumer market, advertising companies invented new techniques for sending out electronic spam, integrating pop-up ads on popular websites and collecting data profiles of users. The ability to freely exchange identical copies of digital content on the net alerted first the music and later also the film industry. Their lobby efforts led in the US to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which severely restricted previous rights to fair use of cultural content (Lessig, 2002; Vaidhyanathan, 2003). Large-scale non-commercial peer-to-peer file-sharing networks (P2P) were more or less effectively shut down and replaced by profit-seeking content providers. Corporations with vested interests in patents and copyrights had already exercised their influence on the Trade Round on Intellectual Property and Services (TRIPS) and model laws prepared by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Sell, 2003; UNCITRAL, 1998), which in turn were to shape the legal definitions of the participating countries (Schulz, 2002). The worldwide computer networks are the technology behind the global trade in financial derivatives and the accelerated circulation of capital. While

a taxation of these flows for funding supranational agencies and cooperative initiatives is possible, the political will to do so has not been mounted.

The market-based mode of development failed to solve the problems of digital inequalities and the needs of citizens for a global media infrastructure supportive of a democratic public sphere. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD continue to push countries towards privatization and liberalization of their telecommunication sectors, with the argument that competition brings down prices. Yet for competition to work, strong state regulation would be needed to create and enforce level playing fields. A private oligopoly that takes control of its regulatory agency is not necessarily performing any better than a well-run state provider. The main problem, however, in many poorer countries with a high degree of social inequality is that the impoverished sectors are not of much interest to commercial providers if these are left unregulated. And it would not solve the problem of how to access password-protected, subscription-only quality content or of how to provide the education for turning passive consumers into active users.

Worse still, large quantities of obsolete computers, monitors and other NICT garbage from the well-connected countries appear to be dumped in the absence of valid regulations for toxic waste under the rubric of 'recycling' in poorer countries, where they create environmental health hazards. It thus appears that the unfettered market forces that prevent people on the margins of the digital world from sharing the benefits of the cyber-age expose them at the same time to its externalized costs. In a recent study, the Basel Action Network (BAN), a Seattle-based NGO, estimated that three-quarters of the NICT products shipped to Nigeria for recycling are actually neither usable nor economically repairable and end up as unaccounted toxic waste, which is frequently discarded in poor shanty-towns (Puckett et al., 2005). This toxic waste regime is partly made possible by the fact that the US has neither ratified the Basel Convention, which would make such practices illegal, nor implemented equivalent regulation.

Meanwhile hopes are being projected on the next round of technologies. Wireless services are experiencing a boom now. The number of wireless phones has already surpassed the number of fixed phonelines. Although wireless connections are currently not as powerful as services via digital subscriber lines (DSL) or cable, it can be expected that they will be improved and eventually replace wired technologies. This presents opportunities especially in countries with less developed fixed line infrastructures but sufficient individual purchasing power.

Despite a doubling of its projected cost, the development of the much debated US$100 laptop computer could push up diffusion rates throughout the developing world and may help computer manufacturers expand beyond rapidly saturated markets. But it still leaves open the question of whether a low-end laptop user in Nicaragua, Bolivia, or Sub-Saharan Africa will have the same kind of access to the Internet as a high-end user in New York, Tokyo, or Zurich. It also leaves out the question of whether the low-end user will be able to engage in the same information and communication multi-media activities as the high-end counterpart or whether he or she will be a second-class citizen in cyberspace while being told to just wait for the next new technology to trickle down and solve any problem then.

Value decisions and the future

The development of the new mediascapes might have just entered a new period but its course and direction remain uncertain. That the future NICT will offer more capabilities and more bandwidth supportive of audiovisual content is easy to imagine, as leading research institutions are already building with public funding Internet2 as a high-speed successor to the established Internet. Current trends point to dominance by commercial and security interests but there are also important counter-trends. The US Department of Homeland Security that was set up in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington seems bound to assume increased control in the name of the war against terror. The Echelon system for the interception of international Internet communications through filters was already established prior to these attacks. Private companies are inventing ever new technologies for collecting data on consumers in a legal environment which does not provide effective protection. An anti-trust suit against Microsoft was discontinued by the federal administration but individual states continue the legal battle in the US, and the European Union has advanced its own legal proceedings to curb what it perceives to be flagrant monopolistic business practices undermining fair market competition.

On the other hand, there are also plenty of signs for alternative future developments driven by the values of open access and sharing. This model is supportive of the vision that the global mediascape belongs to a global community and that there should be a social right for communication. Parallel to the 2003 Geneva World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), NGOs organized their World Forum on Communication Rights, in which they affirmed the social right for communication and demanded a more equitable framework for global communication. On a practical level, a non-proprietary operating system has been developed under the name of Linux by a network of computer programmers who embrace cooperative values and share a commitment to an open source code that can be freely used by anyone. Brazil, Peru and Venezuela are among the countries most strongly promoting the use of Linux, though Microsoft has threatened costly law suits, claiming that Linux would violate copyrights. The ITU, which had been largely on the sidelines of the Internet's development, published the results of a web survey on the question: 'Should Cyberspace be declared a resource to be shared by all?' Of the 1250 online respondents 94.2 percent voted 'yes', and 5.78 percent 'no' (ITU, 2004). The percentage of 'no' votes was higher in better connected world regions than in the less well connected ones. Although such an online survey would not qualify as representative, it does indicate, at least within the ITU, a new level of awareness.

Whether the future Internet will follow a trajectory dominated by commercial and national security values or a trajectory inspired by an alternative agenda based on democratic values and the social right to communicate and share is up to the actors who are getting involved in the process of its social shaping.

New mediascapes and the prospects for global democracy

This article has argued that the conditions of global communication are shaped through series of decisions about values, implicit or explicit. It has traced the role of values in

the social creation of NICT from the 1970s to the present and prospective future. The cooperative values of Californian engineers and researchers had a profound impact on the shaping of computer networks. Their libertarian convictions and practices translated into horizontal networking, free sharing of ideas and collaborative work. Internal collaboration was also the practice of the researchers of the military-funded APRAnet, later converted into the publically funded NSFnet. In accordance with their cosmopolitan values, civil society organizations established an increasing number of international nodes. As the Internet began to attract a mass base with the development of graphic user interfaces in the early 1990s, it also became increasingly commercialized. Intense corporate lobbying and the absence of a broader social debate resulted in legal codes serving private profit interests, allowing consumer data collection and restricting cultural access. Security concerns were employed to justify increased surveillance.

This article has linked the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. Micro processes, in which global grassroots dialogues about values and future directions take place, are shaped by their enabling technological architecture, while the very shape of this macro structure is the result of more or less contentious struggles between meso-level collective actors, who, in turn, are drawing from broader, yet varying value codes.

Applying the notion of value choices to an analysis of how the new mediascapes are being shaped contributes not only to overcoming resilient assumptions of technological determinism but also helps to open the horizon for broader empirical and normative debates and for the imagination of alternative futures. In this article, the contrast between alternative trajectories was used to indicate what is at stake in the shaping of the technological, legal and cultural preconditions of social communication.

The new mediascapes appear to develop unevenly, especially in a global perspective. Only a fraction of the world's population has quality access. What values are behind such an unequal distribution of human goods? How does it come to be that the digital futures are primarily framed in terms of marketable property values and not in a language of human rights to access information and communication? How are digital futures imagined, by whom, and with what implications? It had to be stressed that NICT exclusion is not merely another dimension of social inequality. Digital inequality increases existing inequalities and thus presents barriers to social equity and democratic inclusion. Waiting for the new media to trickle down is insufficient because the maintenance of interoperability requires continuous investments and because inequalities tend to widen during diffusion periods.

The course, mode and patterns in which the new mediascapes develop are not stemming from a historical automatism. Access policies, regulatory regimes and effective usage result from decisions. Social actors are not just passively impacted by new technology but can shape the way these are implemented to the extent of their active appropriation and involvement in regulatory processes. Some actors appear to have more influence than others. There are choices as to whether the new mediascapes will be shaped more by corporate and security interests or by the values of civil society actors in the global North and South.

The questions about how to shape the new mediascapes are urgent. The decisions that are made in an early period of the establishment of a new medium prefigure later choices,

and the dangers of digital marginalization and socio-technological maldevelopment are acute. Considering the stakes, the technological preconditions of global social communication are too important for actors of civil society to leave the arena to others.

The speed of technological development thus confronts social research with imminent challenges. More attention to the emerging new global mediascapes is needed to enable relevant actors to identify shapeable policy aspects and make informed choices. Research about value choices in the making of the new media can help in envisioning, designing and implementing digital futures that are more desirable than the alternatives to which current trends seem to point.

The debate about how and based on what values we want to construct our global future depends on a global public sphere in which diverse constituencies have opportunities to participate. In this sense, the prospect for a democratic world society is tightly related to the creation of democratic conditions for global communication.

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Article

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Cosmopolitanism, the clash of civilizations and multiple modernities

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Abstract

The article examines the three alternative conceptions of the emerging global order with special reference to the place and role of the world religions in that order. (1) Cosmopolitanism builds upon developmental theories of modernization that envision this transformation as a global expansion of western secular modernity, conceived as a universal process of human development. Secularization remains a key analytical as well as normative component. Religions that resist privatization are viewed as a dangerous 'fundamentalism' that threatens the differentiated structures of secular modernity. (2) Huntington's conception of the 'clash of civilizations' maintains the analytical components of western modernity but stripped of any universalist normative claim. Modernity is a particular achievement of western civilization that is grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The world religions are the continuously vital core of what are essentially incompatible civilizations doomed to clash with one another for global hegemony. (3) The model of 'multiple modernities' is presented as an alternative analytical framework that combines some of the universalist claims of cosmopolitanism, devoid of its secularist assumptions, with the recognition of the continuous relevance of the world religions for the emerging global order.

Keywords

clash of civilizations, cosmopolitanism, multiple modernities, religion, secularization

Cosmopolitanism, the clash of civilizations and multiple modernities are three alternative analytical conceptualizations as well as three markedly different pragmatic visions of the present and of a future global order. I would like to examine critically those three alternative visions with special focus on the role and place they assign to religion and particularly

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to the world religions. The main idea I would like to propose is that SN Eisenstadt's (2002) theory of multiple modernities offers a more fruitful alternative conceptualization of processes of globalization than either theories of a secular cosmopolitan 'world society' or of 'the clash of civilizations'. Within such a perspective the world religions can be viewed as global imagined communities reconstituted by processes of globalization, which in turn become carriers of those processes and of the multiple modernities that ensue within their civilizational spaces. However, under contemporary global conditions the world religions and their related civilizations become deterritorialized and are to be conceived no more as geopolitical territorial spaces but rather as interrelated communicative spaces within a single world.

For the purpose of this presentation I use 'world religions' in the loose, unsystematic sense in which it was introduced by Max Weber (1946 [1922–3]), without entering into thorny definitional, doxological, or taxonomic issues. It can be taken for granted that 'religion' is a modern category, constituted by the epistemic hegemony of 'the secular' and that the so-called 'world religions' are inventions of western secular Christian modernity (Asad, 1993, 2003; Masuzawa, 2005; Scott and Hirschkind, 2006). One may also assume that the clusters and families of heterogeneous traditions, practices and civilizational ensembles that are called world religions have neither essence nor fixed internal and external boundaries, despite all attempts by high priests, rulers, theologians, scientific experts and media to define canons and boundaries. What could count as world religion? Certainly, the many branches of the religious and moral traditions included by Max Weber in his comparative studies, namely, Judaism (1952), Christianity (1930, 1993), Islam (1993), Hinduism (1967), Buddhism (1967), Confucianism (1968) and Taoism (1968). But also included could be the many 'hybrids' which have emerged from the colonial and intercivilizational encounters between East and West, North and South, and are today becoming increasingly globalized, as well as the so-called 'native' or 'indigenous' religions which are also being transformed and transplanted under renewed diasporic and global conditions. The Bahai, Hare Krishna, Unification Church and Falun Gong movements are examples of contemporary global hybrids, while Afro-American religions such as Vodou, Santeria and Candomble are old colonial hybrids which are undergoing today a renewed process of radical diasporic transformation.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is used here in the broad sense of any worldview that envisions the future global order as a single, relatively homogeneous and unified global economic, political and cultural system or as a single 'universal civilization'. It includes the explicit collective project of 'cosmopolitan democracy' associated with the names of David Held, Daniele Archibugi, Mary Kaldor and Richard Falk among others (Archibugi, 2003; Archibugi and Held, 1995; Archibugi et al., 1998; Beck, 2000, 2006; Falk, 1998; Kaldor, 1999), but also 'the end of history' thesis proposed by Francis Fukuyama (1992) with its vision of the 'universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government'. To a certain extent, most economic and technological deterministic theories of globalization also share the same cosmopolitan assumptions insofar as they assume that economic and technological globalization will determine the shape of global society and of global culture. Despite their greater complexity and the room they give to

diversity, heterogeneity, inequality and difference within world society, Luhmannian theories of *Weltgesellschaft* also share many of the same secular cosmopolitan assumptions insofar as they conceptualize the process of formation of such a world society as a process of functional differentiation (Stichweh, 1991).

Cosmopolitanism builds upon developmental theories of modernization that envision social change as a global expansion of western modernity, which is understood not as the hegemonic expansion of a particular social formation, but as a universal process of human development. In most cosmopolitan accounts, religion either does not exist, or it is simply 'invisible' in Thomas Luckmann's (1967) sense of the term of being an individualized and privatized form of salvation or quest for meaning, that is irrelevant to the functioning of the primary institutions of modern society. In its collective dimension, religion is simply reduced to just another form of cultural group identity. If and when religion emerges in the public sphere and has to be taken seriously, it is usually branded either as anti-modern fundamentalism resisting processes of secularization, or as a form of traditionalist collective identity reaction to the threat of globalization (Castells, 1997). In other words, religion in the eyes of cosmopolitan elites is either irrelevant or reactive. Indeed, when it comes to religion all forms of cosmopolitanism share at least implicitly the basic tenets of the theory of secularization which the social sciences and modern liberal political ideologies have inherited from the Enlightenment critique of religion. Cosmopolitanism remains a faithful child of the European Enlightenment.

The ideological critique of religion developed by the Enlightenment and carried out by a series of social movements throughout Europe from the 18th to the 20th century has informed European theories of secularization in such a way that those theories have come to function not only as descriptive theories of particular European developments, but more significantly as critical-genealogical theories of 'religion' in general and as normative-teleological theories of religious development which posit religious decline as the *telos* of history. The theory of secularization is so intrinsically interwoven with all the theories of the modern world and with the self-understanding of western modernity that one cannot simply discard the theory of secularization without putting into question the entire web, including much of the understanding of the social sciences. Self-definitions of modernity are tautological insofar as secular differentiation is precisely what defines a society as modern. Consequently, the analytical definition of secular differentiation cannot easily be dissociated from 'the unfinished project of modernity' (Habermas, 1981), from the normative task of turning the temporal age of modernity into a homogeneous global space until all contemporary societies *in* modernity but not *of* modernity become liberal modern secular societies.

It is time to abandon the Euro-centric view that modern Western European developments, including the secularization of European Christianity, are general universal processes. The more one adopts a global perspective, the more it becomes obvious that the drastic secularization of Western European societies is a rather exceptional phenomenon, with few parallels elsewhere other than in European settler societies such as New Zealand, Quebec or Uruguay. Such an exceptional phenomenon demands therefore a more particular historical explanation. The collapse of the plausibility structures of European Christianity is so extraordinary that we need a better explanation than simply referring to general processes of modernization. Holding onto the traditional theory of secularization, by

contrast, reassures modern secular Europeans and global cosmopolitans, including sociologists of religion, that this collapse was natural, teleological and quasi-providential. It turns the theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Casanova, 2003, 2006).

The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact. An increasing majority of the European population have ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, even though they may still maintain relatively high levels of private, individual religious beliefs. But the standard explanations of the phenomenon in terms of general processes of modernization are not persuasive since similar processes of modernization elsewhere (in the US, or in the cultural areas of other world religions) are not accompanied by the same secularizing results. We need to entertain seriously the proposition that secularization became a self-fulfilling prophecy in Europe, once large sectors of the population of Western European societies, including the Christian churches, accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization: that secularization is a teleological process of modern social change; that the more modern a society the more secular it becomes; that 'secularity' is a *sign of the times*. If such a proposition is correct, then the secularization of Western European societies can be explained better in terms of the triumph of the knowledge regime of secularism, than in terms of structural processes of socioeconomic development such as urbanization, education, rationalization, etc.

Indeed, in recent revisionist theories it is Europe and European settler colonies which appear as the exception to the global rule of religious vitality. But the new concept of 'European exceptionalism', while helpful in undermining the old universal claims of European secularization, becomes problematic and misleading if it is meant to imply that there is some general global pattern or rule of religious development or resurgence, be it the American paradigm of competitive religious economies (Finke and Stark, 2005; Iannaccone, 1991; Stark et al., 1996) or 'the desecularization of the world' (Berger, 1999), to which Europe would be the exception (Davie, 2002).

We need to go beyond exceptionalisms as much as against invidious misleading contrasts between the secular liberal West and the religious fundamentalist 'Rest' (Juergensmeyer, 1993). I would not propose, however, that we abandon altogether the concept or the theory of secularization as meaningless. I believe that the theory of secularization is still useful not only as a way of reconstructing analytically the transformations of modern European societies, but also as an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda which aims to examine the historical transformation of all world religions and civilizations under conditions of modern structural differentiation, as long as the outcome of this transformation is not predetermined by the theory, and as long as we do not label as religious fundamentalism any counter-secularization, or any religious transformation which does not follow the prescribed model.

A brief review of contemporary theories of religious fundamentalism can help illustrate the way in which secularist assumptions built into our theories of modernity unwittingly distort our social scientific analysis and our understanding of the ways in which religion and religious movements of all kinds are implicated in political conflicts throughout the world. Indeed, our theories of religious fundamentalism only make sense as counterparts of our theories of secularization. As the reader will know, hundreds of books have been written lately on the topic of religious fundamentalism, the most important of them being the dozens of studies of contemporary religious movements in all world religions,

gathered under the five-volume *Fundamentalism Project* (Marty and Appleby, 1991–5). From a descriptive and even interpretative point of view, many of the individual studies are extremely valuable. It is the general analytical-theoretical framework within which they have been placed, as if all those diverse religious movements would be instances of a single phenomenon we may designate as global religious fundamentalism, that is in my view highly problematic. We need to put into question the basic tendency to interpret all those religious movements as a fundamentalist reaction to the world-historical process of secularization, as instances of a global conflict between religion and secular modernity.

As an analytical category of social science as well as of political journalism, the concept of religious fundamentalism re-emerged together with the public re-emergence of American Protestant Fundamentalism, with the foundation of Moral Majority and other organizations of the Christian Right in the midst of the 1979 electoral campaign that brought Ronald Reagan to the White House. In this particular context the category of fundamentalism may have been fully justified since it was a designation which many Christian groups and congregations used to name themselves in contradistinction to other mainline and evangelical Protestant denominations. Immediately, however, the category of religious fundamentalism was applied to the simultaneously unfolding Islamic revolution in Iran. Soon thereafter the category was extended to characterize pejoratively all kinds of Islamic and 'Islamist' religious movements emerging throughout the Muslim world, until Islam itself was generally viewed as an essentially 'fundamentalist' religion, incompatible with modern differentiated structures, particularly with the differentiation of religion and politics.

Subsequently, the category of religious fundamentalism was expanded to incorporate revival movements in all world religions and religious traditions: the growth of Hindu nationalism and the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the expense of the secularist Congress; ethno-religious conflicts between Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab and between Muslims and Hindus in Kashmir; conflicts between separatist Tamil Hindus and Sinhalese Buddhist movements in Sri Lanka; the emergence of new forms of Jewish religious Zionism challenging the foundational secular Zionist project; the subsequent related transformation of the Palestinian nationalist movement with the rise of Hamas and other Islamic movements within the occupied territories; even the growth of Protestantism in Latin America and the expansion of Pentecostalism throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia. All these religious phenomena were now interpreted as so many instances of a single worldwide phenomenon, the global growth of religious fundamentalism as a multiform reaction against secular modernity.

In their book *Strong Religion*, which grew out of the Fundamentalism Project and is probably the best and most systematic attempt to develop a comparative theory that can account for 'the rise of fundamentalisms around the world', Gabriel Almond, Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan (2003) repeatedly refer to 'fundamentalism' as 'one of the most significant political phenomena of our time', and indicate that 'the phenomenon of "global fundamentalism" took an unprecedented urgency in the minds of millions of people around the world' after September 11 (Almond et al., 2003: 1). They interpret these movements as 'militant and highly focused antagonists of secularization . . . [which] call a halt to the centuries-long retreat of the religious establishments before the secular power' (Almond et al., 2003: 1–2). But such an interpretation, indeed such an analytical

perspective, only makes sense if one assumes first the existence of a world-historical process of secularization. Take away the premise of a universal process of secularization and the analytical category of global religious fundamentalism collapses as meaningless.

What does not disappear is the reality of all these diverse religious phenomena out there throughout the world or the urgency to develop better analytical categories and a more useful conceptual framework to compare, classify and differentiate all these complex religious movements in order to gain a better interpretative understanding. The problem with the concept of religious fundamentalism as an analytical social scientific category is that, as so many other sociological categories, it is not a neutral descriptive category but rather an evaluative, normative and highly emotive category that emerges from within the ideological epistemic conflicts between secularism and religious worldviews. As engaged participants in these ideological conflicts we are of course entitled to use the category of fundamentalism as a way of expressing our partisanship, but as analytical observers and sociological interpreters of these conflicts we are obliged to adopt a more critical and reflexive awareness of the ideological baggage of the category.

As I already indicated, I am not implying that secularization is not a real historical and deeply contested process. I do not share the view of so many of my American colleagues in the sociology of religion who believe that secularization is a myth, a European one. I take for granted that secularization is indeed a historical process, or rather, that is, an appropriate and useful analytical category, as a way of conceptualizing the historical process of transformation of Western European Christianity. It is a category that makes sense within the context of the particular internal and external dynamics of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present. But the category becomes problematic once it is generalized as a universal process of societal development and once it is transferred to other world religions and other civilizational areas with very different dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and world, or between cosmological transcendence and worldly immanence.

As the dictionary of any Western European language will show, to secularize means 'to make worldly', to convert or transfer persons, things, meanings, etc., from religious or ecclesiastical to secular or civil use. But such a concept of 'secularization' could hardly be applicable, for instance, to such 'religions' as Confucianism or Taoism, insofar as they are not characterized by high tension with 'the world' and have no ecclesiastical organization. In a sense those religions, which have always been 'worldly' and 'lay', do not need to undergo a process of secularization. To secularize, i.e. 'to make worldly' or 'to transfer from ecclesiastical to civil use', are processes which do not make much sense in such a civilizational context.

It just happened, of course, that this particular Western European and specifically Christian dynamic became globalized with the expansion of European colonialism, with the global expansion of capitalism, with the global expansion of the European system of states, with the global expansion of modern science, modern culture and modern ideologies of secularism. Therefore, to ask how Confucianism, Taoism or any other world religion responds to the global expansion of 'Western secular modernity', how religious traditions are reinterpreted as a response to this global challenge, to examine which kinds of *aggiornamentos* emerge within all world religions – using here the particular name given to the recent reinterpretation of the Catholic tradition – are all valid and important

questions. But to view all these diverse processes of religious transformation in a simple dichotomous way as either accommodation to secular modernity or as fundamentalist reaction against secularization is not, I would argue, a very fruitful or insightful way of interpreting these processes. It only situates us as secularist Euro-centric observers.

It is time to revise our monological and teleological conceptions of a global cosmopolitan secular modernity against which we can characterize the religious 'other' as 'fundamentalist'. It is time to make room for more complex, nuanced and reflexive categories which will help us to understand better the already emerging global system of multiple modernities. As long as we maintain this concept of a single cosmopolitan modernity as a general process of secular differentiation, indeed as a normative global project, we are compelled to characterize all forms of religion we cannot accept as our own as threatening 'fundamentalism' and we become ourselves unwitting partisans in a supposedly worldwide secular–religious conflict and may even help turn the so-called 'clash of civilizations' into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The clash of civilizations

It is to the merit of Samuel Huntington to have been one of the first prominent voices to point out the increasing relevance of cultural systems, civilizations and the world religions for world politics after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War. The relevance of his study, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), is threefold:

1. He breaks with the secularism long hegemonic in the field of *Realpolitik* and international relations by bringing religion to the center of civilizational analysis and by insisting that the contemporary global condition facilitates the return of the old civilizations and world religions as significant cultural systems and as imagined communities, overlapping and at times in competition with the imagined community of the nation. Nations will continue to be, for the foreseeable future, relevant carriers of collective identities within this global space, but local and transnational identities, particularly religious ones, are likely to become ever more prominent. While new transnational imagined communities will emerge, the most relevant ones are likely to be once again the old civilizations and world religions.
2. He subverts through a powerful ideological critique the universalist claims of theories of modernization as westernization, of western modernity and of cosmopolitan globalization. In this respect his position dovetails with traditional critiques of western imperial hegemony and with postmodern critiques of western universalism.
3. As a political analyst grounded in the hard-nosed tradition of *Realpolitik* he offers a mordant critique of the overtly optimistic visions of a harmonious and peaceful global order based on cosmopolitan values and multilateral internationalism that proliferated after the end of the Cold War.

Huntington has raised provocatively the argument that democracy and the cultural norms and values upon which it is based such as liberty, equality and human rights may be

a civilizational achievement of the Christian West and therefore not easily transferable to other civilizations or world religions, other than through western hegemonic imposition or through outright conversion to western norms and culture. If the thesis is correct, it would follow that the third wave of democratization, which he himself analyzed systematically in a previous work, may have reached its civilizational limits and that few other countries are likely to attain successful transitions to stable democracies (Huntington, 1991). Ironically, this is a view shared by western hegemonists like Huntington, by postmodern critics of hegemonic western universalism and by some religious and political elites in non-western countries who want to protect themselves and their societies from the contagion of undesirable elements of western modernity.

But Huntington's (1996) controversial vision of the impending clash between the Christian democratic West and other civilizations, particularly 'Islamic-Confucian states', has three fundamental flaws:

1. Huntington offers an essentialist and ahistorical view of civilizations that assumes that the world religions upon which they are based have some unchangeable core essence.
2. He conceives of civilizations as territorially bounded geopolitical units akin to superpowers and nation-states.
3. From a policy perspective, the combination of normative particularism and the presumption of the inevitability of hegemonic power conflicts in the international arena leads him to an unabashed assertion of western global hegemony that can easily turn the prognosis of the clash of civilizations into a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

Huntington's thesis has been most widely and rightly criticized for his essentialism. Huntington's (1991) own analysis of 'the third wave' of democratization can be used to question his essentialist assumptions. Roughly two-thirds of the 30 or so countries which underwent successful transitions to democracy since the mid-1970s were Catholic. Moreover, Catholic groups played a prominent role in democratic transitions even in countries where they constituted small minorities, such as South Korea or South Africa. In this respect, it was a Catholic wave not just because the countries where it occurred happened to be Catholic, but because the transformation of Catholicism associated with the *aggiornamento* of the Second Vatican Council was itself an important independent factor in producing the wave (Casanova, 2001).

Had Huntington developed his argument only a few decades earlier, before the Catholic *aggiornamento*, the formulation could possibly have taken the form of the clash of the Protestant secular West against 'the Rest', and Catholic culture could have been easily construed as essentially inimical to democracy. This, after all, was an old thesis, not totally without foundation in reality, which De Tocqueville (1972 [1835–40]) had already tried to refute in the 1830s. The thesis found particular resonance in Protestant America, where from the 1830s to the 1960s it took the expression of the alleged incompatibility between 'Republicanism' and 'Romanism'. At the very least, and irrespective of how one judges the old anti-Catholic prejudices, the swift and radical transformation of the political culture of Catholic countries as the result of the official reformulation of

the religious teachings of the Catholic church puts into question the notion of the unchanging core essence of a world religion as dogmatically structured as Catholicism. The premise of an unchanging core essence should be even less valid for other world religions with a less dogmatically structured doctrinal core or with a more pluralistic and contested system of authoritative interpretation of the religious tradition.

The successful democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan, in addition to the persistence of democracy in Japan, put into question the validity of Huntington's thesis for the Confucian–Buddhist area, despite the attempts of political leaders in Singapore to defend a supposedly Asian authoritarian culture against western cultural imperialism. The same could be said about the persistence of a much tested democracy in India, despite the hegemonic project of a resurgent Hindu nationalism that challenges the institutions of a secular Indian state which are meant to protect religious pluralism. But it is in relation to Islam that Huntington's thesis has found the greatest resonance and has provoked the most heated debates.

Tragically, the terrorist attacks of September 11, perpetrated as they were by Muslim militants, and the military response of the western alliance against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, against Al Qaeda and other networks of Muslim militants and against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq have only exacerbated these debates. Not surprisingly, many have viewed the terrorist attacks and the western military responses as a dramatic confirmation of the civilizational clash between Islam and the West. Such an interpretation of the conflict appears to have found considerable resonance throughout the West as well as throughout the Muslim world. Such a charged atmosphere is hardly conducive to a reasonable debate on the conditions of possibility for democracy and civil society in Muslim countries. But the question is as relevant and perhaps more urgent than ever.

It is an undeniable fact that the majority of Muslim countries today have authoritarian political regimes and repressive states. Many of those regimes rely on the military and financial support of the US and other western powers. Many of them also claim to be 'Muslim' states or seek the religious mantle of Islam as a source of political legitimation for the most diverse institutions and political practices. In fact, practically every political movement or project, in power or in opposition, throughout the Muslim world claims to be 'Islamic' if not 'Islamist'. It is this very fact of the apparently inevitable fusion of religion and politics in Muslim countries which has led so many external observers and 'experts' to attribute a 'fundamentalist' essence to Islam that allegedly makes it incompatible with the differentiated structures of modernity and with the privatization of religion supposedly required by liberal democracy (Lewis, 1993; Tibi, 1990).

More than the ongoing intellectual debates among orientalists and 'experts' concerning the nature of Islam, it is the very open and contentious contemporary debates among Muslims concerning their own tradition that raises the question as to what constitutes if not the essential core of Islam as a civilization, certainly its authoritative interpretation and its authentic representation today. But essentialist interpretations of Islam tend to preclude the possibility that contemporary Muslims may find their own models of *aggiornamentos* (they are likely to be plural), which like the Catholic one would offer viable responses attuned both to their religious tradition and to modern requirements.

The comparison with Catholicism may be instructive because, like Islam today, it was viewed for a long time as the paradigmatic anti-modern fundamentalist religion.

Catholicism served as the central focus of the Enlightenment critique of religion. It offered for centuries the most spirited, principled and seemingly futile resistance to modern processes of secularization and modernization. Even after its official accommodation with secular modernity and after relinquishing its identity as a monopolistic state church, the Catholic church refuses to become just a private religion, just an individual private belief. It wants to be both modern and public. Indeed, since Vatican II it has kept a highly public profile throughout the world.

The relevant question, of course, is whether one should attribute the widespread impulse found in the contemporary politics of Muslim countries to establish 'Islamic' states to some Islamic essence which Muslims cannot relinquish without also abandoning their religious tradition and their identity; or alternatively whether 'it is the product of modern politics and the modernizing state' (Asad, 1997: 190). I am not in a position to evaluate the competing claims concerning the history of Islam, but since one finds similar 'fundamentalist' impulses to symbiotic fusions of religions and politics throughout the history of nation-state formation in the Christian West and today one finds similar 'fundamentalist' impulses within Judaism in Israel, within Hinduism in India and within Buddhism in Sri Lanka, I would be inclined to attribute the common 'fundamentalist' impulse to the common context of nation-state formation, rather than to some common symbiotic fusion of religion and politics at the genesis of all these religions which has left an indelible mark in their make-up.

The problem is not just that Huntington's analysis rests on an essentialist conception of Islam, but that the construction of 'the West' on which it is based is no less essentialist. The juxtaposition of Catholicism and Islam shows that the problem lies not only in simplistic depictions of a uniform 'fundamentalist' Islam, that fail to acknowledge the extraordinary diversity one finds among Muslim societies in the past and in the present. Equally problematic and misleading is the essentialist construction of a modern secular West that fails to recognize Catholic Christianity as an integral part of the past and present of western modernity. Every incrimination of Islam as a fundamentalist, anti-modern and anti-western religion could have been directed even more justifiably against Catholicism not long time ago. Moreover, most features of contemporary political Islam which western observers find rightly so reprehensible, including the terrorist methods and the justification of revolutionary violence as an appropriate instrument in the pursuit of political power, can be found in the not too distant past of many western countries and of many modern secular movements. Thus, before attributing these reprehensible phenomena all too hastily to Islamic civilization one should perhaps consider the possibility that global modernity itself somehow generates such practices.

The suggestion that contemporary transformations of Catholicism and Islam, all their crucial differences notwithstanding, can be viewed as parallel, even equivalent, processes of modern religious *aggiornamento* can be interpreted differently (Casanova, 2005). Modern secular conceptions of religion are likely to interpret all reflexive reformulations of religious traditions either as doctrinal capitulations which make evident, at least to the cynical observer, the vacuity of the claims of those religions to possess transcendent revealed truths valid for all times and places, or as superstructural ideological adjustments to changes in the dominant material base. Religious traditions of course view differently their own hermeneutic task of interpreting and re-evaluating the meaning of their unchanging

principles for changed circumstances. It is by proving their continued relevance and their ability to offer guidance in changed circumstances that religious traditions can attest that their reinterpreted principles are unchanging and universally valid.

The swift democratization of Catholic countries following the Vatican *aggiornamento* demonstrates not so much the fact that at long last the Catholic church gave up its traditional resistance to modernity allowing democratization to proceed and, thus, the final triumph of modernity over tradition, but rather the practical advantages that accrue when actors are able to offer traditional religious legitimation for modern developments. The sacralization of the modern discourse of human rights by the church was the single most important factor in the mobilization of Catholic resources for democratization (Casanova, 1999). The struggles for democratization in Turkey, Iran and Indonesia offer similar lessons. There is no guarantee, indeed it is unlikely, that movements of Islamic revival or renewal will be uniformly conducive to democratization. What is more certain is that democracy is unlikely to grow and thrive in Muslim countries until political actors who are striving for it are also able to 'frame' their discourse in a publicly recognizable Islamic idiom. Calls for the privatization of Islam as a condition for modern democracy in Muslim countries (Tibi, 1990) will only produce anti-democratic Islamist responses. By contrast, the public reflexive elaboration of Islam's normative traditions in response to modern challenges, political learning experiences and global discourses has a chance to generate various forms of public civil Islam which may be conducive to democratization.

Huntington's thesis has been mostly criticized for its 'essentialism' and for its undiluted West-centric hegemonic vision (Riesebrodt, 2000). But in my view, where Huntington is particularly wrong is in his geopolitical conception of civilizations as territorial units akin to nation-states and superpowers, which leads him to anticipate future global conflicts along civilizational fault lines. The analysis misses the fact that globalization represents not only a great opportunity for the old civilizations and world religions to free themselves from the straightjacket of the nation-state, to regain their transnational dimensions and their leading roles in the global center stage. Globalization also represents a great threat insofar as it implies the deterritorialization of all cultural systems. Globalization threatens to dissolve the intrinsic link between sacred time, sacred space and sacred people common to all world religions, and with it the seemingly essential bonds between histories, peoples and territories which have defined all civilizations.

What constitutes the truly novel aspect of the present global condition is precisely the fact that all world religions can be reconstituted for the first time truly as deterritorialized global imagined communities, detached from the civilizational settings in which they have been traditionally embedded. Paraphrasing Arjun Appadurai's (1996) image of 'modernity at large', one could say that the world religions, through the linking of electronic mass media and mass migration, are being reconstituted as deterritorialized global religions 'at large'. For the world religions globalization offers therefore the opportunity to become for the first time truly world religions, i.e. global, but also the threat of deterritorialization. The opportunities are greatest for those world religions like Catholicism, Islam and Buddhism which always had a transnational structure. The threat is greatest for those still embedded in civilizational territories like Islam and Hinduism. But through global migration they are also becoming global and deterritorialized. Indeed, their diasporas are becoming dynamic centers for their global transformation. Ironically, the diaspora religion par excellence, Judaism, forced to become deterritorialized from the Land of

Israel millennia ago, has become tied again to the physical Land of Israel in the very age of globalization.

Multiple modernities

The concept of multiple modernities, first developed by SN Eisenstadt (1974, 1987, 2002) and now gaining increasing acceptance – as attested by many of the papers presented in the congress 'Culture, Values and the Future of Society' on which this monograph is based – is a more adequate conceptualization and pragmatic vision of modern global trends than either cosmopolitanism or the clash of civilizations (Arnason, 2003; Eisenstadt et al., 2001). In a certain sense, it shares elements of both. Like cosmopolitanism, it maintains that there are some common elements or traits shared by all 'modern' societies that help to distinguish them from their 'traditional' or pre-modern forms. In this respect, one can talk of a civilization of modernity. But it does not envision the global expansion of those modern traits as a process of homogenization or convergence that would lead to a single world society or global civilization. Rather, common modern traits or principles attain multiple forms and diverse institutionalizations in various historical contexts. Moreover, many of these diverse institutionalizations are continuous or congruent with the traditional historical civilizations. Thus, there is both a civilization of modernity and the continuous transformation of the pre-modern historical civilizations under modern conditions which themselves help to shape the multiple modernities.

There is no single pattern of modernity. Most of the modern traits may have emerged first in the West, but even there they assumed very different manifestations in different times and in different places. Thus, even in the West one finds multiple modernities which in multifold ways are related with the multiple forms of Christian civilization. Naturally, this multiplicity becomes even more pronounced as non-western societies and civilizations acquire, institutionalize and transform some of those modern traits. Precisely because modernity is a constantly changing formation in multiple directions, one cannot simply define those modern traits as if they were fixed forms.

Without trying to be exhaustive, one could point to some modern traits:

1. The principle of sovereignty of the people and of the nation, along with the 'providential' trend toward equalization of conditions and democratization.
2. A reflexive relationship to traditions and identities, mediated by intercivilizational encounters with 'the other'.
3. A pragmatic historicism that views social change and the future as a collective programmatic construction.
4. The work ethic and vocational asceticism as the regulative principle of the division of labor and of individual worth.
5. Processes of individuation, self-determination, personal worth and human dignity, from the cult of the individual to the institutionalization of universal human rights.

These modern traits are not developed necessarily in contradistinction to or even at the expense of tradition, but rather through the transformation and the pragmatic adjustment of tradition. In this respect, the multiple modernities position shares with the clash of civilizations position the emphasis on the relevance of cultural traditions for the formation

of multiple modernities. Both insist that modernization is not simply westernization. But unlike Huntington, the multiple modernities perspective does not see those modernities simply as a continuation of some essential tradition. All traditions, including the western ones, are radically transformed in the process of modernization.

It is precisely in the different ways in which they conceive of the relationship of tradition and modernity that one can clearly differentiate the three positions. Cosmopolitanism, like the theories of modernization of the 1960s, is still based on a rigid dichotomous contraposition of tradition and modernity, assuming that the more of the one the less of the other. But, in fact, it is well recognized today that societies can become ever more modern while simultaneously reproducing or reconstructing their traditions or inventing new ones. The clash of civilizations, by contrast, emphasizes the essential continuity between tradition and modernity. Western modernity is assumed to be continuous with the western tradition. As other civilizations modernize, rather then becoming ever more like the West, they will also maintain an essential continuity with their respective traditions. Thus, the inevitable clash of civilizations as all modern societies basically continue their diverse and mostly incommensurable traditions.

The multiple modernities position rejects both, the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in the processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern traits. The model of *aggiornamento* is perhaps a more adequate image of the dynamic and reciprocal relations between tradition and modernity. Traditions are forced to respond to and adjust to modern conditions, but in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts they also help to shape the particular forms of modernity. No modern culture is simply a continuation of pre-modern traditions, otherwise there would be no common modernity and no common modern traits. But modernity is not simply a homogeneous formation to which traditions have simply to adapt. There is a continuous dynamic relationship whereby multiple traditions help to shape multiple modernities while modernity radically alters all traditions.

Let me offer an illustration of this complex relationship through a reconstruction of the process of Catholic *aggiornamento* of the 1960s and particularly of the Catholic adoption of the modern discourse of human rights, a critical example since the alleged modern universality of human rights is one of the most contentious issues in the debates between the defenders of cosmopolitanism and the defenders of cultural particularism.

From the moment of their emergence at the time of the American and French revolutions, the Catholic church had opposed vehemently the modern principle and the discourse of human rights. In his papal Brief *Caritas* (1791), Pope Pius VI condemned the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man by the French National Assembly, stating that the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of the press were contrary to the divine principles of the church. Pope Gregory XVI reiterated the condemnation in his encyclicals *Mirari Vos* (1832) and *Singulari Nos* (1834). Pius IX included the principle of human rights and most modern freedoms in the *Syllabus* (1864) of errors, pronouncing them anathema and irreconcilable with the Catholic faith. The principle of religious freedom was particularly odious since it implied making equal the true religion and false ones, as well as the separation of church and state.

But as part of the process of *aggiornamento* of the 1960s, the Catholic church has embraced the secular discourse of human rights, offering a theological justification for it.

Pope John XXIII's encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963) was the first to adopt the modern discourse. The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965), recognized the inalienable right of every individual to freedom of conscience, based on the sacred dignity of the human person. Since that time papal pronouncements and episcopal pastoral letters throughout the world have consistently presented the protection of the human rights of every person as the moral foundation of a just social and political global order.

There can be no doubt about the geopolitical impact of this doctrinal transformation upon the democratization of Catholic societies throughout the world. But how are we going to interpret this theological reformulation of the Catholic tradition? Are we going to view it as the final capitulation to the inevitable triumph of secular modernity after centuries of apparently futile resistance? Certainly the very concept of *aggiornamento*, with its semantic connotation of 'bringing up to date' or of 'catching up' with the spirit of the age, would seem to warrant such a reading. To a certain extent, this development would seem to confirm Durkheim's (1965 [1912]) vision that the cult of the individual was becoming the religion of modernity, but with an ironic and paradoxical twist, since it is the old gods, who according to Durkheim were either dead or dying, the ones who are becoming the carriers of the new religion of modernity. Thus the new religion does not replace the old world religions. Rather the old world religions become carriers of the new religion of modernity and in the process are radically transformed.

Naturally, the Catholic *aggiornamento* took a particular 'catholic' form. Other world religions are undergoing parallel yet also different forms of *aggiornamentos* attuned to their particular traditions and institutional structures. Indeed all world religions are forced to respond to the global expansion of modernity by reformulating their traditions in an attempt to fashion their own particular civilizational versions of modernity. Moreover, they are responding not only to the global challenge of secular modernity, but also to their mutual and reciprocal challenges, as they all undergo multiple processes of *aggiornamento* and come to compete with one another in the emerging global system of religions. Under conditions of globalization, the world religions do not only draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another. Intercivilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization and transcultural hyphenations are as much part and parcel of the global present as western hegemony, cosmopolitan homogenization or the clash of civilizations.

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The values of global futures

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Abstract
This article provides concluding reflections for the monograph on Values and Culture by focusing on the role that values can play in the shaping of global futures. It discusses the emerging reconceptualizations of values and culture vis-a-vis accelerated financial flows and neoliberal deregulation, transnational migration, social movements and incipient global publics. It emphasizes that the study of values is not just about social cohesion but also about social transformation. Social reality is never stagnant but always in the making. Sociology should thus not shy away from reflecting on the future but use its critical imagination to inspire and push public debates further.

Keywords
culture, economics, future, globalization, migration, social movements, values

The future depends on values. They are not its sole determinants but influential factors in its social shaping. Departing from this assumption, this article discusses the emerging reconceptualizations of values and culture in relation to the challenges of globalization, including the accelerated financial flows and economic regulation, transnational migration, social movements and incipient global publics. The article concludes by pointing to the contributions sociology can make to public debate.

The old-fashioned concept of values returns to sociology with renewed force. Values were a concern of sociology since its inception. They were crucial in the classic works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. Values studies proliferated in the 1950s but were almost abandoned following the critique of then dominant structural-functionalism with its rather reductive conceptualization of values that came to be seen as ignoring any freedom of choice in actions and treating humans as 'cultural' or 'judgmental dopes' (Garfinkel, 1984 [1967]). In the wake of paradigm-shifting innovations in the sociology of culture even the very usefulness of the concept of values was doubted (Swidler, 1986).

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But values made it slowly back onto the agenda. The reasons for this renaissance were a complex mix of social science discourse dynamics and real-life events, including the 1980s/1990s debate between liberalism and communitarianism and, more so, the early 2000s debates on the role of values in elections and the controversy about allegedly inevitable civilizational clashes.

The revived interest in values involves a rethinking that benefits from new insights of cultural and transnational sociology, thick ethnographic descriptions and empirical model-building, as well as rereadings of classics (Featherstone, this issue; Joas, 1997). Values are not just cultural glue providing cohesion to social units. Nor are they just remote-controlling the behaviour of individuals. Values can project unsurpassable appeal and exercise moral force in decisions but, on the other hand, values themselves are also in flux. They can be debated, negotiated, traded, ignored, denied, bypassed, undermined, exaggerated, propagated, disassembled, repackaged, used, abused and betrayed. Their complexity and ambiguity do not make values an easy object to study. Human actors are known to die for their values but in other circumstances they may just as well disregard them. People sacrifice their lives for their nation, religious beliefs, or honour, but they may also readily put aside their values in the pursuit of competing goals. Values orient and transcend human action at the same time as values are being oriented and transcended. Values are inseparable from their larger cultural context. This is why descriptive and context-sensitive empirical approaches are often among the most useful.

Globalization has brought new challenges to the study of culture and values. Old assumptions have been shaken. The intensified global integration of markets and production, unprecedented levels of transnational migration and the rise of new media require new approaches. Culture itself has to be rethought vis-a-vis globalization. The old container model that ascribed to nations a homogeneous culture and standardized values has become obsolete, if it was ever accurate at all and not just an ideological abstraction (see e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] on 'invented traditions'). Globalization is profoundly reshaping culture. Unprecedented levels of migration and flows of media content and marketing are creating new cultural mixes. To be sure, culture has always been hybrid, as especially Latin American theorists pointed out in response to the postmodernism debate flourishing in late 20th-century Europe and North America (García Canclini, 1990). Yet the current period of intensified and accelerated globalization hybridizes already hybrid cultures, creating thus a 'global mélange' that is not homogeneous, as theories of westernization or McDonaldization suggested, but rather locally specific (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004). And this local specificity is valorized with the increasing 'expediency of culture' (Yúdice, 2003). At the same time, travellers and migrants are forming across the grid of nation-state borders new translocal 'ethnoscapes' (Appadurai, 1996). Global culture communicates in a multitude of diverse publics. The constitution and efficacy of incipient transnational publics impact cultural change. How these publics deal with the forces of globalization can influence collective identities, regulatory regimes and the distribution of wealth.

The accelerated global flows of financial values have sharpened the question about the normative standards by which they are regulated. The spectacular growth of trade with derivates has by far outpaced the underlying production of goods and is presenting new risks (LiPuma and Lee, 2004). During the last several decades, the gap between the

global financial elite and the multitudes of the undocumented and unbanked has widened even in times of economic growth and worse so during recessions. Protest against the neoliberal mode of globalization (not globalization per se) has been mounted across the globe, probably most pronouncedly in the wave of Latin American countries that elected over the last decade more populist governments. But the neoliberal regulation bias has also been shaken on a global scale as the world economy entered into a crisis mode with mega-corporations of the wealthiest countries lining up for government bail-outs. How far the old assumptions were shaken is not only illustrated by the sensationalist yellow-press headlines about an impending 'fall of capitalism' but also by remarks from within the global political leadership. *The New York Times* reported UK prime minister and former chancellor of the exchequer Gordon Brown, a long-time proponent of neoliberal deregulation, as saying during the March 2009 meeting of the G8 in Strasbourg that 'the problem of unbridled free markets in an unsupervised marketplace is that they can reduce all relationships to transactions, all motivations to self-interest, all sense of value to consumer choice and all sense of worth to a price tag' (Burns and Landon, 2009). The global flows of financial values with their universally understood binary logic of money need to be countered by the diversity of cultural values. Global publics are needed to debate the values that orient the social shaping of common futures (see Pogge, 2002). However, publics appear to be divided along linguistic, ethnic, religious and other cultural lines. Among the interfaces that connect networks across borders are not only international trade and diplomacy but, at the grassroots, also migrants and social movements.

Transnational migration flows carry values into new social settings, create new values, transform old ones and produce new pluralisms (Casanova, 2006; Flores, 2009). The notion of international migrants moving in one direction from a sending society to a receiving one had to be replaced in light of the increasing forth and back travels of transnational migrants, their often ongoing active engagement in locales of their origin, the steady streams of remittances and the frequent identification with two or more locales as home (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001); and this while maintaining diasporic connections, at times even through generation-spanning 'serial migration' (Siu, 2005). The increased cultural diversity that comes with migration is seen within most countries as a challenge that often produces nativistic backlashes (Bauböck et al., 1996). Migrants play key roles in the dialogue between world regions (see e.g. the studies of the mutual cultural influences in the Afro-Atlantic in Yelvington, 2006). Considering the cultural flux but also the relational restraints of given opportunity structures, the various modes and degrees in which migrants relate to different settings can be most usefully conceptualized as a 'flexible acculturation' to 'global multiculturalism' (Nederveen Pieterse, 2007).

Social movements form to effect change. Activist networks are not only bonded together by shared values but they also transform culture and values (e.g. Melucci, 1996). Social movements invent new values or reinterpret old ones in the communicative spaces of grassroots milieus. They disseminate and promote these to larger publics, and they appeal to authorities for efficacy. The feminist movement has redefined the role of women in society, household and family around the world. The gay and lesbian movement has redefined norms of sexuality. The environmental movement has redefined our relation to nature and responsibility for its future protection. Religious movements have redefined spiritual world-views along with this-worldly notions of the good life. At the same time

as the global integration of markets has reduced the political capacity and undermined the welfare commitments of even larger nation-states, people all over the world have started to mobilize against this neoliberal mode of globalization (Altvater, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Schulz, 1998).

The new information and communication technologies facilitate not only economic globalization but also the globalization of social dialogues. The interactive propensities of the Internet provide an infrastructure for the creation of new global publics, though many of the hopes for a harmonically integrated 'global village' that proliferated into the 1990s were disappointed in the course of the new media's further development. The availability of a global communication grid did not necessarily bring more global understanding but could fuel cultural fragmentation just as much. Unequal access to the new media produced new digital inequalities. The business opportunities brought corporate players into the process that began to commercialize cyberspace and encroach on the digital commons through the imposition of new copyright and usage restrictions. How the new media are being shaped is an open-ended battle, the outcome of which depends in part on the active involvement of civil society groups to push for socially orientated legislation and their creativity in using the new public spheres for cultural encounters across borders (see Schulz, this issue).

The future of society is being reimagined in the wake of globalization. Transnational migration, social movements and new media contribute to a new constellation in which the direction of future change is being debated. The continuation of wars, poverty, barbarism and environmental degradation proved false the announcements late last century of an alleged 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992). History has gone on with a vengeance. The future is as embattled as ever. Beyond the spectres of 'McWorld vs. global Jihad' (Barber, 1995) is the renewed search for common ground across borders. The values of a cosmopolitan citizenship cannot be imposed by any party (see Casanova, this issue). A sustained appeal can only be developed through dialogues from the grassroots up.

The sociology of values is not just about social cohesion, though this remains an important question, but also about social transformation. If incipient global civil society is not to leave the future to hegemonic interests or blind forces, then it must debate the grounds for cooperation. Sociology can contribute to this debate through critical research and imagination. Sociology can be viewed as a socially constituted space for reflecting on society and its future. Sociology does not need to restrict itself to anything less. As the notion of 'public sociology' (Burawoy, 2004) has been gaining acceptance, its task here is twofold: to provide public debates with otherwise unavailable data and to help extend their limits through critical reflections and distinct sociological perspectives. This includes enquiries into the preconditions of debate as much as research of specific value choices and alternative futures.

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A last reflection

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Modern, complex societies move on many wheels and along many tracks. This monograph is primarily concerned with some tracks along which present sociocultural life evolves in many countries, but where are those tracks leading? It is certain that the future of the world to come is being shaped in various ways. It is also certain that values, which people take to heart or unintentionally embody in their attitudes, play a significant role. Two authors of the collection engaged in mapping the tracks in personal and social life in East Malaysia/China and Japan. Other authors focused on institutions and corporations and still others on national and global trends in India, Europe and the United States. As pointed out in a friendly if also incisive way by the anonymous reviewers of this monograph, other tracks of value formation have not been dealt with. Co-editor Markus Schulz has lent them a keen and attentive ear in his coda: 'The values of global futures'. I am venturing a finishing touch to our picture in a somewhat imaginative and speculative way.

Thus, even if it is certain that values as human sociocultural phenomena matter, patterns of operation and value change remain concealed. It is not easily perceivable how the smaller wheels of values are moving within large structures of corporate, technocratic societies – those bigger cogs of society: the economic corporations and administrative bureaucracies. Nor is it apparent how values function within individual minds. Observing people, we may want to know what moves them, but, similar to Plato's cave men, looking from behind, we only see people moving. We cannot see their faces and cannot look into their hearts. Even if we could, the people, those in the street and the experts in various fields, they themselves, short of self-reflection, are not keenly aware of what exactly moves them in terms of values. Nevertheless, values are part of everyday life, most likely as the dimension of gratification that becomes internal to actors, orienting them from within, positively or negatively.

Further, ambivalence and lack of clarity pertain to the contexts within which values operate: the meso-intermediate and macro levels of social reality. The most consequential level of operation seen socially is perhaps the meso level of institutions and corporations. Value orientations that trickle down into social institutions tend to stick and decisions made within corporations impact both the micro and macro field.

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Apart from the contexts in which values operate, values as such must be focused on. In addition to the theoretically problematic points mentioned in the Introduction (the normative status of values and the degree to which values involve feeling and rationality), the nature of the so-called higher values needs more attention: the good (moral values), also the spiritual and the holy (religious values). Admittedly, sociologists are not primarily concerned with morality or religion but with the whole fabric of contemporary life. More than ever, enjoyment is an aspiration to people in consumer societies and those in developing societies who covet a fashionable lifestyle, particularly the young. Maximizing income is another ambition for a generation of achievers. This is modern life. It is not problematic except when it comes to excess, for example, in individual patterns of addiction and corporate misdemeanour. This not-so-new ethos shows that, socioculturally, traditional institutions are palpably in tension with individual autonomy. The 'moral majority' feels this as an acute problem. However, merely pinpointing tensions is not productive. Though difficult as a task, sociologists need to come to terms with the deep-running differences within our set of values: the pleasurable, the aesthetic, the social, the useful, the economic and the spiritual. In other words, in order to assess the significance of values, it becomes imperative to see that values come in distinct categories of gratification, implying distinct feelings and rationality, affecting different forms of quality of life.

Lastly, at its broadest level, the issue of values concerns the interconnectedness between culture and society, between the cultural content and the structural features of societies. It is generally agreed upon that, as everything else, values originate in the subject and that they belong in the sphere of culture, but they relate to social structures as well. This is the broad picture that emerges from Anthony Giddens' social theory in which he draws the basic lines of social interaction focusing on agency and structure or structuring properties. The latter are conceived of as rules and resources that are 'medium and outcome' of social practices. It is these rules and resources that affect the reproduction of social systems. If values could be conceptualized within Giddens' theoretical scheme as a category of resources, their social significance would become theoretically more perceptible and more productive. In a word, the idea of 'resource' with regard to values may open up a new perspective on this subject matter. Sociologists tend to see values as individual preferences, that insinuate arbitrariness. Conceptualizing values as resources of satisfaction and well-being focuses on agency rather than on structural operation. It increases clarity and adds an optimistic note to our outlook. Varied as they are, values constitute beneficial resources which, almost like objective goods, can be adopted and worked on in order to improve human individual and social well-being. This view implies that, even though our contemporary world has changed its gear due to the forces of information technologies and other agencies of globalization – current contexts and trends evidently need a hard look – not everything is new. For all the talk of today's sociocultural entanglements, values may prove to be an ageless subject. Reconnecting to the classical studies of values referred to by Markus Schulz in his reflection is one vital option for 21st-century sociology of culture.

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Résumés/Resúmenes

Valeurs et cultures dans le dressage social du futur

Reimon Bachika et Markus S Schulz

Cet article introduit la monographie *Current Sociology* sur les valeurs et la culture (*Values and Culture*). Il discute du regain d'intérêt de la sociologie pour les valeurs et l'approche générale convergente des différents collaborateurs en dépit de formations théoriques, de domaines et de contextes sociaux différents. Il explique comment les études de ce numéro contribuent à la compréhension de la formation et du fonctionnement des valeurs aux niveaux micro, méso et macro dans un monde toujours plus mondialisé.

Mots-clés: changement social, culture, futur, valeurs

Valores y cultura en la formación social del futuro

Reimon Bachika y Markus S Schulz

Este artículo presenta el tema de la *sociología actual* sobre *valores y cultura*. Analiza el renovado interés de la sociología por los valores y el enfoque general en el que los contribuyentes convergen a pesar de los diversos antecedentes teóricos, aspectos y entornos sociales. Explica de qué manera los estudios incluidos en este volumen contribuyen a comprender la formación y operación de los valores a niveles micro, meso y macro en un mundo cada vez más globalizado.

Palabras clave: cambio social, cultura, futuro, valores

Formation de valeurs sociétales et valeur de la vie

Mike Featherstone

Cet article explore la formation de valeurs aux niveaux individuel, culturel, sociétal, civilisationnel et d'une époque. Il discute des vecteurs de valeurs, des hiérarchies symboliques et des perspectives d'avenir. Il démontre l'utilité constante du diagnostic temporel et conceptuel de l'approche sociologique de valeurs de Georg Simmel. Par ailleurs cet article démontre que sa *Lebensphilosophie* ('philosophie de la vie') offre une plateforme permettant de gérer les contingences et ambiguïtés de la modernité en traitant la vie comme la valeur ultime mais indéterminée qui doit être appréhendée par les individus. Les valeurs sont essentielles en tant que moyens d'orientation préliminaires, même si elles ne doivent pas être considérées comme devrant durer très longtemps.

Mots-clés: culture, formation de valeurs, modernité, mondialisation, Simmel, valeur de la vie, valeurs

Formación en valores sociales y el valor de la vida

Mike Featherstone

Este artículo explora la formación de valores a nivel individual, cultural, social, de civilización y época y analiza qué cosas representan valores, las jerarquías simbólicas y las proyecciones a futuro. Demuestra la utilidad conceptual permanente y adecuada a los tiempos del enfoque sociológico de Georg Simmel respecto de los valores y mantiene que su *Lebensphilosophie* ('filosofía de la vida') ofrece una plataforma para superar las contingencias y ambigüedades de la modernidad considerando la vida como tal como el valor último pero indeterminado que los individuos deben descifrar. Los valores se necesitan como un medio preliminar de orientación aunque no se consideren durables.

Palabras clave: cultura, formación de valores, globalización, modernidad, Simmel, valor de la vida, valores

Valeurs de marchés capitalistes en Malaisie orientale et en Chine

Tan Chee-Beng

Cet article discutera des bases de valeurs écologiques et politiques et de leur signification dans notre compréhension de la vie culturelle via les réflexions ethnographiques engendrées par la rencontre des Badeng Kenyah avec le marché capitaliste. Les Badeng sont une minorité indigène de Malaisie orientale. Par ailleurs, la rencontre de la Chine post-Mao avec le marché capitaliste mondial est également abordée pour montrer la nature des valeurs et des changements sociaux et le besoin de réinventer des valeurs et de créer des institutions pour renforcer les valeurs adéquates qui façonneront les nouvelles formes culturelles. Des valeurs humaines, y compris des valeurs qui mettent l'accent sur le bien-être social et l'harmonie avec la nature sont enracinées dans le principe de réciprocité dans des sociétés égalitaires de petite taille. Cependant, les valeurs gravées dans les traditions culturelles humaines sont balayées par les forces du marché dans un monde toujours plus mondialisé. L'humanisme écologique est une vision du monde nouvelle bourgeonnante qui influence la réinvention de valeurs et encourage la formation de nouvelles formes culturelles.

Mots-clés: Chine, culture, humanisme écologique, Malaisie, marchandisation, modernisation, peuple indigène, religion, valeurs

Los valores del mercado capitalista en Malasia Oriental y China

Tan Chee-Beng

Este artículo analiza las bases ecológicas y políticas de los valores y su importancia en nuestra comprensión de la vida cultural a través de una reflexión etnográfica sobre

el encuentro de los Badeng Kenyah, una minoría indígena de Malasia Oriental, con el mercado capitalista. Trata además sobre el encuentro de la China post-Mao con el mercado capitalista global para mostrar la naturaleza de los valores y el cambio social y la necesidad de reinventar valores y crear instituciones que refuercen los valores relevantes que darán forma a nuevos formatos culturales. Los valores humanos, inclusive aquellos que enfatizan el bienestar social y la armonía con la naturaleza se basan en el principio de la reciprocidad en pequeñas sociedades igualitarias. Sin embargo, los valores arraigados en las tradiciones culturales humanas son arrancados por las fuerzas del mercado en un mundo cada vez más globalizado. El humanismo ecológico es una nueva visión emergente del mundo que influye en la reinvención de valores y fomenta la creación de nuevas formas culturales.

Palabras clave: China, cultura, humanismo ecológico, Malasia, mercantilización, modernización, pueblos indígenas, religión, valores

Vertus mortelles: ascétisme intramondain et *karôshi* au Japon
Scott North

Cet article explore les relations entre l'ascétisme intramondain tenace des travailleurs japonais et l'économie mondialisée actuelle. L'interaction de valeurs et des pratiques culturelles d'entreprise, des forces mondiales du marché et de la santé des individus est illustrée par le cas d'un courtier en bourse d'Osaka mort d'un surmenage au travail (*karôshi*) au cours de la guerre du golfe de 1990 et de l'effondrement de la 'bulle économique' au Japon qui s'en est suivie. L'analyse se concentre sur les documents d'entreprise et sur les événements qui présentaient le courtier comme la personnification de l'employé idéal. La tradition de discipline, de dévouement et de soumission qu'il a symbolisée a interagi avec les inégalités de la division mondiale du travail pour engendrer de tragiques conséquences pour lui et sa famille. Observé à la lumière des prismes historique, micro et macro, le potentiel négatif de telles valeurs ascétiques dans le travail se révèle. Mais l'analyse montre également que de tels cas sont des catalyseurs de mouvement sociaux qui mettent l'accent sur la valeur de l'attention.

Mots-clés: éthique du travail, heures supplémentaires, Japon, *karôshi* (décès dû au surmenage au travail), vie professionnelle

Virtudes mortales: ascetismo intramundano y *karôshi* en Japón
Scott North

Este artículo analiza la relación entre el persistente ascetismo intramundano de los trabajadores japoneses y la economía actual cada vez más globalizada. La interrelación entre los valores y las prácticas culturales corporativas, las fuerzas del mercado global y sus efectos sobre la salud individual se ilustran con el ejemplo de un corredor bursátil de Osaka que murió por exceso de trabajo *(karôshi)* durante la Guerra del Golfo en 1990 y el consecuente colapso de la 'economía burbuja' del Japón. El análisis se basa

en documentos corporativos y hechos que valorizaron públicamente al corredor como la representación del empleado ideal. La tradición de disciplina, dedicación y deferencia que este hombre pasó a simbolizar junto con la desigualdad en la división global del trabajo terminó en consecuencias trágicas para él y su familia. Desde el punto de vista histórico, micro y macro, el artículo se enfoca en el potencial negativo de esta ética laboral ascética. Pero el análisis también demuestra cómo este tipo de casos se convierten en catalizadores para la formación de movimientos sociales que enfatizan el valor del cuidado.

Palabras clave: ética laboral, horas extra, Japón, *karôshi* (muerte causada por exceso de trabajo), vida laboral

Les questions éthiques de la biotechnologie: culture religieuse et valeur de la vie

Shimazono Susumu

Les progrès de la biotechnologie et des sciences médicales, en particulier les découvertes dans les domaines du clonage et des cellules souches, ont soulevé de grands espoirs pour soigner des maladies, régénérer les tissus et organes endommagés, permettre la conception à un âge avancé et sélectionner des embryons sur la base d'un diagnostic génétique. Cependant, la question de savoir si ces progrès contribueront au bonheur de l'humanité ou si des corps humains sont instrumentalisés comme ressources de développement afin de procurer de plus grands profits se pose. Cet article s'interroge sur la conceptualisation de la valeur de la vie par des cultures religieuses par rapport à des menaces émergentes. Par anticipation, dans le cas du premier état embryonnaire de la vie humaine, l'Eglise catholique a, par exemple, condamné l'interruption volontaire des grossesses. En fait, différentes cultures religieuses ont montré et soutenu dans une très large mesure la valeur de la vie et la direction que les sciences et les technologies devraient prendre par rapport à celle-ci. L'article discute de la concurrence mondiale dans les domaines des sciences et des technologies qui oblige à transcender les opinions sur la valeur de la vie propagée par des cultures religieuses particulières.

Mots-clés: biotechnologie, éthiques, eugénisme, médecine de la reproduction, religion, valeur de la vie

Aspectos éticos de la biotecnología: cultura religiosa y el valor de la vida

Shimazono Susumu

Los avances en la biotecnología y la medicina, en especial los descubrimientos sobre clonación y la investigación de células madre, han generado grandes expectativas sobre la cura de enfermedades, la reparación de tejidos y órganos, la posibilidad de concebir a una edad avanzada y la selección de embriones en base al diagnóstico genético. Sin embargo, surge la pregunta de si estos avances aumentarán la felicidad de

la humanidad o si el cuerpo humano está siendo atacado como una fuente de recursos para el desarrollo y la obtención de grandes ganancias. Este artículo investiga el concepto del valor de la vida en las diferentes culturas religiosas frente a las amenazas emergentes. Anticipándose, respecto de la primera etapa embrionaria de la vida humana, la Iglesia Católica, por ejemplo, se ha manifestado contra la interrupción artificial del embarazo. De hecho, varias culturas religiosas han demostrado y enfatizado de manera considerable el valor de la vida y la dirección que la ciencia y la tecnología deberían adoptar en este respecto. Se argumenta que la competencia globalizada de la ciencia y la tecnología exige trascender los conceptos sobre el valor de la vida propagados por ciertas culturas religiosas.

Palabras clave: biotecnología, ética, eugenesia, medicina reproductiva, religión, valor de la vida

Publicité et formation de valeur: le pouvoir des sociétés multinationales

Lynne Ciochetto

Les images publicitaires contemporaines dans les média jouent un rôle important dans la promotion et le maintien d'une culture consumériste contemporaine et constituent un des axes qui soutiennent et développent le capitalisme contemporain. Même si l'une de ses fonctions premières est de promouvoir le matérialisme, l'imagerie publicitaire joue aussi un rôle important dans les changements culturels et de valeurs que ce soit en surface, la vente de produits, ou en profondeur. En effet elle engendre des glissements de valeurs culturelles comme l'importance croissante de l'autosatisfaction via la consommation, l'acceptation de l'utilisation de la sexualité pour vendre des produits, l'obsession de la jeunesse, l'apparence et l'image de soi ainsi qu'une obsession irrésistible pour la modernité et les dernières technologies. Il est essentiel de mieux connaître ces processus ou l'avenir sera probablement une version intense du système économique intenable actuel. Des options alternatives pour l'avenir doivent reconnaître le rôle puissant que la publicité et les média jouent dans la société et évaluer les possibilités de changement de ces rôles.

Mots-clés: culture, formation de valeur, mondialisation, publicité

Publicidad y formación de valores: el poder de las multinacionales

Lynne Ciochetto

Las imágenes publicitarias contemporáneas en los medios juegan un papel importante en la promoción y el sostenimiento de la cultura consumista actual y son uno de los pilares que sostienen y fomentan el capitalismo contemporáneo. Aunque una de sus funciones principales es promover el materialismo, la publicidad también juega un papel en el cambio cultural y de los valores tanto a nivel superficial, vender productos, como a nivel estructural, generando cambios en los valores culturales, por ejemplo aumentando

el énfasis en la auto gratificación a través del consumo, la aceptación del uso cada vez mayor de la sexualidad para vender productos, la obsesión por la juventud, la apariencia y la imagen corporal, y la gran obsesión con la modernidad y la última tecnología. Deben reconocerse aún más estos procesos, de lo contrario probablemente esto lleve a intensificar el sistema económico insostenible actual. Las opciones preferibles para el futuro deben tener en cuenta el poderoso rol que cumplen la publicidad y los medios en la sociedad y evaluar las opciones disponibles para modificarlos.

Palabras clave: cultura, formación de valores, globalización, publicidad

Valeurs, politique et démocratie aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique

David Graeber

Cet article examine le rôle des valeurs dans le discours politique récent aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Il commence par ce que de nombreux observateurs ont décrit comme une énigme: le fait qu'une part importante de la classe ouvrière étasunienne ait voté contre ses intérêts économiques mais selon ce qu'elle perçoit comme ses valeurs. En conséquence, un président qui réduisait les impôts des riches tout en menant une guerre coûteuse en Irak et en augmentant la dette publique à des niveaux historiquement sans précédents avait été réélu. On avance l'idée selon laquelle la classe ouvrière étasunienne blanche était déçue par les politiciens progressistes car elle les associait à une élite culturelle qui occupait des postes dans la société leur donnant accès à des carrières de valeur intrinsèque dans les arts, les sciences ou la politique. Mais ces postes étaient largement inaccessibles à la classe ouvrière. Il est ainsi suggéré que les 'guerres des cultures' aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique sont mieux interprétées comme une lutte pour accéder aux moyens de se comporter de façon altruiste. L'article rejette l'hypothèse largement répandue selon laquelle les individus veulent maximiser leur intérêt économique restreint personnel. Il suggère que l'épanouissement de l'homme peut être plutôt lié à la satisfaction de travailler pour le bien collectif.

Mots-clés: classe sociale, culture politique, discours politique, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, valeurs, vote

Valores, políticas y democracia en los Estados Unidos

David Graeber

Este artículo analiza el papel de los valores en el discurso político reciente en los Estados Unidos. Parte de lo que muchos observadores describieron como un rompecabezas: el hecho de que una parte significativa de la clase trabajadora americana votó en contra de sus intereses económicos pero en línea con lo que percibían como sus valores. Como resultado, se reeligió a un presidente que bajó los impuestos para los ricos mientras asumió una costosa guerra en Irak y aumentó la deuda pública a niveles nunca antes vistos. Se argumenta que grandes sectores de la clase trabajadora blanca americana estaban

desilusionados con los políticos liberales porque los asociaban con una *élite* cultural que ocupaban un lugar en la sociedad que les permitía dedicare a carreras de valor intrínseco en las artes, las ciencias o la política pero que en general no estaban disponibles para las clases trabajadoras. Por lo tanto, se sugiere que las 'guerras culturales' en los Estados Unidos pueden interpretarse mejor como una lucha por el acceso a los medios necesarios para comportarse de manera altruista. El artículo rechaza el supuesto generalizado de que las personas tienen una mentalidad estrecha y sólo desean maximizar sus propios intereses económicos. Sugiere que la realización humana se relaciona más bien con la satisfacción que se obtiene al trabajar para el bien común.

Palabras clave: clases sociales, cultura política, discurso político, Estados Unidos, valores, voto

Symbolisme et valeurs: rationalité et irrationalité de la culture

Reimon Bachika

Les politiciens communautaires, les croyants ainsi que plusieurs sociologues ont tendance à considérer que les valeurs vont de soi. C'est à dire dans la mesure où certains aspects de la vie sociale soulignent la croyance dans l'importance de valeurs. Cependant d'autres phénomènes sociaux, en particulier des conflits ethniques et religieux, semblent plus affectés par le symbolisme de la culture plutôt que par des valeurs. Cet article tente de trouver la logique du symbolisme et des valeurs dans différents contextes culturels. Il prétend que ces composants clés ont des conséquences importantes mais peuvent également poser problème en raison de leur ambivalence et de leur réunion. Il conclut que le symbolisme et les valeurs peuvent inverser leur nature raisonnable inhérente et modifier la rationalité et l'irrationalité.

Mots-clés: conflit ethnique/religieux, intérêts, rationalité/irrationalité, symbolisation, 'symbolisations', symbolisme, valeur, valeurs, valorisation, 'valorisations'

Simbolismo y valores: racionalidad e irracionalidad de la cultura

Reimon Bachika

Los políticos comunitarios y las personas religiosas, así como varios sociólogos suelen dar pon sentado a los valores; es decir, en la medida en que ciertos aspectos de la vida social afectan la importancia que se les da a estos valores. Sin embargo, otros fenómenos sociales, en particular los conflictos étnicos y religiosos, parecen verse más afectados por el simbolismo de la cultura que por los valores. Este artículo intenta realizar un seguimiento de la lógica del simbolismo y los valores en varias culturas. Arguye que estos componentes centrales de la cultura son muy importantes pero también pueden causar problemas debido a su ambivalencia y combinación. Concluye que el simbolismo y los valores pueden invertir su naturaleza inherente de razón y afecto, racionalidad e irracionalidad.

Palabras clave: conflicto étnico/religioso, intereses, racionalidad/irracionalidad, simbolismo, simbolización, 'simbolizaciones', valor, valores, valuación, 'valuaciones'

Valeurs culturelles et mondiallsation: le dilemme de l'Inde
Kamlesh Mohan

L'argumentation comprend deux axes. Premièrement le projet euro-étasunien de créer un marché mondial est sous-tendu par le programme hégémonique de ces puissances. Deuxièmement, il a de sérieuses implications pour la préservation de la tradition culturelle composite et les identités religieuses de l'Inde. La marchandisation des femmes et des relations hommes femmes y est également liée. La pertinence cruciale de la greffe des idéaux de la modernité occidentale pour le succès du projet de mondialisation sera démontrée. Cependant, l'idée selon laquelle la mondialisation et la modernité occidentale sont inévitables doit être contestée. Le paradigme de la modernité pour l'Inde n'ignore pas les aspects matériels de la vie humaine, ne préconise pas le rejet de son riche héritage culturel ni le retrait de la vie sociale basée sur la communauté.

Mots-clés: capitalisme consumériste, Inde, médis, modernité, sexe, valeurs

Valores culturales y globalización: el dilema de la India
Kamlesh Mohan

Este artículo plantea un doble argumento. En primer lugar el proyecto euroamericano para crear un mercado mundial se ve afectado por su agenda hegemónica. En segundo lugar, tiene serias implicancias en la preservación de la tradición cultural compuesta de la India y sus identidades religiosas. Esto se relaciona con la mercantilización de las mujeres y las relaciones entre los géneros. Se demostrará que es esencial aplicar los ideales de la modernidad occidental para que el proyecto de globalización sea exitoso. Sin embargo, debe objetarse el argumento sobre la inevitabilidad de la globalización y, por ende, de la modernidad occidental. El paradigma que la modernidad representa para la India no ignora los aspectos materiales de la existencia humana ni fomenta el rechazo de su rico patrimonio cultural ni la eliminación de la vida social basada en la comunidad.

Palabras clave: capitalismo, consumidor, género, India, medios, modernidad, valores

Vers des sociétés multiculturelles: l'expérience européenne
Eleonora Barbieri Masini

Les migrations actuelles engendrent, et engendreront à l'avenir, la rencontre de populations dont les cultures sont plus diverses que jamais auparavant. C'est pourquoi nos sociétés évoluent vers des sociétés multiculturelles dans différentes parties du monde. Cet article se concentre sur l'Europe et les sociétés multiculturelles, ainsi que sur la possibilité de

création de projets pour des sociétés interculturelles. Dans de telles sociétés, les peuples appartenant à des cultures différentes apprennent à créer des conditions de dialogue en reconnaissant leur propre identité et celle d'autres cultures. L'article analyse la question sur la base conceptuelle de l'unité et de la diversité. Il adopte également une perspective tournée vers l'avenir alliée à l'habileté à concevoir des 'graines de changement' qui pourraient générer des visions et des projets de sociétés multiculturelles et interculturelles ainsi que des projets pour ces mêmes sociétés. Il cherche des preuves des évolutions européennes en rapport avec le dialogue socioculturel parmi les tenants des différentes identités et valeurs qui pourraient mener à de futures alternatives socioculturelles.

Mots-clés: cultures, Europe, sociétés interculturelles, sociétés multiculturelles, valeurs

Hacia las sociedades multiculturales: la experiencia europea

Eleonora Barbieri Masini

La migración produce en la actualidad, y producirá en el futuro, el encuentro entre poblaciones con las culturas más diversas que nunca. Por lo tanto, estamos avanzando hacia sociedades multiculturales en diferentes partes del mundo. El artículo se enfoca en Europa y las sociedades multiculturales así como en la posibilidad de desarrollar proyectos de sociedades interculturales. En estas sociedades, las personas de diferentes culturas aprenden a crear el diálogo reconociendo su propia identidad y la de las otras culturas. El artículo analiza el tema desde la base conceptual de la unidad y la diversidad. También adopta una perspectiva a futuro relacionada con la capacidad de diseñar 'semillas de cambio' que puedan generar visiones y proyectos de sociedades multiculturales o interculturales. Busca pruebas de los cambios producidos en Europa en relación con el diálogo socio-cultural entre personas con diferentes identidades y valores que lleve a posibles futuros socio-culturales alternativos.

Palabras clave: culturas, Europa, sociedades interculturales, sociedades multiculturales, valores

Valeurs et conditions de la communication mondiale

Markus S Schulz

Cet article examine le rôle de valeurs dans le façonnage de l'avenir d'un point de vue de la communication mondiale. Il argumente que les perspectives d'une société mondiale démocratique dépendent de la création de groupes délibératifs mondiaux comme une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante. Il explore comment les nouveaux médias qui facilitent la mondialisation du commerce et de la production peuvent aussi fournir les infrastructures techniques des bases d'un dialogue entre pays. Le contraste entre des trajectoires alternatives est utilisé pour préciser les enjeux et les choix de valeurs possibles. Après avoir rejeté les notions persistantes de déterminisme technologique,

this article. As editor of *Idafat* and board member of *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi* (a refereed journal in the social sciences targeting specialized and non-specialized audiences), I have had sight to a large number of social scientific manuscripts. Also, being a faculty member at AUB, I draw many arguments from my own experience and consider this university as a case study. The article does not follow the typical structure of an empirical work; rather the empirical material serves to support a mainly theoretical argument.[2]

Compartmentalization of scholars by language of interaction

Higher education has historically played a role in the formation of the one sort of elite, endowed with cultural capital. The transformation of the university, especially through marketization and the diversification of its resources that is examined in this section, has engendered a diversification of elites, who are compartmentalized mainly through their language of interaction.

There are three types of universities in the Arab East. The first type is the *public university*, which absorbs the overwhelming majority of students. Being often a national university, it generally uses Arabic-language curricula. According to the UN's *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2003), political censorship and repression limits critical approaches, especially in public institutions. The democratization of education in Egypt and in Syria (where a free education allows a large proportion of the population access to it), albeit very important in the post-independence era, has led to an increase in the quantity, not the quality of students. In addition to these two major factors affecting education, one should add: lack of proper faculty salary, poor libraries and teaching resources, out-dated curricula,[3] enormous logjams of students, lack of financial resources for research and poor knowledge of foreign languages. These factors make the level of education in these universities problematic.

The second type of university is older; some of them historically founded by missions. As their tuition is very costly, they are *private non-profit universities*, which attract the upper middle class (e.g. Saint Josef University, LAU and AUB in Lebanon, American University in Cairo [AUC]).[4] These universities teach exclusively in English or French and are 'selective universities', or universities with a distinct linkage to social class. These universities accommodate both (upper) middle-class students as well as faculty from the same classes. Bourdieu (1984: 214) characterizes academia as a fundamentally conservative institution that reproduces and reinforces social class distinctions as a result of internalized faculty outlooks and expectations. This observation would only apply to the exclusive universities in the region (and not to the public universities). Some of these universities have mission statements which clearly state that their aim is to prepare students to serve the people of the region (e.g. AUB, AUC), while the mission statements of others aim to prepare students for work in the global market (e.g. LAU).

Finally, since the beginning of the 1990s, many countries in the region have opted for the privatization of education. While private non-profit universities in Lebanon date from the 19th century, Jordan opened its first *private for-profit university* in 1990, followed by Egypt, Syria and the Gulf Region.

These three types of universities do not necessarily produce corresponding types of elites and knowledge, but they do indicate particular patterns of classification, which are

addressed later in the article. Boundaries are occasionally blurred between these types of universities; for instance, some public universities have created private programmes.

With the transformation of the relationships between Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff's (2000) famous triple helix of university, industry and government, education is now being seen more as a private than a public good. Facing declining budgets and under intensified competition, private and public universities in the Arab East have responded with market solutions, standardization and corporatization. They have instituted joint ventures with private corporations and have been reinventing education as a commodity through distance learning (for other regions, see Bok, 2003; Kirp, 2003). Mamdani (2007) argued that whereas privatization (the entry of privately sponsored students) is compatible with a public university where priorities are publicly set, commercialization (financial and administrative autonomy for each faculty to design a market-responsive curriculum) inevitably leads to a situation where the market determines priorities in public universities. The primary objective is to turn the university into an entrepreneurial organization that can foster a relationship with the productive sectors of the economy (Clark, 1998). Turning educational development in the Arab East into a means of industrial development combines with the often backward looking gaze of these elitist institutions, to frustrate social science scholars (Sultana, 1999: 24). Some of the public universities, like those in Syria, are often much better than the newly opened private universities. Mamdani (2007) warns that the commercialization of public universities leads to the subversion of public institutions for private purposes. While commercial universities have often attracted middle and upper middle classes, the quality of the higher education is also problematic,[5] as they produce an elite that cannot compete in the global market.

There is a massive academic boom in higher education in the Arab world. One important pattern characterizing the current boom is a dual process of *privatization* amidst *globalization*. Two-thirds (around 70) of the new universities founded in the Arab Middle East since 1993 are private, and more and more (at least 50) of them are branches of western, mostly American, universities (Romani, 2009: 4).

While offshore campuses (Qatar Education City, Dubai Campus[6]) can protect the university from their conservative surrounding societies, this results in a tendency for the university to cut its ties with society. The parachuting (Bashshur, 2007) of these structures does not encourage research output and the social sciences in these institutions are very marginal. For Vincent Romani (2009: 5) it is highly unlikely that the influx of new higher education venues can proceed without engaging the conflict between nationalism and the necessary *inter*nationalism of the projects. On the level of language, national universities often teach social sciences in Arabic, while exclusive universities use French and/or English. Private universities use what Zughoul (2000) called 'innovative accommodation' with lecturers and students code-switching between Arabic and English (or French) in order to get their points across. Many researchers, especially in North Africa, have shown that code-switching is not only frequent, but almost instinctive, producing an effortless and seamless flow of language that accommodates the variable levels of students' understanding (Sultana, 1999: 32).

These new trends in university development in the Arab region, driven by marketization and privatization, thus impact the language of instruction and elite formation, deserving closer scrutiny.

The UN's *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2003) indicated how little Arab countries translate from, and to, other languages. The damage caused by the lack of translation effort has become quite obvious: mono language teaching (in Arabic, French, or English) and the disconnection from external cultural and scientific advances or disembeddedness from the local context have led to the isolation from international debate of younger generations graduated from public universities. Generally speaking, the language-divide corresponds to an unequal division of labour in which Arabic production is mainly local (only slightly abstract) and of little relevance to international debates. These observations are based on a review of articles submitted to the journals *Idafat* and *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi* since early 2007.

Although language is a highly symbolic marker of identity, multilingual scholars have multilayered identities which open the door to more expansive research agendas and a commitment not only to local and regional contexts, but international ones too. The language of instruction cannot be chosen exclusively on the basis of political-cultural factors, which are related to identity formation on gaining political independence. There is also a political-economic component, which involves recognizing problems related to the dearth of resources that limits the production of required textbooks, as well problems determined by the marketing strategies of international publishers from core universities (Sultana, 1999: 31). Production in two languages, especially through translation, allows Arab scholars to be read by both the Arab public and an international audience. Recent experience from the region confirms this.[7] Thus, there are different markets for different languages, which make English very important as a teaching tool. However, there is no reason to have a syllabus devoid of references to Arabic publications. A study of 30 syllabi of social science courses taught in Saint Josef University, LAU and AUB shows that it is extremely rare (only two references) to find Arabic references, even as secondary reading.

However, as many interviewees pointed out, compartmentalization of the language of scholars does not mean one cannot find a way of mixing English and Arab curricula and references. One can expect universities that teach in English to be a bridge connecting the local social science to the international arena, but they become globalized institutions only in the sense that they have access to global conventions and resources but do not necessarily participate in the production of global science. Moreover, these universities contribute to the isolation of students and faculty from their society. George Soros (2002) and Joseph Stiglitz (2002) have recognized the pitfalls of globalization, specifically that internationalization of higher education creates and/or magnifies inequalities and inequities that already exist in southern societies. This process has led to the homogenization of curricula. Knight (2008) and Yew (2009) suggest that the complexities involved in working in the field of internationalization require additional sets of knowledge, attitudes, skills and understandings about the international, intercultural and global dimensions of higher education.

In Lebanon, while there is segmentation of society on sectarian-nationalist lines, language has come to reinforce this division. Knowing a foreign language becomes a source of integration globally and isolation locally. These elite universities produce hybridity that is geared only towards production and leads to alienation from national society and, consequently, marginality. Social scientists in Lebanon do not speak with each other because while the Lebanese University (public university) talks to the society,

AUB, LAU and Saint Joseph talk to the international world. The fora for encounters are rare.[8]

In brief, increasing privatization and the commodification of knowledge have created hierarchies between universities and between different language-speaking elites; and also the compartmentalization of scholars by language of interaction. In addition there is segmentation in the variety of social science activities.

Compartmentalization of scholars by types of social research

To address this second type of compartmentalization, I use the seminal four-dimensional typology elaborated by Michael Burawoy for sociology, applying it more broadly to all of the social sciences. Burawoy distinguishes between four types of sociology: two (*professional* and *critical* sociology) are relevant to academic audiences, and the others (*public* and *policy* sociology) pertain to a wider audience. Professional sociology consists of 'multiple intersecting research programs, each with their assumptions, exemplars, defining questions, conceptual apparatuses and evolving theories' (Burawoy, 2005: 10). Critical sociology examines the foundations – both the explicit and the implicit, both normative and descriptive – of the research programmes of professional sociology. Public sociology 'brings sociology into a conversation with publics, understood as people who are themselves involved in conversation. It entails, therefore, a double conversation' (Burawoy, 2005: 8) and reciprocal relationships, in which meaningful dialogue fosters mutual education that not only strengthens such publics but also enriches sociological work itself and helps it in setting the research agendas. Community participation in the design of research proposals as well as lectures and workshops with different stakeholders for dissemination of the results of research are forms through which social scientists can interact with the public and determine the relevance of future topics of study, both for the needs of society and the public. Public social science thus has four levels: first, privileging the method of sociological intervention[9] and action research; second, speaking and writing for the public exclusively about the researcher's discipline; third, speaking and writing about the discipline and how it relates to the social, cultural and political world around it; finally, speaking, writing and taking a stand for something far larger than the discipline from which the researcher originated (Lightman, 2008). Here we should admit the public researcher's normative stance without necessarily uncritically espousing a cause (Marezouki, 2004; Wieviorka, 2000).

Finally, policy sociology's purpose is to provide solutions to problems that are presented to the society, or to legitimate solutions that have already been reached. Some clients (international organizations, ministries, etc.) often request specific studies for their intervention, with a narrow contract (Burawoy, 2005: 9).

While all four types of social science are equally represented and being debated in Europe (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Touraine and Michel Wieviorka) and partially in North America (e.g. Michael Burawoy, Herbert Gans and David Riesman), this is not the case in the Arab East. The lack of dialogue regarding this issue in the Arab East can be noted from the ratio between published articles, newspaper articles and unpublished reports in 203 CVs of social scientists in the Arab East. Research shows that scholars often specialize in one type of social science and there is no debate between these individuals.

Table 1. Source of references in the 2009 *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP)

	No. of references	%
UN documents	113	47
International organizations	40	17
Internet documents	30	12
Academic production	30	12
Official documents	21	9
Newspapers	8	3
Total	242	100

In terms of researchers' profile, critical social scientists are generally over 50 years old. The trend is often that senior scholars do not do fieldwork. Policy and public social scientists are often male. The high competitiveness and aggressiveness of the consultancy market could explain this male bias.

Some professional and critical social scientists that I interviewed expressed a condescending attitude towards public and policy sociology. For a long time, professional researchers have taken a position of objectivity and set aside their ethical responsibilities by avoiding both expressing their views (pro or con) in public forums and lobbying public officials. This attitude becomes clearer when the faculty serve in elite universities. A glance at the profiles of the consultants conducting policy research for state and international organizations revealed that around three-quarters have never published in academic journals, there are no traces of fieldwork and most of the output recycles the work of the others instead. These consultants seem to be lacking consistent reflexivity.

There is unequal competition between policy researchers and other types of social scientists, resulting from the intervention of the donor agencies, who often favour the former, coined 'expert social scientists', at the expense of the latter. This reflects what Lee et al. (2005) called the tumultuous marriage between social science and social policy, in which the rules of conjugality are never fully established or agreed on by both parties. For instance, UN agencies sometimes produce policy knowledge which is self-legitimized and disconnected from professional research. The 2009 *Arab Human Development Report*'s text references (UNDP, 2009) (which are different from the statistical references) reveal only 12 references over 242 (14 percent) and almost half (47 percent) of those references are UN documents (see Table 1).

Examination of CVs shows that public social scientists in the Arab East are also often disconnected from professional social scientists. They become experts on any topic that they are requested to research by media or public institutions. Although anecdotal, I have watched TV programmes in some Arab channels (al-Jazeera, Future TV, Syrian TV, Palestinian TV and al-Arabiyya) during the last year, to look for the presence of Arab public social scientists. I have noticed a small number of them being interviewed on different topics which are sometimes related to their field of expertise, but in many cases the topics are not related at all. Reviewing some of these media savvy scholars' CVs shows that they have not been producing much professional and critical research. Similarly, it is rare to find books written by social scientists that are read beyond the academic realm,

and they become the vehicle of a public discussion about the nature of Arab or local society – the nature of its values, and the gap between its promise and its reality, tendencies and malaise. Many scholars have studied the figure of the intellectual and its relationship to academia and to society. For Hisham Ju'eit (2001), while European intellectuals are connected to their traditions, Arab intellectuals have deserted theirs. Both Ali Harb (1996) and Abdul-Elah Balqiz (1999) complain that Arab intellectuals are overly politicized and partisan to political formations, rather than being critical thinkers connected to academia.

Having said that, I am not suggesting that each scholar should do all four types of social research. However, when there is a trend of compartmentalization at the societal level, this risks producing mediocrity in each type of social science and, in particular, risks rendering professional and critical research more elitist and irrelevant (Alatas, 2001); disconnected from society's needs. Structures such as universities, donor agencies and media are pushing towards this specialization. I argue infra that the university is disconnected from the public sphere.

Demise of the university as a public sphere

Does the university constitute a 'public good' or a public sphere? As many interviewees pointed out, many faculty members in public, commercial and selective Arab universities avoid engaging with the public or with social movements; they instead conceive of the university as an 'apolitical' space.

Arab universities do not often constitute a public sphere, in terms of a space in which new ideas are discussed and tested. They isolate themselves from the city, avoiding the risk of generating animosity from certain social groups. Before the 1970s, this was not the case. The change of AUB's status in Lebanon constitutes an enlightening example.

Historically (before the 1970s), AUB played a major role in producing critical scholarship (Myntti et al., 2009). Critical intellectuals, reformists and nationalists engaged with the public, addressing critical issues in Arab history, modern reading of the Koran, gender education and Arab unity.[10] However, since the beginning of 1980s, the financial and institutional focus within universities has shifted from the departments of history, philosophy and Middle Eastern studies, and is instead focused on business and engineering schools. Whereas AUB was once a vibrant space of critical thinking, challenging common suppositions and engaging with the public, some interviewees indicated that administrators have become cautious because of the sensitivity of some of these engagements. Some from administration request that faculty not reveal their affiliation to AUB when they write public articles and that they even add a disclaimer disassociating their opinions from the institution. Others have asked faculty not to use the AUB email system when they call for signatures or petitions dealing with societal issues. Some faculty hide their writing in newspapers in their CVs, not only because these do not count towards promotion, but also because some of their colleagues would consider it dispersion or as 'being too widespread'.

While national universities were heavily controlled by the state in a fashion resembling McCarthyism-style campaigns and deliberately not invited to engage with society, the commercialization of higher education has produced a place for interaction with the

demands of the market and not of society. For instance, the importance of liberal art education programmes is shrinking and they have become merely general education requirements to service and supplement other programmes.

In some universities in the region, a new trend has recently emerged: the establishment of civic engagement and community service centres (as in the case of AUB and Saint Josef University in Lebanon and AUC in Egypt). AUB has many initiatives, six of which are worth noting here: the Civic Engagement and Community Service Centre,[11] the Agricultural Research and Education Centre (AREC) (which is the AUB campus in the Bekaa Valley[12]), the Neighbourhood Initiative,[13] Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy,[14] City Debate[15] and Sociology Café.[16]

In spite of these numerous initiatives, many challenges are still facing the faculty. AUB interviewees have mentioned how some deans and administrators do not positively evaluate the faculty's efforts. They highlighted a paradox: while AUB wants to show a good image of civic engagement, this is not counted de facto in evaluation of the faculty. Thus, what about the promotion system?

Universities often have three criteria for promotion: research output, effective teaching/learning and contribution to university services and development. As to the last criterion, it is described in the AUB regulations as follows: 'this criterion is reflected in two types of service: a. Service based on initiatives to promote the quality of education in the Faculty and University. This takes the form of introduction of new courses and programs to the applicant's department, contribution to the graduate program, research funding initiatives, service to the community and outreach, etc. b. Service to the Faculty and University in committees needed for the management of the affairs of the Faculty and University' (*source:* unpublished electronic circulation). Although 'service to the community, and outreach' is mentioned, interviewees reported that 'achievement according to this criterion is hardly discussed in meetings for evaluation of the promotion files, whether at the department, advisory committee, or superior levels'. If faculty engage in community work, their rigour and reputability are often held suspect.

In brief, and in the words of Myntti et al. (2009: 13), 'internal discussions are taking place about how to proceed, but, generally speaking, what is interesting is how narrowly service is defined. The argument rests not on the inherent value of service – *as an act of citizenship* – but how it will build the financial, political and social capital of the implementer through service on expert committees, editorial boards, and media contributions.' I now turn to look at publication as a criterion in the promotion system and the problems that this implies.

Ratings system in the promotion procedure

The university has a role, not only in the production, but also the legitimization of knowledge (Stevens et al., 2008: 129). It orients research through funding or favouring a certain type of research output for the promotion of faculty (e.g. Slaughter, 1993). Research output is indeed the most important criterion for promotion. For instance, according to the AUB Faculty of Arts and Sciences regulations, 'the research output should reflect an international standard in fields that are deemed timely and contributing to knowledge in a well-defined area of research. Above all, work should be published in recognized

academic journals that are refereed internationally. In the case of books, the quality of the publisher, the process of refereeing, and the reviews the book receives will be taken into account.'[17] As is clear from this regulation, there is no mention about the importance of publishing in regional or local publications. Although regional or local journals cannot compete with 'internationally recognized journals', they have the possibility of generating better debate locally and regionally. This regulation also does not address the question of language. In the meetings discussing their promotion, some faculty reported that 'Arabic articles cannot be counted' or are labelled pejoratively as 'local'. The 2008 annual report of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at AUB demonstrates clearly how few social science publications are published in Arabic (only three of 245 articles and two out of 27 books).[18] The American University of Sharjah (UAE) does request in its research criteria that some of the research activities should 'apply specialized research to the needs of the UAE'. However there is no encouragement to publish in local or regional outlets.

How have we come to this point? Is it due to the regulations surrounding promotion or the practice of the well-established professor, i.e. the *reproduction of the corps* (Bourdieu, 1984: 84), and the continuation of the orthodoxy? Academia is determined by the control of the mechanisms for accepting new faculty members into the university ranks. The selection and moulding of these new faculty members are a core exercise of power in the ongoing creation of academia. I tend to blame the corps rather than institutional regulations. Even if I blame regulations for not encouraging faculty to spare some time for dissemination of their research beyond referee journals, the corps have not resisted. Worse, according to many faculty interviewed, this practice is to some extent related to colleague snobbery rather than regulations. This does not disregard the fact that there are also other factors which render publication in Arabic difficult, such as the small number of refereed journals in the Arab world.

While this problem is acute in selective universities in the Arab world, a similar problem can be found in a large part of the southern world. In South Africa, for instance, Tina Uys (2009) noted that the rating system of their scholarly output, while designed to promote international competitiveness, raises a major problem for embeddedness of the research in the local context.

The promotion system's objective is to signify institutional isomorphism with top American universities, but this objective should not stand alone. Accommodating the local context is also very important. In DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) theory of 'institutional isomorphism', isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. I am not against borrowing institutional forms from North America, but rather object to the uncritical imitation of American institutions, especially when the Arab region has a very different set of environmental conditions. In addition, this process of isomorphism does not assume that there is heterogeneity in the US system, neglecting the fact that comparisons refer to very few elite universities.

Ratings based on publications in international journals and relying on international reviewers draw research away from issues and problems of local and national importance. A professor of education at AUB reported that many articles were distorted to fit within the framework of the international audience and lost both their focus and the capacity to

generate debate at the national and regional levels. Other faculty members complain of reviewer reports rejecting their manuscript as 'being not relevant to the American audience', 'mixing academia with advocacy', or because 'important American literature is not cited'. This means northern locals become international while the southern locals become obsolete.[19] Based on bibliometric studies, Wiebke Keim confirms the marginalization of the south in social scientific production: 'Pouris (1995), for instance, applies this methodology to the study of social sciences internationally, stating that 90% of the articles contained in the "Social Science Citation Index" originate from 10% of the world's countries' (Keim, 2008).

The idea of simply publishing in international journals yields to a modernist interpretation of producing (objective) knowledge of 'who, what, when, where, why' with a 'view from nowhere', while attention should be drawn to a knowledge that considers the (situated) questions of 'for whom, for what, for when, for where' and 'from whose viewpoint' as an inseparable part of the analytic project and not merely a matter of the individual analyst's concerns (Lee et al., 2005). Public social science is a way of writing and a form of intellectual engagement that cannot be accommodated in an international refereed journal, especially if one takes into account the delay (sometimes two years) in publication.

The result is the demise of fieldwork and textual analysis in favour of theoretical and statistical analysis. The way researchers are required to publish exclusively globally has led them to perish locally. What is the interest of being a researcher who enjoys considerable international recognition by one's peers for the high quality and impact of their recent research outputs while she or he is unknown locally? Many social scientists in Lebanon and the Arab world fall into this category. Clearly, refereed journals are often very academically jargoned and do not make social science assessable to the general public, contrary to what some journals insist. In the editorial of the inaugural issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*, Albion Small wished by the end of the 20th century for this journal to be accessible to the public, but so far this journal, like others, has failed in this mission (Haney, 2008). Refereed journals should be one of the outlets of social science production, important for the dialogue inside the discipline, but should not be the unique publication outlet. Japanese and German social scientists reach a certain balance in this effort. Their social science establishment, while very much influenced by western models, does not gauge success according to publications in international periodicals and the English language (Alatas, 2003: 606).

Becoming a globalized researcher does not happen without cost in terms of content or narrative. For instance, it is at times difficult to publish articles critical of the mainstream western thought in the 'core' journals of the field (i.e. the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *American Sociological Review*, *Social Problems*, *Social Forces* and *Rural Sociology*). Some interviewees mentioned for instance 'how difficult [it is] to publish in such journals on social classes or a radical criticism of Israeli colonial practices'. In terms of narrative, the ratings system disregards publication in non-orthodox 'scientific' journals, such as literary journals. Writing for an international standard imposes a certain stylistic model and structure of argument. If we adopt Wolfe's classic distinction between two ideal-type models: the 'scientific or experimental model' and the 'literary model' (Wolfe, 1990),[20] we see that a scholar will hardly find a scientific journal allowing a literary model of writing.

Ratings system also have not yet adapted to new media technology. The proliferation of publications and resources on the Internet has dramatically changed the way information is transmitted. For academic journals, the Internet provides an opportunity to make articles available to subscribers and the public while eliminating the delay that is inevitable with a print publication. However, the interviews showed that in some universities, the promotion criteria rate such journals are far lower than hard copy journals.

In brief, in selective and private universities, instead of assessing research, international benchmarking of research output and the rating system are what makes the product count. An article based on two years' fieldwork is equal to a literature review. Once the product is identified, there is no need to assess what happened, either before (research methodology and process) or after (dissemination of knowledge to the public or the recycling into policy study).

While selective universities are often *globally* oriented, the national universities are only *locally* oriented. Faculty publish very little in international journals and in languages other than Arabic.[21] If the former issue is a problem of *publish globally and perish locally*, the latter issue is *publish locally and perish globally*. This is the publication profile of the average researcher in the Arab East, based on the CVs analysis, but this does not mean that there are no few other scholars who were able to bridge between the global and the local. Already the conditions for carrying out research in the region are very difficult: they have poor libraries and comparatively low salaries.[22] This leads to a lack of interest, but also to a difficulty in satisfying international journal criteria. A glance at the CVs of social science faculty at public universities shows that the faculty who published in English or French journals are those who graduated from northern or Atlantic universities. A survey of the publications on the science of education conducted by Maaloof (2009) has shown two striking facts: first, 95 percent of articles in the Jordanian journals are published by Jordanian authors. Another survey has shown that 11 percent of Egyptian authors and 35 percent of Kuwaiti authors publish outside their respective countries (Maaloof, 2009).

The marginality of the Arab-language production in the global arena is accompanied by invisibility in international scientific fora. Few scholars coming from the Arab world attend international conferences. National universities rarely provide scholarships to attend international conferences. There were only five, seven and 10 participants respectively in the World Congress of the International Sociology Association in Madrid (1990), Bielefeld (1994) and Montreal (1998). However, if Arabic-language social research is somehow peripheral in global knowledge circuits it is mainly due to its non-hegemonic language (Arabic) rather than to the issues, perspectives or paradigms that are worked with.

Finally, some local universities are aware of the importance of evaluating local and international publications. For instance, Birzeit University (Ramallah, the West Bank) distinguishes between research output and scientific output. To evaluate scientific output, applicants for promotion are invited to cite the titles of all their publications and talks addressed to large public audiences, while research output concerns production in academic journals and books and academic workshop attendance.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated the role of the university promotion system in the orientation of faculty research and sheds some light on elite formation. As a critical vector for

scientific production, publication crystallizes the particular links woven between the institutional (rating systems inside the university and donor funding) and cognitive (types of knowledge) aspects of a field. This article reveals that understanding the field's scientific practices goes with the analysis of the specific interrelations between its contextual modalities of institutionalization and the characteristics of the knowledge it produces. Donor agencies and universities tame the social sciences. The state either promotes loyalists or criminalizes the opponents (Abaza, 2010), and sometimes just does not promote 'national sciences' (Kabbanji, 2009) and leaves it to the donor agenda. Being exposed to these institutional frames, and having economic concerns as well, social scientists self-censor.

I demonstrate that the promotion system in some universities, especially selective ones, is pushing for a narrow definition of the service as the promotion criterion. This has contributed in the demise of the university as a public sphere. The research criteria and the publication rating system have influenced research narratives and research agendas and discouraged professional and critical researchers from combining their research with policy and public concerns. Faculty are then pressured to standardize their way of conducting research and to publish mainly in English-language refereed journals. Using Bourdieu's (1984) dichotomy, these journals often publish orthodox and institutionally approved intellectual viewpoints, rather than 'heretical' ones. Little space has been left for creativity or eccentricity.

While there is human achievement to social sciences' certain universalism (albeit discontinuities also), there are also *differentiated trajectories to reach these* tendencies. Already, the logic of scientific discovery is interrupted by epistemological breaks and paradigm shifts. It becomes more difficult for the southern researcher to contribute to these discontinuities. Social scientists' relationship to their practice is usually mediated by values, attitudes and their representations that are frequently quite remote from the formal standards of verification.

A local researcher has the right to choose the style she or he likes, to use local metaphors without 'proper translation' and to cite the authors she or he likes in the literature review, whether they are local, southern or northern. High-impact journals should adopt the multiculturalist approach to allow a diversity of concepts and styles, but not in the sense that we need only Arabic concepts for Arabic phenomena. In the words of Kenway and Fahey (2009: 2), it is a question of how these journals can encourage the development of 'defiant' global imaginations and communities with the capacities to think, 'be' and 'become' differently in a world of research increasingly governed by rampant reductionist rationality.

In short, the promotion system effectively internalizes the hegemony of northern social sciences, thereby deepening the divide among Arab social scientists. Southern countries, dominated in the international division of scientific work, thus produce *peripheral science* (Losego and Arvanitis, 2008) and *peripheral visions* (Connell, 2009), reinforcing 'academic dependency' (Alatas, 2003). This rating system inhibits the emergence of autonomous sociological production, marginalizing it and not supporting work that is 'more consequential' (Appadurai, 2000: 3). The work of Wiebke Keim (2008) on the marginality of the southern social sciences is very enlightening. For Keim, the rating system hides an inherent evolutionist perspective in the social sciences, which despite postmodern deconstruction and disillusion, still prevails and creates hierarchies between

objects of research as well as between locations of sociological production: the success of the southern social sciences is determined by its catching up the northern sciences. The internationalization of social science is just its ongoing process of modernization/ westernization (Keim, 2008; Oommen, 1991: 7).

Finally, this dependency path is not inevitable and there are many notable exceptions. If there is a structural dependency that the third world finds hard to change, there is 'optional dependency', in the words of Munir Bashshur (2007),[23] that scholars can challenge. Wiebke (2011) provides a very illuminating example of what she called counter-hegemonic currents in international sociology from South Africa, namely the development of labour studies in South Africa. The central feature in this work is their refusal to participate in the common arena; less through theoretical discussion and explicit critique, but rather through specific forms social scientific practice. Keim writes:

> In the South Africa of the 1970s, the political opposition was banned and the only broad social force against Apartheid remaining in the country were the black trade unions newly emerging after the Durban Strikes of 1973. Progressive intellectuals in the liberal white English-language universities entered into contact with the labour movement and started programmes of research and teaching in support of the black trade unions, thus initiating the first phase of counterhegemonic development.
>
> Instrumental in this contact were . . . 'Labour Service Organizations' (LSO), university-based non-governmental organizations that provided research and training for the newly emerging trade union movement. . . . The reason for installing LSOs on campus was mainly that the liberal universities . . . provided a relatively secure environment for oppositional activities in the Apartheid environment. Furthermore, universities acted, as several sociologists ironically put it, as 'money laundering' institutions, channelling funding from the international anti-Apartheid solidarity into the labour movement or using it to provide support in the form of commissioned research and trade union education. (Keim, 2011: 132)

In the region, the 'dependency path' is still very strong, though with some exceptions. We see at AUB, for example, that hope is on the horizon. Quiet debates began to emerge among faculty following the establishment of the Civic Engagement and Community Service Centre. New regulations, announced by the president in June 2009, also emphasized that the minutes of the meetings about faculty promotion should not only report the quantity but also the quality of research output. However, more effort should be made to connect research output and the university to local and regional societies and not hinder the cultivation of scholars' strong roots in their community. Institutional resources are very important for the Arabization of social sciences: a department of publication can facilitate publication in the Arab language through providing funding to faculty to publish in Arabic or in cooperation with local publishers.

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Notes

1. Beyond the issue of representativity, a serious qualitative research should carry out a more detailed coding process, which entails not only the form of the publications but also their content.
2. Because of the lack of space, I have not included extended extracts from the interviews. Whenever there is quote without a reference it means that it is a quote from one of the interviews.
3. For an example, see Badawi (2009) on the sad reality of the curricula in sociology in Egypt.
4. There is also a more recently established university, the Islamic University in Medina (Saudi Arabia), which was founded in 1961.
5. For an example, see the report of the Academic Delegation on the Private Arab Universities in Al-Eid (2009).
6. Branches of foreign universities like Carnegie Mellon, Texas A&M, Weill Cornell and Sorbonne were opened in these campuses.
7. For instance, the translation into Arabic of 150 classical and theoretical books from English, German and French by the publisher Arab Institute of Translation achieved a real success if one is judge from the number of copies sold in the Arab world since the establishment of this institute in 2000 (interview with the publisher in January 2010). Also since 2006, the Centre for Arab Unity Studies has co-published with Routledge (London) the journal *Arab Contemporary Affairs*. The journal aims to present Arab social scientific knowledge translated into English to an international audience.
8. The president of the Lebanese Sociological Association has complained that AUB faculty are not interested in adhering to this association and are condescending to it.
9. This method is developed by Alain Touraine (1981).
10. The case of the historian Constantine Zureik is very revealing. While he was professor at AUB in the 1940s, he wrote seminal books in Arabic engaging with his society. Affected by the Palestine War in 1948, he coined this loss as al-Nakba (catastrophe) (arguing it is not only a destruction of Palestine as a geopolitical entity but also of entire communities) in his short book *The Meaning of the Nakba* (Zureik, 1948) He also wrote books on Arab nationalism (e.g. *The Manifesto of Arab Nationalism*). At the same time, he was conducting small closed cultural seminars, talking to a limited number of students (20–30) about Arab nationalism, and about the Arab nation and how and why it should be resurrected (Kawar, 2008).
11. This centre has three main functions: support for community-based research initiatives; development of and support for teaching service to the community; and the organization of a strong student volunteer outreach programme (Myntti et al., 2009).
12. Established in 1953 on 100 hectares of land near Baalbek, in the northern Bekaa Valley, AREC was initially created for students, faculty and local communities to collaborate in the development of innovative solutions to agricultural problems.
13. AUB hoped that this initiative would play three roles in their communication with their immediate environment: first, to foster an atmosphere where change is possible through invigorated but targeted outreach that would demonstrate AUB's commitment to the neighbourhood; second, to provide incentives to faculty and students for research on problems confronting the neighbourhood; and finally, to create positive and sustainable change through a strategic focus on projects that would have many positive secondary effects (Myntti et al., 2009).
14. Established in 2007, this centre aims to connect research to policy and to community. For instance, the programme 'Policy and Governance in Palestinian Refugee Camps' has invited different publics and stakeholders to participate in debate on current issues related to the refugee camps in the region.
15. City Debate is an annual workshop organized by the graduate programme in Urban Planning and Urban Design in the Department of Architecture and Design. The idea originates from the belief that urban planning must be an all-inclusive process. This process involves the various

stakeholders, including architectural and development professionals, NGOs, such as environmental groups, and of course the general public who live in and use the urban environment.

16. It aims at creating a forum for informal discussions between students and professors on critical issues of life in Lebanon and the region. An invited speaker usually initiates the discussion. From 2006 until January 2010, 27 sessions have been organized.
17. This regulation also mentions that 'In general, promotion to the rank of Associate Professor requires a minimum of six (6) "individual – equivalent" publications. Non-major publications (e.g. notes, communications, book reviews, posters, etc.) shall be accounted for on a case by case basis. In all cases, a measure of relevance and timeliness must be demonstrated, whenever possible, by current citations of the papers concerned.' For the promotion to full professor, eight publications are required.
18. *Source:* www.aub.edu.lb/fas/fas_home/faculty_and_research/Pages/annual_report.aspx
19. The work of Syed Farid Alatas (2003: 607) is very important. He noted. 'A glance at several issues of a leading theory journal in the discipline of sociology, *Sociological Theory*, will reveal this. Volume 20 (2002) of that journal carried 20 articles authored by a total of 28 authors. All of them were based in universities in the US, despite the fact that the journal calls for submissions in all areas of social thought and social theory and does not specify any particular theoretical or geographical area of interest.' He also mentioned an example from the journals *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* and *Theory and Society*. Even in area studies journals, according to Alatas (2003: 608), most of the articles on non-western topics are nearly always authored either by scholars based in one of the social science power bases or by scholars who are nationals of the country being written about.
20. Wolfe (1990) defined these ideal-types by considering that the experimental model is generally 'characterized by shorter sentence construction, elliptical phrasing, greater density of jargon and scientific shorthand, multiple authors, tables and algebraic expressions, stylistic conformity, and greater use of the passive voice', whereas the literary model is characterized 'by more a leisurely development of ideas, more frequent obiter dicta, less consideration of economy of presentation, single authors, idiosyncratic styles, use of first-person singular, reliance on metaphor, and more complex rhetorical strategies' (Wolfe, 1990: 479).
21. For the case of Lebanon see Kabbanji (2009).
22. According to Mona Abaza (2010), faculty at Cairo University earn 20 times less than their colleagues with comparable rank at AUC.
23. Interview with the author, December 2010

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Article

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The problem and sociopolitical confusion of 'technological neutrality': The case of the Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica in Spain

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Abstract

This article analyses the concept of 'technological neutrality' and the sociopolitical confusion that derives from an incorrect use of the term, as in the case of the new Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica. It begins by formulating the problem and then offers a brief historical review of the main contributions that the philosophy, sociology and history of technology have made towards refuting the principle of technological neutrality. It goes on to analyse the connection that exists between politics and technology insofar as this shapes the *polis* and society, and looks at the need to focus on a true philosophy and political sociology of technology. Lastly, it examines what meaning the concept of technological neutrality has for the Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica, from which we can conclude that the term has been used in an incorrect and ambiguous way, and it makes a sociological and philosophical critique of the authors of the Observatorio's reports. The main conclusion is that, on the one hand, the term should be modified and that, on the other, the Observatorio does not seem to make explicit the political philosophy underlying its approach, which leads to a series of theoretical difficulties that it is important to reconsider.

Keywords

civic participation, politics and technology, sociology of technology, technological neutrality

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The formulation of the problem

> A year ago [2005], the Public Administration informed the *Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo* [or Ombudsman] that, in response to widespread complaints from the legal profession and software producers in Spain, it would be implementing the principle of technological neutrality in relation to the contracting of information goods and services. For the purpose of verifying that it fulfilled its commitment, the *Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica* was set up with a mandate to register complaints relating to any lack of interoperativity or technological neutrality on the part of public services as regards their information structures. (Observatorio, 2006: 3)

This is the opening paragraph of the First Report of the recently created Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica. However, even this short statement contains hermeneutic difficulties for any sociologist, philosopher or historian of technology, especially as technology has already been the subject of multidisciplinary theoretical study for over a century. The main difficulty stems from the demand for and commitment to what the authors (along the same lines as an important international movement) call 'technological neutrality'. The expression as it is employed by the Observatorio is erroneous from both a theoretical and epistemological point of view, and its use will cause serious 'language interferences' between the academic world and political and legal spheres.

This article seeks to demonstrate that the (theoretical) presumption of 'technological neutrality' characteristic of the study of technology prior to the 20th century was refuted at an early stage by the specialists who studied this technical phenomenon from disciplines as diverse as sociology, philosophy and, indeed, the history of technology itself.[1] This means that the reintroduction of this expression and its conceptual universe – and as no less than a universal political requirement – could become the cause of misunderstandings that will make the theoretical analysis of technology more difficult. Particularly because we live in so-called 'reflexive societies' (Lamo de Espinosa, 1990), it is possible that the unjustified use of this expression will be assimilated and adopted by society. This will lead to the obvious problem of once again placing the technological sphere outside the sociopolitical sphere and thus excluding civic participation. This would then allow it to be considered as an essentially technical and technocratic phenomenon, beyond the reach of democratic political control.

In other contexts (see, for example, Romero Moñivas, 2006b, 2010), I have always insisted that the phenomenon of technology requires interdisciplinary study both for an adequate understanding of its complexity and to emphasize the (ontological) dialectic within which it functions. Technology is constructed and configured by human beings and it is therefore loaded with values and visions of the world and social reality. At the same time, the technology that is constructed, objectified and reified has a constructional (configurative) and reflexive power over society. It is in this dialectical process[2] between technology and society where the processes of sociality of the modern world come into play. For this reason, to demand 'technological neutrality' (in spite of the fact that, as we shall see, the authors of the report mean something else) is not only confusing but potentially dangerous from a political and social point of view.

To provide an example of these possible legal and political, theoretical-conceptual mistakes, I have chosen to analyse the specific case of a Spanish institution that is part of the international network of 'neutrality technology' called the Observatorio de Neutralidad

Tecnológica. The Observatorio is not a government body, but it is nevertheless a social and juridico-political paradigm that will allow us to weigh up theoretically the long-running debate on the relationships between technology and society. Thus, in the first section, I outline the process by which technological neutrality was refuted by the sociology, history and philosophy of technology. In the second section, I centre my analysis on the social relationships that are established between technology and politics. This leads on to the final section that deals with the case of the Observatorio and its successes and difficulties.

Just one observation before I begin: it is important to bear in mind that when investigating a subject like technology, it is impossible to establish clear-cut distinctions between the various sociological, philosophical and historical approaches. Consequently, the interrelationships between the conceptual contributions of the philosophy of technology have no meaning unless the empirical data provided by both the sociology and the history of technology are included, and vice versa. For this reason, although our ultimate aim is sociological – namely, to use the example of the Observatorio to explain the possible incongruities that exist in academic and political arguments over the relationships between technology and society – a great deal of the conceptual apparatus used in the sociology of technology derives from the older disciplines of philosophy and history. Hence I cannot avoid referring to them in my argument, although this in no way detracts from my sociological approach.

The neutrality of technology under examination: A historical synthesis

What do we understand by technological neutrality?

At first glance, the idea of the neutrality of technology would seem easy to understand at an intuitive level. In the words of Langdon Winner (1986: 41):

> In the way we usually think about them, technologies are tools that can be used well or badly, for good, for evil, or for something in between the two. But we do not generally pause to consider whether a given artefact could have been designed and built in such a way that it produces a series of logical consequences *that antedate any of its hypothetical uses*.[3] (emphasis in the original)

The whole argument about technological neutrality is summed up in this quotation. From it, we can elicit three assumptions that underpin the neutralist approach. First, that technologies are simply tools or instruments. Second, that artefacts in themselves do not have any moral disposition towards good or evil. Third, that the use to which a technological artefact is put is not necessarily intrinsic to it.

At this point, the problem becomes more complex than one might anticipate. In reality, each one of these assumptions corresponds to a different kind of neutrality: axiological, ontological and sociological. These three levels that we can distinguish are compatible but not necessarily obligatory. One can defend an axiological neutrality and deny an ontological or a sociological one. That gives rise to different degrees of technological neutrality, and this is precisely what makes possible and gives meaning to a non-technical study of technology.

There are a number of reasons why one might consider technology to be neutral. The simplest of these is based on a naive perception of technical objects as no more than 'empty channels' used by people for their own purposes. Another reason is clearly a technological trap (see below), whereby technical activity is considered to be 'objective' and unconnected to ideological arguments. This would justify society being run on the basis of a technical rationale: technology is presented as a-institutional and apolitical, and technocrats predicate its neutrality in contrast to private partisan interests, and its objectivity compared to subjectively established values. A rather more theoretical reason is the fact that the 'neutralist' approach may be considered as the first way in which sociology tried to refute the technological determinist approach engendered by WF Ogburn's concept of 'cultural lag' (see Romero Moñivas, 2008b). While, on the one hand, he maintained the preponderance of technology in social change, on the other, by claiming its 'neutrality' (seen as an epistemological strategy), he attempted to preserve intact the 'will' or 'sovereignty' of human over artefact. This was perhaps a more intuitive way of thinking than later constructivist approaches.[4]

Nevertheless, philosophical and historical analyses, as well as later sociological ones, demonstrated – from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view – the fallacy of neutrality. From then on, it appeared to have been refuted by experts in technology, and particularly by those who worked in interdisciplinary fields. Therefore, we should not forget that to deny the neutrality of technology does not mean denying the relative validity of determinism, nor the equally relative validity of constructivism. On the contrary, to affirm that technology is not neutral means that each technological system is shaped by and laden with values and visions of society, humankind and history, etc. (constructivism). At the same time, when this sociotechnical system becomes socially consolidated, it has an equally determinant and configuring power on the society in which it is embedded (determinism).[5]

The theoretical refutation of technological neutrality[6]

Chronologically, even before the history of technology overcame its internalist approach (see below), the birth of the philosophy of technology in Germany had led a rejection of the 'neutralist' postulate to some extent. Philosophical thought on technology would not have been possible if the latter had been considered 'neutral' or, in other words, if it were, in itself, empty of all 'problematicity' or anything 'beyond' the simple practical, daily use of the artefact. In 1877, Ernst Kapp endowed technology with a quality that did go beyond the simple schema of 'actual use': he based its very essence on the fact that it is a 'projection of the human organs' (*Organprojektion*). Arnold Gehlen (1957) considered that technology was founded on the 'defective equipping of mankind' (*mangelhaften Ausstattung des Menschen*), insofar as man is a 'being with deficiencies' (*Mängelwesen*) who needed to make up for his biological lacunae with artefacts. Moving on from this biological perspective, writers such as Dessauer, Heidegger and Ortega y Gasset took an essentially metaphysical or anthropological attitude to technology. More modern authors such as Carl Mitcham (1994), Paul Durbin, Frederick Ferré (1988), Don Ihde (1979, 1990) and Langdon Winner (1986) – among others – also begin with the problematicity inherent in technology, especially because it is a mediating agent (and, therefore, transforms

relationships with the world-environment) and because it is highly charged with sociocultural world views.

As regards the field of the history of technology, initially historians of the ('old' history) of technology conceived of their work either as a record of artefacts or as the study of the lineal 'internal' development in variations of a particular artefact, ignoring the sociocultural-ideological context. However, one of the pioneers of the study of mediaeval technology, Lynn White, began to draw attention to matters that were not strictly technical but very closely related. He demonstrated the influence of – in this case, western Christian – ideology on technology, which leads to different ways of understanding it (cf. White, 1978). Another historian, RJ Forbes, explained that: 'The problem is that our technology is far from being culturally neutral. It is a product of Western ideas and value judgements without which many of the impulses driving it would lack any meaning and would even be destructive' (Forbes, 1968: 55). Little by little, this viewpoint was adopted in the journal *Technology and Culture* of the Society for the History of Technology, which has contributed to the consolidation of the contextualist and, for that reason, non-neutralist perspective of technology.

More recently, sociology has contributed empirical studies that show how technology is impregnated with and inspired by society and culture, that technology is *shaped by and has a shaping effect* on the *polis*, and that therefore it is 'political'. In other words, that it is not only the purely technical issues that must be taken into account in the formation of a new technology. There are also, for example, power struggles between companies competing to bring their technology onto the market; user groups who look at how a technology satisfies or solves their problems in a different way; the ethical arguments that underlie technological innovation insofar as it can reformulate traditional views of humankind and society; and legal and political criteria that may also underlie the creation of a new technology. The empirical analyses produced by sociologists are not necessarily exclusive to the sociology of constructivist technology (Bijker and Pinch, 1997) nor to the more radical sociological theories of Latour and Law. On the contrary, it is not necessary to be a committed constructivist to understand that the technology (as opposed to the scientific knowledge[7]) that we use on a daily basis is definitely permeated by all manner of conflicts and values of those who designed, financed, invented, made legal and subsidized it politically. For this reason, it cannot be claimed that technology is neutral in any sense: not socially, politically, historically, or even ontologically (see Romero Moñivas, 2008b).

The political nature of technology

Technology has only recently come to be seen as a political problem, although it has had a profound effect on sociological and philosophical thinking for over a century (Mumford, 1964, 1967). Technology as a political problem is necessarily linked to the traditional aim of political philosophy insofar as this is concerned with the creation of a 'just society'. And it is from this perspective that technological development, involved in the *construction of society*, is introduced into the thinking of political philosophy (Mitcham, 1994: 107–8). Consequently, the political issue of technology arises *either* in conflict *or* in harmony with a prior philosophical vision of *what the society that we want should be like*. 'What kind of world are we building?' (Winner, 2001: 189–90).

However, this concern actually dates much further back. In fact, technology has always been behind classical political thought on justice, but it was never considered to be problematical because it was perceived to be neutral and subject to shaping by other social institutions. The political works of Plato and Aristotle do not include any explicit thoughts on the *techne*, which was always left unmentioned. Such a conception is currently considered to be unsustainable (see Sfez, 2002: 12).

With the possible and notable exception of Marx (see MacKenzie, 1984; Westrum, 1991), there was no true systematic philosophical interest in technology from a political perspective in respect of two crucial issues until the 20th century. One of these was the already classic question of 'technocracy', and the other was the more recent problem of the (political) autonomy or neutrality of technological actions and institutions.[8] These are the technological issues most directly involved in the case of the Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica, which, in practice, boil down to a question of whether or not technology has the capacity to 'legislate' our lives and to impose political criteria for its own benefit. It is what I have called active and passive technocracy (Romero, 2006a). In short: 'Mit dem Begriff Technokratie wird ausgedrückt, daß weder der Adel noch das Volk, sonder die Techniker herrschen' [The term technocracy means that it is neither the nobility nor the people who rule but the engineers] (Rammert, 2000). There are two implicit assumptions underlying this concept: the *neutrality* of technology as opposed to private interests and its *objectivity* in comparison with the subjectivity characteristic of established or perpetuated values (*Wertsetzungen*). This is why technocrats argue for the desirability of applying technical solutions *(technischen Lösungen*) to social and political problems. In this sense, technocracy is a form of government in which technicians *actively* extrapolate technical mechanisms of action to sociopolitical problems. It is most commonly defined 'as the rise to power of those who possess technical knowledge to the detriment of the power of politicians' (Meynaud, 1968: 36).

Here we have two definitions that we can use to illustrate the first 'sense' or 'meaning' of technocracy as 'active'. They support the classic view of technocracy as government by technicians. Strictly speaking, however, this kind of active technocracy has never existed (see Armytage, 1965; Meiksins, 1988); although it has led to some perplexity among students of the political implications of technology because, in spite of everything, they could perceive or intuit some kind of technological 'control' of the political sphere. But if, according to the analyses, engineers did not constitute a powerful corporation with a real capacity for government, then where did that 'technological control' come from? At that point, several authors began to turn to an alternative notion of technocracy, which I have called 'passive' (and which other authors call 'autonomous') technology. According to Winner (1977), we can state that the issue is no longer *who* governs but *what* governs. However, it is not only that technical solutions are applied to political problems, but also that technological artefacts themselves embody 'political qualities'. This explains why it is not the technicians who are the true rulers but the technology itself – insofar as it has become autonomous – that imposes its own requirements, even on the engineers.[9]

All this implies that 'technological activity is always political because it is always a form of action *on* the *polis* that defines its own rational means of taking advantage of the institutions and values of that same *polis*' (Goldman, 1992: 279–80). What therefore

becomes necessary is public participation by citizens in technological decision-making. This, in the case of the proponents of the Observatorio, translates into freedom of access to public institutions with the software that each user prefers, and therefore the relative autonomy of any specific system. These two requirements differ, but they do share the idea that technology is, so to speak, a necessarily public institution and, therefore, not normative or imposed 'from above'. In this sense, we need to be made aware that technological development is neither irreversible nor the product solely of 'technical decisions'. As a result, the necessary civic participation is required in the making of this kind of decisions, which are, after all, creating the world we live in.[10] The situation is problematical in itself because, as the Elliot and Elliot (1980: 140) have pointed out: 'These tendencies towards a growing technification and centralisation diminish even further the power of the man-in-the-street to control technological developments through "democratic" political mechanisms'.[11]

The technological neutrality proposed by the Observatorio as a paradigm of the conceptual confusion surrounding the technology–society relationship

What is the Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica?

The Observatorio,[12] created in 2005, is a body that is not dependent upon the Public Administration but is a joint project of the association Linux Español, the lawyer, José María Lancho, the lawyers' association Legalventure and *Linux Magazine*. Its main aim is to 'ensure that the information infrastructure of the State Administration ceases to be a *de facto* monopoly of a single proprietary technology'. Its main activity is to actively expose cases and deal with the complaints of all private individuals or bodies who feel that the principle of 'technological neutrality' has been violated. In its First Report, the Observatorio outlines the instruments that have been set up for the detection and reporting of incidents, which add up to just three:

> The first is to provide information (through newsletters and other kinds of publication) to make people aware of the problem of technological neutrality. This information is updated and freely available to the public through its web page.
> The second, and perhaps most suggestive, is the compilation of users' complaints which are made via the Observatorio's web page or email address.
> The third, most 'active' instrument has been designed and developed by the Observatorio itself. It is a 'robot application software' that automatically trawls the websites of the Public Administration. 'Specifically, the robot searches for evidence of technological dependence dictated as much by the technical requirements for access to information on the web as by the availability of information in files with a proprietary format that can only be accessed by means of a particular technology' (Observatorio, 2006: 16).

By these three methods, the Observatorio not only seeks to provide a channel for complaints and to draw the attention of users to the technological determinations that some websites impose upon them; it also hopes that, on being made aware of these

deliberately imposed technological website restrictions, the Public Administration will take measures to encourage 'technological neutrality'.[13]

The concept of technological neutrality

The Observatorio has been created for the purpose of promoting and monitoring the observance of legislation that safeguards 'technological neutrality'. And this is the point at which sociopolitical and theoretico-academic confusion arises. How is it possible, after a century of theoretical and empirical studies that have demonstrated the pernicious fallacy of a supposed (but false) technological neutrality, that there has now been a call for legislation that defends its (impossible) existence? The answer is simple: the term 'technological neutrality' is epistemologically incorrect (and consequently false) and is therefore *inadequate* to describe the movement that the Observatorio (and the so-called 'neutrality net') and the world movement on which it is based are championing.

It is astonishing that the term should be used so freely in the legal sphere. The First Report of the Observatorio quotes a judgement of the Audiencia Nacional of 19 June 2005 (*Recurso* No. 410/2002) in which the term is already present: '1) The principle of technological neutrality holds that operators, service providers, and awardees of public tenders, etc. must be offered the possibility of providing their services through the technologies and infrastructures that they consider to be the most appropriate, without preventing the introduction and development of new technologies in the free market sphere.' However, the technological neutrality referred to here is not the neutrality of the technology itself but of the legal and political framework that supports the development and use of information software and, especially, Internet technologies. In other words, it is the demand for free software (as opposed to proprietary software) in the sphere of public administration. For this reason, the authors of the First Report of the Observatorio classify it as a 'necessity of constitutional importance', and as a 'guarantee of independence, sovereignty and democratic consolidation, and for the democracy of the information infrastructures of the Administration' (Observatorio, 2006: 3). From my point of view, in spite of the political symbolism on which the authors base their assertions,[14] this legislation is not exactly a requirement for the democratization of society nor for a new model of citizenship. It is more like an attempt to curb the business and economic monopolies of the giant software companies (at least in relation to public institutions), which conforms to the hacker ethic that has existed since the beginnings of information technology.

This does not mean that the aim of the Observatorio is either banal or economicist. On the contrary, as Himanen (2001) describes and demonstrates so well, hacker activity is based upon an ethic (or, it could even be said, upon a philosophy of work and an anthropology) that is put forward as a true alternative to the Protestant work ethic (as described by Weber). The passion, the overcoming of obstacles and the different (and more flexible) relationship of the hacker to time are characteristics typical of this philosophy, which is very close, as Himanen also points out, to the philosophy subjacent to artistic activity. For this reason, it seems to me that the origin or source of the Observatorio's task is more ethico-personal (characteristic of the hacker) than sociopolitical in respect of citizenship. And although the importance of the Observatorio stems from the fact that its ultimate objectives have a true social, civic and political dimension, we cannot disregard these

ethico-personal origins. In the prologue to Himanen's work (2001: xvii), the creator of Linux himself, Linus Torvalds, states that the prime motivation of the hacker is the *free* creation and *free* exchange (and use) of technology:

> The reason that Linux hackers do something is that they find it to be very interesting, and they like to share this interesting thing with others. Suddenly, you get both entertainment from the fact that you are doing something interesting, and you also get the social part. This is how you have this fundamental Linux networking effect where you have a lot of hackers working together because they enjoy what they do Hackers believe that there is no higher stage of motivation than that.

This is precisely the foundation upon which the Observatorio bases the four pillars of 'technological neutrality' (First Report, Observatorio, 2006: 3–4): (1) absence of technological dependence; (2) non-obstruction of the introduction and development of new technologies in the free market sphere; (3) interoperativity; (4) open parameters as officially defined in the European Framework of Interoperability. All this can be summarized as follows: 'By means of this [technological neutrality] it is possible to ensure that there will be no technological predominance by any single company that conditions the future of the informational development of public services; it guarantees that the purchase of information goods and services on the part of the administration will be put out to public tender; and it encourages research and development in the Spanish State.'

What the authors understand as the need for 'technological neutrality' is the classic rejection of the business monopoly of giant companies like Microsoft. Therefore, what this means is that the Public Administration cannot privilege one information technology to the detriment of others or oblige citizens to access their information through the technology that the Administration has 'selected'. In other words, users must be able to select the protocols and the software that they consider to be most appropriate. And the state has the obligation of guaranteeing the free, independent framework that gives no preferment or advantage to specific brands or designs of information technology. This indicates that the authors of the report appear to be conscious of the danger of a potential technological determinism that has led to them making their demands.

This being the case, it becomes clear that the term 'technological neutrality' is incorrect because it makes no reference to the neutral nature of technology as such (which is ontologically impossible). The only reference is to the legal and contractual framework within which a particular technological structure is developed, used, exchanged and/or approved. In reality, the Observatorio and the entire 'neutrality net' movement is based on a dangerous paradox: they invoke the non-neutrality[15] of software in order to demand legal and contractual neutrality, but they employ the concept that was coined a century ago to demonstrate the contrary. This issue is not simply a purely terminological, academicist discussion, it is also political, given that if this term continues to be used, it will lead to misunderstandings between the academic world (which has spent over a century thinking about these issues) and the recent legal and contractual world. In this sense, Iriarte Ahon (2006), after an analysis of innumerable definitions of what is understood by technological neutrality in the juridical-contractual sphere, concluded that: '*technological neutrality* has a basic problem that is linked to its linguistic meaning: it should in fact be called the "non-preferment-of-one-modality-or-make-of-technology-over-another". But

because our legal experts will tell us that such a long name is simply "not viable", we have to look for a shorter, simpler term, and we would propose to talk about "No Preference in Technology".' Whatever the term adopted (which is essentially unimportant right now), what is clear is that the need for change seems undeniable after what has been said. More importantly, all this illustrates, in exemplary fashion, the conceptual confusions that still arise in the theoretical sphere about the relationships between technology and society, with all the associated ethical and political problems.

The problem of the universality of the principle of technological neutrality

The Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica was created to ensure the existence of this 'no-preference-in-technology' only in the sphere of informatics and telecommunications.[16] From a sociological and political point of view, this seems insufficient and, to some extent, reductionist. It is what I call here *the problem of the universality of the principle of technological neutrality* and which, in my opinion, hampers the work of the Observatorio in creating a new model of citizenship or a new *polis* freely fashioned from a wide variety of technological designs. Instead of that, the issue is in danger of being reduced entirely to the hacker milieu and based on its philosophy and ethic (which, I repeat, does not detract from or trivialize it but simply puts it in context and limits the scope that its proponents would like it to have). I feel it is worthwhile making a few observations in this respect.

The political issue of technology, as I said before, is a problem that affects all citizens and thus, 'if the technologies that we adopt or introduce shape the future in which we will have to live, this compels us to ask ourselves which technologies and, therefore, what kind of future we are going to choose; as well as who those technologies will belong to, which is tantamount to asking who the future is going to belong to' (Goldman, 1992: 270). Evidently, this is an issue central to sociological constructivism which affirms that, as there is no single technological design for any given technology (interpretative flexibility), the finalization of discussions and the choice of one design over another is a social and political process. In other words, in every technology, there is an underlying ideology involved, a way of seeing social reality, a social theory or even a philosophy or world view (which does not mean, as I stated before, that one can therefore deny the influence and power of technology in the shaping of society). It is this which proves that technology is not neutral and that, therefore, once one design is given preference compared to others, a political, social and philosophical choice has been made that will subsequently shape and structure those very spheres, and constrain later decision-making. This is a 'universal' problem characteristic of *every* technology, from a stirrup for horse-riding to an airport or the design for underground public transport. Nevertheless, it is only and exclusively in the field of informatics that the Observatorio considers freedom of design and use to be constitutionally necessary for a new model of citizenship.

This does not fail to be a paradox, because all public infrastructures, architectural plans, public transport networks, etc. have been designed and built from a 'specific technological option' which is rarely challenged except for sporadic ideological or party political motives. No *observatorio* has been created to denounce the fact that one kind of

metro has been chosen for Madrid in preference to another, or to defend our freedom as citizens to ride a bicycle on the motorway. In other words, in the sociotechnical systems of our cities, technological choices are made by the Public Administration that do not allow of the 'indetermination' proposed by the supporters of free software. In my opinion, this does not mean that the hackers do not know that the design of an airport or a bridge is not a non-neutral decision. What it means is that this does not affect them directly, given that essentially they are seeking freedom within their own technological sphere and not a constitutional reorganization and a new model of citizenship. If this were not so, the Observatorio (which, as its name indicates, only makes generic reference to 'technological neutrality') would be scrutinizing the technological disputes that occur daily in other technological spheres and denouncing the way in which they are 'concluded' together with the political decision-making behind them.

Furthermore, the Observatorio equates its conception of neutrality with the development of freedom. In this sense, the authors of the First Report state that: 'Nowadays, the technological dimension of the exercise of political responsibility and individual and collective rights has made it necessary to import the principle of technological neutrality.' They go on to say that: 'If we do not understand something as fundamental as the information architecture of our Administration, if it neither responds to nor serves the principles of freedom, participation and equality which form our starting point, sooner rather than later we are going to find ourselves in a position beyond our control but for which we shall be responsible' (Observatorio, 2006: 12, 13).

The question that springs to mind is whether the Observatorio is not grossly exaggerating a situation that is, de facto, of very minor importance for the free and responsible exercise by citizens of their political rights. Up to what point does the fact that users can choose the software that they prefer to interact with the Public Administration involve greater *political* and *civic* freedom? Is it not overlooking profound social, political and philosophical issues that are far more essential to freedom and civic participation than just the computer operating system that we use? In short, is this a truly political (insofar as it is public) concern for citizens or merely for the limited number of computer experts and hackers who have the knowledge and ability necessary to create independent software? From my point of view, the weak point in the Observatorio's approach is that its critique is not aimed at the political or participatory system, or even at the existing model of citizenship, but only at the information network and management of that system. In this sense, in spite of its optimism that a law that ensures 'technological neutrality' will bring about a new model of the state and citizenship, considered from the angle of social and political theory it is an illegitimate extrapolation from a philosophical viewpoint, and it shows acritical naivete from a political one.

To quote Martínez, 'citizenship is primarily a means of inserting people into political society; [it is] a political relationship between an individual and a community, by virtue of which the individual is a full member of that community and owes it his loyalty. In this sense, the term citizen alludes to the political identity of individuals, or to their identity in the public space. However, citizenship . . . is the status granted to full members of a community, from which it can be inferred that there are other members who do not have full rights in the political community in which they live' (Martínez, 2007: 591–2). None of this seems to bear much relation to the possibility of choosing software. Otherwise,

urgent action would be needed to create an *observatorio* with a broader remit that would – as I indicated above – monitor the specific configurations that Public Administrations select in other areas such as public transport or infrastructures, and other similar sociotechnological plans. The Observatorio's reports overlook the fact that changes to the model of citizenship depend upon priority issues such as the true integration of immigrants, gender equality, greater civic participation (through whatever channels), a reduction in both the physical and the technological poverty gap and, last but not least, serious attempts to promote interreligious and intercultural dialogue.

Of course, I am not denying the very real political implications of technology; I have emphasized the indissoluble link between the two and advocated effective civic participation in technological decision-making. Hence, the work of the Observatorio is undoubtedly useful, although not primarily to generate greater political freedom (which would be naive) but simply greater freedom to be creative and to denounce the giant monopolies: issues that are fundamental for the building of a more just and universal citizenship. However, we must beware of a danger that is different though analogous to the business monopoly, namely, the temptation towards technocracy that lurks within Public Administrations. Of course, as I said earlier, the Observatorio is based upon a solid and now classic hacker ethic, and in this sense, it does not appear that the hacker community has any kind of technocratic pretensions. On the other hand, by defending technological neutrality in the terms described solely in the informational sphere, without taking into account other technological spheres, it runs the risk of defending the freedom of 'just a few' (software designers). As a result, it ignores the potential danger of an information technocracy and fails to deal with the most urgent 'human' problems of our present-day multicultural societies, which are the true keystone for generating a new model of citizenship and the state. To some extent, this danger is real. Consequently, although I do not believe that the Observatorio has any technocratic pretensions, it has to be said that the way it articulated its First Report obeys an 'objectivist' and 'technocratic' vision of technology. A careful reading of the report makes plain that the proposal for the free use and development of software with 'no preference' to be shown by the Public Administration, seems to conform to the idea that technology and politics are two totally separate and mutually exclusive spheres. The logical conclusion is that governments should not interfere in the creation, use or exchange of information technology. From my point of view, this is very similar to the radical positivist concept of science and technology as spheres that are free of political interference. Therefore, just as we have seen claims for value-free science, this seems to imply value-free technology. And just as the state has been called upon not to interfere or take sides in scientific disputes, it appears the authors of the report are demanding the same thing.[17] Of course, if this were so, the idea of the Observatorio becomes very problematical because it is based upon the unresolvable confusion between constructivism and technocracy: between the political implications and apoliticity of technology. A criticism that I make with all due respect.

Conclusions and some last questions

To conclude, it is hard to know where the authors of the Observatorio's reports stand theoretically. The difficulty arises because their approach seems to imply a clear technological

constructivism that justifies the idea that there are many possible designs for information software and that these should be given an opportunity to develop in the public arena. In addition, they warn against accepting a 'naive' view whereby Microsoft, for example, must have the 'best technology' because of its potential monopoly.

However, in the First Report, they state that: 'From strategic reasons of national independence to improving welfare and public services on behalf of citizens. It is not a question of protecting particular producers but of identifying a social good and a social value. Technological neutrality is an equilibrium that makes companies and the Administration be sensitive to technological freedom of choice, competitiveness and quality, that allows *less efficient instruments to be substituted and replaced by more efficient technological options*' (Observatorio, 2006: 7; emphasis in the original). This phrase is an almost literal version of one of the assumptions of the determinist vision of technology (see Staudenmaier, 1985). So one must ask, are they constructivists or determinists? Do they believe in the existence of real, objective improvements in some technological models, or simply in a large number of different and equally valid designs? Are they, so to speak, technological relativists or realists?

If they believe in the latter, their constructivist-relativist assumptions make perfect sense because they involve complete freedom of the design, exchange and use of software. However, as quoted above, the authors try to justify their claims in support of the principle of technological neutrality in order that *less efficient instruments are substituted and replaced by more efficient technological options.* (This, rightly, distances them from radical constructivism and brings them closer to a point of view in which, even if technological, 'the' truth seems to have some bearing.) If so, the question for a radical constructivist would be obvious: who determines which are the most efficient instruments, and on the basis of what criteria? And furthermore, what happens if the Public Administration decides – according to those criteria – that it should make a specific technological choice to the detriment of what appear to be less efficient instruments? In that case, could the Administration be prohibited its legitimate right to decide in favour of the *best instrument* solely to promote greater freedom of choice between other more mediocre ones? Is it the hackers who evaluate the best instruments and decide which ones can or cannot be considered legitimate among the multiplicity of options, or is it a question of the markets (with the ensuing danger of monopolies)? Is this not an incipient sign of technocracy? Should the Public Administration make its decision or choose its option on the basis of criteria other than purely technical ones? If so, what happens if the Administration decides that, although technically there is a variety of equally valid designs, it will choose one in particular for a series of ethical, political, strategic, economic or social reasons? In other words, and this is the underlying issue, what political philosophy do the proponents of the Observatorio adhere to? Above all, is their political philosophy compatible with the present system or is it necessary to rethink the model of citizenship and the political system, etc. in order to be able to introduce the principle of technological neutrality at a later date? Lastly, why doesn't the Observatorio make an in-depth criticism of the system? Is it necessary to explain its ethico-philosophical foundations (which I have considered to be those of the hacker ethic)? Is this ethic congruent with the current political and economic system?

To sum up, in writing this article I have attempted to do two things: first, to emphasize that the term 'technological neutrality' as it is used by the Observatorio is incorrect and

will therefore fail to promote fruitful dialogue with the academic world and its thinking on technology. Second, given that its surveillance work is fundamental in our technological societies, I have, with the utmost respect, tried to put a number of questions to the members of the Observatorio, with the intention that they base their approach on sociological and philosophical principles.[18] As a result, I hope it will then be possible to unite the efforts of the academic, business, hacker and legal worlds to consider how technology can have *truly* political implications; and thus be able to rebuild the system to make it more plural, fair, free and intercultural, not only from a technical perspective but also from a human and social one.

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Notes

1. More recently, it has also been possible to talk about the psychological study of technology, in the sense that it has gradually been shown how technology has the power to reshape the psychological or self-perceptive structures of the identity of the subject; and even that it has addictive or 'phobic' psychological effects.
2. In respect of this dialectic, I wish to keep the same distance from technological determinism as from radical constructivism (taken in isolation), and prefer to align myself with the thinking of Thomas P Hughes (cf. 1996) and of Thomas Misa (cf. 1988). The former places this dialectic on a diachronic evolutionary plane, and the latter differentiates between 'macro' and 'micro' approaches to the study of technology. Thus, the determinists seem to be more correct when research centres on 'old' technological systems that are socially consolidated, from a macro-historical perspective; while the constructivists seem to be right when empirical research centres on new technologies and the power struggles that take place between designers, financers, users, salespersons, politicians and other relevant social groups, from a micro perspective.
3. Translation from Spanish version of English book.
4. We should not forget that a systematic study of technology began at a later date in sociology than philosophy and history. Rammert's (1998) theory, which is shared by Degele (2002), for the explanation of this phenomenon suggests that sociology gradually lost its initial interest in technology and relegated it to the sidelines of analysis due to the progressive effort to establish our discipline as an independent science, without interference from other disciplines. Consequently, by separating technical from social spheres, it became mandatory to respect the principle that gave rise to sociology with Durkheim: explain what is social solely through what is social ('Sociales nur durch Sociales erklärt wird'). See Romero Moñivas (2008a).
5. I do not discuss here whether it is possible to separate and distinguish the social from the technical sphere, or whether, in a sociotechnical system it is not possible to separate, either functionally or ontologically the actors from the components (be they mechanical, human, animal or legal, etc.) of that system, as is affirmed by systemic approaches, on the one hand, and actor-network theory, on the other.
6 Due to lack of space, I only take a brief look at the theoretical approaches and exclude the empirical ones.
7 I put in this aside to make it clear that to be a constructivist in theoretical analyses of technology does not mean that one is a constructivist in studies of science. However much we sociologists may dislike it, the 'Sokal case' has shown that not only can it be epistemologically wrong

to maintain radically constructivist positions but that it can even be ethically dangerous (see Sokal, 2009; Sokal and Bricmont, 1999).

8. However, before going on to analyse these two problems, it is necessary to point out that current thinking on the technology–politics binomial deals mainly with the Internet and the new information and communications technologies, and how the exercise of politics has undergone a radical transformation under their influence. As a result, the Internet has become an object of philosophical-political theorizing (see Graham, 1999). As well as the classic example of Internet influence, which is the Zapatista movement and the extension of its struggle through the Web, we would draw attention to two other more current examples. One is the Tibetan cause (aggravated by recent attempts to boycott the Olympic Games in China), which has an extraordinary presence through a number of Internet platforms; even on YouYube, many videos can be found by just searching for 'Free Tibet'. The other is the World Social Forum, which meets annually. In 2008, it sponsored a decentralized campaign that it manages through its web page, where all the social initiatives promoted by independent groups all around the world can be posted.
9. From the economic point of view, this is what Gregory Tassey (2007) has called 'the technology imperative'.
10. The arguments in Spain over the hydrological plan and its possible alternatives are a good example of the fact that in every technical construction there are value judgements and interests involved that have nothing to do with purely technical issues (even though politicians vainly go to great lengths to put a technicist gloss on their decisions).
11. Translation from Spanish version of English book
12. The website is at: www.neutralidad.es.
13 The initial optimism present in the First Report (2006) over some 'progress made by the Administration in the guarantee of Technological Neutrality' (in spite of its recognition that *the data obtained ad hoc by this report indicate how far the Public Administration still finds itself from a situation of effective technological neutrality*), gave way to some harsh criticism by the Observatorio in its Second Report (2007) of the *Proyecto de Ley de Acceso Electrónico de los Ciudadanos a las Administraciones Públicas* [the Draft Bill for Citizens' Electronic Access to Public Administrations]. In the Third Report (Observatorio, 2008), it even asked the question 'Technological neutrality in Spain. Is the rule of law vulnerable?' and went on to say: 'However, one year after the law was passed and came into effect, we have to recognize that the information infrastructure of the Public Administration has noticeably failed to embrace this principle and that it is now in a consolidated state of technological captivity.'
14. In the Second Report, it is stated that: 'The new law will not only be the cornerstone for legislation that the Administration of the future is going to introduce. It is more than that, it is a real Electronic Constitution and it necessarily involves a model of state and a model of citizenship, which is why it should not be shy of including guarantees and it should implement procedures that include the participation and opinions of social agents at every stage of its development, an opportunity that they have not had in this draft' (Observatorio, 2007: 3).
15 It is clear that they consider technology to be non-neutral (in spite of the confusion that clouds other parts of the report) when they claim that if the Public Administration opts for one technology and not another, it is making a choice that determines and structures society and, therefore, that *de-neutralizes* subsequent political and social options.
16. In its three reports, the Observatorio includes a small selection of the more than 150 complaints that it received. All of them relate exclusively to information issues, problems of software, etc.
17. Of course, when we talk about science and values or science and politics, we are not lapsing into scientific constructivism and denying the (tendency towards) objectivity of scientific

knowledge, but simply demonstrating that science, as a human enterprise, is difficult to separate from axiological and political implications, even though these do not intervene in the epistemological validity of scientific theories.

18. It is only right to thank the authors of the Third Report (2008) for inserting an introduction outlining what they understand by technological neutrality in order to avoid confusion, possibly as a result of the critical observations that I made in this respect. However, the use of the expression continues to be problematical.

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
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Sport and gender construction in the postcolonial context: Between East and West – the paradoxical effects of globalization

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Abstract

This article examines the social uses of the body by the French of Tamil origin in the sports centres of Pondicherry (southern India). It reviews the ways in which the body participates in the development and expression of gender arrangements in a postcolonial context faced with globalization. An analysis of semi-structured interviews shows the extent to which the structure of gender relationships, although occurring in a specific community, is both affected by the logic of identity related to cultural affiliations and linked by more global imperatives to the symbolic relationships between the local area and the former motherland, Metropolitan France. Finally, it appears that far from stigmatizing evident gender positions, the organization of roles between the sexes follows a sociocultural rationale that leads couples to adopt strategies which

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accentuate the structure of gender. On returning to the country of origin, the play of gender opposition and complementarity thus enables the symbolic gender advantages achieved through emigration to be retained while at the same time avoiding the risk of social exclusion.

Keywords
biculturalism, gender, India, reintegration, sport

In India, when the Nehruvian Socialism development model was renounced in July 1991 (Chatterjee, 1998) and the Indian economic and financial market had to open up – leading to a tight budgetary policy, monetary devaluation and a massive reduction in import tax – it resulted in an increase in the circulation of western goods and services unprecedented since the British Raj. Television, music, sports, manufactured goods, employment, foreign tourists as well as Indian tourists travelling abroad, only increased the cultural contacts with the rest of the world (Das Debendra, 1998), marking a transformation of the traditional social hierarchy based on the caste system, as well as in lifestyles generally (Khurana, 1998).

In this context, confronted by Indian traditions yet living in a new world open to western concepts, the French of Tamil origin provide a unique opportunity for analysing the mechanisms by which plural identity and sociocultural integration are expressed on return to the country of origin. In fact, this population having chosen French nationality and having lived in the West for a number of years, then chose to settle back in their place of origin, Pondicherry.

The purpose of this article is therefore to examine the way in which gender positions are constructed and employed in this French postcolonial situation. The analysis of the ascribed male and female roles as implied by the use of physical and/or sports activity (P/SA) should assist in understanding the importance accorded to the roles of the sexes in the reintegration process of the Tamil-origin French into Pondicherry society. There is apprehension regarding P/SA here, beyond any prior definition, to the extent that it represents a whole universe of practices which offer an area of socially significant alternatives to a population in an environment marked by a specific sociohistoric background. While it covers a number of noteworthy activities within the range of local pastimes such as petanque, tennis and even kabaddi,[1] yoga, bharata nâtyam,[2] volleyball, keep fit and walking,[3] there is a difference in the way in which these are undertaken by the two sexes, who are apparently responding to a specific rationale.

A monographic study has been made of the way in which this rationale operates in Pondicherry. Data collection took two years, with P/SA observation phases being alternated with periods of recording semi-directed discussions with Tamil-origin French men and women returning to their country of origin ($N = 41$).[4] The discussion and observation notes were transcribed without editing, and were then subjected to a double theme and comparative analysis bringing out, for each parameter addressed, the different positions taken by men and women. This qualitative analysis provides an update of the significance of and manner in which P/SA has organized relationships within this population, and provides a better understanding of the factors orienting behaviour in this matter.

Background and social position of Tamil-origin French in Pondicherry

A former French trading post, Pondicherry is situated in the southeast of Tamil Nadu. Colonized by the French from 1672 until 1956, its situation as a small French enclave in an India that is predominantly British is singular. Yet, it is the way in which independence from France was granted to this territory that is of interest for our study, and notably the possibility that was offered to the local population to choose between two nationalities. In fact, the 300-year French presence led the French government of the period to offer a nationality option to the Indians living in Pondicherry. 'With effect from 16th August 1962, the inhabitants of the former French trading posts in India had six months, until 15th February 1963, to decide. By this crucial date, 4944 adults had submitted their written declarations. Together with their children they made up a new community, that of the French-Pondicherrians, at first comprising 7106 persons' (Weber, 1996: 404).

This possibility of choice of nationality thus created a paradoxical situation leading to the coexistence in the same family of French brothers and sisters on the one hand and Indian on the other (Weber, 1996). These Tamil-origin French, representing barely 2.5 percent of the town's population, formed a new minority in their own place of origin. Those opting for French nationality had visa facilities for continuing to live in Pondicherry, but many chose French military careers. A large number of them were therefore expatriated with wives and children to Metropolitan France, to overseas French territories or to French military stations abroad.

Some of their children, on becoming adults and marrying (for the most part) Indians of the same caste, members of their expatriate community or, through an arranged marriage, members of the French or Tamil community in Pondicherry, decided to resettle in their country of origin. They brought back with them therefore some attributes of French culture integrated with the culture of their country of origin (Sugumar, 1998).

In the complex situation of a dual cultural background, it is important to understand how, from an initial attempt at cultural adaptation, the daily adjustment to the original country is managed in the context of the transformed Indian society. Twenty, 30 or even 40 years elapsed between the departure of these individuals and their resettling in Pondicherry, where they again felt the weight of their former caste membership[5] (Srinivas, 1996). In this situation, their return meant taking the risk of being reassigned to their original caste, and this led to strategies to distance themselves from the traditional hierarchy. However, integration presupposes taking part in local social and cultural life. A subtle game became established among these individuals, who, while they did not stand out physically from their Tamil counterparts, tried to differentiate themselves by their social and cultural position (Michalon, 1990; Weber, 1988).

Today, this community totals approximately 7000 individuals, in a town of 973,829 inhabitants. The proportion of military retirees demonstrates the significant impact of such a career within the community. In 1985, a quarter of this population benefited from military retirement pensions, and in 1990 the value of French pensions received was the main source of income for 58 percent of the men. Those still in active employment make up only a small proportion of the community being studied. According to data

held at the French consulate in Pondicherry, 88 percent of this population was inactive at 31 December 2000.

Physical and sports activity: The ideal environment for gender construction in the colonial and postcolonial environment?

There is little French research that focuses on gender construction through P/SA in the postcolonial environment. History and sociology however reveal the extent to which such activity contributes to building gender identity and ratifying the social relationship between the sexes (Louveau, 2006). P/SA is historically construed as a masculine citadel founded on a heterosexual postulate (Ferez, 2007, 2008; Terret, 2005).

Yet social science literature shows the extent to which the sexual character of sports activity depends on the history and social context in which it became established. In England, the game of football is emblematic of masculinity (Clark and Paechter, 2007; Williams, 2006). In the US, American football holds the primary position in the context of school and in constructing the masculine subculture (Clayton and Humberstone, 2007; Messner, 1997, 2002), while cheerleading, despite its sporting connotation, is considered a female activity (Grindstaff and West, 2006). In Canada, the male practice of keeping fit to enlarge and shape the body is seen by the middle class as a response to the male identity crisis (Atkinson, 2007).

We know that P/SA structures masculine identity and social gender relationships (Baillette and Liotard, 1999; McKay et al., 2000; Pronger, 1990). The peculiarities ascribed to the two sexes include showing the body to advantage, as well as the areas where this is permitted. In Pondicherry, this normative gender organization orients sports possibilities for both sexes. The uniqueness of the Tamil-origin French population is based on this distribution and serves a double purpose: distinction from and proximity to Indian cultural society on their return to the country of origin.

Physical and/or sports activity, culture and globalization: Sports modernity

P/SA, as a unique body culture, expresses specific ways of being (Guay, 1993; Pociello, 1995). From one country to another the ways in which physical activities are performed diverge (Grant, 2006; Hargreaves, 1986), reflecting the individual aspirations of men and women from heterogeneous cultures. In the current climate of globalization, which increases the complexity of an individual's cultural identity (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000; Clifford, 1994; Friedman, 1996) and sows confusion in such definitions as the expression of cultural membership, P/SA appears as a witness of the transformation affecting the individual's body, and expresses the cultural and identification references employed by those concerned.

Throughout its historical development, P/SA has served as the guardian of the social symbolism that extends through a society. Modern sports are one of the cultural supports in industrial societies. Through them are expressed the values of progress (Taguieff, 2001), performance (Brohm, 1992 [1976]), competition and hierarchical classification driven by a rationale of efficiency (Ehrenberg, 1991).

At the same time, shared physical activity in India is often guided by religious or cultural aspirations that express the local mentality in their own way. Yoga and bharata nâtyam come to mind here, revealing a specifically Indian culture that is apparent both in its ascetic aspirations and in the gestures employed. Beyond the specifically Indian production is the propensity to be conscious of, and to reinterpret, various aspects of western culture, and this raises questions. Appadurai (1996) has largely contributed to the study of these mechanisms through analysing the development of cricket in India, as has Guttmann (1977, 1994) by analysing the changes in P/SA. Other research is more generally interested in the use of P/SA in the colonial and postcolonial context (Deville-Danthu, 1997a; Dumont, 2002; Fates, 1994). In Pondicherry, its use in participating in the dissolution of colonialization has been studied (Ruffié and Gleyse, 2005) and for analysing health representations among Tamil-origin French (Ruffié, 2008).

Numerous studies show in fact that beyond a nominal unity, the same sports activity may be appropriated in different ways by different cultures. Lévi-Strauss (1962) observed that the Gahuku-Gama people of New Guinea changed the game of football, modifying the form of this modern sport while ignoring its founding logic. In New Guinea the game is treated as a ritual with the confrontation between the two sides continuing for several days, until a balance is finally reached between the number of games lost and won by each side (Le Pogam, 1999).

Research into P/SA in the postcolonial environment improves our understanding of how the observed syncretism is the result of tension. Such findings thus encourage consideration of the historical inclusion of P/SA in the specific social context.

Sport and identity claims in the postcolonial environment

The current discourse on 'globalization', by putting the focus on mixed blood or cultural homogenization, tends to mask inseparable political and ethnic identity issues in sports usage in the former colonies.[6] Thus the symbolism of investment in competitive sports in countries that have been decolonized seems to go with a feeling of 'revenge by the dominated' (Denis, 1997). Following decolonization of French territories in West Africa in 1960, sport quickly appeared as one of the main vectors in constructing a national identity (Deville-Danthu, 1997a). It thus served the political plan which turns the spotlight on the values of dynamism and vitality of a people (Deville-Danthu, 1997b).

When the practice of P/SA appeared in Pondicherry at the start of the 20th century, it was initially the prerogative of the colonist, although Indians were not totally excluded. Although they could not play in the classy clubs to which only colonists, Creoles and renunciators[7] were admitted, they developed their own clubs (Ruffié and Gleyse, 2004). With decolonization and the departure of French colonists in 1956, the Indian population espoused the readoption of P/SA and the resurgence of previous activities. The spread and practice of P/SA indicate the rationale for imposed and/or material and symbolic exchanges with Metropolitan France (Blanchard et al., 2005). The degree of importance and the social recognition of these activities depend on the nature of the population that promotes them and the group among which they become popular (Ruffié and Gleyse, 2004).

However, P/SA also has an impact on the distribution of social positions locally, from the point of view of gender and the hierarchy of various social groups.

Local and global rationales: The paradoxes of gender organization in the postcolonial environment

In the French postcolonial environment represented by the former trading post of Pondicherry, the social function of P/SA seems paradoxical. Vectors of 'modernity', it might be expected to contribute to the questioning of traditional gender identification. On the contrary, by providing a setting for gender construction and hegemonic masculinity (Anderson, 2002, 2005; Terret and Liotard, 2005), it might be seen to play a role in maintaining, even strengthening, traditional gender norms.

The use of P/SA in the context of gender is an indicator of the possible arenas in which the players evolve and become bound. It also indicates the gender organization that operates within it. Men and women spend time in different activities related to the social and cultural aspirations imposed by local society, yet these aspirations are in themselves shaped by the relationship this society has with a global reality grafted on by its colonial history.

Among the Tamils of French nationality sports organization brings to light a sexual differentiation that in part complies with the current codes in Indian society. Men and women in Pondicherry do not each have the same degree of access to P/SA. While for French-Tamil men to take part in P/SA is lauded, for their female counterparts the situation is quite different. To understand the mechanisms that produce this differentiation is it not important to understand the strategies of the male–female couple? Are the social and cultural possibilities assigned to each of the partners not at the origin of the forms of cohabitation which in turn give rise to an organization unrelated to physical activities?[8] Harding (1986) considered the importance of the gender-dependent occupational structure by referring to the dualist division of social activities. It is this organizational duality and its effects on individual identity that have to be examined for a particular type of activity, P/SA, in the sociohistorical context of Pondicherry.

Separation of physical activities and the difficulty for women to have access to modern P/SA

The type of P/SA undertaken corresponds to the different intensity in the use of the body (both in respect of duration, as well as the body movements involved) depending on the sex being considered. Men are oriented to physical activities such as tennis, football and volleyball[9] (Ruffié, 2003) and thus show off their physical abilities, as well as their proximity to western culture. The competitive, intense form of these sports thus seems preferred as being a way of affirming masculinity (Messner, 1997; Pronger, 1990; Terret and Liotard, 2005). Women only take part moderately, focusing more readily on activities such as caromboard,[10] chess or bharata nâtyam which, it seems to us, allow them to avoid displaying their bodies excessively but rather to express their allegiance to tradition:

> Women don't do sport. They are not allowed to take part here. (Bala, 45 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who goes in for walking)[11]

> My wife and I play caromboard every afternoon. But women don't take part in sport here. (Rajendran, 52 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who goes in for walking)[12]

As for women, they don't do sport here. Firstly it's a matter of dress; it's not easy in a sari . . (Vikas, 50 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who does no P/SA)[13]

In fact, in Tamil Nadu, as in the Indian tradition in general, women must be discreet, docile, gentle and compassionate while her physical weakness seems to bestow on her powers of compromise (Banerjee, 2003). She may not take part in P/SA with men outside the family and she is confined to graceful activities such as dance, which reinforce her feminine personality and loyalty to tradition. Thus, it is often suggested that she play bharata nâtyam, and indeed that she take no part in physical activity whatsoever. On this point Balandier (1995 [1967]: 132) notes that in traditional societies, dance forms have the function of symbolically re-establishing the social order. Dance regenerates tradition: 'dance expresses the dynamism of the Universe and of society, human beings, their ancestors and the Gods, their possessions, and their symbolic wealth'. Thus dance seems to have the function of reviving forgotten tradition, just as it affirms membership of a family that embraces Tamil culture.

Separation of sports areas

Women play indoor games . . . but they don't do sport! (Rajendran, 52 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who goes in for walking)

The areas where P/SA takes place also indicate a strong symbolic organization. Men take part in physical exercise in outdoor, public places, while women are confined to indoor areas, protected from the gaze of men. This differentiation between sports areas has an effect on financial investment. On the one hand, men carry out their activity in the town's classy clubs, such as the Cercle de Pondichéry and set aside relatively substantial sums for taking part in their sport (cost of membership and gear), while the budget for women's P/SA is almost nothing. Furthermore, some male activities, such as petanque, involve betting. The only financial investment found in female activities concerns the new trend of attending the town's keep fit clubs.[14]

Finally, the clothing requirements in themselves consolidate these differences in types of male and female activities. While men don sportswear, particularly for western sports, women may not cover their bodies with such clothing. Wearing the sari and the chadhor[15] justifies the difficulties for women to take part in P/SA; their attire restricts movement and its purpose is to hide the body:

They don't do much sport. . . . No, there is the question of their ability, clothing and everything, showing their thighs and all that. . . . A girl in shorts, in a skirt, is arousing . . . (Shegar, 52 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin French who goes in for walking)[16]

With clothing there are sometimes problems. . . . In other words, before, Indian women were hesitant about wearing trousers or shorts in front of their brothers and parents because their knees could be seen. And us, our culture is to fully cover everything! (Uma, 25 years old, a single woman whose parents want to arrange a marriage for her)[17]

Over and above these structural aspects, the main differences leading to a male–female hierarchy may be sought in the significance they project onto P/SA. Men and

women do not take part in the same games (Rao, 1999). Yet although the view of those involved in physical activity differs depending on gender, it springs from the hierarchism that exists in the social relationships between the sexes (Goffman, 2004 [1976]). For the population studied, this structure forces the expression of biculturalism that is essential for integrating the society they left years before, and to which they must adjust while remaining distinguishable.

Modern sport vs traditional customs: Between global male distinction and local female assimilation

Hierarchization of the body and culture: Male distinction through P/SA

Taking part in western-type P/SA offers Tamil-origin Frenchmen the possibility of standing out in Pondicherry society. Through P/SA, they express their membership of western modernity, seeking distinction in terms of locality, returning to tradition (Bourdieu, 1979). Physical activity is for them the means of a hierarchical classification of the body, sports, and the values associated with them. Taking part in western physical activities confirms their dynamism and indicates a rewarding form of modernity in the local context. The choice of P/SA is therefore not anodyne and causes a double hierarchization: first, in respect of women, because they are not invited to take part in P/SA thus demonstrating their deep commitment to tradition, and among the men as well as they show their distinction by their choice of activities. A greater or lesser investment in physical activity indicates the degree of closeness to the West, the active body being at the summit of the suggested classification (Rao, 1999):

> Petanque – is what? It exercises what? What movement does it have? None, it's just a matter of taking the ball, bending down and throwing it! It's nothing, it doesn't damage your feet, it doesn't hurt your hands, nothing. . . . But I don't play petanque, I don't like petanque! . . . I play tennis, to keep fit, to move around . . . (Bala, 45 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who goes in for walking)

The data built up in the course of our investigation show that the main sports undertaken by men are tennis, football and petanque. Left by the wayside are local activities such as kabaddi, as being too Indian, yoga too static, cricket, the country's new symbolic sport having English origins but played with an Indian interpretation,[18] which do not meet the particular requirements of the French (Ruffié, 2003). Tennis is an example of this male desire for westernization as described by Srinivas (1952) and is perfectly illustrated in the operative hierarchy. It is modern, classy and onerous; it is carried out in sports '*Cercles*' and makes heavy physical demands on the body. Petanque has a unique position in the field of sports activities. While its local appropriation and the changes it has undergone make it an Indian sport and scarcely identifiable for French-Tamils, other properties of the game mean they stand apart from Indian players. The distinctive hierarchy that operates here through the knowledge of this activity that has been acquired by the French, together with the inclusion of betting for money, enables them to demonstrate their financial ease and distinguishes them from the poorer Indians:

> No, it's not interesting, I wanted to play it but it's a waste of time, I let someone else have my place, they play ten rupees the point. It's not interesting, I play for higher stakes. (Saravanan, 54 years old, married to a Tamil-origin Frenchwoman who undertakes no physical activity)[19]

In another context, betting definitely draws on traditional customs, but expecting individuals originating from low castes to be able to play for money would be like thumbing your nose at them. In this perspective, egalitarianism is associated with the relationship with money, a sign of modernity (Simmel, 1987). Men thus have a double advantage. First they affirm their membership of a western world and are recognized as such by local people, who see them as a bridge to this coveted status. They thus often have contact with the local bourgeoisie, who seek a form of sophistication that they imagine is found by being associated with them. Furthermore, this reference to the French world distances them from the caste system, which is a particular disadvantage for the Tamil-French, allowing them instead to benefit from an economic and cultural classification that is entirely to their advantage:

> Fine, the castes still exist, but if someone has means there are no castes, it's mainly . . . it's more that money makes. . . . You see, just as there are people that were low caste then and have money now, they are at the same level as others. (Rajendran, 52 years old, married to a Tamil-origin woman who goes in for walking)

Depending on the situation, a double cultural code applies. Thus, the men juggle skilfully with what Heinrich (1991) calls the cosmopolitan code represented by western modernity and traditional Indian codes. During P/SA, the cosmopolitan aspect is more significant, with its emphasis on joining the modern world. Nevertheless, attitudes associated with controlling women by refusing to let them take part in 'modern' physical sports or the management of their own attire, appear to correlate with traditional Indian codes.

The Tamils make a 'gift' of acceptance to the Frenchmen of Pondicherry origin and admit their symbolic and economic differentiation despite their social origins. However, as Mauss (1923–4) and Godbout (1992) demonstrated, this gift requires a counter-gift. French-Tamils have to 'reimburse a debt' to the local people; they have to compensate for the advantages that come with taking with French nationality.

De Leseleuc (2000) showed that this system of 'gift and counter-gift' is not unusual in sports and it generates a reciprocal relation of obligation between those who initiate and those who receive. In the situation studied, sports highlight a particular form of counter-gift that is employed by the Tamil-French. To 'pay for' the boon of their French nationality, and thereby the economic and symbolic advantages with which they are associated, they have to allow the locals to benefit from some of their privileges. Depending on their social, cultural and economic status, and corresponding to different physical activities, the Tamil-French use a special system of counter-gifts. With games such as tennis, the debt is settled financially. It will be the French who are more inclined to subsidize the lighting for a particular sports club or to take part in training youngsters. In games such as petanque, the counter-gift takes a direct monetary form. Betting during and subscriptions for tournaments are often settled by the French, who are considered

more wealthy. In other cases, the superior quality of a Frenchman's game will be taken advantage of by their Tamil partners, who will pocket any winnings made. Despite some reluctance, the French accede to this counter-gift rationale:

> So, today, the French of Pondicherry have become milch cows. For example, those lamps installed for tennis lessons, they were paid for by me and other Frenchmen. (Radju, 70 years old, married to a Tamil-origin woman who goes in for walking)[20]

> If you're French, they lean on you! For example, if I want to play in a tournament, someone will want to play with me and I'll have to pay the entry fees for both of us. That's the way it is, you're French so you pay. (Subramaniam, 63 years old, married to a Tamil-origin woman who does no physical activity)[21]

Quite obviously, some refuse this system of counter-gift, but having done so find themselves excluded from the local community. They therefore turn to expatriates of European origin, and are then unable to become integrated into the Pondicherry society. They are henceforth considered European French, thus losing the benefit of dual culture. By contrast, there are other individuals of French nationality who have never been to France and who take part in local life. They do not benefit from any economic or symbolic prestige that their nationality might bestow on them and, that being the case, are not subject to the counter-gift custom. Finally, the game of distinction from the community of origin involves compensatory systems that are part of the strategies of male–female couples. These strategies strengthen the different sexual roles associated with the valence of different cultures, weighed down by the tensions of local history.

Thus, in the sharing out of gender attitudes, if they turn to western society, which their status allows them to do, men must compensate for the distance from the Indian society that they have put in place. Women, for their part, may submit willingly or grudgingly to local customs; their counter-gift is to comply with the body norms of local custom and practice. A strategy finally seems to be established by couples, which leads to accentuating gender differentiation. Emancipation from tradition by the men still forces them to pay a part of their debt in monetary form. Their wives are, for their part, more directly engaged by their social attitudes and behaviour.

'Traditional' behaviour: The expression of female assimilation

Body in movement vs body static. Female physical activities are drawn from a local repertoire, which does not contradict the relationship to the socially constructed body. Most often, women do not undertake P/SA, justifying this non-activity by their status, particularly if married. Some women cite respect for their husband; they cannot move their bodies in a particularly pronounced way, and mostly choose not to take part:

> Let's say that it changes so much once you've left school, it's so different; it's not that you don't want to do sport, but you get married, and then you have other things to do, as I told you, the home, work, children, your husband, all that, there's no time, it's out of the question. Our situation does not allow it. (Lakshmi, 32 years old, married to an Indian)[22]

Interior, exterior and 'the gift of the body'. When young, their enrolment in French educational institutions forces girls to undertake physical activities regularly through classes in physical and sports education. However, these exterior activities remain the exception:

> At secondary school my daughter is learning a bit of judo, a bit of sport, later she will do bharata nâtyam, but not sport, not sport. (Bala, 45 years old, married to a woman of Tamil origin who goes in for walking)

The great majority of women questioned (see note 4) stated they did little or no exercise at all. Young French girls of Tamil origin but born in France are more likely to take part in the physical activities that are the most important in Tamil tradition. Is this not a way of compensating for the symbolic effects of being born on another continent? Bharata nâtyam is, for example, very largely undertaken by these girls. In this way the dance represents their Indian culture and takes on a sacred meaning. Their search for integration means giving allegiance to tradition:

> The bharata nâtyam is danced mostly with the legs bent, and you walk really well to the rhythm of your feet. . . . It is truly of great beauty, and they [the young women] are basically really expressing their civilization. (Lilu, 80-year-old Frenchwoman teaching bharata nâtyam)[23]

> The bharata nâtyam, I danced it from time to time at home, for myself. . . . even when in France I did a few shows. . . . There was a cultural festival where different countries represented their culture. (Kripa, 30 years old, married to an Indian-origin Frenchman)[24]

> The bharata nâtyam is not anodyne. I don't want to do it at secondary school because the kids whistle and make fun, even during the music accompanying us, and that doesn't go with the respect that should be paid [to the dance]. It is disrespectful of the music and the gods who are sacred. (Sahra, 14 years old, Tamil-origin French and a pupil at the French secondary school in Pondicherry)

Modernity and tradition: Gender negotiations and arrangements

Yet, in contrast to the men, this close assimilation does not allow women to distance themselves from a lower family caste. However, while the majority of them respect 'tradition', a small number distance themselves from a position which would lead the family group to excessive confusion within the Tamil world. Progress can be detected from the strategies of modernization of the female body, notably through the intermediary of keep fit. Since 1995, some young women take part in the activities made available by the keep fit clubs in the town. Nevertheless, of the 18 women interviewed, only two were enrolled in this type of club, which could reflect the majority's desire to conform to local norms. The first, aged 25, is single. She returned just a short while ago from the Paris area, where she has spent most of her life. She is in a paradoxical situation as she is trying to satisfy local expectations – in terms of marriage for example she has accepted, after a few setbacks, that her parents make an arranged marriage for her in the Indian tradition – but at the same time she is trying to keep some freedom, as she has by exercising in the keep fit clubs which are to be found in the major hotels in the town. For the

second woman, the situation is different. She has never left Pondicherry and is married to an Indian. French nationality is an appreciated dowry that also helps in arranging a marriage. This dowry, however, by contrast with other Tamil-origin Frenchwomen, has not helped locally to compensate for the distancing of her husband. Quite the contrary, the reason she was chosen was probably due to her French nationality. Finally, these two women also have a high income level, which certainly allows them to ignore some of the rules. However, they respect the traditional framework. Thus, in the clubs, women are separated from men and most often wear traditional clothing.

Undertaking physical exercise however, takes on a double meaning and is justified in respect of the tradition of arranged marriage. In fact, even among the Tamil-French, marriage arranged by the family remains the main solution for the union of a man and woman, which is furthermore often proclaimed in the temple.[25] Yet while beauty used to be judged by plumpness – a sign of wealth and good health – standards have evolved. The development of television and the arrival en masse of western inspired programmes have contributed to significantly changing the aesthetic criteria for a woman's body in India (Thapan, 2001). Slim bodies with fair skin are now characteristics sought after in the matrimonial market. Parents, who used to refuse to allow their daughters to take part in physical activities outside school, now feel constrained to orient them towards this type of practice. Premature weight increase now causes parental concern, the increasing awareness of new standards of female beauty increase the fear of being unable to get their daughters married. By a curious paradox, far from being motivated by the modernization of the appearance of the female body, sports orientation finds itself dictated by the tradition of the arranged marriage:

> If you don't need to slim you don't do sport here. Above all, they do it before marrying. Yeah, there you are, slimming, [and] after they couldn't care less, when they have a baby. (Shacty, 24 years old, single)[26]

> Now the mentality is starting to change. So, uhm . . . when fathers see they're a bit out of shape, well, it's hard to find a husband for the girl! (Parvati, 28 years old, married to an Indian-origin Frenchman)[27]

Physical exercise enables a complicity to be achieved between two contradictory rationales: respect for tradition is able to come to terms with the attempt to stand apart from local women through doing keep fit in order to be compared with northern women, who are also Indian but more modern:

> But there are no Frenchwomen there; there are only Indians, Indian women who come from the north! There's a difference between northern Indians and southern Indians. Northern Indians are better turned out than here. Here, they let themselves go, after getting married everything's over for them. (Mandala, 44 years old, married to an Indian)[28]

A compromise therefore seems possible between Indian and western traditions. It allows a way of escape from an uncomfortable situation of capitulation to local pressures, while at the same time remaining apart, probably to distance themselves from the caste system in order to obtain greater social prestige.

Gender, political heritage and postcolonialism

Far from stigmatizing the opposing positions of men and women, this study shows that the organization of roles bestowed on each of the sexes is a response to the sociocultural rationale specific to the situation encountered. Double cultural membership combined with successive migrations generates strategies of reintegration to the country of origin which influence gender relations. Investment in P/SA, by playing with the symbolic support that 'the body' represents, is an example of the expression of the largely differentiated roles played by each sex. Although the masculine figure allows itself a profile that is mainly drawn from western modernity, and, drawing on a distinctive register, stands out from the local culture, women yield to the prohibitions of Indian tradition. This organization of male and female roles, in addition to structuring social relations between the sexes, follows a specific arrangement (Goffman, 2002 [1977]), and facilitates locality-specific integration: this provides the ability to become entire by renouncing the symbolic benefits conferred by a prestigious exterior identification. A strategy of claiming exteriority increases the risk of being excluded, and treated like a foreigner. The men also seem similarly constrained in some situations to compensate the references to the exterior by counter-gifts to the locality. Likewise, the women are not satisfied by simply complying with tradition and manage to achieve some emancipation, particularly by drawing comparisons with women in northern India, who are more modern but who are still, above all, Indian.

It should be noted that this way of functioning is also apparent in French-Tamil couples where the husband has French nationality, regardless of his wife's nationality before marriage (Tamil-French or Indian origin). If the wife is from Metropolitan France, the gender split described does not seem to operate, the wife refusing to yield to the requirements of local life. In the same way, if the wife is Tamil-French and the husband is Indian, the system has no bearing either. On the one hand, most of these individuals have never left India; on the other, Frenchwomen seem to have been chosen for their nationality and the distinct assets they offer their husbands.

In this situation, the women can live outside the frame directed by tradition. Her membership of the Indian society is unquestioned because of her husband's nationality.

Similar studies have been undertaken among the Indian population living in the UK. Here the male–female attitudes are reversed: Indian women seem more prepared to 'westernize' their lifestyles than do men. For Singh Ghuman (1997), the reason for this role reversal is that women are quicker to accept the cultural changes offered by the host society since the advantages of emancipation are substantial. They have more to gain than the men by accepting the host culture. Comparing the results of the two studies (Pondicherry and UK) illustrates a particular sex-based organization. Although the roles are reversed, women in both instances turn to the host culture, while men are more exclusively attached to the culture they left. In addition to the cultural situation and geographic location, women seem to play a role of unification with the host society, operating as a link with the current cultural base, while men take on the role of memory as regards the society they have abandoned.

However, it must also be acknowledged that apart from the confusion produced by the multiplication of the discourse on 'globalization', the two studies concern the migratory and cultural process predetermined by the colonial history of France and the UK. Both

studies highlight populations mainly affected by a bicultural problematic issue. The two cultures concerned are not without historical similarities as both involve a former colonial nation and a former colony. Far from measuring the variations and similarities of the impact of a so-called 'globalization' process, the two studies measure and reinterpret local effects (regarding gender relationships) in a specific situation reflecting a postcolonial history. There is an important difference, however, between the two groups being considered, since the Indians in the UK represent the previously colonized living in their former governing country, while the Tamil-origin French of Pondicherry are the previously colonized who opted for the colonizer's nationality, choosing to live in the former governing country after decolonization, before returning to live in their home country.

The reversal of the gender relationship is perhaps not unrelated to this difference. The economic migration of Indians to the UK has little in common with the political and cultural membership of the Tamil-origin Indians of Pondicherry who opted for French nationality in 1963. Beyond their cultural origin, men are guardians of the political heritage of the group. Participants in the colonial and postcolonial history, they are its trustees. They make the choice of rebelling against the governing country, just as they rally to escape from an inferior position in the local caste hierarchy. When they decide not to abandon the men of the group who, although symbolically dominated, are unable to abandon their heritage so easily (Bourdieu, 2001), women are led to adopt the strategies of the hyper-genderized couple, playing opposition and complementarity, and are able to cushion the effect of symbolic domination while avoiding the risk of social exclusion.

The sexual sharing of social roles and the extension of gender relationships in a multicultural, postcolonial context are thus affected by the peculiar and paradoxical rationality linking the double relationship between 'local' and 'global', 'tradition' and 'modernity'. Examining the use of P/SA offers a means of analysing this ambivalent rationality based on the body. It reveals a gender-based social structure, directed by a double constraint. Negotiating the significance of the specific resulting structure seems to relate more to colonial history than to the impact of the more recent process of globalization.

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Notes

1. Kabaddi is a traditional Indian game of Tamil origin.
2. A classical Tamil dance originating in the Hindu temples. The dance has a strongly traditional connotation. The various movements made tell the story of the Indian gods
3. These are the principal possibilities in P/SA open to the population studied.
4. Of the 41 interviewees, 23 were men – 18 were former servicemen now retired, one was a retired teacher, one had served as consul and one had retired from the Pondicherry local council. Finally, two teachers had held posts in Pondicherry. Of the 18 women, five worked in French institutions in Pondicherry, one taught bharata nâtyam, one was a student at the University of Pondicherry. The others had no paid employment.
5. The caste system is a socioreligious organization that exists in India, despite its abolition since the country achieved independence in 1947. It divides the whole society into four major

groups, the Varnas, who according to the hierarchy are categorized by their profession which in turn denotes their degree of purity. Several authors have made a detailed analysis of the system and its influence in Indian society (e.g. Dumont, 1966; Fuller, 1997; Marriott, 1989; Srinivas, 1996).

6. On this subject, see the recent edition of the review *Actes de la recherche en Sciences Sociales* (2008: 171–2) devoted to 'Politiques imperialistes' and 'Genèses et structures de l'Etat colonial'.
7. The personal act of 'renunciation' was in order to make the Indians fully French. Thus, 'the native who repudiates his customs must be regarded as French from the former governing country' (Clairon, 1926: 128). The total number of those repudiating the Indian system, who at the same time were supposed to adopt the values of the French Republic as a first step towards cultural assimilation, was 2000 in 1882, 2861 in 1898 and 3000 in 1900 (Sugumar, 1998). Most of the individuals making this choice were from the lower castes or had no caste and thus had an interest in escaping from an underprivileged situation. According to Michalon (1990) 95 percent of those opting for French nationality came from repudiating families.
8 For this reason, in the subsequent text, the extracts of discussions do not concern just one interviewee but a couple.
9. Of the 23 men interviewed, 10 took part in games such as volleyball, tennis and football, considered locally as western activities; four undertook physical activities and/or 'Indianized' sports whose origin was European but which had been changed to suit an Indian approach; only one pursued an activity considered traditional, kabaddi; and eight others mixed various registers. For the women, of the 18 interviewees, two undertook keep fit, an activity considered locally as western; another undertook an activity that was 'Indianized' by its general use, namely walking. Finally, other women undertook either traditional activities such as bharata nâtyam or more often, no activity at all after marrying
10. Indian billiards comprises a wooden plank 80 cm long with a hole in each corner. The aim is to make different-coloured disks go into the holes using a pebble. The game is played by two or four players
11. Bala, a tennis player at the Cercle Sportif Pondicherien (CSP), is a retired serviceman; interview April 2002. (All the interviews were conducted by S Ruffié, in Pondicherry, India.)
12. Rajendran, a tennis player at the Cercle Sportif Pondicherien (CSP), a retired serviceman; interview May 2002.
13. Vikas, petanque player at the Club du Canal is a retired serviceman; interview April 2001.
14 The first keep fit club, Shape Up, was set up in Pondicherry at the junction of the former black and white towns, in 1995; it is largely associated with the modernization of the town and for this reason has very few women members.
15 The sari and chadhor are two traditional items of women's clothing, the most widely worn in India.
16. Shegar, a tennis player at the Cercle Sportif Pondicherien (CSP), a serviceman; interview January 2002.
17. Uma works in a French institution, and does keep fit in one of the town's hotels; interview May 2002.
18. Some P/SA found in India, and particularly in Pondicherry, has undergone transformation from the local translation and reinterpretation. Thus, some rules are changed and even the purpose of the activity transformed. For a more detailed analysis of these transformations see Ruffié (2003: Ch. 3).
19. Saravanan, a petanque player at the Cercle Sportif Pondicherien (CSP), retired serviceman; interview November 2001.
20. Radju, a tennis player at the Cercle Sportif Pondicherien (CSP), former French consul; interview October 2001.

21. Subramaniam, petanque player at the Club du Canal, retired serviceman; interview December 2001.
22. Lakshmi, employed at the French consulate, does no physical activity physique; interview May 2001.
23. Lilu, former Indian dance teacher; interview February 2002.
24. Kripa, employed in a French institution, does no physical activity; interview April 2001.
25. According to figures at the French consulate in Pondicherry, from 1995 to 2000 over 96 percent of the Tamil-origin French marriages were conducted in local religious buildings before being recorded by the French authorities.
26. Shacty, employed in a French institution, does no physical activity; interview June 2002.
27. Parvati, employed in a French institution, does no physical activity; interview June 2002.
28. Mandala, working in a French institution in Pondicherry, no longer does a physical activity; interview June 2002.

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Social-emotional world: Mapping a continent

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Abstract
This article describes two basic aspects of the social-emotional world: degree of connectedness (solidarity/alienation) and six specific emotions. This field needs to be clarified, because of the use of vernacular words rather than clearly defined concepts. Two sets of definitions are proposed. The first involves conceptual and operational definitions of degree of connectedness. The second offers a preliminary taxonomy of six emotion concepts. The connectedness formulation establishes an alienation/solidarity axis with three points between complete solidarity and complete alienation. Studies of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus, drama theory and other applications fall somewhere in the middle of this axis. The emotions taxonomy can be a first step toward better understanding their role in social life and their relation to connectedness. The theory implied by these definitions can be viewed as a first step toward a map of the social-emotional world.

Keywords
conceptual and operational definitions, degrees of attunement, solidarity/alienation, taxonomy of emotions

This article proposes that degree of connectedness and emotion are the main dimensions of the social-emotional[1] world (SEW). Although these domains are closely linked, they are separate entities. The first dimension is harder to envision than the emotions, because it is usually taken for granted between individuals, individuals and groups, and between groups. CH Cooley made the clearest and most general statement in this respect: 'we live in the minds of others, *without knowing it*' (Cooley, 1922 [1902]: 11; emphasis added), as is discussed below.

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The idea of an intersubjective component in consciousness has come up incessantly in philosophy and the social sciences, but the implications are seldom explored. As Cooley (1922 [1902]) suggested, mind-reading is so primitive that we usually take it for granted, to the point of invisibility.

Cooley's idea is profoundly significant. We have many, many names for it: intersubjectivity and shared or mutual awareness are only examples from a long list. The term joint attention was used by the psychologist Bruner (1983), when he explained how an infant learns to read the mind of his or her caretaker. The mother, he says, is only trying to teach a new word. She places an object (such as a doll) in her own and the baby's line of sight, shakes it to make sure of the baby's attention, saying 'See the pretty DOLLY.' In this situation, the baby is encouraged to learn not only the meaning of a word, but also, since both parties are looking at the same object, how to have, jointly with the mother, a single focus of thought and attention, to use Goffman's phrase.

John Dewey used still another term, shared experience. He proposed that it formed the core of communication and therefore of humanness:

> Shared experience is the greatest of human goods. In communication, such conjunction and contact as is characteristic of animals become endearments capable of infinite idealization; they become symbols of the very culmination of nature. (Dewey, 1925: 202)

This formulation by Dewey, because of its exuberance, can help override the individualist ethos of modern societies. Humans, like other mammals, are social creatures first, stand alone, self-reliant individuals second.

The literal contents of ordinary speech and gesture are so ambiguous as to be confusing if not completely incomprehensible. A whole school of thought, deconstructionism, has been built on this fact. However, their analysis is misleading, since it leaves out a key ingredient in social transactions, role-taking. By an early age, most children have learned to try to understand speech not only from own point of view, but also from the point of view of the speaker. Comprehension depends on success in taking the role of the other. Gradually the child gets so apt at guessing the other's viewpoint and at going back and forth between the two points of view as to forget what he/she is doing. In forgetting, the child becomes the kind of adult that modern societies imagine us all to be, a self-contained individual.

Connectedness

It seems likely that this dimension, the degree of connectedness, is both cause and effect of most emotions. Human beings need to be connected with others as much as they need air to breathe, a social oxygen. Disconnected from others, one is alone in the universe. Deep connection, even if only momentary, can feel like union, not only with the other(s) but also with the universe. Varying degrees of disconnect at the level of individuals and of groups lead to a vast array of problems, large and small.

An example that implies disconnect at all three levels is provided by George Bush Jr's comment after an Iraqi reporter threw his shoes at him in Baghdad: 'I don't know what his beef is.' This response suggests the failure of connection by one individual with

another individual and with another group. It further implies the same lack by one group (the US government) toward another group (the people of Iraq).

The following example of individual–group disconnect comes from my own experience. After many weeks with no difficulties in a small (20) class for freshmen, I was shocked by a moment of utter disconnect. I began this particular meeting by introducing a new idea, 'genuine love'. No sooner having said it, the class went dead. I had experienced brief moments of disconnect before, usually in large classes. But the length and depth of silence in the small room was unique. It felt physical, like gasping for breath, drowning. After what seemed like forever, I finally choked out: 'What's wrong? Talk to me.' After another painfully long silence, one student said 'We are all too young to know anything about that.' My term had profoundly embarrassed them, because it might reveal what they apparently thought of as a deficit in themselves. It took much reassurance to get the class started again.

This shattering episode suggested I had been taking connectedness for granted. Even in the earliest versions of the class, when the format was wrong in many ways, I had experienced more or less continuous connection with the majority of the students. I realized only in retrospect that there had been a few moments of disconnect, but brief enough so that I had ignored them. All of these years I had been floating on a sea of solidarity without knowing it, like a fish taking an endless ocean for granted.

It may be that the extent and accuracy with which we live in the minds of others is the key to many of the problems of our civilization, especially those concerning peace, health, welfare and happiness. Beginning in the 1970s, a study that seems to support one part of this idea was conducted by Bruhn and Wolf (Bruhn and Wolf, 1979; Wolf and Bruhn, 1993). Wolf, a physician, had found out by chance that in the town of Roseto, in Pennsylvania, there was a group of poor Italian immigrants whose health and welfare were hugely better than their neighbors, who were comparable in most other ways.

Challenged by this situation, Wolf, in collaboration with the sociologist Bruhn, made an exhaustive study of the lives of every immigrant family in Roseto, and a comparable study in a nearby, non-immigrant town. They found that over a period of some 20 years, health and welfare were dependent on what they called cohesion. As the younger generation adopted individualist American ways, their health and welfare levels decreased to the level of the neighbors.

Using vastly more data, at the level of nations and other large groups, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have reported similar findings, not only with health, but also many other kinds of problems, such as education and crime. Their formulation is somewhat different: the greater the distance between the highest and lowest incomes in a nation, the less the overall health, and the more social problems. They explain this finding in terms of what they call the level of trust. For example, at one end of their charts, in Sweden and Norway, there is a high level of trust, and a low level of ill health and social problems, just the reverse of the US, Singapore and Portugal at the other end.

The various terms discussed in the opening section are related to, but are more general than what Bruhn and Wolf called cohesion, and Wilkinson and Pickett called trust: intersubjectivity, mutual awareness and solidarity are some examples. None of these terms

have been adequately defined. Schacht (1994) has noted that the term alienation is used in the literature with eight different meanings. Seeman's (1975) finding of confounded dimensions in alienation scales is discussed later. Neither Seeman nor Schacht offered a usable definition. The purpose of this article is to provide definitions of both connectedness and in a preliminary way, a group of emotions. The next step is to note that not only Cooley, but also Marx and Goffman had ventured into this arena.

Marx, Cooley and Goffman

In his early writing, Marx suggested that connection with other humans was the basic species need (Tucker, 1978). He went on to discuss alienation from the means of production, others and self. Later, Marx made clear what he meant by alienation from the means, but not alienation from self and others. Nor did he define connectedness or solidarity.

The second dimension of the SEW involves emotions. In his early work, Marx made casual but brilliant remarks about emotions. For example, he named the emotions that accompany alienation (disconnect): feelings of 'impotence' (shame) and 'indignation' (anger) (Tucker, 1978: 133–4). In a letter to Ruge in 1843 about German nationalism, he wrote: 'if a whole nation were to feel ashamed it would be like a lion recoiling in order to spring'. This latter statement, particularly, turned out to be prophetic of the fate of France, then Germany in the period 1871–1945 (Scheff, 1994) However, neither he nor most other researchers have been able to go much beyond the ambiguous and confusing emotion terminology of ordinary language.

Marx's early work implied that the human condition involves both rank and power, on the one hand, and solidarity/alienation (degree of connectedness) and emotions, on the other. The social sciences have focused largely on the first part, power and status, on money and votes, often dealing with numbers rather than people. We need to give equal time to the second part, the SEW.

Cooley and Erving Goffman were the Marx and Lenin of the SEW. Cooley included much of it, albeit abstractly, in two sentences:

> 1. [The looking glass self] seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification [shame]. (Cooley, 1922: 11)

An important but unstated implication is that almost all emotions arise out of relationship dynamics. This idea cannot be overemphasized: not just pride and shame, but also most other emotions typically are generated by the moment by moment particulars of relationships.[2] Most emotions may be understood to be signals of the state of a relationship.

As already mentioned, Cooley also stated that the whole process seems effortless and therefore invisible:

> 2. [In rejection, one realizes one] was *living in the minds of others without knowing it*, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up. (Cooley, 1922: 11)

Like Marx, Cooley didn't spell out the details, particularly what he meant by the two emotions he referred to, pride and shame.

Oddly, these crucial formulations by Cooley were completely ignored for many years. Scholars treated Cooley's work as an inferior version of GH Mead's. Without crediting Cooley, Goffman took it up, and went further with both dimensions. The underlying theme of much of Goffman's writing is what he called 'facework', in which embarrassment, shame and humiliation play a crucial part. It is to Goffman's credit that he sensed the ambiguities of the vernacular emotion lexicon, attempting both conceptual and operational definitions of embarrassment (Goffman, 1967: 97–8). Yet little further progress has occurred beyond Goffman's attempt.

This article proposes definitions of the main terms of the SEW. In particular, it outlines preliminary definitions of connection and alienation, and of the six emotions that have received the most attention from researchers: love, pride, anger, shame, fear and grief.

Solidarity/alienation (degree of connectedness)[3]

It is to Goffman's further credit that he also provided a first step toward a concept for the other part of the SEW, connectedness. During his career he used various terms, including intersubjectivity, mystic union, joint focus of attention and mutual awareness. His last attempt was co-presence:

> When in each other's presence individuals are admirably placed to share a joint focus of attention (1), perceive that they do so (2), and perceive this perceiving (3). (Goffman, 1983: 3; *numbers added*)

This definition reminded me of a popular song from the 1930s: 'I know that you know that I know . . . et cetera . . . that we're in love.' It has been proposed that this kind of folding back on itself, recursion, is uniquely human and a central component of human cognition (Corballis, 2007; see also Butte, 2004). Perhaps it is recursion that gives rise to the momentary feelings of unity in close relationships.

Goffman's definition is brilliant in many different ways. For one thing, it displays his ability to make a complex idea easily understandable rather than obscure. However, it also has limitations. One is that it hides ramifications. In particular, it deals only with the easy part, complete connection, but not with the various degrees of disconnection. Nor did Goffman accompany the definition above with clear and detailed examples of actual instances of connectedness and disconnectedness. The next section attempts to remedy these two omissions.

Solidarity and alienation defined as concepts

By working out the permutations of accuracy/inaccuracy of role-taking at two levels of mutuality, degrees of connectedness can be visualized. (Noah Friedkin helped me with this task).

Degrees of mutual awareness between two parties

- First level co-orientation: shared agreement or disagreement.
- Second level: shared agreement or disagreement that is itself shared.

Table 1. Accuracy of the other's agreement/disagreement

No errors	One error	Two errors	Three errors	Four errors
Solidarity	Asymmetric solidarity	Uneven allen. or solid./ alien.	Asymmetric allenation	Complete allenation

Summarizing the five points in Table 1: (1) Agreement or disagreement with no errors: attunement/solidarity. (2) One error by one party: partial attunement. (3) Two errors: both by one party, or one by each party: uneven alienation or connected/disconnected. (4) Three errors: two errors by one party; one error by the other. (5) Two errors by both: complete alienation, whether they are in agreement or not.

This definition is relevant to two sizable empirical literatures, one on pluralistic ignorance (Miller et al., 2000), the other on false consensus (Marks and Miller, 1987). These two fields are focused on exactly the same phenomena, but most studies don't make the connection. Both involve only first level sharing, and neither consider the dichotomies implied: pluralistic understanding/knowledge and false and true consensus. If these studies were to include two levels of sharing, as indicated above, there would four degrees of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus ranging from a single error of understanding, asymmetric alienation, to four, complete alienation. Perhaps including two levels would increase the predictive value of the concepts.

Another problem with the existing studies is they tend to treat the zero level as a type of connect or disconnect. Yet marriage studies (Carrere et al., 2000) have suggested that unattuned agreement can be as disruptive as attuned disagreement.

Most of the studies do not attempt to use degree of attunement as predictive of behavior. An exception is a study of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases by Drumright et al. (2004) that used first level recursive awareness. They asked gay partners independently if their partner had other partners. This study showed that awareness levels relate to reality: those who knew that their partner had other partners were less likely to be infected with STDs.

So that this note will not be just one more example of abstract theory, it requires examples. Consider the degree of connectedness between a teacher T, and his teaching assistant A. Perhaps A doesn't understand the lectures, but doesn't know that he doesn't understand. T might understand that A doesn't understand, and that A doesn't know that he doesn't understand. A would be alienated from T even though T wasn't alienated from him.

A might be more respectful of T if he knew that he didn't understand and knew that T knew (no errors, solidarity, #1). A might be less puzzled and repulsed by T's rudeness if A understood that he didn't understand (only one error, #2). T would be more rude if he didn't understand that A didn't understand (three errors, #5). Finally, if both T and A didn't understand that A didn't understand, (four errors, #5) they might develop total enmity.

Exemplary studies

Using episodes in fiction (novels and films), Butte (2004) provides much more detailed renderings of intersubjectivity in particular moments than Goffman or anyone else. His

calling to our intention these moments in familiar stories shows how we take recursion for granted in our understanding, since the plot often hinges on recursive attunement or lack of attunement. Once again, as Cooley suggested, we live in the minds of others without knowing it, and we understand fictional others when they are depicted as doing it.

Theories of distancing in drama depend upon specific types of recursive connect and disconnect without referring to them as such. Virtually all comedy depends upon this device (Scheff, 1979). A scene in Shakespeare's *The Merry Wives of Windsor* provides an instance. One scene begins when Ford returns to his house the second time, certain he will catch Falstaff with his wife.

The first time, Falstaff escaped in a basket of laundry. This time, however, he has disguised himself as a woman. At the moment that Ford comes to the door, his wife sends her servants out the door with the laundry basket. The audience knows that Falstaff is not in the basket. The audience also knows, however, that Ford will think that Falstaff is in the basket, a recursive disconnect between Ford and the servant and her mistress. Since Ford doesn't know he doesn't know, and the mistress knows he doesn't know, he is alienated from them (two errors: asymmetric alienation). The audience, however, must be solidary with the mistress, knowing what she knows, and knowing that Ford doesn't know that he doesn't know.

Ford asks the servants what is in the basket. They reply that it is laundry. In one performance I saw, when Ford shouts for them to put down the basket, the audience roared with laughter. They continued to laugh as Ford threw item after item out of the basket. Laughter occurs because of the recursive disconnect that is written into the plot.

The psychiatrist Daniel Stern (1995; Stern et al., 1984) seems to be referring to some of these structures in his analysis of what he calls 'mismatches' in the communication of mothers and infants. Collective denial (Zerubavel, 2006) implies two types of alienated awareness structure: both parties agree, but don't know they agree, and/or know that each doesn't know they agree. That is, they all might have the sense of having mutual awareness, but in the silence, cannot be sure. In families where incest has been committed, for example, the victim may come to reject her/his own memories. The victim is then not only alienated from other family members, but also from self.

Detailed examples of complete solidarity are particularly important for filling out the theory presented here. Since modern societies focus on individuals, the idea of two or more persons in a state of full or partial unity, however temporary, is a hard sell. Durkheim's idea of the *conscience collective*, when translated as Group Mind, is almost universally scorned. Yet we need shared awareness to correctly understand even fairly simple dialogue, let alone humor, metaphor and other flights of fancy. It might be illuminating to explore the varying degrees of connectedness between students and their instructors in the classroom, or doctors and their patients (as Glaser and Strauss [1968] did in a preliminary way).

A web of emotion concepts

As indicated, emotions form the second main dimension of the SEW. What is needed preliminary to systematic research on emotions is a taxonomy of emotions. There have been more than a dozen taxonomies proposed in the literature, but no agreement at all

between them (Ortony et al., 1988; Plutchik, 2003). In the meantime, we are faced with multiple ambiguities in the vernacular words.[4]

Among the many who have written about this problem, for brevity, only one will be reviewed, since it is fairly typical. Bruner (2003) has an extensive discussion of the ambiguities of vernacular emotion words:

> Scientists continue to use old, familiar words for emotions . . . as if the communities that invented these . . . terms eons ago possessed a special insight into the basic elements of human nature. (Bruner, 2003: 323)

Bruner goes on the describe many of the confusions of the ordinary emotion words. However, he ends his discussion by offering his own definitions of 18 emotions. Most of his definitions, it seems to me, offer little advance toward a taxonomy that would be clearer than the vernacular. However, he does offer one bit of crucial advice for emotions researchers: define what YOU mean by each emotion word that you use. Great advice, even though it would mean virtually starting over.

This article proposes a web of just six concepts: definitions of love, pride, anger, shame, fear and grief, because they have attracted most attention from researchers. It is assumed that these emotions are genetically inherited, pancultural universals. One should keep in mind, however, that these emotions are usually caused by problems with connectedness. This is least true of fear, which can have physical, rather than social roots. On the other hand, it is most relevant to shame. Indeed, I treat shame as a signal of threat to the social bond, that is, lack of connectedness. As is discussed below in connection with fear and shame, if one is to understand emotions, one needs to define the boundaries of each, if only to keep from confusing one with another. To the extent that this attempt is successful, perhaps more emotions can be added to this web at a later time.

Six emotions defined: Grief, love, pride, anger, fear and shame

Grief. In this case, ambiguity might seem at first to amount only to the choice of words. Many authors use the term grief to refer to the emotion of loss of an attachment. However, there is a very large literature on attachment in which the authors use the term distress instead. Since distress is much broader than grief, and implies consciousness, the choice of the word distress can have serious consequences.

For reasons that he doesn't make clear, Silvan Tomkins (1962), a founder of the psychology of emotions, seems to have started the use of the word distress. In the first three volumes of *Affect/Imagery/Consciousness* (1962, 1963, 1965, 1992) the word distress is used frequently, with the word grief occurring only on page 6 of the first volume. However, in Volume 4, there is a sharp change, distress disappears, its place apparently taken by grief on many pages.

In the first three volumes it is clear what he means, because he connects distress to loss and crying. In Vol. 4, he makes this connection using only the word grief. What happened? As far as I know, there has been no published response to this dramatic change in nomenclature.

The original studies of facial expression of emotion followed Tompkins' first usage: neither Ekman and his colleagues nor Izard refer to grief. However, later works, such as Harre and Parrott, refer only to grief, never to distress. Plutchik (2003) also refers only to grief. Others use the word sadness, rather than distress or grief.

I have found only one explicit discussion of the relationship between distress and grief, in Izard (1977). What he proposed, that grief is an affect of which distress is only one ingredient, seems to me the exact opposite of the majority understanding: grief is a primary emotion.

Still another direction is followed by Vamik Volkan, in his otherwise excellent book on collective conflict, *Blind Trust* (2004). He elides around both grief and distress, by referring only to failure to mourn, behaviorizing grief. Hiding emotions behind behavior or cognition turns out to be a frequent occurrence with respect to other emotions as well. It would seem that anarchy rules in the naming of the emotions.

Pride. In this case, ambiguity is more focused and more flagrant. This word has two distinct and directly contradictory meanings in current usage in English, one positive, the other negative. The dominant one is negative, as in the biblical 'Pride goeth before the fall.' This usage confounds the positive meaning, authentic or justified pride, with arrogance, egotism or self-centeredness. Negative 'pride' may even be the opposite of genuine pride, since it can be a defense against shame. This basic contradiction creates problems of many kinds. One is discussed below: the meaning of self-esteem.

Fear/anxiety. Before Freud, fear meant the emotional signal of physical danger to life or limb, and anxiety was just a more diffuse kind of fear. However, after Freud, the meaning of these words began to expand. Anxiety became broader, enough to include many kinds of diffuse emotion, but not as broad as 'emotional arousal'. Current vernacular usage is so enlarged that fear can be used to mask other emotions, especially shame and humiliation. 'I fear rejection' has nothing to do with threat of bodily harm, nor does 'social fear' or 'social anxiety'. These terms refer rather to the anticipation of shame or humiliation. (When I explain this nicety to my students, their eyes glaze over.) Anxiety may be moving toward becoming an abstract, pliable word like emotion or arousal.

Anger. The confusion over the meaning of this word is different and more lethal than is the case with the other emotions. It involves confounding the feeling of anger with acting out anger. We don't confuse the feeling of fear with running away, the feeling of shame with hiding one's face, or the feeling of grief with crying. However, anger is thought to be destructive, even though it is only a feeling.

The feeling of anger is only an internal signal, like any other emotion. It is one of the many signals that alert us to the state of the world inside and around us. In itself, if not acted out, it is instructive, not destructive. The condemnation of emotions as negative in western societies is another aspect of the chaos of emotion words. Normal emotions, at least, are not negative, since they are brief and instructive feelings. It would appear that any specific emotion can lead to many different types of behavior.

When anger is expressed as a verbal explanation, rather than acted out as screaming or aggression, it is constructive. It explains to self and other where one is, how one is frustrated, and why. Both self and other need to know this information. The confounding of anger expression with acting out can be a seen as a way of justifying acting out, rather than expressing anger, and the prevalence of acting out, as in spousal abuse, road rage and the vast empire of revenge. 'I couldn't help myself.'

Shame. In contrast to the pliability of the word love, as discussed below, current usage of shame in English usually involves only one meaning, and an extremely narrow one at that: a crisis feeling of intense disgrace. (The usage 'What a shame!' doesn't count, since it is just a variant of the word pity.) In normal usage, a clear distinction is made between embarrassment and shame. Embarrassment can happen to anyone, but shame is conceived as horrible. Embarrassment is speakable, shame is unspeakable. This usage avoids everyday shame such as embarrassment and modesty, and thus sweeps most shame episodes under the rug.

Other languages, even those of modern societies, treat embarrassment as a milder version of shame. In Spanish, for example, the same word (*vergüenza)* can be used to mean either. Most languages also have an everyday shame that is considered to belong to the shame/embarrassment family. For example, the French *pudeur*, which can be translated as modesty, or better yet, a sense of shame, is differentiated from *honte*, disgrace shame. If you ask an English speaker is shame distinct from embarrassment, they will answer with an impassioned yes. A French speaker might ask 'Which kind of shame?'

One European language seems to be moving toward the English-language model of denying everyday shame. In contemporary German, since the word for disgrace shame (*schande*) is seen as old fashioned, the word for everyday shame (*scham*) is being used in its place. This usage is probably making shame less speakable, as in the English-language model. A similar phenomenon may be happening with *pride*. The negative version (*hochmut*) is now seen as old fashioned, so that the positive version (*stolz*) is confounding a positive feeling with a negative one.

Love. In current English usage, love is so broad as to include almost any kind of positive feeling, including extremely dysfunctional ones. Most unabridged dictionaries list some two dozen meanings. The subjects of the best-selling Women Who Love Too Much illustrates this usage. Women who are so pathologically passive and dependent as to allow their husbands to abuse them and/or their children explain that they don't leave because they love their husbands too much. Love, a positive word, is used to deny a highly dysfunctional relationship. The word love is much narrower in all other languages.

Current usage also confounds genuine love, which surely means loving someone that we know, warts and all, with infatuation, which deletes blemishes in favor of an idealized fantasy. Infatuation is often based on appearance alone. In this way, the word love may be used to hide a failure to connect. In another place (Scheff, 2010) I proposed a conceptual definition of romantic love in terms of three As: attachment, attraction and attunement. Non-erotic love would involve only two As: attachment and attunement. A conceptual definition of attunement (connectedness) is developed in the last section of this article.

The emotional/relational status quo

All of these confusions and limitations help maintain the status quo in the SEW: individualism, the subordination of feeling to thought and denial and suppression of emotion. The broad use of the word love, and the narrow meaning of the word shame may be central to this end.

Referring to all kinds of slightly positive or even negative relationships with the positive word love helps disguise the miasma of alienation and disconnection in modern societies. Similarly, defining shame narrowly, as only disgrace shame, helps mask everyday disconnections.

Suppose that just as fear signals danger of bodily harm, and grief signals loss, shame signals disconnection. In modern societies, since connecting with others is uncertain, we can hide that fact. Instead of saying that we were embarrassed, we say 'It was an awkward moment for me.' It was the *moment* that was awkward (projection), not me that was embarrassed (denial). In English especially, there is a vast supply of words that can be used as alternatives to the S-word (Retzinger, 1995): more than a hundred vernacular code words that may stand for shame, under six headings:

Alienated: rejected, dumped, deserted, etc.
Confused: blank, empty, hollow, etc.
Ridiculous: foolish, silly, funny, etc.
Inadequate: powerless, weak, insecure, etc.
Uncomfortable: restless, tense, anxious, etc.
Hurt: offended, upset, wounded, etc.

The broadening use of fear and anxiety seems to be another way of disguising shame. To say that one fears rejection, or to use a term like social anxiety, is to mask the common occurrence of shame and embarrassment.

We can also disguise the shameful pain of rejection by masking it with anger or withdrawal and silence. Similarly, the negative version of pride can be used to mask a defense against shame as too much pride. Studies of stigma and of indignities, even though these words signify shame, seldom take note of the underlying emotion, concentrating instead on thoughts and behavior.

Apologies suggest another instance of the masking of shame. The ritual formula for an apology in the English language is to say that you are sorry. However, the word sorry (grief) serves to mask the more crucial emotion of shame. 'I'm ashamed of what I did' is a more potent apology than the conventional 'I'm sorry' (Miller, date 1993).

The process of industrialization and urbanization has been influencing spoken English longer than any other language, since it began first in England. Modernization has led to the downplaying of emotions and relationships in English to a greater degree than in any other language, in favor of emphasis on thought and individualism. As this process continues, the emotional/relational world seems to be vanishing from awareness in English-speaking countries, and to a lesser degree, in other urban/industrial societies.

The banishment of emotions from discourse and thought both reflects and generates alienation. One way of countering this trend would be to acknowledge and define

emotions, rather than denying them. Rediscovery of the lost world of emotions and relationships might be a path toward further understanding of the enigmas of human conduct and experience.

For this reason it is difficult in English to even imagine relational dimensions, because most of the attributes we might use are themselves extremely ambiguous. For example, what does a 'loving' relationship mean, when the word love in English is wildly ambiguous, a blank check. The notion of self-esteem faces similar problems.

The idea of self-esteem[5]

Reviews of the vast corpus of studies based on self-esteem scales suggest that these measures are not valid. At this point, there are probably some 20,000 such studies, using one or another of the 200 standardized scales that are available. These scales have been shown to be reliable; that is, they repeatedly get similar results. Yet it is not clear what these scales measure: their validity is in question.

According to reviews of the field, the results of this vast labor have been trivially small. The average effect size for predicting behavior over the last 40 years has been under 3 percent of the variance, and is not increasing. With 97 percent of the variance unaccounted for, the field is treading water. If the instruments are not valid, then reliability means merely repeating errors.

What is the problem? One possibility is that the scales confound cognitive and emotional, and dispositional and relational elements as well. With respect to cognition and emotion, they repeat an ambiguity in the meaning of the English word self-esteem, casting doubt on the validity of the scales.

As indicated earlier, the word pride in English is ambiguous. Unless one precedes the word with 'justified, authentic or genuine', there is an inflection of arrogance or hubris, 'the pride that goeth before the fall'. This latter feeling would better be called false pride, since it implies hiding shame behind boldness. A new conceptual definition of self-esteem as an emotion construct, rather than one that mixes cognitive and emotional elements, might help to resolve this embarrassing problem.

The Rasch (1980) probabilistic model sets very stringent conditions for establishing standardized scales. The condition that is particularly relevant is the requirement of unidimensionality. He offers a number of approaches to test for the existence of two or more dimensions in scale materials. Since 1980, when Rasch published his extended volume on this problem, a small literature has developed. As of this writing, there is one book-length treatment of the model (Bond and Fox, 2007), and many references with Rasch in their title.

However, out of the 6336 references with self-esteem in their title, only two titles also include the word Rasch. One (Beres, 1981) was a dissertation on self-esteem; there was no subsequent publication. The other (McRae, 1991) appears to be an application of the Rasch technique in the use of a single self-esteem scale. This application made a significant difference in the outcome of the study.

There are over 2000 references with alienation in their titles, but none of them have Rasch in their title. It would appear that attempting unidimensionality in scales is an area that needs much more development.

The Seeman (1975) analysis of alienation studies suggests the need for Rasch models of the six dimensions he found. Allowing for emotional/cognitive and dispositional/relational components for four or five of these dimensions could give rise to a large number of unidimensional scales.

Similarly, for self-esteem, the Leary and Baumeister (2000) study suggests the need for Rasch models of the relational and the dispositional dimensions. The Brown and Marshall (2001) analysis and the study by Scheff and Fearon (2004) propose Rasch models of the emotional and the cognitive dimensions.

These latter studies might provide a way out of the dilemma reported by Baumeister and his colleagues (Baumeister and Boden, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1996). Presumably only the cognitive scale, in which high self-evaluation amounts to egotism, would be correlated with aggression. The pride/shame scale would not or it might be negatively correlated. The development of a scale that measures the emotional dimension might require, at least at first, a qualitative approach, similar to the one used in the Fearon (2004) study.

The confounding of independent variables suggests an answer to the riddle of the low correlation between self-esteem measures and external variables. High values on a cognitive dimension, self-evaluation, would hide low values on the emotional dimension. Since egotism is often a cover for low self-feeling, it would seem fair to guess that the mixing of these two elements would lead to low correlations with real world behavior.

Conclusion

Perhaps this model of solidarity/alienation and emotion will encourage discussion of the problem of conceptual and operational definitions for basic ideas about human conduct. It might also help to establish a particular model for the exploration of the relatively unknown continent of the social-emotional world.

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Notes

1. In the field of child development there is a large literature on social-emotional education. However, the term social-emotional is not clearly defined. It is used to mean only the opposite of standard academic education.
2. Rime' (2009) has proposed that emotion elicits the social sharing of emotions, but he doesn't define what he means by social sharing, as I do in the last section of this article.
3. This section is based in part on Scheff (2008).

4. Wierzbicka (1999) has called attention to this problem for many years, but the direction she takes toward solving it is different than mine.
5. This section is based in part on one section of Scheff and Fearon (2004).

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Thinking Goudge: Fatal child abuse and the problem of uncertainty

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Abstract
The increased valuation of children's lives characteristic of modern society emphasizes the problem of child abuse. Beginning in the 1960s, increased public awareness of child abuse led to increased attention to the professions concerned with child homicide. This attention has taken the form of inquiries into children's deaths that historically concentrated on social work 'error'. Recent inquiries have expanded their attention to other professions, particularly the medical and policing professions. Ontario's Goudge Inquiry centred on paediatric forensic pathology but, rather than focusing concern on murdered children, considered the moral hazard of wrongful convictions stemming from an overzealous concern with child abuse. The inquiry thus raises the problem of what evidence is certain, and how this certainty is evaluated. In turn, this makes the risk of child abuse reflexive insofar as under conditions of uncertainty professional medical judgement contains reflexive risk conditions. Because of these reflexive conditions, professional willingness to engage in child protection is being undermined and therefore threatens to paralyse the larger child protection project.

Keywords
child abuse, medico-legal, pathology, public inquiries, risk, uncertainty

Introduction

Perhaps one of the most overworked clichés of the 20th century is: 'children are our most precious resource'. However, as banal as the phrase has become, it captures something of the shifting valuation of children characteristic of modernity. As Ian Hacking put it, if

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you really think we live in morally relativist times try standing up in front of a group of people and claiming child abuse is a good idea.[1] Nothing unites modern society more than its condemnation of child abuse.

The revulsion caused by revelations of child abuse tends to obscure the fact that 'child abuse' has a history – albeit a short one. This means child abuse as both an area of scientific research, and as an area of medico-legal action, contains vast knowledge gaps and moral uncertainties. Yet despite these failings, the problem of child abuse cries out for somebody to *do* something. Into this area have come assorted philanthropists, volunteers, professionals, politicians and journalists, each with a belief that child abuse ought to be stopped, and given sufficient effort, that it can be stopped.

Despite increased awareness of child abuse, children have continued to die at the hands of abusers. As a result, public inquiries into child fatalities have become a recurring institution. Inquiries into 'failures' to protect children are now four decades old and until recently had become so routine in their structures, findings and recommendations that one tended to blur into another.[2] Recently, however, inquiries have begun to mutate. Prior to 2000, inquiries typically focused on social work, but since the turn of the century other vocations have also come under scrutiny. The 2008 Goudge Inquiry in Ontario demonstrates this enlarged field of inquiry and is the main source for this article.

The Goudge Inquiry was tasked with examining the state of paediatric forensic pathology in the province of Ontario. The inquiry had become necessary because of growing concern about the competence of Dr Charles Smith. Dr Smith was a paediatric pathologist who worked at the Sick Children's Hospital in Toronto and since 1981 had conducted post-mortems for the Chief Coroner of Ontario's Office. He had no training in forensics but unlike his colleagues he had an interest in conducting autopsies on children and eventually became an acknowledged expert on paediatric forensic pathology. In 1992 he became the first director of the Ontario Pediatric Forensics Pathology Unit (OPFPU) at Sick Children's and went on to establish himself as what many witnesses described as the 'go to' pathologist on cause of death for children who died under suspicious circumstances.

However, as early as 1991 concerns about Dr Smith's competence had been expressed by Judge Dunn before whom he had given evidence. Similar concerns continued throughout the 1990s culminating in a *Fifth Estate* story broadcast on national television.[3] Dr Smith was removed from coroner's work in January 2001, but an article in the national newsmagazine *McLean's* later that year ensured he stayed in the public eye. Meanwhile, complaints to various medical, coronial and government review bodies culminated in a critical report from the Ombudsman of Ontario. Dr Smith was then relieved of forensic pathology duties, and removed from his position at the OPFPU in 2004. The following year, the Coroner's Office commissioned five experts from around the globe to conduct a review of all the criminally suspicious cases Dr Smith had been involved with.

The reviewers took issue with 20 of 45 cases they reviewed, but the main cause for concern were 12 cases where there had been a finding of guilt by the court. In view of this, the government appointed Justice Goudge to conduct a judicial inquiry as a separate process to judicial appeals of specific cases. The inquiry was established on 25 April 2007 and reported on 30 September 2008.

Problems with paediatric forensic pathology are not unique to Ontario. England and Wales have experienced unsafe convictions – particularly those of Sally Clark and Angela Cannings – which led to extensive reviews of convictions for infant deaths at the behest of Lord Goldsmith. South Australia also experienced loss of confidence in an eminent pathologist, sparking media coverage and much soul searching (Moles and Sangha, n.d.). The Goudge Inquiry, however, has several unique characteristics. First, unlike the Goldsmith Review, its purpose was not to consider the safety of convictions, but to examine the functioning of forensic pathology within the Coroner's Office and in relation to other parties such as Crown prosecutors, the defence bar, child protection authorities and so forth. Second, the inquiry drew on pathology expertise from around the world including Australia, Canada, Finland, England, Northern Ireland and the US. This expertise came in the form of lengthy written background papers, formal evidence and more informal panel discussions. Third, counsel representing a variety of parties was able to cross-examine. This included organizations representing children, the wrongfully accused, aboriginal interests, the defence bar, as well as individuals affected by Dr Smith's conduct. Fourth, the inquiry was able to draw upon the experience of other jurisdictions and, in the case of Dr Helen Whitwell, had access to an important witness at the English Sally Clark trial. Finally, for the convenience of researchers, virtually all the background materials and transcripts of evidence are available online. This amounts to a massive resource of documentation of which this article barely scratches the surface.

To guide the analysis of the inquiry, the article draws primarily on three theoreticians. Andrew Abbott's (1988) work on the professions guides the analysis of the boundaries between the various professions involved with child abuse and its effects. As I argue later, child abuse is not a discipline; it is an intersection of professional interests and esoteric knowledge requiring various professional groups accommodate one another. However, child abuse is also an area of scientific interest involving both researchers and clinicians from many subspecialties. Yet, paediatric forensic pathology is an extremely small world composed of perhaps less than a dozen people qualified in both the paediatric and forensic specialties of pathology. The uncertainties and relative novelty of the area mean 'facts' are hard to come by and almost never stable. For this reason, readers familiar with Bruno Latour's (1987) Actor Network Theory will recognize his influence. Finally, the major concern underwriting this article is the 'risk' of professional error. The problem of 'risk' is a permanent feature of modern states – of the moral hazards generated within 'risk societies' – but tends to be elided by inquiries. Thus, the insights of Ulrich Beck inform my framing of the moral hazards created by child protection practices.

The deaths of children, especially those styled preventable, tend to receive large amounts of press coverage focusing on the failures of individuals or 'systems'. British Columbia's Gove Inquiry, for example, was sparked by press coverage of Verna Vaudrieul's lawyer's claim that it was not her client who had killed Matthew Vaudreuil, but the 'system' (Anderson, 1994: 5A). The close association between child welfare scandals, inquiries and the press in English history is closely examined by Butler and Drakeford (2003), who conclude inquires serve an important function in bringing public attention to governance flaws. Nevertheless, while 'naming and shaming' professionals in the child abuse field may provide benefits, its effects on individuals and professions can be corrosive.

Child abuse, professions and inquiries

It is notable that within medical literature concerned with child abuse the seminal moment is normally identified as Caffey's (1946) article describing the presence of unexplained healing fractures to children's bones revealed by radiography. Caffey offered no speculation on the cause of the fractures. Social work literature, on the other hand, tends to identify Kempe et al.'s (1962) paper as the genesis of our present concern with child abuse. Kempe cited Caffey so the different attributions are not competing stories of scientific discovery.[4] The difference seems to be that Kempe's audience was wider because he published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (the article was accompanied by a strident editorial) and Kempe asserted the cause was a *psychiatric* disorder within adults rather than a physiological defect in the child.

Despite medicine's seminal role, however, the concept of child abuse has never been the exclusive domain of a single discipline or vocation. Rather, child abuse combines the domains of medicine, justice and social work. The resulting collision of professional interests generates boundary disputes over responsibility, authority and knowledge both vertically within professions and horizontally across professions. Thus, for example, while judges certainly have more status than police constables, do police constables have more status than doctors?[5] How these relationships are negotiated has serious practical implications for how responsibility for preventing child abuse is attributed.

The ever-growing awareness of child abuse has not stopped children being killed as a consequence of child abuse. The public outcry over these deaths, fuelled by media reporting, set the stage for a series of public inquiries. England broke the ground for child homicide inquiries in 1973 (Corby et al., 1998), but Canada entered the tradition in 1982 with the publication of Judge H Ward Allen's four-volume report into the 1975 death of Kim Popen (Allen, 1982). Inquiries may be large judicial affairs or smaller more routine reviews. For the most part, inquiries into child homicides caused by child abuse have focused on social work practices. Where other professions have made an appearance, their roles have been relatively minor and their inadequacies generally described as of little consequence.

The relatively minor role assigned medicine by judicially led inquiries into child fatalities changed with events in Cleveland, England during 1987. The Cleveland 'affair' has many implications, but for present purposes two will be highlighted. First, many medical diagnoses of sexual abuse were made on the basis of physical evidence alone. Second, the diagnosis was bitterly disputed *within* the medical profession. In particular, the police surgeon and his allies did not agree with the diagnostic procedure used by hospital-based paediatricians. The dispute placed both social workers and the police in a quandary. On the one hand, the police were unlikely to disbelieve their own surgeon and even if they did could scarcely expect successful criminal convictions without his evidence. On the other hand, social workers who were being frequently and publicly pilloried for missing obvious evidence of child abuse could scarcely ignore the diagnoses of paediatricians. Thus, 121 children found themselves in care. The inquiry gives no figures as to convictions although it seems likely at least some of the children were criminally assaulted (Butler-Sloss, 1988: 21). Ordinarily, the central issue of Cleveland is described as conflict between parental 'rights' and an overly intrusive welfare state.

The Cleveland Inquiry's extension of error across the professions was reinforced in the new millennium. The 2003 report of Lord Laming into the death of Victoria Climbié examined social work but also paid equal attention to the fallibilities of medicine and policing. The following year, murders committed by Ian Huntley prompted two inquiry reports; one emphasized social work (Kelly, 2004) while the other centred on police failings (Bichard, 2004). In the Goudge Report (2008a), social work becomes a minor player in a drama formally concerned with the practices of forensic pathologists and investigating coroners with critical supporting roles supplied by police officers, Crown counsel and members of the defence bar.

Superficially, the Goudge Inquiry covers familiar ground. It is concerned with the death of children as a consequence of child abuse and uses close examination of the facts to make recommendations at both systemic and practice levels. However, the Goudge Inquiry has a very different focal point. The central tension within previous inquiries had been between children's protection from abuse as against parental rights. But in Goudge this is replaced by a tension between the necessary and sufficient evidence of fatal child abuse and the presumption of (adult) innocence. Paediatric forensic pathology is crucial to determining if fatal child abuse – that is, the commission of a crime – has actually occurred.

Paediatric forensic pathology is the branch of medical science charged with determining the cause of death for children who die under suspicious circumstances. In Ontario, pathologists examine bodies under a coroner's warrant, but they are not ordinarily employees of the Coroner's Office and, therefore, while they may report their findings to the coroner, their work is typically independent. Broadly speaking, pathologists determine cause of death, while coroners determine the manner of death.

To make their determination, pathologists may use a full array of diagnostic tools including skeletal x-rays, autopsies, microscopic examination of cells (histology), toxin screens and so forth. They take photographs of the body, make records and store relevant evidence (or forward it to the police or Crown). In cases where a criminal trial results pathologists may give expert evidence on their findings. Moreover, pathologists are often encouraged to testify for both prosecution and defence at different times in order to both expand their knowledge and to emphasize their 'objective' status before the court.

In Ontario, the number of deaths of children under five declined from 276 deaths in 2002 to 194 deaths in 2006 (Paediatric Death Review, 2008: 16). There are, however, several conditions unique to paediatric forensic pathology that have resulted in heated debates and unsafe convictions. These areas include Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), short-fall head injuries and Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS). In Ontario, SIDS is the second leading cause of death behind accidents (150 in 1994 and 1995 of a total 855 deaths) (OACAS, 1997: 8) and is notoriously difficult to determine. Therefore, the terms Sudden Unexpected Death (SUD) or 'unascertained' cause of death have become a more common pathological finding.

Only pathology can establish the medical fact of fatal child abuse upon which social work and law depend, but it was this very 'fact-making' capacity that is examined by the Goudge Inquiry. What are the 'facts' of short falls, SBS, SIDS and the possible persistence of recurring injury caused by the birthing process? Very young children's physiology remains poorly understood thereby creating many areas of uncertainty. Previous inquiries

had always presumed the cause of a child's death was certain. Thus, evidence of abusive or questionable prior child care could always be utilized as an 'obvious' indicator that the death of the child was predictable. For Goudge, the problem was reversed because the cause of the child's death was insecure and therefore evidence of prior caregiver conduct had little objective relevance to cause of death. Put another way, the problem had usually been posed as how to protect children from the *risk of homicide* whereas, for Goudge, the problem was how to protect adults from the *risk of wrongful criminal conviction* when children had 'really' died from accidental or natural causes. The problem hinged on what 'the pathology' revealed. But as all agreed, pathology is an 'interpretive' and 'evolving' science. The question then became: who can be trusted to do the interpreting?

Thinking dirty vs thinking truth

In 1995 the Office of the Chief Coroner of Ontario had issued a protocol to coroners and forensic pathologists which contained, among other things, advice to 'think dirty':

> The police and the coroner are both at a scene as independent parties. While working together they should also be prepared to vigorously, but fairly, question each other's conclusions about the death. Everyone should be 'thinking dirty' and not get lulled into accepting the most obvious conclusions at the beginning of an investigation. (Nov. 26/07, 48/7)

During the inquiry there was considerable debate over the meaning of 'think dirty'. Parties' counsel to the inquiry suggested it represented an invocation to bias. For example, Drs Butt and Milroy, both expert forensic pathologists assisting the inquiry, preferred the phrase 'a healthy index of suspicion' (Nov. 23/07, 53/13). However, Dr Cairns, who at the time of the issuance of the 'think dirty' memo was the Deputy Chief Coroner, explained:

MS. LINDA ROTHSTEIN: Do you not accept, Dr. Cairns, that at the very least, the language 'thinking dirty' may suggest a lack of objectivity, a mind-set that may conclude that there is foul play where, indeed, there isn't any?

DR. THOMAS CAIRNS: I think there is a very distinct difference between 'thinking dirty' and 'acting dirty' and I think 'thinking dirty' means do not accept things at face value; consider that there – that there is something else going on. (Nov. 26/07, 54/9)

Later he compares his use of language to that of the present Chief Coroner in this way:

> I don't mean this flippantly, but I think the best way I can describe it to you is I would called a shovel a shovel; Dr. McLellan might be inclined to call it an agriculture instrument. (Nov. 26/07, 59/12)

It is an interesting question as to why this phrase was of such concern to the inquiry's participants. According to Dr Cairns, he had first heard the phrase used by a retired

police officer who had been an assistant to a previous chief forensic pathologist. So far as I'm aware, no one connected with the inquiry questioned whether a police officer's use of the term indicated biased policing. Nor should one underestimate the temper of the times. With the exception of the Cleveland report, from the mid-1970s onward every inquiry into child protection practices had severely criticized social workers for lack of scepticism in evaluating parental conduct. Further, the assumption that children had been killed by their parents under circumstances of previous abuse is explicit in Judge Allen's comments in his 1982 report on the death on Kim Popen. On the issue of whether her sibling should have been removed after her death he wrote:

> I can only express wonderment that one with the general knowledge and experience in social work that Mrs. Harvey had, coupled with her knowledge of Kim's case and her belief that Kim had been abused by Jennifer Popen, should not have been aware of the likelihood that Kim's death was caused by abuse.
>
> Perhaps clinically or legally at that stage one could not 'know' it, but surely when asked if she believed Kim's death was the result of an accident she must have been able truthfully to express her belief rather than to retreat, as she did, to a denial of certain knowledge. (Allen, 1982: 1. 245)

The present Chief Pathologist of Ontario, Michael Pollanen, claims forensic pathologists should 'think truth' rather than 'think dirty' in order to 'know' how a child died. But what is 'truth' in the context of child abuse? And, who is to determine this 'truth'? There are two aspects to this problem. First, some children die in hospital which means they are often seen by a variety of clinicians before death and their body is autopsied by a forensic pathologist. Such a child is, in fact, two children – one that is alive and under the care of clinicians and one that is dead and literally composed of anatomical pieces distributed among specialist technicians whose various findings (facts?) are then assembled by forensic pathologists into a cause of death. The second aspect is the problem of pathologists disagreeing among themselves as to appropriate interpretations of physical evidence obtained by other pathologists or of the significance of 'facts' provided by ancillary specialists.[6]

From the cases before Goudge, an example of the first problem involves the 'Kasandra' case. In 1991 Kasandra was living with her father and stepmother. Many abuse complaints had been made by her mother and maternal relatives. Investigators noted bruises and what appeared to be a cigarette burn. Prior to her death, she had already been admitted to hospital while dehydrated, vomiting and bruised. She returned to hospital a short time later and eventually died there. As Dr Smith's counsel pointed out, during this second admission the receiving physician, two neurologists, two ophthalmologists and the director of the receiving unit all believed the child had been abused. Dr Charles Smith concurred in his post-mortem, believing the child to have died as a result of a head injury. Dr Whitwell, a leading English forensic pathologist, reviewed Smith's opinion for the Chief Coroner and gave evidence to Goudge. She did not dispute Smith's observations but was of the opinion that the child may have suffered from 'fits'.[7] She stated in her report: 'Probably would have been given by clinicians, pathologists in 1991, but alternative non-traumatic mechanisms not completed [*sic*] explored' (Dec. 13/07, 200/8).

The question of who to believe is summed up in this exchange:

DR. HELEN WHITWELL: . . . I mean – I'm afraid, because you're reading out what they [the clinicians] – they've said.
I – I've reviewed the case now, from a pathological aspect, so this is all factual, which I can't challenge one way or the other. I wouldn't be able to.

MR. NIELS ORTVED: Well, what I'm saying to you is that they were reflecting on injuries that they saw while this child was still alive. (Dec. 13/07, 196/2)

The question of whether clinicians' views are of the same value as pathologists' views arises throughout the inquiry. Dr Pollanen states the view of forensic pathology on the limits of clinical knowledge (in this case, on sexual abuse indicators):

> Pediatricians which have as their experience living children, do not, on that basis, have experience with the dead anus, in this circumstance, therefore are not fully appreciative of the artifacts associated with that. So, this is where the – where the issues arise. (Nov. 16/07, 99/2)

Pollanen is clearly using experience to mark the boundary within which forensic pathology claims exclusive jurisdiction. Similarly, the Irish forensic pathologist Dr Crane shows no hesitation in overruling a neuro-pathologist's interpretations based on his superior experience with deceased bodies (Nov. 20/07, 212/9).[8] But the experience of autopsying infants is very limited even for experts. According to the Ontario Coroner's 1997 report, the Coroner investigates approximately 200 infant deaths a year but does not necessarily do an autopsy on all of them (OACAS, 1997: 6). In any event, according to the present Chief Forensic Pathologist, Dr Pollanen, and with very little variation, homicide accounts for only five to 15 infant deaths per year (Nov. 12/07, 57/4). There are three centres in Ontario where paediatric autopsies are done, which means infant autopsies are an extremely rare occurrence at any of these facilities. Dr Whitwell stated her experience as some 50 or 60 autopsies under suspicious circumstances since 1988 – roughly two or three a year. How many of Whitwell's autopsies were on children is not given, but one assumes their incidence is not significantly different than Canada. The rarity of suspicious child deaths explains why there are no pathologists in Canada, Australia, or the UK accredited in both paediatric and forensic pathology subspecialties.

Disagreements between pathologists are not marked by jurisdictional boundary disputes, but by disputes over interpretations. Such disputes are by no means a recent phenomenon. Indeed, medico-legal courtroom argumentation over the 'normative' range of anal dilation was argued in 1871 in the context of 'habitual sodomy' (Edmund, 2001: 198). This early instance questioned which preconditions are necessary for adequate interpretations including: what constitutes an adequate 'examination', and what kinds of equipment are necessary?[9] For the Goudge Inquiry additional issues included what kind of training and/or experience ought pathologists to have? What relative weight should be placed on reported research as against 'anecdotal' evidence?

For present purposes two themes are particularly significant. First, the question of what kinds of examination and equipment are pertinent and trustworthy. A hallmark of

science is replication, but first autopsies cannot be replicated. And, even if replication were possible it would inevitably cost money, which is a burden on the defence. Moreover, subsequent analysis of autopsy material is necessarily dependent upon the quality of the initial post-mortem examination and autopsy. Strictly speaking, then, the ability to replicate procedures – a necessary step in establishing scientific facts – is not possible. It is interesting to note that at one point the experts used by Goudge strongly criticize a case in which a pathology assistant actually did the 'cutting' for an autopsy because Dr Smith was incapacitated. The assistant was acknowledged as highly skilled by everyone who worked with him – more so than many doctors – but the Irish pathologist Dr Crane states:

> Because, for instance, if some organ is damaged – if you do it yourself as a pathologist, you know you've done it. But if you let someone else do it, you don't know. Was there was a laceration of the liver or did the technician make it? (Nov. 22/07, 235/8)

If we are to take this statement seriously, then it raises the question of whether any subsequent second opinion of an autopsy can be trusted because only the original pathologist can know what was actually done to the body. Given that pathologists routinely give second opinions on the basis of photographs and other secondary media it seems any second opinion must be suspect – not because of the knowledge of the pathologist but because the immediacy of personally handling the body is lost.

The second theme is perhaps more crucial. Forensic pathology is a very small world. For example, in England and Wales there are only approximately 40 forensic pathologists on the Home Office list of government recognized forensic pathologists (Nov. 19/07, 27/10). Canada has no training available for forensic pathologists who generally qualify in the UK or US. Further, remuneration is poor so Ontario has had periods where the Chief Forensic Pathologist was the only qualified person within the coroner's ambit. Moreover, evidence to Goudge indicated that forensic pathology has been largely abandoned by universities because it does not generate research funds and therefore lacks cachet within medicine. None of forensic medicine's journals achieve the minimum impact rating that English universities require and, besides, the pool of potential authors is necessarily small. In short, forensic pathology practitioners, researchers, expert witnesses and authors are one and the same. For example, even when his competence was being widely questioned, Dr Charles Smith was still co-authoring articles (with virtually the entire medical staff of the Coroner's Office) in forensic journals in 2002 and with researchers at the University of Toronto in 2005 (Pollanen et al., 2002; Somers et al., 2005).

Given this small world, comments by expert forensic pathologists on their colleagues can be surprisingly harsh. Dr Crane, for example, specifically states the literature cannot be trusted when it contradicts his own experience (Nov. 20/07, 220/1). Crane's English colleague, Dr Milroy, later claims a lot of literature in forensic journals is 'rubbish' (Nov. 20/07, 246/8). When Dr Saukko was asked about how forensic pathologists in Finland learn to give evidence he responded 'some don't learn it ever' (Dec. 3/07, 49/14). Despite the appeal to evidence, rationality and method, much of the evidence given to Goudge by acknowledged experts rests upon their personal experience and the small amount of research literature they have been able to generate and publish in journals of limited quality.

There are, then, several indications that forensic pathology is as much art as science. This is in keeping with Smith's (1989) account of the way English forensic pathologists think of themselves. Nor is it inconsistent with a view of science influenced by social construction. But the expert pathologists testifying before Goudge seem unable to decide where they stand on this issue. On the one hand, they agree with Dr Pollanen's assertion that forensic pathology should be 'truth-seeking', 'evidence-based' and supported by the relevant literature. On the other hand, they are more than willing to discount evidence relayed from other specialties or research from literature when it contradicts their own anecdotal experience. Indeed, at one point Dr Crane goes so far as to imply that the sign of a good forensic pathologist is that he or she is older. At the very least, he claims, an older and more experienced pathologist is more likely to find a cause of death as unascertained than a younger pathologist.

From risk to evidence-based

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the proliferation of risk as an idea capable of mastering the ambiguities of child protection work. Inquiries established that social workers routinely failed to anticipate fatal child abuse (and therefore the incidence of child fatalities) because they were too concerned with supporting families rather than interpreting risk factors. Risk assessment tools were encouraged because it was believed their organization of contextual data could provide a basis for predicting abusive outcomes. Less obvious, but equally important, risk assessment tools ensured a 'paper trail' visible to the increasing prevalence of audit and accountability structures (Cradock, 2003). In fact, risk assessment tools simply lowered the threshold of risk tolerance for social workers (Leslie and O'Conner, 2002; Spratt, 2000, 2001). Increased managerial surveillance combined with an increasingly hostile public encouraged 'defensive social work' in which the main index of social work action was the risk felt by social workers – not the risk experienced by children (Regehr et al., 2002).

It seems forensic pathology underwent a similar, if more subtle, transformation. Evidence given before Goudge suggested that during the 1990s forensic pathologists and the Coroner's Office were unduly influenced by the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect (SCAN) unit of the Sick Children's Hospital in Toronto (Nov. 17/07, 101/2; Nov. 21/07, 113/9). At the very least, there was an underlying suspicion that clinicians and Dr Smith were inclined to opine that children had been killed on the basis of circumstantial evidence or evidence of previous treatment by caregivers that may have been occasionally brutal, but was not necessarily fatal; at least not demonstrable to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.

The knowledge base of paediatric forensic pathology also changed rapidly. At the beginning of the 1990s, presence of the so-called 'triad' indicating fatal Shaken Baby Syndrome was generally accepted as the 'truth'.[10] By contrast, experts giving testimony before Goudge were not only sceptical of the triad's diagnostic veracity, they were sceptical SBS exists at all (Nov. 21/07, 227/5; Dec. 12/07, 145/1). Similarly, in the early 1990s it was generally believed short falls in infants of younger than two years were relatively benign but it is now generally accepted that while rare, a short fall can be fatal. These shifts in knowledge are not shifts in 'facts' in the sense that present observations are qualitatively

different.[11] Rather, these are ongoing controversies about appropriate *inferences* for which there are a range of opinions claiming validity under uncertain circumstances.

In this sense, the call for 'evidence-based' pathology is somewhat misleading. If the evidence itself is unsettled it is unclear how this provides support – let alone direction – to practitioners. The generally agreed solution placed before Goudge was that pathologists (and this is no different from the rationale expected of any evidence-based practice) make their reasoning transparent, indicate why they prefer one interpretation over others, and, if appropriate, support their position with reference to the literature. Further, forensic pathologists must be careful to present all sides of any controversy so as to not unduly influence judges and juries. This does not resolve the fundamental problem, however, because in this view unsettled evidence – that is, unresolved uncertainty caused by disagreement over *how* to determine the 'truth' of evidence – cannot be resolved.

Throughout the evidence given to Goudge the problem of how to evaluate the veracity of evidence and the truth value of statements is pervasive. What is striking is the legal players' – Goudge and counsel – persistence in trying to express opinions in terms of percentages. At no point do the participants seem aware that expressing evidence in terms of percentages is to invoke ratios; ratios are measures of probability; probability is another way of saying 'risk'. Legal functionaries' insistence on trying to express cause of death in terms of percentages led Dr Charles Smith to use the phrase 'If I were a betting man' in evidence. In a similar way, the eminent English paediatrician Sir Roy Meadow compared the percentages of two or more SIDS deaths occurring in one family to the running of the Grand National horse race. Both men were heavily criticized for this phrasing despite the fact that risk as a concept was originally rooted within gambling.

In short, except for obvious cases (say, gunshot wounds), no 'evidence-based' diagnosis is risk free. As Abbott (1988) pointed out, making decisions under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty is fundamental to the definition of what a professional is. For those engaged in child protection, every 'evidence-based' decision is fundamentally a risk decision. If it were not, it would not be a professional decision; it could have been made by an automaton. A way out of this dilemma is to refuse to make a decision. For paediatric forensic pathologists this means characterizing the cause of death of an infant as 'unascertained'. This is, in fact, the most common reclassification of Dr Smith's findings. Yet, in at least some of the cases – Paolo, for example, whose father later admitted in the context of family court that he had punched his infant child with a closed fist – the finding of unascertained would have astounded Judge Allen in 1982 (*Children's Aid* v. *T. (M)*). Such a finding seems more an expression of moral weakness than scientific rigour. Nevertheless, it protects pathologists from public opprobrium in the form of public inquiries. To borrow from the social work literature, this is 'defensive pathology'.

Risk and reflexivity

In the context of child abuse, risk is ordinarily conceived in one of two ways, each related to Ariès' two concepts of childhood (Ariès, 1962: 128). Either children are innocents at risk of harm from adults or children pose a risk to others because they are incapable of controlling their baser instincts. However, there is another way to conceive of risk within child protection practice. Like any other bureaucratized techno-scientific activity child

protection creates moral hazards (Ewald, 2002). These hazards are the generally predictable harms generated by the activity itself. Thus, the process of criminally convicting persons for killing children will result in wrongful convictions. When those wrongful convictions occur, and who is affected by them, may be more or less random, but it is moral certainty some will occur. This is the reality of the 'risk society'.

The central characteristic of the 'risk society' described by Ulrich Beck (1992) is the universal distribution of risk within modern techno-scientific industrial culture. For Beck, the risks that really matter are globally distributed and thus unhinged from social class and status. Distinctively modern risks from global warming, nuclear meltdowns, resource exhaustion and so forth are independent of class insofar as there is nowhere on the planet from which to escape their consequences. The globalization of risk, then, produces a situation of radical self-reflexivity since all members of society have the potential to suffer from the moral hazards generated by activities guided by uncertain science or ambiguous facts. 'The ultimate deadlock of risk society, however, resides in the gap between knowledge and decision: there is no one who really knows the global outcome – at the level of positive knowledge, the situation is radically "undecideable" – but we none the less *have to decide*' (Beck, 1999: 78; emphasis in original). Beck's focus is catastrophic, but insofar as child abuse can potentially happen to anyone his analysis helps illuminate the knowledge crisis of 'child abuse' due to inevitable contradictions generated by an endlessly 'self-critical society':

> So risk society is provoking an obscene gamble, a kind of ironic reversal of predestination: I am held accountable for decisions which I was forced to make without proper knowledge of the situation. The freedom of decision enjoyed by the subject of risk society is the 'freedom' of someone who is compelled to make decisions without being aware of their consequences. . . . it is necessary to redefine the rules and principles for decision-making, for areas of application and critique. The reflexivity and incalculability of societal development therefore spreads to all sectors of society, breaking up regional, class-specific, national, political and scientific jurisdictions and boundaries. (Beck, 1999: 78–9)

The reflexivity of risk in the context of child abuse raises the possibility that those involved in seeking to discover and ameliorate child abuse are themselves placed at risk by the moral hazards generated by the project.

The classification 'unascertained' as a cause of death is out of step with Beck's analysis and the analysis of previous inquiries. From Kempe et al.'s first description of the battered baby syndrome there has been an assumption that fatal child abuse is obvious (or at the very least can be determined through the use of appropriate instruments such as risk assessments or autopsies) and therefore blame for children's deaths can always be located. The Goudge Inquiry's tendency to applaud forensic pathologists' willingness to admit uncertainty undermines the trend of inquiries over the previous four decades. Insofar as previous inquiries acknowledged the possibility of uncertainty, the advice was always to err on the side of safety. But those inquiries never seriously grappled with the possibility that ensuring children's safety through toleration of false positives might generate unacceptable risks elsewhere.

When 'blame' was located within social work practice uncertainty was obscured. Social work was, after all, a very junior and low status profession whose conduct was typically evaluated by more senior professions. Even where inquiries recognized

'systemic' problems, the solutions to those problems have been remarkably repetitive. At no time (with the possible exception of the Cleveland Inquiry) had the problem of unstable or uncertain knowledge been seriously raised within inquiries.

The new millennium expanded the scope of scepticism to medical doctors. In quick succession some of the leading lights of the medical profession were publicly castigated. In the UK, Sir Roy Meadow and David Southall – both leading paediatric researchers and clinicians – were disciplined by the General Medical Council in the context of children's deaths. In South Australia, Dr Colin Manock's pathological work came under critical scrutiny (Moles and Sangha, n.d.). Like Charles Smith, these doctors had been the eminent 'go to guys' in their jurisdictions because of their extensive research, publications, clinical practice and eminent status within paediatric professional associations.[12]

In the wake of the disciplining of Meadow and Southall three articles appeared in *Pediatrics* (one co-authored by 53 paediatricians, a 'senior lawyer' and a 'senior social worker') arguing that doctors were now being 'intimidated' by parents, the press and medicine's own governing councils (Chadwick et al., 2006; Jenny, 2007; Williams, 2007). The net result is: 'One third of child protection posts for designated doctors are unfilled and 62% of trainees in North West England do not wish to deal with child protection cases' (Williams, 2007: 801). Paediatricians were not alone in this concern. In his written judgement on the General Medical Council's appeal of a lower court's decision to reinstate Meadow on the medical register, Justice Thorpe spends considerable time on the need to protect expert witnesses. He notes: 'The volume and the nature of the public criticism of Professor Sir Roy Meadow caused anxious concern to the President and Council of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Members of the Royal College were either withdrawing from or declining to enter forensic work, a vital ingredient of overall child protection services' (*GMC* v. *Meadow*, para. 232). These problems are not unique to England and Wales. According to Dr Pollanen's evidence, recruiting pathologists to forensic work is extraordinarily difficult because pathologists prefer work in hospitals where there is 'larger remuneration and less controversy' (Nov. 12/07, 81/20).

Two points can be made about the preceding. First, the reaction of English paediatricians is not dissimilar to the reaction of social workers before them. Inquiries have not only had a debilitating effect on the social workers involved in them, but they have contributed to making child protection work profoundly unattractive for new recruits to the field (Regehr et al., 2002). Second, if an occupational pool as large as social work can experience chronic and debilitating shortages of capable personnel, how much more so for the relatively small world of paediatricians, and the even smaller world of forensic pathologists. It is useful to remind ourselves that Dr Charles Smith became the 'go to guy' for child homicide in Ontario largely because nobody else wanted the position.

Conclusion

Child abuse generates reflexive risk conditions for adults. The overwhelming social imperative to protect children from harm which began during the mid-19th century was transformed into a techno-scientific project when Kempe et al. published 'The Battered Child Syndrome'. In turn, the re-presentation of child maltreatment from the moral realm of cruelty into the techno-scientific realm of child abuse presumed the creation and

evolution of a factual basis for determining cases of child abuse – and particularly fatal child abuse. This fundamental assumption underpinned the rationale for inquiries into child abuse 'failures'. Thus, those engaged in the discovery and amelioration of child abuse carried the enormous responsibility of realizing seamless protection for 'our most precious resource' from lethal harms conceived as scientifically self-evident.

The intensity of public emotions surrounding child mortality must be understood in the context of these assumptions. However, the Goudge Inquiry presented a competing and equally emotionally charged problem – the problem of the 'wrongfully convicted'. This is more than the usual public outcry over the state's agents trampling parental 'rights'. Criminal convictions can and have resulted in lengthy terms of imprisonment, the permanent loss of children through adoption, and in the tragic instance of Sally Clarke, death by suicide. When inquiries were demanding social workers and other professionals place the child at the centre of their practices the consequences of wrongful convictions were never contemplated.

Dr Charles Smith became the 'go to guy' in Ontario because he was not afraid to aggressively confront the 'fact' of child abuse. The relatively high status of medicine protected him from the kinds of inquisitions social workers had undergone. However, as the attention of inquiries expanded from social work he was eventually confronted by equally aggressive organizations and a sympathetic press pursuing defence of the wrongfully convicted. In this confrontation 'innocence' was not the exclusive prerogative of childhood but, in the absence of factual evidence, an assumed quality extended to all. In short, the death of children is now unascertained in the absence of *certain* evidence to the contrary. But, of course, it is the very problem of the constitution of certainty that creates the problem in the first place. What exactly is meant by terms such as 'a high index of probability'? When the world turns again, one wonders if the expert forensic pathologists who testified so confidently before Goudge might not find themselves equally vilified for their unwillingness to draw 'obvious' inferences from the 'facts'.

The popular enthusiasm for the claim that risk assessments could prevent the deaths of children prompted me to publish a paper ending with the question: 'What risks does risk thinking pose?' Now, some six years later, and taking account of the newly stated importance of 'evidence', I update the question. What are the evidential requirements for certain (enough) evidence?

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Notes

1. I heard Hacking make this comment at Green College, University of British Columbia, during his lecture 'The social construction of what?' in January 1998.
2. Corby et al.'s (1998) exhaustive analysis of inquiries in the UK includes an inquiry from 1945 and another from 1967. The authors note that there is no central location for inquiry reports so it is possible reports exist but are unknown to researchers. That said, they report only these two inquiries took place between 1945 and 1972. Between 1973 and 1982 the number was 31 and in the next decade another 28.

3. The *Fifth Estate* is a public affairs newsmagazine style television show broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
4. Kleinman (2006) cites Frederick Silverman 'a protégé of Caffey' to the effect that Caffey believed the injuries he was observing were due to 'parental malfeasance' but 'did not go further because he was concerned about possible legal repercussions'. In any case, Silverman drew attention to Ambroise Tardieu who had identified both physical and sexual mistreatment of children as early as 1857 (Labbé, 2005). Clearly, child abuse was not 'discovered' but *conceived*. See also Hacking (1991, 1995).
5. The Laming Report contains the following remarkable passage 'It is wrong for social workers or police officers to blindly accept everything they are told by doctors, no matter how important those doctors are, and they must fit the medical evidence in with the other information available before arriving at their own conclusion' (Laming, 2003: 302). Taken seriously, this sentence suggests each profession is required to evaluate each other profession's knowledge claims through the lens of their own epistemological practices. At the very least, each professional is required to be sceptical of the knowledge claims of other professions.
6. Interestingly expert pathologists giving evidence to Goudge show no inclination to question the 'Black Boxing' of 'facts' generated by other services such as radiography, DNA analysis, etc. (Latour, 1987). They question the *significance* of the facts; not the creation of the facts themselves.
7. Smith co-authored a paper in 2001 on Sudden Infant Death in children with epilepsy in which it was noted 'because the causes of epilepsy in children differ from those in the adult population, the circumstances of sudden death may also differ' (Donner et al., 2001). Kasandra died in 1991 so arguably Smith contributed to the creation of the knowledge Whitwell implies was not available at the time of Kasandra's death.
8. Elsewhere, Crane asserts the view that while clinician's accounts must be 'taken account of', the forensic pathologist's opinion of the value of those accounts is primary (Nov. 21/07, 228/21).
9. Interestingly Tardieu's work was raised in the context of this case but rejected on the grounds that 'continental' knowledge couldn't be trusted. Hence, the reliability of knowledge had nationalist overtones.
10. The 'triad' is defined by as infants who presented with encephalopathy, thin subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages. 'In July of 2005, the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom reversed or reduced three convictions of SBS, finding that the classic triad of retinal hemorrhage, subdural hematoma, and acute encephalopathy are not 100% diagnostic of SBS and that clinical history is also important' (Cordner et al., 2008: 85).
11. To be fair, the research into brain damage Whitwell co-conducted did utilize a new stain. But this then raises the problem of standards of validation for a 'novel' technique; whether scientific standards are sufficient to meet legal standards.
12. While Meadow was eventually vindicated by the English courts (twice), it is interesting to note his vindication is almost completely ignored in the literature Before Goudge, Meadow is described as fallen 'from grace' (Nov. 23/07, 121/6). In Bala and Trocmé's (n d.· 60) commissioned paper Meadow is called 'incompetent', and in Kramer's (2006) commentary Meadow is called a 'self-described child-abuse expert' and whose evidence 'resulted in the wrongful convictions of three women' (Kramer, 2006: 808). In fact, Meadow was chastised for overstepping his expertise by using erroneous statistics. His evidence in the Sally Clark case (which problematized the two other cases) did not result in her wrongful conviction which was overturned on other grounds. The evidence in question was, in fact, described by the original trial judge as a 'sideshow'. The suggestion he was merely a 'self-described' expert is disingenuous to say the least given his extensive publication record.

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Résumés/Resúmenes

Les systèmes universitaires dans les pays arabes d'Orient: publier mondialement et périr localement vs publier localement et périr mondialement

Sari Hanafi

Cet article tente de montrer comment le système universitaire et le système social de production de connaissances influencent fortement la formation des élites dans les pays arabes d'Orient (Egypte, Syrie, territoires palestiniens, Jordanie et Liban), en se focalisant sur trois facteurs combinés : la compartementalisation des activités des universitaires, la fin de l'université comme sphère publique et les critères de publication qui comptent pour l'avancement dans la carrière. Les universités ont souvent produit des élites comportementalisées à l'intérieur de chaque Etat-nation et elles ne communiquent pas entre elles : soit les élites publient mondialement et périssent localement, soit elles publient localement et périssent mondialement. L'article porte une attention particulière aux universités d'élite.

Mots-clés: formation des élites, internationalisation de la recherche, système de promotion, publication, universités dans le monde arabe

Sistemas de universidad en el Este Árabe: Publicar globalmente y perecer localmente vs. Publicar localmente y perecer globalmente

Sari Hanafi

Este artículo procura demostrar cómo el sistema de universidad y el sistema de producción de conocimiento social han influenciado notablemente la formación de élites en el Este Árabe (en Egipto, Siria, el territorio Palestino, Jordania y Líbano) al centrarse en tres factores entrelazados: la compartimentalización de las actividades del ámbito académico, el deceso de la universidad como una esfera pública y los criterios de publicación donde se toma en cuenta la promoción. Las universidades han producido a menudo élites compartimentalizadas dentro de cada Estado-nación, y estas no se comunican unas con otras: o son una élite que publica globalmente y perece localmente, o una élite que publica localmente y perece globalmente. El artículo presta especial atención a las universidades de élite.

palabras clave: formación de élites, internationalización de investigaciones, sistema de ascenso, publicaciones, universidades en el mundo Árabe

Le problème de la "neutralité technologique" et la confusion sociopolitique qu'elle cause: Le cas de l'*Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica* en Espagne

Jesús Romero Moñivas

Cet article analyse le concept de « neutralité technologique » et la confusion sociopolitique qui découle d'un usage incorrect de ce terme, comme dans le cas de l'Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica. Il commence par une formulation du problème et ensuite il présente une brève histoire des principales contributions faites en philosophie, en sociologie et en histoire des sciences pour réfuter le principe de neutralité technologique. Puis il analyse la connexion entre la politique et la technologie dans la mesure où celle-ci transforme la *polis* et la société, et montre le besoin de se concentrer sur une vraie philosophie et sociologie politique de la technologie. Enfin, il examine la signification du concept de « neutralité technologique » pour l' Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica, d'où nous pouvons conclure que le terme a été utilisé dans un sens incorrect et ambigu, et il fait une critique sociologique et philosophique des auteurs des rapports de l'Observatorio. La principale conclusion est que primo le terme devrait être changé, et secundo l'Observatorio ne semble pas expliciter la philosophie politique qui est à la base de son approche, ce qui conduit à toute une série de difficultés théoriques qu'il est important de reconsidérer.

Mots-clés: participation civique, politique et technologie, sociologie des techniques, neutralité technologique

El problema de la "neutralidad tecnológica" y la confusión socio-política que ello causa: El caso del *Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica* en España

Jesús Romero Moñivas

Este artículo analiza el concepto de 'neutralidad tecnológica' y la confusión sociopolítica que se deriva de un uso incorrecto del término, como en el caso del nuevo Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica. Comienza formulando el problema y luego ofrece una revisión histórica de las principales contribuciones que la filosofía, sociología e historia de la tecnología han realizado para la refutación del principio de neutralidad tecnológica. Prosigue analizando la conexión que existe entre las políticas y la tecnología en la medida en que esto da forma a la *polis* y a la sociedad, y observa la necesidad de focalizar en una verdadera filosofía y sociología política de la tecnología. Finalmente, examina qué significado tiene el concepto de neutralidad tecnológica para el Observatorio de Neutralidad Tecnológica, de lo cual podemos concluir que el término ha sido usado de una manera incorrecta y ambigua, y así se lleva a cabo una crítica sociológica y filosófica de los autores de los informes del Observatorio. La principal conclusión es que, por un lado, el término debería ser modificado y que, por el otro, el Observatorio no parece explicitar la

filosofía política subyacente en su enfoque, lo que lleva a una serie de dificultades teóricas que es importante reconsiderar.

Palabras clave: participación cívica, políticas y tecnología, sociología de la tecnología, neutralidad tecnológica

Sport et construction du genre dans un contexte post-colonial: Entre l'Orient et l'Occident, les effets paradoxaux de la mondialisation

Sébastien Ruffié et al.

Cet article analyse les usages sociaux du corps chez les Français d'origine tamoule dans les centres sportifs de Pondichéry (Inde du Sud). Il examine comment le corps participe au développement et à l'expression d'arrangements genrés dans un contexte post-colonial confronté à la mondialisation. L'analyse d'entretiens semi-directifs montre dans quelles mesures la structure de relations de genre, bien que se déroulant dans une communauté spécifique, est à la fois influencée par la logique identitaire liée à des affiliations culturelles, et liée par des impératifs plus globaux aux relations symboliques entre ce lieu et l'ancienne patrie, la France métropolitaine. Enfin, il semble que l'organisation des rôles entre les sexes, loin de stigmatiser des positions de genre évidentes, suit une logique socioculturelle qui mène les couples à adopter des stratégies qui accentuent la structure de genre. Après le retour dans le pays d'origine, le jeu de l'opposition et de la complémentarité des genres permet donc de garder l'avantage symbolique de genre obtenu lors de l'émigration, tout en évitant le risque d'exclusion sociale.

Mots-clés: biculturalisme, genre, Inde, réintégration, sport

Deporte y construcción de género en el contexto postcolonial: Entre este y oeste – los efectos paradójicos de la globalización

Sébastien Ruffié et al.

Este artículo examina los usos sociales del cuerpo entre los franceses de origen Tamil en los centros de deportes de Pondicherry (sur de la India). Examina la manera en que el cuerpo participa en el desarrollo y expresión de disposiciones de género en un contexto postcolonial que encara la globalización. Un análisis de entrevistas semi-estructuradas muestra hasta qué punto es afectada la estructura de las relaciones de género, aunque ocurran en una comunidad específica, por la lógica de la identidad relacionada con las afiliaciones culturales, como también está ligada, por imperativos más globales, a las relaciones simbólicas entre el área local y la antigua patria, la Francia metropolitana. Finalmente, parece que lejos de estigmatizar posiciones de género evidentes, la organización de roles entre los sexos sigue una lógica sociocultural que lleva a las parejas a adoptar estrategias que acentúan la estructura de género. El juego entre la oposición y la complementariedad de género posibilita así que, al volver al país de origen, sean retenidas las ventajas de género simbólicas logradas a través de la emigración, mientras al mismo tiempo se evita el riesgo de exclusión social.

Palabras clave: biculturalismo, género, India, reintegración, deport

Le monde socio-émotionnel: cartographier un continent

Thomas J Scheff

Cet essai décrit deux aspects basiques du monde socio-émotionnel : le degré de connectivité (solidarité/aliénation) et six émotions spécifiques. Ce champ doit être clarifié à cause de l'usage de mots vernaculaires au lieu de concepts clairement définis. Deux ensembles de définitions sont proposés. Le premier inclut des définitions conceptuelles et opérationnelles de degrés de connectivité. Le second présente une taxonomie préliminaire de six concepts d'émotions. La formulation de la connectivité établit un axe aliénation/solidarité avec trois points entre la solidarité complète et l'aliénation totale. Des études de l'ignorance pluraliste et du faux consensus, la théorie du drame social et d'autres applications relèvent du milieu de cet axe. La taxonomie des émotions peut être une première étape vers une meilleure compréhension de leur rôle dans la vie sociale et leur relation à la connectivité. La théorie qui découle de ces définitions peut être considérée comme un premier pas vers une cartographie du monde socio-émotionnel.

Mots-clés: aliénation, connectivité, émotions, solidarité

Mundo social-emocional: Mapeando un continente

Thomas J Scheff

Este ensayo describe dos aspectos básicos del mundo social-emocional: el grado de conexibilidad (solidaridad/alienación) y seis emociones específicas. Este campo precisa ser aclarado, a causa del uso de palabras vernáculas más que de conceptos claramente definidos. Se proponen dos conjuntos de definiciones. El primero envuelve definiciones conceptuales y operacionales del grado de conexibilidad. El segundo ofrece una taxonomía preliminar de seis conceptos de emociones. La formulación de conexibilidad establece un eje de alienación/solidaridad con tres puntos entre solidaridad completa y alienación completa. Los estudios sobre ignorancia pluralística y falso consenso, teoría del drama y otras aplicaciones se sitúan en estas partes medianas del eje. La taxonomía de emociones puede ser un primer paso hacia una mejor comprensión de su rol en la vida social, y de su relación con la conexibilidad. La teoría implicada por estas definiciones puede ser vista como un paso inicial hacia un mapa del mundo social-emocional.

Palabras clave: alienation, conexivilidad, emoción, solidaridad

Penser Goudge: Les violences mortelles sur enfants et le problème de l'incertitude

Gerard Cradock

La valeur accrue accordée aux vies d'enfants, qui est caractéristique de la société moderne, attire l'attention sur le problème des violences sur enfants. Au début des années

soixante, la plus grande sensibilité du public à ce problème a conduit à plus de vigilance envers les professions qui s'occupent des meurtres d'enfants. Cette attention a pris la forme d'enquêtes sur des morts d'enfants qui se limitaient dans le passé aux « erreurs » du travail social. Des enquêtes récentes ont étendu leur champ à d'autres professions, en particulier dans le domaine de la médecine et de la police. L'enquête Goudge en Ontario a porté sur la médecine légale pédiatrique mais, plutôt que de se centrer sur les enfants assassinés, elle a envisagé le risque moral de jugements erronés qui apparaissent suite à une attention trop zélée aux violences sur enfants. L'enquête soulève le problème de la certitude de la preuve, et de comment cette certitude est évaluée. Ceci rend à son tour le risque de violence sur enfants réflexif, dans la mesure où le jugement professionnel médical dans des conditions d'incertitude comprend des conditions de risque réflexif. A cause de ces circonstances réflexives, la volonté des professionnels de travailler à la protection de l'enfance est en train de diminuer, ce qui menace de paralyser le projet plus général de protection des enfants.

Mots-clés: Violence sur enfants, enquêtes publiques, pathologies, incertitude, risque, médico-légal

Pensando en Goudge: El abuso infantil fatal y el problema de la incerteza

Gerard Cradock

En la sociedad modernista, la característica y cada vez mayor valoración de la vida de los niños enfatiza el problema del abuso infantil. Empezando en la década de 1960, la creciente conciencia pública sobre el abuso infantil llevó a una cada vez mayor atención hacia profesiones que se ocupan del homicidio infantil. Esta atención ha tomado la forma de investigaciones sobre muertes de niños que históricamente se han concentrado en 'errores' de la asistencia social. Investigaciones recientes han expandido su atención a otras profesiones, particularmente las profesiones médicas y de mantenimiento del orden. La investigación de Goudge, en Ontario, se centraba en patología pediátrica forense pero, más que enfocar su interés en niños asesinados, llevaban en cuenta el riesgo moral de las convicciones erradas que tienen su raíz en una ferviente preocupación por el abuso infantil. Esta investigación plantea así el problema de sobre qué evidencia se tiene certeza, y de cómo es evaluada esta certeza. En cambio, esto torna el riesgo de abuso infantil en reflexivo en la medida en que, bajo condiciones de incerteza, el juicio médico profesional contiene condiciones de riesgo reflexivo. A causa de estas condiciones reflexivas, la voluntad profesional de implicarse en la protección infantil esta siendo socavada y por lo tanto amenaza con paralizar el proyecto más amplio de protección infantil.

Palabras clave: Abuso infantil, investigaciones públicas, patología, incerteza, riesgo, médico-legal

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